Transporter Philosophy

[Dragonrock]

Let us say that Star Trek style transporter tech is invented and people start beaming around here and there. The impression of this technology is that people or items are converted to energy which is sent to the destination and reformed into matter. What was discovered after the technology was in use for a while was that the original was destroyed and a copy was made at the destination. This was discovered when glitches in the system cause multiple copies of people to be created and each of these copies is identical and believes themselves to be the original person.

My question is, would this matter to you?

Would you be okay with transporting yourself or your loved one if you knew it wouldn't be the same person, just something exactly like the same person?

What might the large scale reactions of religious and non-religious people be?

ETA: This was supposed to be in religion and philosophy but I missed. Would a mod be a dear and move it for me?

 

[Ririon]

I would not like to meet myself and argue about my property. Unless I was American and could sue the transporters for a gazillion. 1/2 a gazillion each... You can keep the apartment, sir.

 

[Ashles]

Awaiting Ian...

It's a thorny one. To borrow an analogy from Peter F Hamilton's Confederation books, surely when we sleep and wake up we are a new consciousness who only has memory as a sense of continuing, persistent identity. So memory is our existence. So all copies would be us.

Also we are pretty much a different mass of chemicals to what we were years ago, so in a sense we have already been destroyed and recreated.

I don't think there would be any particular large scale ramifications for religious and non-religious people. Not as long as Adam Sandler kept producing movies.

 

[Dark Jaguar]

Consider the last option, that a million clones are made but the original is NOT destroyed. Further, the original never finds out about those clones. I can't see how that original person is the same person as the clones. They seem to be seperate incarnations. Further, their minds are not linked in any way. They share a memory (except the new ones they are forming as they continue to exist, perhaps an important point) but not a conciousness.

Seems to me memory is part of it and the actual being aware is another part, and that in order for someone else to be "me", they need to actually be connected to my conciousness.

The thought experiment I do is to actually think from the perspective of one of them. Doesn't matter who. I'd be looking AT the others, I could talk to them, but at no point would I see out one of the other clone's eyes or experience what it's like to be them, excepting the memories of past events. I can't reasonably conclude that those other me's are "me". I sure can conclude that this would completely break ownership laws though. Fortunatly, those are just a legal construct and don't really matter in terms of the identity theres.


Seems to me that the very instant there's two of me, each one is it's own person.

So the only question I have is, which one would be "me"? I've heard it said they all would, but again none of them are connected. They may all be copies of me perfectly, and I have no issue with that, but due to physical limitations I can only see out the eyes of one at a time, unless one is suggesting my "spirit" is connected through all of them. The only other thing that could be the case is to think of it as "fracturing and distributing" my awareness among them all, but that doesn't make much sense either, for the same reason.

Essentially, I'm stumped.

Let's introduce death into the equation. If one submits that yes, if you are killed but a perfect backup was made on death, and an irrelevent amount of time later a new body is created and your "mind" is dumped into the new brain, that new brain is you, you blink and you're in the future in a new body, then there's a small problem with the clone example I'll go into in a second. If however, one submits that no, when you die, even if a copy is made, that copy will be someone else with the exact same attributes, and from your perspective, there is nothing, no perspective, you are dead, the problem is clearly "what about the sleep between dreams or deep coma?. In that case, every time I wake up I'm a new existance and that person from yesterday is no more, but it sure doesn't feel like that at all and I've no reason to think that's true.

The problem with the first though is if you kill a clone. Let's say that a million clones are made of me, and I'm still around. If one states that ALL of them are equally "me", even though those minds aren't linked in any way and no matter what set of eyes you look out of, they can't ever know what the others are thinking, what happens if that "me" I picked is shot dead? Do I blink and I'm suddenly seeing out the eyes of a nearby clone? That sounds completely ridiculous to me, as it should. So, I'm stumped. The only resolution to this seems to be to accept that every single time we lose conciousness in life, when we wake back up, we're a new entity and losing conciousness is death of "an awareness", but again it doesn't feel like that's happening at all. That seems silly too.

Yeah, I'm still stumped.

 

[Just thinking]

I find it hard to reject that if clones are possible, then the original cannot be transported, only a duplicate can come out of the other end -- even if only one person is materialized. Once disintegrated, I am essentially dead, and whatever comes out the other end is a copy, be it one or a million. Why? Because if no one can tell the difference between copies and the original (what was the original), then all are copies.

What difference should it matter to me if I am simply disintegrated, or disintegrated and then at some remote location a physical duplicate of me is made? If my consciousness does not find itself among all of the clones, why should it somehow be specific to only go into the first copy?

 

[grayman]

So if a person has sex with their clone, is that homosexuality or self-abuse?

 

[fuelair]

So if a person has sex with their clone, is that homosexuality or self-abuse?

This is really response to all above. I must apologise to all for not being able to quote specific titles and authors, but this was all played with in late 50's -60's by two + S.F. authors with pretty much everything above this brought up and discussed/explained/ legaled, etc. The phrase "Dellian robots" sticks in my head re: part of it .

 

[...JR]

weren't scientists recently able to teleport a large clump of atoms about half a meter away. I read this in an article, but if no one else has heard of this, I'll try and find the article again.

edit: It's mentioned below briefly, but I can't find the article:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teleportation

 

[toddjh]

It all boils down to whether or not you believe in something like a soul.

If you do, then you have some basis for claiming that copies are not "the same" as the original.

However, if you believe that consciousness and identity are emergent properties of the workings of our brains, then I don't see how you could claim any meaningful difference between the original and the copy. Identical physical systems would produce identical results. Creating an exact copy and immediately destroying the original would be no different than simply moving the original atoms to the target location, provided it was done fast enough that the original didn't have time to change state (i.e. experience anything) before being destroyed.

Destroying the original in favor of the copy doesn't present any problems, because no information is being destroyed: since the copy is exact, presumably down to the last atom, every aspect of the original person is preserved. Of course, the copies and the original wouldn't stay identical for more than the tiniest fraction of a second.

 

[Just thinking]

However, if you believe that consciousness and identity are emergent properties of the workings of our brains

Which I do ...

... then I don't see how you could claim any meaningful difference between the original and the copy. Identical physical systems would produce identical results. Creating an exact copy and immediately destroying the original would be no different than simply moving the original atoms to the target location, provided it was done fast enough that the original didn't have time to change state (i.e. experience anything) before being destroyed.

Destroying the original in favor of the copy doesn't present any problems, because no information is being destroyed: since the copy is exact, presumably down to the last atom, every aspect of the original person is preserved. Of course, the copies and the original wouldn't stay identical for more than the tiniest fraction of a second.

So where is the consciousness you now have once the copy is made -- before the original is destroyed? Is it in the original or in the copy or in both?

 

[Just thinking]

edit: It's mentioned below briefly, but I can't find the article:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teleportation

From the article ...

Until recently, scientists had been able to transport only light or single atoms over short distances (millimeters). However, it has been reported in October, 2006 that Professor Eugene Polzik and his team at the Niels Bohr Institute at Copenhagen University in Denmark have made a breakthrough in the field.[3] Their experiment involved the transportation of a macroscopic atomic object containing thousands of billions of atoms over a distance of half a meter. The technique involved the use of quantum entanglement, quantum measurement and quantum feedback. Little information is available, however, which throws suspicion over what would be a great accomplishment.

There's also much about psychic effects as well in this link -- I wouldn't give it too much weight at this time.

PS: Also, get a load of the title ... "quantum entanglement, quantum measurement and quantum feedback" ... where else do we find so much use of the word quantum?

 

[Just thinking]

Creating an exact copy and immediately destroying the original would be no different than simply moving the original atoms to the target location, provided it was done fast enough that the original didn't have time to change state (i.e. experience anything) before being destroyed.

I'm not so sure I would agree with that. Moving something awfully quick is not the same as destroying it and then re-creating it.

 

[quixotecoyote]

So where is the consciousness you now have once the copy is made -- before the original is destroyed? Is it in the original or in the copy or in both?

This seems to me like painting a yellow house red and asking, "where is the yellowness?" If consciousness is an emergent property of the brain, then an exact copy of the brain would produce the exact same consciousness. If the original brain was replicated while in an unchanging state (ie, not exhibiting consciousness) and then destroyed, then when the replica wakes up, it would producethe exact consciousness as the previous one. Before the original is destroyed there is no consciousness as it wasn't existing as an artifact of the brain.

 

[Just thinking]

Let's try this thought experiment ...

I have a matter disintegrator/re-integrator, but it's essentially the same enclosure. A subject enters and gets vaporized -- poof, he's gone. Five minutes later (or whatever time you like) I re-assemble him. He, however, walks out and claims that no time has passed. OK, fine.

Is this the same person that entered the machine? Has his consciousness carried over to the new materialized person? If so -- let's hypothetically kill him and let the machine create another, a clone. Will the same consciousness emerge as before? If you say yes, what of the case where we choose not to kill off the first copy? Does that consciousness exist now in two places (bodies)?

PS: I don't like using the words "carried over" either, but please just accept it for lack of a better term.

 

[...JR]

From the article ...

There's also much about psychic effects as well in this link -- I wouldn't give it too much weight at this time.

PS: Also, get a load of the title ... "quantum entanglement, quantum measurement and quantum feedback" ... where else do we find so much use of the word quantum?

good points, it seems the rampant use of quantum may have duped me into thinking it was a scientific breakthrough. I think I'll wait and research it a bit more before i conclude anything....it's pretty remarkable if it's true though

 

[toddjh]

PS: I don't like using the words "carried over" either, but please just accept it for lack of a better term.

I can't accept it, because it really does imply some kind of "soul" -- a consciousness that inhabits the body, rather than one which arises because of it.

If you create a copy, then that copy will have identical memories and an identical awareness. There will, in effect, be two "yous" for a fraction of a second. Again, this is only a problem if you believe a soul. Otherwise, there's no reason identity has to be absolutely unique.

Of course, practically speaking, the two copies will become increasingly different people in short order, so it's really kind of a moot point.

Edit: More to the point, if you destroy a person and then recreate him, on what grounds do you claim that he is a different person? He'll look and sound the same to you. He'll have the same memories and personality. He'll swear up and down that he's still himself. In fact, depending on how the process works, he might even swear up and down that his consciousness was never even interrupted!

It's difficult to discuss topics like this sometimes because people often have different ideas when they use words like "self," "identity," and even "person." So, what is a "person" to you in this context? What makes you think the copy is different from the original, when every conceivable test will point to the fact that they're the same?

 

[Just thinking]

... More to the point, if you destroy a person and then recreate him, on what grounds do you claim that he is a different person? He'll look and sound the same to you. He'll have the same memories and personality. He'll swear up and down that he's still himself. In fact, depending on how the process works, he might even swear up and down that his consciousness was never even interrupted!

Then you can claim that you never destroyed him in the first place. Killing a person that can be recreated at will becomes somewhat moot -- given that at some point in the past he went through the process of being transported and copies can be made. A person can exist -- then not exist (for some indefinite period of time) -- and then exist again. The problem with this is, we can sort of do this now with biological cloning; only the process goes all the way back to when the individual organism didn't have self awareness. Killing a person by disintegration (in a transporter-possible world) should carry no greater a penalty than simply transporting him. And if a person was biologically cloned today, he wouldn't have the rights and belongings to all the original person has -- he would be considered a different person.

It's difficult to discuss topics like this sometimes because people often have different ideas when they use words like "self," "identity," and even "person." So, what is a "person" to you in this context? What makes you think the copy is different from the original, when every conceivable test will point to the fact that they're the same?

I would think some of what I just posted helped answer that.

 

[toddjh]

Killing a person by disintegration (in a transporter-possible world) should carry no greater a penalty than simply transporting him.

Sure it should. If you just disintegrate someone, then you have destroyed the information which determined his personality and identity. You've irrevocably destroyed the person. That's not the case if you create a copy first.

Your argument is equivalent to saying that a hard drive failure is just as bad regardless of whether or not you have a backup.

And if a person was biologically cloned today, he wouldn't have the rights and belongings to all the original person has -- he would be considered a different person.

A biological clone would have only superficial similarities to the original person. That's not the same thing as exact duplication at all.

 

[Just thinking]

Sure it should. If you just disintegrate someone, then you have destroyed the information which determined his personality and identity. You've irrevocably destroyed the person. That's not the case if you create a copy first.

But what if you don't first create the copy? Place someone for the first time into a transporter -- disintegrate the person. Now, before we reintegrate at some other location (or even within the same enclosure) we wait. One minute, one year or 10,000 years. Is this person dead before we integrate? Did we kill him? If we reintegrate him is it the person we disintegrated? Remember, we claim there is no soul (consciousness) to be carried over, so why can't the person that was disintegrated be any different than someone who is killed outright by disintegration? He dies.

Your argument is equivalent to saying that a hard drive failure is just as bad regardless of whether or not you have a backup.

But the failed hard drive still exists -- we can examine it as useless. You are reasoning the information as being equivalent to the hard drive. I would not jump to such a conclusion.

A biological clone would have only superficial similarities to the original person. That's not the same thing as exact duplication at all.

It all depends at which point of its life you make the comparison.

 

[toddjh]

But what if you don't first create the copy? Place someone for the first time into a transporter -- disintegrate the person. Now, before we reintegrate at some other location (or even within the same enclosure) we wait. One minute, one year or 10,000 years. Is this person dead before we integrate? Did we kill him?

Well, "kill" implies a permanent destruction. Does a surgeon "kill" a patient when he stops the patient's heart during a transplant? Maybe in a strict biological sense, temporarily, but in the sense we normally mean, then no. Ditto in this situation. The information to recreate the person still exists. His physical situation (or lack thereof) may not allow for him to be aware at that particular moment, but same with a person under general anesthesia. Temporary interruptions of consciousness do not necessarily imply permanent death.

If we reintegrate him is it the person we disintegrated?

Yes, unless you believe in a soul.

But the failed hard rive still exists -- we can examine it as useless. You are reasoning the information as being equivalent to the hard drive. I would not jump to such a conclusion.

Then you believe in a soul. If you don't, then you must admit that it is the physical configuration of the person's brain which defines who he is. Impose that same configuration on a separate but equivalent substrate and you've recreated the person -- atoms have no hair, remember.

I'd still like to see your answer to my question of why you would regard a copy as different from the original when there is no conceivable way to distinguish between them.