Would god(s) be natural?

[CFLarsen]

Surely, if atheists argue against the notion of god(s), they have notions of god(s).

What incredible nonsense.

 

[T'ai Chi]

They should use their understandings to the best of their ability.

Should I define every word I used becuse they might not use it in their vocab?

 

[Rufo]

They should use their understandings to the best of their ability.

Should I define every word I used becuse they might not use it in their vocab?

Well, if you want them to answer the question, why not? I mean, since the definitions are important and there are only two words here for which a definition has also been requested, it might be a good idea. Of course, if you don't want answers from people who have no definitions of their own, I understand if you choose not to define them.

But there has been a lot of complaining about the lack of a good definition for 'God' on this forum, especially lately, so to some people, the question may not be as simple as you think.

 

[Correa Neto]

If SATAN exist, would your worldview accept him and HELLFIRE to be natural objects?

 

[Mercutio]

Surely, if atheists argue against the notion of god(s), they have notions of god(s).

Or they simply have notions of logic and evidence, and argue against the flaws in another's argument. In such cases, an inadequately framed question like the OP is incomprehensible: If X exists, for all values of X and all meanings of "exist"...

But keep trying! Someday you'll manage a thread that we'll all agree is "interesting".

 

[bruto]

There have been a few threads here recently regarding the possibility of "god" to exist, either practically or logically. Most discussions of such a subject must begin with a definition of "god." Most standard definitions of "god" require that he be supernatural and the creator of the universe. It is hard to conceive of a god that is its own creation. So before you can really give a meaningful answer to the original post, or even ask it meaningfully, you need to decide what the word "god" means. Once you have settled on a definition, if the question is not inherently answered by the definition, it can be addressed intelligently.

 

[Euromutt]

Then use a dictionary, or use their best idea.

All right, then...
From Princeton University's WordNet 2.0:

god

n 1: the supernatural being conceived as the perfect and omnipotent and omniscient originator and ruler of the universe; the object of worship in monotheistic religions [syn: God, Supreme Being] 2: any supernatural being worshipped as controlling some part of the world or some aspect of life or who is the personification of a force [syn: deity, divinity, immortal] [...]

Italics mine. That answers that question, and all that remains is to observe is if that T'ai would have the common decency to take his own advice before starting a thread, he wouldn't post such quasi-profound but demonstrably inane "questions."

 

[uruk]

it would depend on thier relation to our existance. Current popular concesus would say no. Thier "supposed' powers or abilities would be considered un-natural since nothing in this existance posses thier ascribed abilities.

 

[H'ethetheth]

You need to define god and natural object first.

In fact, the very feat of defining them would probably answer the question.

~~ Paul

Paul, get a dictionary.

Or better yet, since I am asking people what they think, they should use their own understandings of those words to answer the question.

I'm not sure about everyone, but I do remember a thread I contributed to, where I went in thinking I was a materialist, but came out simply confused, yet at the same time quite certain of the fact that defining a "natural object" is mind bogglingly difficult.
Defining God might be even more complicated, I'm not sure, but I imagine we would need some help.
In other words: I have no understanding of these words, and I therefore also do not understand the question.

 

[Tricky]

But keep trying! Someday you'll manage a thread that we'll all agree is "interesting".

One way to cross the "interesting" threshold, T'ai Chi, might be to actually take a stance or contribute meaningfully to the discussion instead of tossing out a question designed to be ambiguous and then sitting back with feigned indifference whils't earnest people try to answer you.

 

[thomps1d]

What a rude reply.

Not only rude, but self-defeating as well. Since he has admitted that the definition of God that is used does not matter, the question is moot.

God: A tasty baked snack shaped like a small goldfish.

So, to answer the OP: no, God isn't natural. It was manufactured to be delicious (though from mostly natural ingredients). I've been munching on a bag of God all morning. I really should have had a proper breakfast, but what the heck...it's God, after all.

 

[H'ethetheth]

Not only rude, but self-defeating as well. Since he has admitted that the definition of God that is used does not matter, the question is moot.

God: A tasty baked snack shaped like a small goldfish.

So, to answer the OP: no, God isn't natural. It was manufactured to be delicious (though from mostly natural ingredients). I've been munching on a bag of God all morning. I really should have had a proper breakfast, but what the heck...it's God, after all.

Since I have admitted to know everything about the universe in that other T'ai Chi thread, I can divulge that, indeed, God is a tasty baked snack shaped like a small goldfish.

 

[chriswl]

I'm not sure about everyone, but I do remember a thread I contributed to, where I went in thinking I was a materialist, but came out simply confused, yet at the same time quite certain of the fact that defining a "natural object" is mind bogglingly difficult.
Defining God might be even more complicated, I'm not sure, but I imagine we would need some help.
In other words: I have no understanding of these words, and I therefore also do not understand the question.

I understand naturalism as something like this: the world can be reduced to explanations expressed in terms of a small number of simple laws.

We should be careful not to define naturalism in such a way that the world could not be anything other than naturalistic. For example, if telepathy turned out to be possible there would be two distinct possibilities:

1) So far undiscovered physical mechanisms could allow one brain to communicate directly with another. This would still be consistent with naturalism.

2) In certain circumstances brains were observed to mirror each others states. This appeared to be a fundamental fact about brains that was not reducible to any simpler mechanism. This would be inconsistant with naturalism.

(2) would imply a universe that is fundamentally more than mere inanimate matter. It would be a world we could never truly understand because we could never predict the likelihood of strange, complex phenomena in advance merely by considering the actions of the constituent building blocks. The world could always be full of undiscovered special cases.

Whereas the naturalistic hypothesis is that all such complex phenomena are reducible to simple mechanisms. e.g. we can rule out perpetual motion machines because we feel confident of generalising from the examples we have studied to the whole of matter.

To answer T'ai's question, gods are not natural objects. They are not compatible with naturalism. But this isn't a disproof of gods because we can't prove naturalism.

 

[H'ethetheth]

I understand naturalism as something like this: the world can be reduced to explanations expressed in terms of a small number of simple laws.

We should be careful not to define naturalism in such a way that the world could not be anything other than naturalistic. For example, if telepathy turned out to be possible there would be two distinct possibilities:

1) So far undiscovered physical mechanisms could allow one brain to communicate directly with another. This would still be consistent with naturalism.

2) In certain circumstances brains were observed to mirror each others states. This appeared to be a fundamental fact about brains that was not reducible to any simpler mechanism. This would be inconsistant with naturalism.

(2) would imply a universe that is fundamentally more than mere inanimate matter. It would be a world we could never truly understand because we could never predict the likelihood of strange, complex phenomena in advance merely by considering the actions of the constituent building blocks. The world could always be full of undiscovered special cases.

Whereas the naturalistic hypothesis is that all such complex phenomena are reducible to simple mechanisms. e.g. we can rule out perpetual motion machines because we feel confident of generalising from the examples we have studied to the whole of matter.

To answer T'ai's question, gods are not natural objects. They are not compatible with naturalism. But this isn't a disproof of gods because we can't prove naturalism.

Hmmm, nice. That's something to munch on for a while. I'm not sure if I agree yet though, but it sure sounds reasonable.

 

[fuelair]

I understand naturalism as something like this: the world can be reduced to explanations expressed in terms of a small number of simple laws.

We should be careful not to define naturalism in such a way that the world could not be anything other than naturalistic. For example, if telepathy turned out to be possible there would be two distinct possibilities:

1) So far undiscovered physical mechanisms could allow one brain to communicate directly with another. This would still be consistent with naturalism.

2) In certain circumstances brains were observed to mirror each others states. This appeared to be a fundamental fact about brains that was not reducible to any simpler mechanism. This would be inconsistant with naturalism.

(2) would imply a universe that is fundamentally more than mere inanimate matter. It would be a world we could never truly understand because we could never predict the likelihood of strange, complex phenomena in advance merely by considering the actions of the constituent building blocks. The world could always be full of undiscovered special cases.

Whereas the naturalistic hypothesis is that all such complex phenomena are reducible to simple mechanisms. e.g. we can rule out perpetual motion machines because we feel confident of generalising from the examples we have studied to the whole of matter.

To answer T'ai's question, gods are not natural objects. They are not compatible with naturalism. But this isn't a disproof of gods because we can't prove naturalism.

Can we prove TC? Is TC natural or man-made? (That's a trick question)

If we diss TC does it prove there is a dog in the midwest? Oh where oh where has my mystic dog gone oh where oh where can he pee?

 

[Complexity]

Justin is merely a pathetic troll.

 

[T'ai Chi]

All right, then...
From Princeton University's WordNet 2.0:Italics mine. That answers that question, and all that remains is to observe is if that T'ai would have the common decency to take his own advice before starting a thread, he wouldn't post such quasi-profound but demonstrably inane "questions."

I asked what you think ("would your worldview"). If your thinking comes from a dictionary... well... that's not very interesting to me.

And if you have no idea, you don't have to answer the question.

 

[T'ai Chi]

Someday you'll manage a thread that we'll all agree is "interesting".

Why do you strongly believe getting all to agree is a goal? In fact, asking people what they think implies that it is not.

 

[T'ai Chi]

Well, if you want them to answer the question, why not?

Why not define every word for every person, each of which who may understand it differently even with definitions?

Your suggestion is frankly too silly to take seriously.

People can answer the question or not. It really isn't about what I "want" or not.

 

[bruto]

My brain is a little leaky when it comes to formal logic, but I seem to remember that the only things whose properties can properly be discussed without prior definition are the elusive denizens of the null set or the empty class, and even then only in a limited sense, wherein all things nonexistent can be said to possess all qualities indifferently. But that's good enough for me and my nonexistent God, who can whip any other nonexistent god in the room. He is spicy and finely drawn and his mileage never varies. He cruises through the empyrean folds of hyperspace uttering platitudes of heartbreaking symmetry. Her scales faintly irridescent, she gives off the faint odor of cinnamon and Dektol when aroused. But like all the best gods, it is ready for the ultimate sacrifice, (or is it the ultimate act of selfishness, or both): unwilling to violate the grand inclusiveness of nullity, the only choice for the great god of love and logic is to forego the temptation of existence. But virtue has its own reward, and class its priveleges. Partaking, as they must, of all the best qualities, including ambivalence, inscrutability, and the utterest absence, the gods, all of us, are exempted from the embarrassing necessity of providing sensible answers to nonsensical questions.