If the moon were made of green cheese it would be edible. That is a logically valid argument. However it doesn't prove that the moon is edible.
Correct, the argument does not prove that the moon is edible. In order to prove the conclusion of any argument you must first prove (or accept without proof) the premises upon which it is based (in this case that the moon is made of green cheese and that green cheese is edible).
However, the statement "if the moon is made of green cheese and if green cheese is edible, then the moon is edible" is true. It just happens that at least one of the premises is untrue, therefore the argument doesn't prove that the moon is edible.
Likewise, my argument doesn't prove that an omnipotent God exists who doesn't actively want us to know for certain of his existence (nor have I claimed that it does). It does show that if the premises are true (if an omnipotent God exists), he doesn't actively want to to know for certain of his existence. In other words, if someone accepts the premises as true (as Christians likely do), they would likely also accept the conclusion as true.
Here's the argument stated in a more formal way (although I admit that I'm not particularly adept at formal proofs), which makes it more clear that I'm not drawing any invalid conclusions or basing my argument on any premises that you would likely disagree with:
- If an omnipotent God exists and actively wants us to know for certain of his existence, we would know for certain of his existence.
- We don't know for certain that an omnipotent God exists.
- Either no omnipotent God exists, or an omnipotent God exists who doesn't actively want us to know for certain of his existence (from 1 and 2).
- If an omnipotent God exists, then he doesn't actively want us to know for certain of his existence (restatement of 3).
- Christians believe that an omnipotent God exists.
- Christians probably believe that God doesn't actively want us to know for certain of his existence (from 4 and 5).
Looking only at lines 1 - 4 of the argument, line 4 does indeed seem to imply an attribute of a (possibly nonexistent) omnipotent God based on our ignorance of the omnipotent God's existence. However, it contains a conditional which must be true in order for the second half of the line to be true. The only actual conclusion that I drew from this argument is in line 6.
ETA: I'm sounding too authoritative for my abilities again. I could very well be wrong. I'm going to bow out of this particular argument Bri untill and unless I can get some feedback from others.
Not a problem. I didn't read your "ETA" before I responded, so I'm going to go ahead and submit my post (and maybe it will help), but I agree to shelve this particular argument for now unless others wish to comment on it.
-Bri