Tech Based Youthful Immortality

[roger]

What if the treatment cost $1 million, so you spent half your life saving for it, but a year before you got there your wife was hit by a truck and needed her treatment fifteen years early to save her life?

So? That's what bank loans are for. It's a great business model. The bank invests in a technique that insures decades more of earning potential in the person signing the loan.

And ... "What if a heart transplant costs $1 million (entirely realistic) ...." We face that issue today. We muddle through, somehow.

Or am I missing your point?

 

[roger]

What if we could have all our memories, personality and so on uploaded into a vastly powerful computer network?

Well, that seems like a much more difficult problem then fixing our biological machines. And we are biological machines, we are not merely neural nets. That surge you feel in the bit of your stomach when afraid, in love (sorry for that bit of redundancy), etc., is chemical. An upload, in and of itself, won't fix that. Now, yes, a sophisticated enough simulation can simulate those chemical interactions, but that task requires a complete understanding of the underlying biology. So, a much harder task.

My guess is that we will first achieve very long lives through biology, and then through computers.

 

[Dave1001]

Well, that seems like a much more difficult problem then fixing our biological machines. And we are biological machines, we are not merely neural nets. That surge you feel in the bit of your stomach when afraid, in love (sorry for that bit of redundancy), etc., is chemical. An upload, in and of itself, won't fix that. Now, yes, a sophisticated enough simulation can simulate those chemical interactions, but that task requires a complete understanding of the underlying biology. So, a much harder task.

My guess is that we will first achieve very long lives through biology, and then through computers.

What's your take on the "Oh crap, they think something that can pass a Turing test for being me actually is me uploaded to a computer" problem with uploading to computers?

 

[advancedatheist]

So? That's what bank loans are for. It's a great business model. The bank invests in a technique that insures decades more of earning potential in the person signing the loan.

All the more incentive to stay employable and credit-worthy. Putting rejuvenation and negligible senescence treatments onto the market would do wonders for the rates of savings and capital formation in the economy.

 

[advancedatheist]

Your lover then. (I speak as a lifetime bachelor).

All the more incentive to choose a lover who earns and saves plenty of money so he or she can buy long-term disability insurance.

 

[roger]

What's your take on the "Oh crap, they think something that can pass a Turing test for being me actually is me uploaded to a computer" problem with uploading to computers?

I think "me" is a fairly meaningless term in that context. It only makes sense in the context of a single instance, hosted in a biological medium. It kind of like asking which is the "real" instance of Microsoft Outlook, and if I stop and start it is it the "same". The words are being used in a realm where they can't be usefully correlated with their use in our non-computer world. So I don't worry about the "is it really me" arguments.

 

[Dark Jaguar]

But you totally SHOULD! I do! There is no "real instance" of Outlook, all of them are equal, but they are distinctly seperate instances of Outlook. You can run two copies of Outlook on two different computers and recognize that they are two seperate instances, each unable to communicate with each other, barring access to a network email folder .

Look at the actual question. If I am destroyed, utterly, I cease to be, and if my data is replicated, it isn't about it "passing the turing test of being me" really, I can accept that sice it is a machine, it'll be aware, and fully convinced it is me. But will it ACTUALLY be the same isntance AS me? I have my doubts. Will I, ME, my own awareness, my "me-ness", be IN THAT HEAD, looking out it's eyes and thinking those thoughts? That is my fear, that all I've done is perfectly cloned myself and my self-ness is still dead forever. Like, in Star Trek, what if every time they teleport all they do is create a new captain? Maybe that's why Q laughs at them, they all just create new "thems" each time and the old one is dead forever and is no longer aware.

Me is the most meaningful term in the universe to... ME! So I HAVE to know if that new instance of me is just someone fully capable of everything I have but a seperate instance (in the same way that if I run a program 4 or 5 times each one is a seperate entity and isn't actually the same one, just a perfect copy), and my "instance" is merely dead and buried. It's like the most important question ever. I don't care at ALL about making a perfect copy of myself digitally if my "me-ness" isn't there to experience the whole thing.

 

[Dave1001]

But you totally SHOULD! I do! There is no "real instance" of Outlook, all of them are equal, but they are distinctly seperate instances of Outlook. You can run two copies of Outlook on two different computers and recognize that they are two seperate instances, each unable to communicate with each other, barring access to a network email folder .

Look at the actual question. If I am destroyed, utterly, I cease to be, and if my data is replicated, it isn't about it "passing the turing test of being me" really, I can accept that sice it is a machine, it'll be aware, and fully convinced it is me. But will it ACTUALLY be the same isntance AS me? I have my doubts. Will I, ME, my own awareness, my "me-ness", be IN THAT HEAD, looking out it's eyes and thinking those thoughts? That is my fear, that all I've done is perfectly cloned myself and my self-ness is still dead forever. Like, in Star Trek, what if every time they teleport all they do is create a new captain? Maybe that's why Q laughs at them, they all just create new "thems" each time and the old one is dead forever and is no longer aware.

Me is the most meaningful term in the universe to... ME! So I HAVE to know if that new instance of me is just someone fully capable of everything I have but a seperate instance (in the same way that if I run a program 4 or 5 times each one is a seperate entity and isn't actually the same one, just a perfect copy), and my "instance" is merely dead and buried. It's like the most important question ever. I don't care at ALL about making a perfect copy of myself digitally if my "me-ness" isn't there to experience the whole thing.

You and me both, baby!!

Although it is a much less important question from a solipstic standpoint, I do also have my doubts that a copied version of me that can pass a Turing of being me even has a subjective experience of consciousness. I think it could just as well be a more complicated version of an animatronic puppet.

 

[toddjh]

You and me both, baby!!

Although it is a much less important question from a solipstic standpoint, I do also have my doubts that a copied version of me that can pass a Turing of being me even has a subjective experience of consciousness. I think it could just as well be a more complicated version of an animatronic puppet.

It all depends on what view of consciousness you take. Sure, if you adopt solipsism you're going to run up against all kinds of doubts about the nature of the self, but that's the least of solipsism's problems.

Likewise, if you view consciousness as something which inhabits a body rather than something which arises from it (in other words a "soul"), then of course the idea of replacing yourself with a copy is going to trouble you.

But if you regard consciousness as an emergent property of the complex processes that take place in your brain, then recreating those processes precisely will result in the exact same emergent behavior. Under this model, there is no basis for saying that the copy is anything other than "you."

Personally, I think a lot of people adopt the "soul" theory without even realizing it. It's certainly tempting -- our subjective experience of consciousness and the continuity of our awareness makes it very easy to think of ourselves as something which exists separately from our brains, and our current inability to explain exactly how the complex flow of signals in our brains gives rise to awareness muddies things even more.

 

[roger]

Me is the most meaningful term in the universe to... ME! So I HAVE to know if that new instance of me is just someone fully capable of everything I have but a seperate instance (in the same way that if I run a program 4 or 5 times each one is a seperate entity and isn't actually the same one, just a perfect copy), and my "instance" is merely dead and buried. It's like the most important question ever. I don't care at ALL about making a perfect copy of myself digitally if my "me-ness" isn't there to experience the whole thing.

Well, you shut "me" down every night when you go to sleep. Do you balk at going to sleep, and mourn the death of yesterday's "me". Do you refuse to go under anethesia, where it can be argued to are shut down to a greater extent? What if you drowned in cold water, and were brought back to life after your brain showed no activity except in the brain stem? Would you mournfully hold a funeral for your past "me", or jump around and say "yay, I'm alive!!!"?


I'm not saying it's not an important question. I'm saying the terms "me" just don't work in this context, and our intuitions are deeply flawed.

FWIW, no, I wouldn't step in a teleporter that destroyed this body, and more than I would accept a brain transfer that worked by, say, copying my mind, waiting 1/2 hour to make sure the transfer worked, then killed my body. It's somewhat illogical, in that the continuity of my conscious is already an illusion, but so be it. Our desire for life evolved in entirely different circumstances, where destruction of the corporeal body meant final destruction of the mind.

ETA: I.e. to talk about this coherently, I would totally remove use of the words "me", "I", etc., and replace them with "brain process", etc. Describe the biology of what is happening, not the misleading labels based on a completely incorrect model of what our minds are.

 

[Dave1001]

But if you regard consciousness as an emergent property of the complex processes that take place in your brain, then recreating those processes precisely will result in the exact same emergent behavior. Under this model, there is no basis for saying that the copy is anything other than "you.".

I think one can regard consciousness as an emergent property of the complex processes that take place in your brain, and still be skeptical that recreating those processes "precisely" will result in the exact same emergent behavior.

Because in the real world, when we say "precisely" we mean precise enough ... there are huge numbers of differences between any recreation and the previous version of a real world phenomenon. I think it's a non-trivial concern about how precise we need to be in the recreation and ways it can work or not work, to preserve our individual subjective experiences of conscious existence.

It's a great topic worth discussing, but I doubt we know enough to know yet. I hope we hash this stuff out as we need to though.

 

[Dave1001]

Well, you shut "me" down every night when you go to sleep. Do you balk at going to sleep, and mourn the death of yesterday's "me". Do you refuse to go under anethesia, where it can be argued to are shut down to a greater extent? What if you drowned in cold water, and were brought back to life after your brain showed no activity except in the brain stem? Would you mournfully hold a funeral for your past "me", or jump around and say "yay, I'm alive!!!"?


I'm not saying it's not an important question. I'm saying the terms "me" just don't work in this context, and our intuitions are deeply flawed.

FWIW, no, I wouldn't step in a teleporter that destroyed this body, and more than I would accept a brain transfer that worked by, say, copying my mind, waiting 1/2 hour to make sure the transfer worked, then killed my body. It's somewhat illogical, in that the continuity of my conscious is already an illusion, but so be it. Our desire for life evolved in entirely different circumstances, where destruction of the corporeal body meant final destruction of the mind.

ETA: I.e. to talk about this coherently, I would totally remove use of the words "me", "I", etc., and replace them with "brain process", etc. Describe the biology of what is happening, not the misleading labels based on a completely incorrect model of what our minds are.

I doubt many of us would capriciously go under anethesia or be drowned and brought back to life. I doubt if temporary cessation of subjective consciousness through sleep were optional (rather than a biological necessity) that many of us would be the first to volunteer to try it out. In the same way, my approach towards something as extreme as being uploaded to a computer or teleported star trek style, is let me wait until I have to do it to survive, or to keep up with my cohort. Until then, I think it's rationally prudent to be as conservative about maintaining bodily (and brain) integrity as possible.

 

[toddjh]

I think one can regard consciousness as an emergent property of the complex processes that take place in your brain, and still be skeptical that recreating those processes "precisely" will result in the exact same emergent behavior.

Because in the real world, when we say "precisely" we mean precise enough ... there are huge numbers of differences between any recreation and the previous version of a real world phenomenon. I think it's a non-trivial concern about how precise we need to be in the recreation and ways it can work or not work, to preserve our individual subjective experiences of conscious existence.

Well, I don't think you need perfectly exact down-to-the-neuron replication for it to be close enough. After all, you can kill a few million brain cells in a night of heavy drinking and still be "you" when the hangover wears off. You don't give it a second thought, except to swear never to drink jagermeister again.

And as for the continuity of consciousness, as roger pointed out, that's broken every time you go to sleep, or if you get hit on the head hard enough. But when you wake up, you're still "you." I'm of the opinion that you'd still be "you" even if the substrate which supported your "software" had been swapped out while you were asleep, as long as the new substrate were a sufficiently close copy. But you're right, "sufficiently close" does still need to be defined.

 

[Dave1001]

Well, I don't think you need perfectly exact down-to-the-neuron replication for it to be close enough. After all, you can kill a few million brain cells in a night of heavy drinking and still be "you" when the hangover wears off. You don't give it a second thought, except to swear never to drink jagermeister again.

Does heavy drinking really kill several million brain cells? I'm not saying that to undermine your argument (cause I accept the basic principle and agree with it), it just seems counterintuitive to me that heavy drinking would have that specific effect.

And as for the continuity of consciousness, as roger pointed out, that's broken every time you go to sleep, or if you get hit on the head hard enough. But when you wake up, you're still "you." I'm of the opinion that you'd still be "you" even if the substrate which supported your "software" had been swapped out while you were asleep, as long as the new substrate were a sufficiently close copy. But you're right, "sufficiently close" does still need to be defined.

Yes, and I'm not sure "sufficiently close" can be definable outside of our own subjective, experiential confirmation to ourselves after the fact, because something sufficiently close to pass a turing test of being me or you may not actually be sufficiently close to allow you or I to experience subjective consciousness through it. It may be that it's only behaving like it is you or I well enough to convince observers.

But in a best case scenario, we'll never need to achieve this type technological breakthrough to thwart mortality, because we'll only have to replace parts of our brain incrementally rather than swapping entire substrates or other relatively radical approaches.

 

[AWPrime]

No body lasts forever, so Immortality can only be reached by transfering your mind to a new body.

Now we should also have law that dictate that the new bodies should be different from the old ones, to offer the mind a new perspective.

 

[russingram]

No body lasts forever, so Immortality can only be reached by transfering your mind to a new body.

Now we should also have law that dictate that the new bodies should be different from the old ones, to offer the mind a new perspective.

Nanotechnology could theoretically rebuild the body atom by atom, on a continuous basis.

Of course, some might consider nanotechnology to be "woo".

 

[Lonewulf]

Nanotechnology could theoretically rebuild the body atom by atom, on a continuous basis.

Of course, some might consider nanotechnology to be "woo".

Nanotechnology, as used and developed today, is not "woo" at all. You're talking about carbon nanotubes, making edges that are literally a single molecule wide (to slice open virii, you understand), to make fireproof glass, and various other nifty little effects.

Nanotechnology according to the idea of minicomputers that can rebuild matter like in hollywood (or fictional stories) is, as present, fiction. But don't discount real nanotech; we're using nature's building blocks (molecules) instead of artificial computers.

As for immortality...

Well, downloading your mind into the computer is cool and all, but that tech is a long way off, I believe (but then, so is physical immortality, so meh). The usage of the brain takes millions of tetrabytes, if I remember correctly, and that's just for memory; I have a feeling that the RAM of our mind is quite high too. After all, you're dealing with visual input, audio input, touch input, smell input, all while thinking and operating (not to mention operating your body -- fingers to type on a computer, legs to walk, etc.)

While you can trim things a bit, the overall process would require a large amount of getting used to (which can be done), and probably would come with it's own problems. For instance, you no longer have chemicals or hormones to stimulate your emotions... which can really change how you view the world, even if you can find a way to simulate emotions another way.

As for immortality itself, I see good sides and bad sides to it. The main bad side is that, as a whole, humanity would starve itself of resources. That's the main argument against immortality...

However, longetivity that can get you past the age of 10,000 years, or even 150 years, is probably a ways off. I'm assuming that we'll be going a vast technological and biomedical rennaissance in a few decades, which can have many impacts, small and wide... and I feel that we'll be starting getting serious about our expansion. I say that immortality is mainly only viable when you start expanding the population you got.

Also, furthermore, research shows that in all high economy climates (I.E., U.S., Europe, etc.), the birth rate goes down, not up, which would greatly aid immortality of those still around. (Note: Yes, America's population is increasing, but mainly thanks to immigration, not birth control)

As for "evolution"... you have to realize that "natural selection" does not operate for the human race anymore. It's hard for us to evolve if we try to keep alive everyone, infirm or not, mentally retarded or not, crippled or not, heart disease or not. I'm of the opinion that "natural" evolution is not in store for us in the future, but personal evolution... we can change our young or ourselves in any way we want (genetic engineering, cybernetics, etc.) in the future, and I think such technology should be looked into... cautiously, if you please.

 

[AWPrime]

Nanotechnology could theoretically rebuild the body atom by atom, on a continuous basis.

I think that the control systems would be nearly impossible to carry with you. And some nanos might malfunction, and go corrupt like normal human cells.

 

[russingram]

I think that the control systems would be nearly impossible to carry with you. And some nanos might malfunction, and go corrupt like normal human cells.

perhaps I should have said "maintain" the body - in other words, maintain the position of each atom, or molecule, in the body, in relation to other molecules. I'm not sure how this would affect the "mind" - would memories become fixed? Perhaps a different system would be used for the brain.

 

[Dave1001]

I think that the control systems would be nearly impossible to carry with you. And some nanos might malfunction, and go corrupt like normal human cells.

Besides, I don't see why we need that level of nano-maintenance to functionally eliminate mortality. Just like I don't see why would need to "upload ourselves to computers". cells seem like a stable enough substrate (trees live for thousands of years) and the elements of programmed death and other forms of deterioration in our bodies don't seem to me to need repairs on the atom-by-atom level. I'm sure the challenges to eliminating mortality are non-trivial, but I don't see how they necessarilly involve either that level of nanotechnology or the ability to upload ourselves onto computers.