So you are saying that asking a person if they have sucidial thoughts, writing the result on a piece of paper is empirical? Or is it not empirical?
Empirical.
So you are saying that asking a person if they experience the divine, writing the result on a piece of paper is empirical? Or is it not empirical?
Empirical.
No. I mean empirical.
Notice the categorization here. "Depression" is given the category of "psychological feature" or "state." Why? Religiousity is given the category of abstraction. Why?
You'd have to ask the authors, right? Looks like you're using a dictionary to quibble about technical stuff. I'd use the psychological literature to see how the surveys are applied.
Also: religiosity is slowly proving itself to be a personality attribute, as opposed to depression. It's rare for people to yo-yo with their religiosity indexes: they are very consistent from day to day, year to year. It's more akin to other personality traits, such as extroversion or imaginativeness.
So is a person being "born again" or experience of "nirvana"
1) a state
or
2) an abstraction?
Secondly, is it a feeling or an attribute? And when or where do we make the distinctions?
I'm not sure it's any of these things. Too granular a question. These are not psychologically meaningful terms. I'd say it's more of a manifestation of religiosity. All religions have these epiphany events, but the individuals score here or there on religiosity as individuals. I'm sure 'born again' means a different thing to every person to speaks to it.
You often have to ask a lot of questions to get an overall view. My sister would answer the question "are you religious" with a 'no'. But she's a Gaiaist, and a much bigger zealot than my parents, who are non-church-attending Catholics, and would answer 'yes' to the same question.
So we take something like homosexuality, once in the DSMIV and we realize we are dealing with an attribute, right?
Not so. With homosexuality we are dealing with a "phenomenon."
http://www.wordreference.com/definition/homosexuality
What about lipids? They are an "entity."
http://www.wordreference.com/definition/lipid
Not that the latter two matter, I just find it interesting as to our categorizations.
So here we are with religiosity. It is an
abstraction
A noun
1 abstraction
a general concept formed by extracting common features from specific examples
And depression. It is a
state
A noun
1 state
the way something relates to its main attributes
What's the difference? Religiousity is an abstraction, I agree. It is an abstraction because of a collection of measurements. But depressive "disorders" are also a collection of measurements. Even so, we deem them to be "states." Why?
Again, these are not psychological definitions, so I'm reluctant to speak for the authors of a usage-based dictionary. It reports how everybody uses the term, not necessarily how specialists use it. You'd have to ask psychiatrists how they regard individual indexes, and my impression is that they don't really distinguish. Any index could potentially lend itself to being a 'disorder' if the patient expresses suffering for no external reason, that they want to stop, but can't.
A thought, though: religiosity is a character of the individual, whereas depression is very transitional.
In comparison,
euphoria is a state, often experienced by the religious. Nirvana is a bad example, because depending on who you ask, it's either a temporary state, a permanent characteristic of the individual, a real place, a mystical place, or an unachieveable internal state/characteristic/physical destination/mystical destination.
And still there are others we refuse to reify. Why?
You'd have to be specific. Some are not reified because they fail validation, for example. Kundilani Awakening would be difficult to validate, because you'd have to find independent sources with a convergent understanding of its meaning.
Or when they get committed because a doctor says it is a disorder.
Covered in another reply.
I think this is more conflated than anything I've posted. I'm not sure what to make of it.
Drat. So, why don't you throw us a bone, and outline your argument?
The question is still very simple. Why does a person's self report and others observations of them not allow them to exist in a "state" of being born-again? Why when given the same criteria is one subjective experience elevated to a different degree than another?
See, where here does it talk about being institutionalized? You keep bringing that up, but you haven't included it in your summary. Things like that.
However: to answer this specific challenge, I think part of the problem is validation regarding the expression 'born again'. If I went to China and asked a guy off a farm what 'Born Again' meant, could he explain it to me? If I asked him what depressed meant, could he explain it to me? (this experiment - mood and emotion validation - has been done, incidentally, with many cultures, some of them selected because they were isolated from other cultures, for example the Wayanas tribe in Brazil, and some tribes in New Guinea. Very good validation on moods and emotions, and perfect validation on interpreting facial expressions.)
If I asked random people in the US what 'born again' meant, would their answers be consistent enough to be convergent on a meaning? If not, then it's probably a cultural phenomenon, as opposed to moods, which appear to be an inherent part of the human experience.
This is not the same thing as reification, mind. Also: nobody says that there are underlying physical anomalies to all mood disorders. I personally suspect that some are acquired, and I think this represents the state of the profession. The scientific support comes from correlating the classifications with the
I'm also concerned that you're launching a semantic argument here, quibbling about words like 'state' or 'abstraction' and so on. I tend to withdraw from this when my opponents think their new weapon in a technical discussion is an on-line common-usage dictionary. I'm not sure you shed any light about what psychiatrists actually think or do by quoting it.