Some observations on the problem of evil

[Bri]

My response to your post wasn't meant to be an insult, and I apologize if you took it that way.

You just don't read people's posts do you? If you had you would have read:

"Some randomness is believed to be inherent in quantum mechanics because there is no way, in principle, we can make completely accurate measurements of subatomic particles (Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle)."

I guess you didn't read the rest of it properly either

Yes, I did read your post very carefully. But then you implied that it's random if it's simply difficult to predict also (such as a roulette wheel), so I wasn't sure which type of randomness you were referring to.

What's your answer, by the way?

I think that it is possible that random vs. determined may be a false dichotomy and may not necessarily be the only choices. You had asked me how something that was undetermined could possibly be anything but random, and I tried to give you an example of something that isn't random but also isn't determined. Hopefully that would help you to understand how free will is possibly not random and also not determined.

I thought perhaps you would appreciate the fact that I had spent time thinking about this and really tried to engage with the issues.

I do, truly, and I apologize for the misunderstanding.

-Bri

 

[chriswl]

Why yes, it is. It is part of anyone's moral system to make choices which will result in the most good.

<Sigh> If we knew that it did result in the most good. This is precisely what you are trying to demonstrate - that giving people the opportunity to help others can produce a counter-balancing good that sometimes is greater than the harm done by the suffering necessary to provoke that response.

Quite obviously it can't produce a counterbalancing good if it is not good in itself. And it is not clear that it is good in itself. You haven't explained why it is. If you want to come up with a plausible mechanism that explians why we live in the best of all worlds then I don't think that's it.

 

[Z]

Yes, but you are punishing people for crimes they couldn't possibly not have committed, and I'm not.

Hey, if it helps you sleep at night, believe what you want. I'll punish the robotic wrongdoer, and sleep well at night - because I couldn't do it any other way.

fizzbin.

 

[Robin]

1. Rock not falling -- good
2. Rock falling on person B, and then person A choosing not to help B -- better
3. Rock falling on person B, and then person A choosing to help B -- best

No comment. I just like this.

Your modified example of the doctor is not the same as the example of the rock falling stated above. In your example with the doctor, the choice was to prevent the injection or not. In the rock example, the falling rock cannot be prevented. The greater good has already occurred by the time you make your choice to help the victim or not.

As long as you recognise that your theory does not hold if person A could push the person B out of the way.

To make your doctor example fit my example ....

You mean to fit your rock example? Which you have just posted?

So what you are saying is that you cannot answer the point I just made, but if I will only change my point to something else you will be able to answer it?

Since I posted first, you should make your example fit mine. You could push the person clear of the rocks. Should you? You could hold the doctors arm before the needle went in. Should you?

... you would have no ability to prevent the injection, but you would have a choice whether or not to comfort the child afterwards.

So your theory only holds water for cases where we have no power to prevent or cut short the suffering?

I hope that makes more sense.

No, because you are avoiding the cases that we can prevent suffering (push the man out of the way, hold the doctors arm before he can jab the child). You are avoiding that as soon as we see the child suffering we might withdraw the needle before the injection is complete and thus cut his suffering short.

If your theory only holds for a certain class of suffering, then it is not an answer to my original point.

Now, to answer your question: No. A benevolent God would have to ensure that the onset of the suffering results in a greater good regardless of any reaction to the suffering on the part of other people. Therefore, even if the event which caused the suffering achieved a necessary moral good, the man must still weigh the good and bad consequences of acting and not acting to alleviate the suffering, and then choose the one that he estimates will produce the most good. So if the forseeable bad consequences of doing nothing outweigh the forseeable good consequences (as it sounds like might be the case here unless there are other circumstances you didn't mention) then the moral behavior would be to help the sufferers if he can.

No, there are no circumstances I didn't mention. But you didn't answer my question, what was his sin?

The person sees only a necessary moral good - he is not omniscient, but he just happens to be right about this.

He does nothing to prevent or stop that necessary moral good.

So what is his sin?

Is it a sin to refrain from preventing or interfering with a necessary moral good?

 

[Robin]

Eating is a pleasure, and stealing inflicts pain. Would stealing an apple to feed your starving child never be acceptable under your moral code?

Feeding a starving child is not the same as bringing pleasure to a child.

Alleviating suffering is different to deriving pleasure.

Under my moral code alleviating suffering may justify inflicting pain.

Deriving pleasure does not justify inflicting pain.

 

[Robin]

Let's look at your example: pleasure is not a justification for inflicting pain. This is true as long as whatever good is provided by the "pleasure" is outweighed by whatever bad is caused by the "pain." In general, the good provided by pleasure is outweighed by the bad caused by pain, so in general pleasure isn't justification for pain. But that's not always the case.

As I showed your starving child example was flawed.

However if you are prepared to accept that it is a logical consequence of your argument that God may inflict suffering for no other reason than his own pleasure and still be omnibenevolent then we have probably reached agreement.

Our only disagreement then is in the definition of omnibenevolent.

 

[Z]

This reminds me of the teletrans arguments: for the arguments to successfully work, you have to murder the original; otherwise, the entire argument is demonstrably flawed.

Nevertheless, anytime the clone/teletrans argument occurs, they have to obfuscate the obvious absurdities by murdering the original being and/or completely smokescreening both original and copies.

sorry... complete derail..

 

[Bri]

<Sigh> If we knew that it did result in the most good. This is precisely what you are trying to demonstrate - that giving people the opportunity to help others can produce a counter-balancing good that sometimes is greater than the harm done by the suffering necessary to provoke that response.

Quite obviously it can't produce a counterbalancing good if it is not good in itself. And it is not clear that it is good in itself. You haven't explained why it is. If you want to come up with a plausible mechanism that explians why we live in the best of all worlds then I don't think that's it.

It is not my goal to explain why we live in the best of all worlds. It is only a possible explanation of why we may live in the best of all worlds. As such, it is possible that a world with free choice is a better world than a world with no suffering, and indeed it is possible that we live in the best world possible.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

As long as you recognise that your theory does not hold if person A could push the person B out of the way.

If person A could push person B out of the way then s/he certainly should try. After all, person A can't possibly know whether the greater good might be to provide the choice to save person B. This is precisely the reason why we cannot act on what we think God's greater good is. We must instead act on what the more immediate good is. If an omnipotent God meant to cause the suffering to person B order to achieve a greater good, God would certainly do it in such a way that person A wouldn't be able to push person B out of the way.

You mean to fit your rock example? Which you have just posted?

As I explained, the rock example demonstrates the list that I posted earlier, although perhaps I hadn't explained it well enough. So, yes, to fit my rock example (and the list that was posted earlier).

So what you are saying is that you cannot answer the point I just made, but if I will only change my point to something else you will be able to answer it?

I've already answered the point you made. If the immediately forseeable outcome of an choice produces the greatest good, then the choice is the morally correct choice. In this case it would be to allow the doctor to provide the injection. In the case of the falling rock, it would be to save the person from the falling rock (if you can).

Since I posted first, you should make your example fit mine. You could push the person clear of the rocks. Should you? You could hold the doctors arm before the needle went in. Should you?

I posted the list before you posted your example. I already admitted that I may not have explained the list very well. Get over it. To answer your questions (again): Yes. No.

So your theory only holds water for cases where we have no power to prevent or cut short the suffering?

No, my theory is that if an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God does something in order to achieve a greater good, he will do it in such a way that nobody can prevent it. My point concerned the choice made after the person was hit by the rock and had nothing to do with a choice of helping the person who is about to be hit by the rock, which is another case entirely (and one that I've already discussed above).

No, because you are avoiding the cases that we can prevent suffering (push the man out of the way, hold the doctors arm before he can jab the child). You are avoiding that as soon as we see the child suffering we might withdraw the needle before the injection is complete and thus cut his suffering short.

Not avoiding it. It simply had nothing to do with the point I was making, which concerned YOUR question about why we should try to help someone who is suffering if the suffering was for the greater good. The answer to your question is that God could achieve the greater good in such a way that it is independent on whatever action you take to alleviate the suffering. You then changed the question in the middle of the discussion by asking about preventing the suffering.

If your theory only holds for a certain class of suffering, then it is not an answer to my original point.

Actually, it wa simply an answer to your original question. You've since decided to move the target and I will do my best to keep up.

No, there are no circumstances I didn't mention. But you didn't answer my question, what was his sin?

I'm not sure what you mean by "sin" in this context. If you're asking what behavior on his part would be the best moral choice, I already answered that: "the moral behavior would be to help the sufferers if he can."

The person sees only a necessary moral good - he is not omniscient, but he just happens to be right about this.

He does nothing to prevent or stop that necessary moral good.

So what is his sin?

Is it a sin to refrain from preventing or interfering with a necessary moral good?

How does he "see" this necessary moral good? If he's omniscient, you failed to mention that in your premise. Otherwise, he can't possibly know anything about necessary moral good. I doubt it would ever be moral to act based on a possibly imaginary good that you couldn't possibly know about. If he didn't act, then his "sin" is failing to act in such a way that the forseeable good consequences would outweigh the forseeable bad consequences.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

Feeding a starving child is not the same as bringing pleasure to a child.

Alleviating suffering is different to deriving pleasure.

I find eating to be pleasurable, especially if I'm starving. I also assumed that you meant pleasure to be the opposite of pain, and therefore alleviating suffering would be pleasurable for the sufferer. You'll have to define what you mean by "pleasure" and I'll attempt to come up with a different example. It sounds as if you're using the term "pleasure" to mean something that is gratuitous (if it provides too much good, it's "alleviating suffering" rather than "pleasure"), so it sounds as though limiting the good is a hidden condition of your question.

Either way, if the pleasure could possible bring about enough good to outweigh the bad brought about by the pain, then your "rule" would no longer hold. If you can define "pleasure" in such a way that it can't possibly bring about enough good to override even the mildest pain, then I would agree with your "rule," but only because it falls under a more basic moral code:

When determining whether an action is moral or not, we must weigh the forseeable good outcomes with the forseeable bad outcomes and then determine the best course of action.

Under my moral code alleviating suffering may justify inflicting pain.

Deriving pleasure does not justify inflicting pain.

Unfortunately, these sorts of rules are dependent on specific circumstances and tend to fall apart under other circumstances. Depending on how you define "pleasure" I can imagine any number of circumstances where the rule doesn't hold because the good brought about by the pleasure outweighs the bad brought about by a minor pain.

Is it morally acceptable for two adults to playfully pinch each other in order to make a child laugh?

-Bri

 

[Bri]

As I showed your starving child example was flawed.

Yes, if you limit pleasure to gratuitous pleasure.

However if you are prepared to accept that it is a logical consequence of your argument that God may inflict suffering for no other reason than his own pleasure and still be omnibenevolent then we have probably reached agreement.

Our only disagreement then is in the definition of omnibenevolent.

I don't remember making any argument that would require God to be able to inflict suffering for no other reason than his own pleasure. You asked whether God could inflict pain solely for his own pleasure, and I believe I answered that God could not inflict pain solely for his own pleasure unless somehow God's pleasure served a greater good.

If you define "pleasure" and "pain" is such that any good that comes about from pleasure can never outweigh the bad resulting from pain, then God's pleasure could never serve a greater good.

So I think we may be in agreement on that, but I'm not sure what it has to do with the discussion at hand.

-Bri

 

[Robin]

When determining whether an action is moral or not, we must weigh the forseeable good outcomes with the forseeable bad outcomes and then determine the best course of action.

If you are going to keep on repeating this mantra, without responding to the issues I raised, then I will have to assume that you don't have a clue.

 

[Robin]

I've already answered the point you made. If the immediately forseeable outcome of an choice produces the greatest good, then the choice is the morally correct choice. In this case it would be to allow the doctor to provide the injection. In the case of the falling rock, it would be to save the person from the falling rock (if you can).

Since you say this example fits your list, you are saying that when you see a good situation, you should prevent it from going to better?

 

[Robin]

I find eating to be pleasurable, especially if I'm starving.

If you can say this then I imagine that you have never been actually "starving".

I don't mean the sense of "... I haven't eaten for a couple of hours and could murder a burger". If you meant that sense, then, no it would be immoral to steal for this purpose.

I actually mean "starving". I mean actually suffering. Suffering does not include mild discomfort.

 

[Robin]

How does he "see" this necessary moral good? If he's omniscient, you failed to mention that in your premise.

Otherwise, he can't possibly know anything about necessary moral good.

So we can only act on consequences we can see omnisciently? Is that it?

I specifically said he wasn't omniscient. None of us are. The best we can do is to reach a conclusion with the available evidence and a sound reasoning process. Here is that process:

He believes firmly that there is an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God. Was this a totally unreasonable assumption to make?

He believes that God would not allow any instance of suffering unless it was necessary to a necessary moral good. Was this a totally unreasonable assumption to make?

Therefore, the instance of intense suffering he is witnessing must be a necessary moral good.

Was he wrong? No given the premise he was right. You said he was right. You said it was better than good - it was "better".

So he reached a correct conclusion using a sound reasoning process. Without omniscience this is the best we can do.

He definitely "saw" the necessary moral good, as well as any of us can see anything.

I doubt it would ever be moral to act based on a possibly imaginary good that you couldn't possibly know about.

I agree completely. He can only act on what he knows for sure.

The man is a complete believer in the Omnimax

The man only knows that intense suffering is a necessary moral good, he does not know why.

The most respected philosophers of our time have made lists of possible goods that could ensue - there are many. We have no way of knowing which one is intended.

The only thing he knows for sure is that if there is an Omnimax

If he didn't act, then his "sin" is failing to act in such a way that the forseeable good consequences would outweigh the forseeable bad consequences.

But he did just exactly that. He followed your recipe to the letter. He saw suffering and he decided to do this:

When determining whether an action is moral or not, we must weigh the forseeable good outcomes with the forseeable bad outcomes and then determine the best course of action.

Here is the precise process by which he determined the best course of action, show me which was unreasonable and what it should have been:

1. God is omnibenevolent, omnipotent and omniscient
2. Each and every single instance of intense suffering is necessary to a greater good, otherwise God would not have allowed it.
3. I have no way of knowing what that good is and I have respected theist philosophers Wykstra and Alson to back me up on this.
4. Therefore, depending on God's intentions my actions could lead to good or bad consequences.
5. Therefore the only foreseeable consequence that I can be surest of is the necessary good that has already been accomplished
6. Therefore the best course of action I can possibly follow is to leave well enough alone and do nothing.

If you believe in God, is it wrong to act as though that belief were true?

Should he have acted as if there were no God? Or should he have acted as if he knew God's will?

 

[Bri]

If you are going to keep on repeating this mantra, without responding to the issues I raised, then I will have to assume that you don't have a clue.

The post to which you responded was obviously in response to a previous issue that you raised (and keep raising). I answered your other issue in a subsequent post. I attempted to resolve one issue before moving on to another one.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

I've already answered the point you made. If the immediately forseeable outcome of an choice produces the greatest good, then the choice is the morally correct choice. In this case it would be to allow the doctor to provide the injection. In the case of the falling rock, it would be to save the person from the falling rock (if you can).

Since you say this example fits your list, you are saying that when you see a good situation, you should prevent it from going to better?

I have no idea what you mean. Assuming that you can reasonably forsee the "better" that you're referring to, if you weigh the forseeable good outcomes with the forseeable bad outcomes, the best course of action would be to allow a situation to get better.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

If you can say this then I imagine that you have never been actually "starving".

I don't mean the sense of "... I haven't eaten for a couple of hours and could murder a burger". If you meant that sense, then, no it would be immoral to steal for this purpose.

I actually mean "starving". I mean actually suffering. Suffering does not include mild discomfort.

OK, so as I suspected, you are defining "pleasure" as gratuitous pleasure, and you are definining "pain" as severe pain. In other words, you are defining the situation in such a way that the good will never outweigh the bad. If that's a condition of your question, then yes I agree that according to the moral code I've posted previously, it would never be acceptable for human pleasure to be the sole purpose of inflicting pain because the forseeable good could never outweigh the forseeable bad.

That said, I have never been starving myself, but I would guess that a person who hasn't eaten for several days would find eating to be extremely pleasurable.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

He definitely "saw" the necessary moral good, as well as any of us can see anything.

I apologize, your term "necessary moral good" was throwing me off. I assumed you were referring specifically to "providing a moral choice" since that's what we were discussing just before you brought it up. If by "necessary moral good" you mean the suffering resulted in a greater good, then I agree with you. So, to answer your original question:

If a man believes that each instance of intense suffering is a necessary moral good, but knows nothing of what that good might be, would he be justified in ignoring the suffering?

Assuming that each instance of suffering resulted in a greater good, why would he would ignore the suffering? As I've already pointed out, God would ensure either 1) that his helping them would not interfere with the greater good achieved by their initial suffering, or 2) that he would be unable to help them. Otherwise, the greater good would not be ensured. Therefore, if he didn't try to help them and instead ignored their suffering, then he would not be making the choice that he could reasonably forsee would result in the greatest good (as per the list).

Here is the precise process by which he determined the best course of action, show me which was unreasonable and what it should have been:

1. God is omnibenevolent, omnipotent and omniscient
2. Each and every single instance of intense suffering is necessary to a greater good, otherwise God would not have allowed it.
3. I have no way of knowing what that good is and I have respected theist philosophers Wykstra and Alson to back me up on this.
4. Therefore, depending on God's intentions my actions could lead to good or bad consequences.
5. Therefore the only foreseeable consequence that I can be surest of is the necessary good that has already been accomplished
6. Therefore the best course of action I can possibly follow is to leave well enough alone and do nothing.

OK, I believe your error lies in #4. If God is omnibenevolent, then nothing you can do to help them would negate the greater good accomplished. That's what I've been trying to explain the whole time and you still don't seem to get.

If you believe in God, is it wrong to act as though that belief were true?

Given that the reasoning outlined above is wrong, then it would be wrong to act according to it but not because you believe in God. The reasoning would be wrong because you believe that an omnipotent God wouldn't be able to create a greater good that could not be "undone" by any additional good you do.

Should he have acted as if there were no God? Or should he have acted as if he knew God's will?

One would probably act the same whether or not one believes in God, unless you believe that atheists have no basis for morality (you don't believe that do you?). Nobody should believe that they know God's will, other than that whatever an omnibenevolent God does will result in a greater good.

-Bri

 

[Robin]

Assuming that each instance of suffering resulted in a greater good, why would he would ignore the suffering? As I've already pointed out, God would ensure either 1) that his helping them would not interfere with the greater good achieved by their initial suffering, or 2) that he would be unable to help them. Otherwise, the greater good would not be ensured.

We can assume that God’s actions are always for the greater good, but why assume that God also ensures that our actions are for the greater good?

Why assume that God ensures that our actions cannot prevent the greater good?

You will have to justify this step.

Therefore, if he didn't try to help them and instead ignored their suffering, then he would not be making the choice that he could reasonably forsee would result in the greatest good (as per the list).

No offence to your list, but my man can hardly take it for the infallible word of God can he?

You would have to amend your list to include the possibility that the suffering does not concern anyone else but God and the sufferer. Otherwise you are only considering one case out of many.

All his actions are based on logic derived from the definition of God.

He knows that the suffering is a greater good since it follows logically from the definition of omnibenevolence that God would not permit intense suffering unless by preventing it he would be preventing a greater good or permitting a greater evil.

So he knows the suffering is a moral good, but he knows nothing else.

OK, I believe your error lies in #4. If God is omnibenevolent, then nothing you can do to help them would negate the greater good accomplished. That's what I've been trying to explain the whole time and you still don't seem to get.

I will get it if you show the reasoning. I will not get it if you just assert it as a truth.

Omnibenevolence does not imply that God will ensure that your actions will always lead to the greater good.

Our man has to know which action will help. If he sees one man with a knife trying to cut another man’s throat he might be seeing a murder happen or he might be seeing a doctor performing an emergency tracheotomy.

If he disarmed the man with the knife he might be helping or hindering depending on the situation.

If I see someone wrestle someone else to the floor and put him in a headlock, I don’t know whether I have seen an act of aggression or an act of self defense.

When he sees intense suffering he can conclude that it is a moral good sanctioned by God, but nothing else whatsoever. He cannot assume that the suffering concerns him in any way. He cannot assume that alleviating it is the good action.

If one of the character building or redemptive theodicies were the case then maybe helping may well consist of allowing the suffering to continue.

If God inflicted 40 years in the desert on the Israelites as a character or soul building measure then you would not be helping by getting them a suite at a luxury resort. You would be helping them by letting God’s plan take it’s course.

So if he sees the man with the rocks fallen on his head he would have to know first why God allowed this before he could decide which action was helping and which was not.

Since he cannot know why he cannot make this call.

Given that the reasoning outlined above is wrong, then it would be wrong to act according to it but not because you believe in God.

But as I have shown it is not wrong, unless he makes your extra assumptions, which the man is not logically entitled to do.

The reasoning would be wrong because you believe that an omnipotent God wouldn't be able to create a greater good that could not be "undone" by any additional good you do.

Well if the suffering was necessary to some greater good that did not concern you in any way and you prevent it, there are two choices:

1. You have prevented the greater good
2. The suffering was not necessary in the first place

One would probably act the same whether or not one believes in God, unless you believe that atheists have no basis for morality (you don't believe that do you?). Nobody should believe that they know God's will, other than that whatever an omnibenevolent God does will result in a greater good.

Well I can't imagine that an atheist would behave as though there were a God. So are you suggesting that a believer should behave morally as though he were an atheist?

In any case you will have to conclur that if I fail to act in the face of suffering then the very, very worst real consequence that can befall is the greater good. I can do evil and no real evil will occur.

As I said to start with, our moral choices in the face of suffering are trivial if there is no gratuitous suffering.