Some observations on the problem of evil

[Bri]

No, of course he couldn't. If God sets up the universe to be optimal for one set of human choices, then it is obviously going to be less than optimal if different choices are made. If God can constrain our choices (determinism) he can pick the best of all the options.

Granted, if God chose for us, our choices would never be wrong, but neither would they actually be choices. It is possible that human free will is the greatest good, in which case the greatest good could only be accomplished by allowing us to make our own choices.

As far as I can see, compatibilist free will is free will. What do you mean by libertarian free will other than randomness?

Well, before quantum theory, it was assumed that everything was determined (caused entirely by prior causes). Quantum theory showed that to not be the case, that some things are actually uncaused and random. It is quite possible that there is a third option: something that is not caused entirely by prior causes and is not random either. I imagine that libertarian free will would fit into that third category -- not caused nor random.

Yes there is - God exists or he doesn't. The question is, can we know it?

Yes, you are correct of course, that God either exists or he doesn't. However, in light of a lack of definitive proof, either is possible and there is no current "right" way to believe. It cannot be argued that it is necessarily irrational to believe that God exists, nor is it irrational to believe that God does not exist. It would be irrational to believe it as a proven fact that God exists or doesn't exist, because it's simply not a proven fact. Otherwise, it's just an opinion, and we have opinions on all sorts of things and aren't considered irrational.

Two points here. Firstly, this doesn't apply to Gods that are defined in such a way that they make contradictory claims or imply things about the world that we can see to be false. These Gods cannot exist.

Yes, I'll grant you that if it can be proven that a particular god cannot possibly exist, then it would be irrational to believe in that god. Which is why so many are tempted to suggest that the PoE proves for a fact that God cannot possibly exist. It simply doesn't.

Any God that claims to be omni-anything is skating on pretty thin ice here.

Here I'd have to disagree. To my knowledge, there is no proof that such a God is impossible.

Secondly, I don't think that it requires "faith" to disbelieve in highly improbable things. In fact it comes quite naturally.

It would be difficult to place a probability on God's existance with any accuracy. Theists place the probability very high, and atheists tend to place it much lower, both based on the same [lack of] evidence.

You would probably agree that a theist who places the probability of God's existance at 100% isn't basing the number on any available evidence, right? In fact, the only evidence that would warrant placing the probability at 100% is absolute proof of God's existance. The same must be true of an atheist who places the probability at 0%.

Your continual assertions that we may really live in the best of all possible worlds, supported by no arguments whatsoever, are more like what most people mean by faith: doggedly clinging to ideas that have no basis in reality because you like the sound of them.

The key word "may" in your sentence above shows that the statement is not based on faith -- rather, it is simply a possibility. If we may really live in the best of all possible worlds, then it also follows that we may really not live in the best of all possible worlds. Would you also claim that this latter case (that we may really not live in the best of all possible worlds) is a belief based on faith?

-Bri

 

[chriswl]

Well, before quantum theory, it was assumed that everything was determined (caused entirely by prior causes). Quantum theory showed that to not be the case, that some things are actually uncaused and random. It is quite possible that there is a third option: something that is not caused entirely by prior causes and is not random either. I imagine that libertarian free will would fit into that third category -- not caused nor random.

You've said what it supposedly isn't, not what it is. If "what it is" is what happens when we make apparently free choices then we already have a perfectly good candidate for that - deterministic brain processes.

 

[Bri]

You've said what it supposedly isn't, not what it is. If "what it is" is what happens when we make apparently free choices then we already have a perfectly good candidate for that - deterministic brain processes.

Free will is the ability to make choices which depend on some condition that originates within us rather than external to us.

Now, can you define what "randomness" is without using the terms "caused" or "determined" (i.e. by specifying what it is rather than what it is not?)

-Bri

 

[chriswl]

Free will is the ability to make choices which depend on some condition that originates within us rather than external to us.

Are our psychological dispositions things that are external to us? I'd say they are within us in the sense they are what makes us who we are and they are also determined by our physical brain.

Now, can you define what "randomness" is without using the terms "caused" or "determined" (i.e. by specifying what it is rather than what it is not?)

No I can't, I think "random" is just the opposite of "determined". But that seems to exhaust all the possibilities (obviously something can have a mixture of random and deterministic causation but that doesn't create anything fundamentally new).

 

[Bri]

Are our psychological dispositions things that are external to us? I'd say they are within us in the sense they are what makes us who we are and they are also determined by our physical brain.

They are within us, but if determinism is true do not originate within us. If determinism is true, then our psychological dispositions are no more than various states of our hardware (our physical brains) which are entirely the effect of prior causes that are external to us.

No I can't, I think "random" is just the opposite of "determined". But that seems to exhaust all the possibilities (obviously something can have a mixture of random and deterministic causation but that doesn't create anything fundamentally new).

Do you believe that "uncaused" is an adequate definition for "random?" Would something which has no external cause but produces output in a specific pattern be random?

-Bri

 

[Robin]

If that were true then there are a lot of immoral cancer patients out there.

I have no idea what you could possibly mean by this.

I don't think our moral code says anything about cancer since it's not something that human beings can generally control.

Hmm... So our moral code says nothing about a pregnant woman smoking when she knows this may cause the child harm? Our moral code says nothing about a factory knowingly releasing toxic or radioactive chemical? Our moral code says nothing about whether we should consult a doctor if our child develops some symptoms that suggest incipient cancer?

No, our moral code very definitely does say something about whether it is better for a child to have than not to have cancer.

I'm sorry, Robin, but in everything we do we weigh the forseeable good outcomes with the forseeable bad outcomes and then determine the best course of action.

The question is, how do you determine the best course of action. How do you determine the difference between a good and a bad outcome?

If our possible course of action is to inflict suffering and the forseeable good outcome is that it will provide the opportunity to moral good, we must now apply our moral code to this.

Our moral code says that the provision of the opportunity for moral good can never be the justification for inflicting suffering, so our correct action is not to inflict the suffering.

God would have to do the same thing if he's omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent.

And if God say that same outcome and applied the same rule he must also refrain from inflicting suffering.

Because God can forsee what we cannot forsee, it is inevitable that some of what he does would seem "wrong" to us even though it results in a greater good.

But I have already shown the problem with this. It can also be used to justify God inflicting pain for his own pleasure. By your logic God might be able to foresee a pleasure that justifies inflicting pain.

No, you are simply wrong about this. If our moral code says:
X is not a justification for Y
and we are correct about this, then God can be as omnipotent as all get out but he will never find an X that justifies Y.

On the other hand if God can find an X that justifies Y, then our moral code is wrong and we have no basis for moral choice.

Please address this issue rather than just keeping on repeating that God is omniscient so what seems bad to us might seem good to him.

It's precisely like a child receiving an injection. To the child, the doctor seems evil because the child can only forsee the immediate pain that will result from the injection, and cannot forsee the greater good that will result from the cure.

You said this already, but did not address my objections to the argument. The debate would progress much better if you addressed my points rather than just repeating your original assertion.

If it really is “precisely like” this situation, then our moral response must be “precisely” the same.

So our moral response to a doctor sticking a needle in a child’s arm should be to do nothing even if we did not understand what was happening.

If your analogy is “precisely” correct then you must agree with me that the correct moral behaviour in the face of suffering would also be to do nothing.

So you agree with me?

Once more, no. God, just like us, would weigh the good and bad outcomes.

You are eternally missing the point here. Moral behaviour depends on how you weigh the good and bad outcomes. It concerns principles. So the issue is what principle God would apply in weighing the good and the bad.

If the child developing cancer serves a greater good (i.e. the good outcomes outweigh the bad outcomes) then he would be remiss if he didn't cause the child to develop cancer.

On the other hand if the only good outcome he could foresee was the provision of moral choice then he would be unambiguously evil if he caused the child to develop cancer (if my moral principles are correct).

Possibly incorrect. If free will is a greater good than not having any suffering, then providing a person the opportunity to freely choose right over wrong might indeed be the greater good.

So if I have free will, you are saying that God pushing someone in front of a bus will give me even freer will? That does not make sense.

It's not wrong by our moral code, as I've already explained.

I cannot speak for you, but as I have already explained several times it is the epitomy of evil from my own moral code.

God can be as omnipotent as he pleases, he will never find an even number in the set of odd numbers and he will never find an opportunity for moral choice that justifies inflicting suffering.

If I am wrong about this then I have completely misunderstood the concepts of right and wrong and have no way of forming a moral judgement. By the way, I think I am right.

It would only be wrong for us to attempt to play God because we're not omniscient and therefore for us the immediately forseeable good (which is all we're capable of) would not outweigh the immediately forseeable bad. God, on the other hand, can forsee the actual good and bad that will result, and therefore would not be acting in the most moral way (i.e. producing the most good) if he acted any other way.

Please get out of this rut. It has nothing with what God can or cannot foresee. It is all about the principle that he applies to evaluating the action from the outcomes.

Since I find myself repeating the same responses to the same arguments, I think it may be that you and I are at an impasse.

I have demonstrated at least three times here that you have repeated the same responses but have failed to address the objections I made when you posted them the first time. So the impasse is entirely of your own making.

But look at what you are saying, in effect:

X is a necessary moral good that exists for the sole purpose of providing the opportunity to remove X or if possible to prevent X in the first place

It is just self-contradictory as well as being morally suspect.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You've said what it supposedly isn't, not what it is. If "what it is" is what happens when we make apparently free choices then we already have a perfectly good candidate for that - deterministic brain processes.

Then they aren't meaningfully free. How can I be responsible for committing a crime if the physical chain of causality which led to that crime being committed was already in motion before I was born? I had no choice in the matter. I was compelled to commit the crime by the laws of physics and there is no possible world where I did not commit the crime. If I wasn't free to not-coommit the crime, then I have no free will, do I?

 

[Robin]

Then they aren't meaningfully free. How can I be responsible for committing a crime if the physical chain of causality which led to that crime being committed was already in motion before I was born? I had no choice in the matter. I was compelled to commit the crime by the laws of physics and there is no possible world where I did not commit the crime. If I wasn't free to not-coommit the crime, then I have no free will, do I?

On the other hand how could you be responsible for a crime if the actual decision was ultimately dependent on a mysterious and fundamentally unpredictable process that was independent of your morality, beliefs, emotions and rationality and so on?

If the decision was ultimately independent of your morality, beliefs, emotions and rationality in what sense could it be called your decision?

 

[Bri]

Hmm... So our moral code says nothing about a pregnant woman smoking when she knows this may cause the child harm?

Try to follow me here. Our moral code says: When determining whether an action is moral or not, we must weigh the forseeable good outcomes with the forseeable bad outcomes and then determine the best course of action.

It is forseeable that smoking will harm an unborn child and cause very little good. Therefore, the forseeable bad outweighs the forseeable good.

Our moral code says nothing about a factory knowingly releasing toxic or radioactive chemical?

Releasing a toxic chemical has forseeable bad consequences that may outweigh any forseeable good consequences. Of course, this isn't always the case since a certain amount of toxic chemicals are considered "safe" and are outweighed by the general benefits of factories to society.

Our moral code says nothing about whether we should consult a doctor if our child develops some symptoms that suggest incipient cancer?

Not seeking a doctor would have forseeable bad outcomes for the child that would far outweigh any good.

The question is, how do you determine the best course of action. How do you determine the difference between a good and a bad outcome?

We, as imperfect human beings must try our best to reasonably predict the positive and negative consequences of our actions, perhaps based on the suffering or alleviation of suffering that we predict will result. God, on the other hand, would be able to predict every possible outcome of an action (including those we cannot know about), and therefore would be able to predict precisely the action that is the greatest good.

If our possible course of action is to inflict suffering and the forseeable good outcome is that it will provide the opportunity to moral good, we must now apply our moral code to this.

Our moral code says that the provision of the opportunity for moral good can never be the justification for inflicting suffering, so our correct action is not to inflict the suffering.

I'm afraid that we as human beings cannot know whether attempting to provide an opportunity for moral choice will result in a greater good or not. An omniscient God knows because he can perfectly predict the results of his actions. If we were omniscient and were able to perfectly predict the results of our actions in order to assure that the greatest good would be achieved, then sure we might be justified in inflicting suffering on others if we knew that it would result in a greater good.

And if God say that same outcome and applied the same rule he must also refrain from inflicting suffering.

Only if he wasn't omniscient or omnipotent and couldn't ensure that the greater good would result. But we're assuming an omniscient, omnipotent God here.

But I have already shown the problem with this. It can also be used to justify God inflicting pain for his own pleasure. By your logic God might be able to foresee a pleasure that justifies inflicting pain.

No, you are simply wrong about this. If our moral code says:
X is not a justification for Y
and we are correct about this, then God can be as omnipotent as all get out but he will never find an X that justifies Y.

"X is not a justification for Y" is true as long as the good consequences of "Y" are outweighed by the bad consequences of "X." However, if the opposite were true, then the rule would no longer hold.

Let's look at your example: pleasure is not a justification for inflicting pain. This is true as long as whatever good is provided by the "pleasure" is outweighed by whatever bad is caused by the "pain." In general, the good provided by pleasure is outweighed by the bad caused by pain, so in general pleasure isn't justification for pain. But that's not always the case. Eating is a pleasure, and stealing inflicts pain. Would stealing an apple to feed your starving child never be acceptable under your moral code?

On the other hand if God can find an X that justifies Y, then our moral code is wrong and we have no basis for moral choice.

If the forseeable good of an action outweighs the forseeable bad, then the action is justified.

Please address this issue rather than just keeping on repeating that God is omniscient so what seems bad to us might seem good to him.

I'm really trying to address the issue, but I'm obviously failing to explain it in such a way that you can understand. I'm terribly sorry for that. If you still don't understand, then I suggest we end the discussion at this point rather than repeating ourselves.

-Bri

 

[Robin]

I'm really trying to address the issue, but I'm obviously failing to explain it in such a way that you can understand. I'm terribly sorry for that. If you still don't understand, then I suggest we end the discussion at this point rather than repeating ourselves.

-Bri

Or I am failing to explain my position. But yes, I agree.

 

[Robin]

Or I am failing to explain my position. But yes, I agree.

Actually I find I have to ask just one more thing:

If a man believes that each instance of intense suffering is a necessary moral good, but knows nothing of what that good might be, would he be justified in ignoring the suffering?

If not, what would his sin be?

 

[Bri]

Actually I find I have to ask just one more thing:

If a man believes that each instance of intense suffering is a necessary moral good, but knows nothing of what that good might be, would he be justified in ignoring the suffering?

If not, what would his sin be?

I think I may see the problem here, so I'm going to try one more time to explain. I see that I may not have been clear in my examples (particularly the list), and you may be confusing the onset of the suffering which brings about a greater good and the subsequent relief of that suffering. An example might be in order. Let's say that providing person A with a moral choice to help someone in need will result in a greater good than person B not being injured by a falling rock. So, God causes a rock to fall onto B, resulting in a good that is greater than if B hadn't gotten injured by the rock. Now, A who sees the event (but could not have done anything to prevent it) is presented with a choice: do I help B or don't I help B? Here is where the list comes into play:

1. Rock not falling -- good
2. Rock falling on person B, and then person A choosing not to help B -- better
3. Rock falling on person B, and then person A choosing to help B -- best

The greater good has already been achieved by the rock falling (which God assures is not preventable) by providing a choice for A, and is therefore independent of the actual choice made by A. It is better that the rock fell than didn't fall. It would be better still for A to help B. But even if A makes the morally incorrect choice and decides not to help B, a greater good was served by the rock falling. Hopefully the list makes sense to you now.

The example of the doctor illustrated a different point -- that even though we might think that the rock falling is bad, in reality it is good because it was necessary to achieve a greater good. But because we are not omniscient and cannot understand the full consequences of the rock falling as God can, it seems bad to us. This is like the doctor giving an injection to a sick child. The child thinks the injection is bad even though it achieves a greater good.

Your modified example of the doctor is not the same as the example of the rock falling stated above. In your example with the doctor, the choice was to prevent the injection or not. In the rock example, the falling rock cannot be prevented. The greater good has already occurred by the time you make your choice to help the victim or not. To make your doctor example fit my example, you would have no ability to prevent the injection, but you would have a choice whether or not to comfort the child afterwards. Your choice is therefore independent of the greater good achieved by the injection itself. In that case, it is clear that you should comfort the child rather than do nothing.

I hope that makes more sense. If not, let's just move on...

Now, to answer your question: No. A benevolent God would have to ensure that the onset of the suffering results in a greater good regardless of any reaction to the suffering on the part of other people. Therefore, even if the event which caused the suffering achieved a necessary moral good, the man must still weigh the good and bad consequences of acting and not acting to alleviate the suffering, and then choose the one that he estimates will produce the most good. So if the forseeable bad consequences of doing nothing outweigh the forseeable good consequences (as it sounds like might be the case here unless there are other circumstances you didn't mention) then the moral behavior would be to help the sufferers if he can.

-Bri

 

[Z]

Then they aren't meaningfully free. How can I be responsible for committing a crime if the physical chain of causality which led to that crime being committed was already in motion before I was born? I had no choice in the matter. I was compelled to commit the crime by the laws of physics and there is no possible world where I did not commit the crime. If I wasn't free to not-coommit the crime, then I have no free will, do I?

The entire concept of punishment and responsibility still serves a purpose in a purely deterministic world. By society creating a counter-potential to criminal behavior, it can reduce the total amount of criminal behavior accordingly, thereby allowing increased health for a society.

Hence, even though there is no possible world in which the example above could not have committed the crime, he still must be held accountable as such - in order to reduce the potential occurance of future criminal activities.

 

[Bri]

Not to mention that fact that the punishment was also determined long before the crime was actually committed. So, just as the criminal had no choice but to commit the crime, we have no choice but to punish him/her in exactly the way that s/he is punished.

-Bri

 

[chriswl]

The greater good has already been achieved by the rock falling (which God assures is not preventable) by providing a choice for A, and is therefore independent of the actual choice made by A. It is better that the rock fell than didn't fall. It would be better still for A to help B. But even if A makes the morally incorrect choice and decides not to help B, a greater good was served by the rock falling.

Very clear. And completely loopy.

How is "having a choice to help" a good of any sort? Is this part of anyone's moral system? In any case, we don't need to be omniscient to recognise such cases. If you claim to be able to detect good in such circumstances then you are quite able to compare this with the bad that arises from suffering and judge for yourself whether or not to create some suffering so that someone else can have the precious "choice" of alleviating it. You can't judge it as accurately as God of course, but you will surely get closer to perfection if you include, this "moral choice" aspect in your decisions, however approximately, than if you entirely ignore it? So, we should, at least occasionally, deliberately create suffering.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

The entire concept of punishment and responsibility still serves a purpose in a purely deterministic world. By society creating a counter-potential to criminal behavior, it can reduce the total amount of criminal behavior accordingly, thereby allowing increased health for a society.

Hence, even though there is no possible world in which the example above could not have committed the crime, he still must be held accountable as such - in order to reduce the potential occurance of future criminal activities.

Yes, but you are punishing people for crimes they couldn't possibly not have committed, and I'm not.

 

[chriswl]

Do you believe that "uncaused" is an adequate definition for "random?" Would something which has no external cause but produces output in a specific pattern be random?

Interesting questions. I'd say randomness specifies what we don't know about something. Something is random relative to our knowledge of it. A roulette wheel is random to a gambler even if it is completely deterministic, because he has no way of gathering the data and performing the relevant calculation, even approximately. Or rather, the number that the ball will land on is random - he can be pretty certain that it will obey Newton's laws and eventually settle in one of the slots. Some randomness is believed to be inherent in quantum mechanics because there is no way, in principle, we can make completely accurate measurements of subatomic particles (Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle).

So it makes no sense to say that something is random, just that there is an amount of randomness or uncertainty that affects our ability to predict. If a thing was totally random then we couldn't say what the "thing" was in the first place, we couldn't observe it and notice its randomness because there would be nothing known that we could look for. Things merely have random aspects to them. For an uncaused event, such as the spontaneus creation of a particle-antiparticle pair, the random aspect would be the time and place it happened. But it would still have to be one of a small number of allowable particles and follow all the correct laws of physics for those particles. So there is always both randomness and pattern. The randomness is our inability to predict the entire pattern. I suppose you could say that all randomness is uncaused (and all apparent randomness is apparently uncaused) but I think the idea of "causes" is much more popular with philosophers than with physicists. For physicists there are observations, and patterns (laws) can be deduced from those observations. Including patterns that relate the state at one time with the state at another time. Time is just one of the variables.

So, if there were quantum processes underlying some of our decision-making, then our actions may not be wholly predictable. But to the extent that they formed a pattern they would be predictable. So your behaviour consists of predictable things and random things.

 

[Bri]

Very clear. And completely loopy.

How is "having a choice to help" a good of any sort?

We've gone through this. This whole discussion was brought about because Robin asked how we could possibly ease someone's suffering if their suffering was for a greater good. The question was whether or not easing their suffering would then "undo" the greater good, and therefore it would be best to do nothing to help the guy who is injured by a falling rock.

I simply pointed out the possibility that the opportunity to freely choose to ease suffering is a greater good than having no suffering. If that is the case, then the choice is provided the moment the rock injures the person, and cannot be "undone" by a decision to help the person.

Of course, there are plenty of other possible "greater goods" that could come about from suffering that wouldn't be affected by a bystander's choice to help the victim. Providing a choice for a bystander to help the sufferer is only one possibility.

Is this part of anyone's moral system?

Why yes, it is. It is part of anyone's moral system to make choices which will result in the most good. If we were omniscient and knew that causing suffering was necessary for a greater good, we would be morally obligated to cause suffering for the greater good. By the same token, without being omniscient we are still morally obligated to make similar choices if causing suffering will result in an immediately forseeable greater good. For example, you would be morally remiss if you didn't shoot a criminal in the leg to prevent him from harming others.

In any case, we don't need to be omniscient to recognise such cases.

Of course we do. We don't know for certain that causing suffering for the sole purpose of providing a choice will produce a greater good. By any estimation that we might make, causing suffering for that purpose would likely produce more bad than good -- the risks would outweigh the benefits -- which is why it seems so abhorrent to you. Only God could know for certain that it is necessary for a greater good, eliminating all risk that it won't result in a greater good.

So, we should, at least occasionally, deliberately create suffering.

We do so routinely, when it results in an immediately forseeable greater good. See the example of shooting a criminal above. Also, the example of the doctor giving an injection to a child provided in a previous post.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

Interesting questions. I'd say randomness specifies what we don't know about something. Something is random relative to our knowledge of it. A roulette wheel is random to a gambler even if it is completely deterministic, because he has no way of gathering the data and performing the relevant calculation, even approximately. Or rather, the number that the ball will land on is random - he can be pretty certain that it will obey Newton's laws and eventually settle in one of the slots. Some randomness is believed to be inherent in quantum mechanics because there is no way, in principle, we can make completely accurate measurements of subatomic particles (Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle).

So it makes no sense to say that something is random, just that there is an amount of randomness or uncertainty that affects our ability to predict. If a thing was totally random then we couldn't say what the "thing" was in the first place, we couldn't observe it and notice its randomness because there would be nothing known that we could look for. Things merely have random aspects to them. For an uncaused event, such as the spontaneus creation of a particle-antiparticle pair, the random aspect would be the time and place it happened. But it would still have to be one of a small number of allowable particles and follow all the correct laws of physics for those particles. So there is always both randomness and pattern. The randomness is our inability to predict the entire pattern. I suppose you could say that all randomness is uncaused (and all apparent randomness is apparently uncaused) but I think the idea of "causes" is much more popular with philosophers than with physicists. For physicists there are observations, and patterns (laws) can be deduced from those observations. Including patterns that relate the state at one time with the state at another time. Time is just one of the variables.

So, if there were quantum processes underlying some of our decision-making, then our actions may not be wholly predictable. But to the extent that they formed a pattern they would be predictable. So your behaviour consists of predictable things and random things.

As far as I know, quantum randomness is entirely random (not just difficult to predict) and uncaused.

And you never answered the question.

-Bri

 

[chriswl]

As far as I know, quantum randomness is entirely random (not just difficult to predict) and uncaused.

You just don't read people's posts do you? If you had you would have read:

"Some randomness is believed to be inherent in quantum mechanics because there is no way, in principle, we can make completely accurate measurements of subatomic particles (Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle)."

I guess you didn't read the rest of it properly either

And you never answered the question.

I said it was an interesting question, I wouldn't have said that if I had some easy, stock answer. What's your answer, by the way? I thought perhaps you would appreciate the fact that I had spent time thinking about this and really tried to engage with the issues.

If I didn't answer your questions directly it is because I thought they were based on unclear notions of "randomness" and "cause" and so weren't directly answerable. I tried to clarify them. Maybe I didn't succeed, tell me what you disagree with in my argument.