when did we develop conciousness?

[Alphaba]

this list seems overly restrictive and anthropocentic
...snip...
A sufficiently advanced computer program will probably one day reproduce everything in the above list

If a machine (both logical and material) is one day capable to perform/exhibit all the features listed, wouldn't that somehow render the adjective "anthropocentric" problematic?

[this list] would indeed eliminate many humans from the rolls of the conscious. Under this definition, for example, an aphasic would fail the test.

Well, there always are ceteris paribus^WP clauses in such exercises. Here it is evidently tacitly assumed that it is about awake healthy, non neuropsychologically disabled members of the species.

I kinda got the impression that what Andyandy was talking about was more in line with the folk conception of consciousness, which is pretty much the capacity for introspection -- being aware of one's inner cognitive and emotional states. A sufficiently advanced computer program will probably one day reproduce everything in the above list, without necessarily having this ability. Would we have to consider it conscious? Ask Alan Turing. Personally, I don't think so.

What I have bolded is subsumed under the wider notions of metacognition and executive functions. So having a machine reproducing everything in the list obviously means reproducing metacognition, i.e. your "capacity for introspection".

Ask Alan Turing.

Speaking to defunct persons is against my absence of religion.

 

[Dustin Kesselberg]

I for one find the "mirror test" absurd. Realizing the reflection in the mirror is you may be proof of "consciousness" but not being able to do it doens't mean you aren't self aware. Being able to do it is more intelligence than being self aware. You can be 100% self aware but simply not intelligent enough to realize the reflection in the mirror is you.


It doesn't take a genius to realize higher animals like cats or dogs or lions or tigers or whatnot are conscious and self aware. Their cognative ability is much different than that of humans but it's there none the less.




When did consciousness evolve? I would guess it first appeared atleast a billion years ago or maybe after the time of the cambrian explosion when higher forms of life started to evolve.

 

[aggle-rithm]

5,84,058,405 BC +- a few years.

I'd like to see a detailed Darwinian pathway of the evolution of consciousness. Anyone got one?

Do you have reason to believe anyone should?

 

[T'ai Chi]

Do you have reason to believe anyone should?

Oh, I have reason to believe no one ever will.

 

[Roboramma]

Oh, I have reason to believe no one ever will.

So do I - because we don't have that data.

 

[Mercutio]

Dammit, I just lost a really long and thoughtful post...I'll try again.

Consciousness is the result of our language and behavior, of course. It has to be--we cannot learn what we mean by the word "consciousness" by looking at another person's thoughts (if you can, apply for the million), nor can they point to our thoughts to label them. We learn what "consciousness" means by attaching the label to publicly observable behaviors. No, not a behavior--to think that there is some single thing called "consciousness" is just silly--but a fuzzy category of behaviors, perhaps unique to any given individual, but widely overlapping with other members of the language community.

We argue about consciousness in goldfish, chimps, dogs...and realize fairly quickly that we can only infer consciousness from their observable behavior. What we typically fail to realize is that the same constraint holds true for our fellow human beings, and even ourselves. We have absolutely no way of knowing if the private behaviors we associate with our own consciousness are shared with others; what we do have is the publicly observable behavior we associate with the term "consciousness". We see the goldfish approach a familiar person at feeding time, or flee from an unfamiliar person, and infer "some form of consciousness". We see the chimp attend to a mark on its forehead and infer "some form of consciousness". Whether or not a species displays consciousness is wholly dependent on what public behavior that species displays. Indeed, whether or not a given individual person displays a particular "state of consciousness" is wholly dependent on what public behavior he or she displays.

As such, the question of "when did consciousness evolve" has two distinctly different answers. First, there is the question of when these particular behaviors became associated with the term "consciousness"; this is dependent on culture. Our use of the term has changed over the centuries. Secondly, there is the question of the evolution of the behaviors themselves; this is a task for evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology. Some of the behaviors we call "conscious" may be genetically coded, others may be learned within the lifespan of the organism.

 

[Roboramma]

Merc, another very interesting post.

I was thinking about this thread the other day, and I started to wonder about the evolution of conciousness. I had a little hypothesis pop into my head that went something like this:

What if conciousness evolved to aid social interaction. In order to succeed in social situations it helps to be able to think about what other creatures in your social environment are thinking - what do they want, what are their motiviations, what will they do next, etc.
Maybe in order to think about the motivations of others, it helps if we can think about our own motivations. Conciousness is our brain's way of telling itself a story about our social environment - infering desires from behaviors so that we can predict another being's future actions. In order to do this we first need to have a picture of those things we call desires (etc.)

In this (perhaps silly) hypothesis, we are concious so that we can infer conciousness in others.

What d'y'all think?

 

[MRC_Hans]

*snip*
In this (perhaps silly) hypothesis, we are concious so that we can infer conciousness in others.

What d'y'all think?

The way you express it, it is circular, but I think I know what you mean. We developed consciousness because it is an advantage to be able to infer other being's thoughts and intentions. As such, consciousness is the ability to understand that other beings have a will.

This ability is far from restricted to humans; it certainly also exists in many other animals. I have observed obvious conscious behavior in dogs, cats, and birds.

Hans

 

[Piggy]

andyandy, what would you think of this scheme as a working definition of consciousness? (Adapted from Dennett)

Scenario A: A computer, light sensor, and monitor are rigged up so that when a beam of light in the red spectrum hits the sensor, the monitor displays "I see a red light". A series of different colored lights are flashed. The monitor is blank until a red one is lit, at which point the monitor displays "I see a red light".

Scenario B: I'm asked by an experimentor to look at a screen and say when I see a red light. A series of different colored lights are flashed. I remain silent until a red one is lit, at which point I say "I see a red light".

Why do we think of only B as involving response by a conscious entity?

It has nothing to do w/ response to environment, or discrimination, or following orders of course -- it's because we know that there's an "experience" of "seeing a red light" for the human. We feel instinctively (or argue logically) that there's not for the machine.

So I take your OP to mean something like "At what point did some critters stop merely reacting chemically to the environment and start having some inner experience, a subjective 'feeling' of pain, fear, happiness, etc?"

Tough stuff, since, as others have pointed out, we can't get at that "experience", that "feeling".

But still, to me this is the crux of the issue, not some reflective sense of "I", which may come much later in terms of evolutionary development. To me, it matters if an animal has something like my experience of pain, rather than, say, a computer simulation.

Why? For the same reason we ask questions like "Can Fetuses Feel Pain?". For the same reason it mattered whether Terry Schiavo did or didn't have any higher brain function. For the same reason it matters whether comatose patients can sense their environment.

It matters to me if, say, a cricket is just a bundle of wires like a machine, or if a fish is experiencing pain in something like the way I do.

It's just my opinion, but I think Dennett is very likely to be right when he proposes that a dual brain structure underlies the emergent phenomenon that we call conscious experience or feeling. In short, the model is: Build brain A (brain stem, lymbic system, cerebrum) to process input, then build brain B (cerebellum) to "live inside" brain A. That is, brain B receives processed data from brain A, so that brain A's output becomes brain B's environment. The feedback loops between these "2 brains" produces the sense of the world "being like" something.

If that's correct, then the bug my cat is chasing is just an organic machine, but my cat is a "feeling" animal. The bug has no experience of panic, but my cat has an experience of excitement.

 

[Mercutio]

The way you express it, it is circular, but I think I know what you mean. We developed consciousness because it is an advantage to be able to infer other being's thoughts and intentions. As such, consciousness is the ability to understand that other beings have a will.

(emphasis mine.) Or to understand that their environment will have the same effects on them as it would on you, such that without the circularly defined explanatory fiction "will", we can still use our observations of them to infer their probable actions.

This ability is far from restricted to humans; it certainly also exists in many other animals. I have observed obvious conscious behavior in dogs, cats, and birds.

Hans

If we observe our language, we also observe obvious conscious behavior in cars and computers. "My car doesn't like cold mornings." "My car likes to go faster than the speed limit." "My computer hates me." These are all phrases that imply consciousness of a sort, and are part of how we have learned the words that go with consciousness. (which makes no sense if we define consciousness subjectively, but then we have every bit as much ability to look at the private thoughts of a car as we do another human. In both cases, all we have is the public behavior to go by.)

 

[Darat]

Don't know why but this thread makes me think of a great expression I first heard from my high school biology teacher

"The brain is a parasitical outgrowth of the spinal column".

 

[MRC_Hans]

(emphasis mine.) Or to understand that their environment will have the same effects on them as it would on you, such that without the circularly defined explanatory fiction "will", we can still use our observations of them to infer their probable actions.

Yes, good definition!

If we observe our language, we also observe obvious conscious behavior in cars and computers. "My car doesn't like cold mornings." "My car likes to go faster than the speed limit." "My computer hates me." These are all phrases that imply consciousness of a sort, and are part of how we have learned the words that go with consciousness. (which makes no sense if we define consciousness subjectively, but then we have every bit as much ability to look at the private thoughts of a car as we do another human. In both cases, all we have is the public behavior to go by.)

Well, that is just antropomorphism (sp?). Much of the time when we assign consciousness to animals, it is also antropomorphism, but with higher animals, we can observe behavioral patterns that are difficult to explain as anything but consciousness.

I have a personal example:

I was wisiting a (large florist's) shop that had a parrot on display. Rather, I suppose the owner had a parrot and kept it in the room. It had a large cage, but on this occasion was sitting freely on the top of the cage. I like animals and rarely miss an opportunity to "communicate" with a responsive-looking animal. So I stood in front of the parrot and ... I don't remember exactly what, said "hello" or something.

The parrot eyed me carefully, then climbed down on the front of the cage to the height of my shoulder, took a good grip at the cage with its beak, and pivoted around, hanging by its beak, displaying its feet. After a moment, I realized the purpose of the gesture and stepped close so it could climb onto my shoulder, which it did. It then proceeded immidiately to bend down and bite a button off the collar of my shirt.

Now, it makes perfect sense to interpret this as it seeing the, apparantly interesting, button, and planning a sequence of actions that would give it access to it. A sequence that included eliciting a specific, predictable, reaction from me. Which would require it to be aware of me as a seperate entity with a behavioral pattern of my own.

Hans

 

[Piggy]

Now, it makes perfect sense to interpret this as it seeing the, apparantly interesting, button, and planning a sequence of actions that would give it access to it. A sequence that included eliciting a specific, predictable, reaction from me. Which would require it to be aware of me as a seperate entity with a behavioral pattern of my own.

Would it, tho? You don't think a complex robot could ever be built that could do something like this?

I agree that parrots are conscious, btw. But again, for me, the question is one of "felt experience" rather than complexity of interaction with the world.

 

[Mercutio]

Well, that is just antropomorphism (sp?). Much of the time when we assign consciousness to animals, it is also antropomorphism, but with higher animals, we can observe behavioral patterns that are difficult to explain as anything but consciousness.

We are quick to recognise the connection in that direction, but slow to recognise that this is part of how we learn the language (including how we label our private experience). We use the consciousness-type words, whether for people, other animals, or machines, when the environmental causes are sufficiently subtle as to not telegraph to us what the specific causes of a behavior are. When causes are self-evident, we are less apt to say a behavior was "conscious", and more likely to call it "reflexive". But the salience of external causes is continuous--that is, there is no bright line separating conscious and reflexive behaviors (or, more accurately, no bright line separating the behaviors which we would infer are either conscious or reflexive).

So, I would argue it is not merely anthropomorphism, and that dismissing it as such artificially dichotomizes between our own "real" consciousness and other forms which are some cheap anthropomorphic imitation. Rather, our labeling of other and own consciousness is part of the same process. We have merely (but understandably) attached the label to behaviors which are much more apt to be performed by humans (and a wide variety of those behaviors).

 

[Mercutio]

I agree that parrots are conscious, btw. But again, for me, the question is one of "felt experience" rather than complexity of interaction with the world.

Again I must ask, then, if it is "felt experience", and no one but you can feel your experience (and you can feel no others' experience), how is it that you learned to label this "consciousness"?

The public behaviors you used as referents are how you learned the term. Your "felt experience" is one degree further removed, not closer, to how you learned the word, as your felt experience is imperfectly correlated with the word as learned (iow, not every time you felt a particular way was there someone there to notice and provide a label, and not every time someone used a particular word were you feeling that particular experience. This is the natural result of our inability to read one another's minds.).

This is part of the reason that discussions of consciousness get bogged down so quickly. The focus on "felt experience", while perfectly understandable, glosses over how we learn to speak about this experience, and how we learn to label our own feelings. It leaves us with poorly defined terms and no framework within which to discuss.

 

[Piggy]

Mercutio, I have a hard time teasing out your meaning b/c you seem to drift between discussion of language and discussion of objects as if there were no distinction.

Again I must ask, then, if it is "felt experience", and no one but you can feel your experience (and you can feel no others' experience), how is it that you learned to label this "consciousness"?

What are you asking about, exactly, here? Are you asking why I use that word to refer to felt experience? Are you asking something about language acquisition?

The public behaviors you used as referents are how you learned the term.

You're saying that I learned the term "consciousness" via "public behaviors"? I don't understand this.

Your "felt experience" is one degree further removed, not closer, to how you learned the word, as your felt experience is imperfectly correlated with the word as learned (iow, not every time you felt a particular way was there someone there to notice and provide a label, and not every time someone used a particular word were you feeling that particular experience. This is the natural result of our inability to read one another's minds.).

You've totally lost me here. How does language acquisition come into this in the first place? And even if it did, your statements about lacking a label-provider for every instance are incomprehensible to me.

This is part of the reason that discussions of consciousness get bogged down so quickly. The focus on "felt experience", while perfectly understandable, glosses over how we learn to speak about this experience, and how we learn to label our own feelings. It leaves us with poorly defined terms and no framework within which to discuss.

Why do we need to concern ourselves with how we learn to speak?

I'm sorry, but I can't make heads or tails of all this.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

For all purposes, Vervet monkes do appear to have some "mental states", heck, they even have their own protolanguage. Seyfarth and Cheney have some papers regarding them.

And I agree with Piggy in that consciousness should be used in a more general way. I would say that of course animals (at least those with similar neural structures) experience pain and even some (human like*) emotional states. And this is merely a deduction based on evolution.


* Its more than we animals share the feelings, not that we humans anthropomorphize their behavior.

 

[Mercutio]

Mercutio, I have a hard time teasing out your meaning b/c you seem to drift between discussion of language and discussion of objects as if there were no distinction.

This discussion is about both, of course. The meaning is perfectly clear when we speak of publicly available objects and learning the words we use to refer to them; it is when we apply the same analysis to our private experience that we begin to treat things differently.

What are you asking about, exactly, here? Are you asking why I use that word to refer to felt experience? Are you asking something about language acquisition?

In a sense, yes. You are discussing something that no one else has access to, and which you have no access to anyone else's. And yet, we understand one another (most of the time). How is this possible? Unless you think we somehow have access to some magical collective unconscious or Platonic Ideal, the only way to explain it is through learning via public referent. As such, examining how it is that one learns a word is very enlightening in terms of what the word means.

You're saying that I learned the term "consciousness" via "public behaviors"? I don't understand this.

I am saying exactly that. Are you saying you learned it some other way? Was someone able to access your consciousness and tell you "there, that is what we call 'consciousness'"? Did the word just spring forth like Athena from the head of Zeus, fully grown and armored? If so, what an amazing coincidence that we have similar conceptions of the term.

You've totally lost me here. How does language acquisition come into this in the first place? And even if it did, your statements about lacking a label-provider for every instance are incomprehensible to me.

Language acquisition came into this because it is a useful way to examine the question. It de-mystifies the term and re-frames the question in a much more reasonable manner. Some of the apparent difficulties in understanding consciousness are, in my opinion, merely artifacts of our improper assumptions about what consciousness is; critically and skeptically examining our assumptions about consciousness is the first step in examining the question more productively.

Why do we need to concern ourselves with how we learn to speak?

I'm sorry, but I can't make heads or tails of all this.

It is a very different view from traditional linguistics (which, as one critique put it, relies on magic). But unless you can figure a way for us to have direct knowledge of someone else's conscious experience, the only other option is to learn through publicly available referents--in this case, observable behaviors.

What are your own assumptions about consciousness? Starting from how you learned the term, to why you see consciousness in some things (people, at least, I assume) and not in others.

 

[Piggy]

This discussion is about both, of course. The meaning is perfectly clear when we speak of publicly available objects and learning the words we use to refer to them; it is when we apply the same analysis to our private experience that we begin to treat things differently.

Why?

In a sense, yes. You are discussing something that no one else has access to, and which you have no access to anyone else's. And yet, we understand one another (most of the time). How is this possible? Unless you think we somehow have access to some magical collective unconscious or Platonic Ideal, the only way to explain it is through learning via public referent. As such, examining how it is that one learns a word is very enlightening in terms of what the word means.

Enlightening how? Why should that be enlightening? Why are we discussing "what the word means"? Why are we discussing learning? Why are we discussing language acquisition? How is any of this relevant?

All I've said is that I find it meaningful to consider consciousness in terms of the presence of "felt experience" rather than a sense of an understanding of the "I/thou" distinction or in terms of functional definitions such as certain types of interactions with the environment. And suddenly, we're launching into discussions of language acquisition (laid out in terms that don't seem very clear or coherent, btw).

I am saying exactly that. Are you saying you learned it some other way? Was someone able to access your consciousness and tell you "there, that is what we call 'consciousness'"? Did the word just spring forth like Athena from the head of Zeus, fully grown and armored? If so, what an amazing coincidence that we have similar conceptions of the term.

I don't know that we have similar conceptions of the term at all.

As for the definition I'm using here, I came to it through a combination of reading, introspection, observation, and reasoning.

In any case, I still don't see the relevance of discussing language acquisition.

Language acquisition came into this because it is a useful way to examine the question. It de-mystifies the term and re-frames the question in a much more reasonable manner. Some of the apparent difficulties in understanding consciousness are, in my opinion, merely artifacts of our improper assumptions about what consciousness is; critically and skeptically examining our assumptions about consciousness is the first step in examining the question more productively.

I don't see that examining language acquisition is going to help us examine the question at all. I think it's much more effective and efficient to focus on the object of discussion. And I wasn't aware that the term was "mystified" to begin with.

If you want to talk about assumptions and why they may be incorrect, then please, put them on the table.

It is a very different view from traditional linguistics (which, as one critique put it, relies on magic). But unless you can figure a way for us to have direct knowledge of someone else's conscious experience, the only other option is to learn through publicly available referents--in this case, observable behaviors.

Again, you're sliding back and forth between discussions of language and discussions of things as though there were no difference.

Do you have some non-traditional linguistics to propose? And if so, why is that important?

"Direct knowledge of someone else's conscious experience" is not needed for our purposes here. We all have human bodies and brains. We all came from the same evolutionary processes. We all behave essentially the same. There's no reason to believe that we somehow have radically different conscious apparati.

Are you claiming that some of us have felt experience and others don't (excepting people in vegetative states and other such obvious exceptions)?

If so, then you're merely kicking up trivial objections. If not, then I'm not following you.

What are your own assumptions about consciousness? Starting from how you learned the term, to why you see consciousness in some things (people, at least, I assume) and not in others.

How I learned the term is immaterial. That's like saying that a wool sweater may not be wool, depending on where you bought it. To determine if it's wool, you examine the fabric, not the provenance. And in any case, how the heck am I going to remember anything about my learning this word as a child?

You want an inventory of assumptions? Please.

Again, all I've said is that what's most important to me is whether another being has, for lack of a better term, "the experience of experience". I don't care what happens to a computer with a monitor and light sensor because I don't believe it has any awareness of what happens to it. But I'm sickened by reports of abuse of horses, dogs, and cats because I believe that they -- like humans -- do have "felt experience".

And I believe that Dennett's A/B-Brain model is very likely a correct and useful one.

If you're interested in why I believe that, then why not just ask me directly?

 

[Mercutio]

Why?

Because some choose to treat the processes of experience as qualitatively different from the things that happen on the other side of our skin. Thus, dualism...

Enlightening how? Why should that be enlightening? Why are we discussing "what the word means"? Why are we discussing learning? Why are we discussing language acquisition? How is any of this relevant?

All I've said is that I find it meaningful to consider consciousness in terms of the presence of "felt experience" rather than a sense of an understanding of the "I/thou" distinction or in terms of functional definitions such as certain types of interactions with the environment. And suddenly, we're launching into discussions of language acquisition (laid out in terms that don't seem very clear or coherent, btw).

Yes...you have chosen to consider consciousness in terms which cannot be shared by any other. This is why "what the word means" is important. If you do not find my approach relevant, you don't have to use it.

I don't know that we have similar conceptions of the term at all.

As for the definition I'm using here, I came to it through a combination of reading, introspection, observation, and reasoning.

Reading and observation are the sorts of public referents I refer to. Introspection and reasoning, unless you are quite different from the rest of us, build upon these public referents.

In any case, I still don't see the relevance of discussing language acquisition.

Then don't.

I don't see that examining language acquisition is going to help us examine the question at all. I think it's much more effective and efficient to focus on the object of discussion. And I wasn't aware that the term was "mystified" to begin with.

Focusing on the object of discussion is wonderful, as soon as we have agreement on what it is.

If you want to talk about assumptions and why they may be incorrect, then please, put them on the table.

Again, you're sliding back and forth between discussions of language and discussions of things as though there were no difference.

When we have a way of discussing things without using language to do so, then the language question will be irrelevant.

Do you have some non-traditional linguistics to propose? And if so, why is that important?

My point was simply that my point of view, while well established within behaviorism, is very likely not familiar to you.

"Direct knowledge of someone else's conscious experience" is not needed for our purposes here. We all have human bodies and brains. We all came from the same evolutionary processes. We all behave essentially the same. There's no reason to believe that we somehow have radically different conscious apparati.

Are you claiming that some of us have felt experience and others don't (excepting people in vegetative states and other such obvious exceptions)?

If so, then you're merely kicking up trivial objections. If not, then I'm not following you.

I am actually trying to examine what it is that this "felt experience" is--which is what I thought you were trying to do. I find my approach quite useful. You do not.

How I learned the term is immaterial. That's like saying that a wool sweater may not be wool, depending on where you bought it. To determine if it's wool, you examine the fabric, not the provenance. And in any case, how the heck am I going to remember anything about my learning this word as a child?

It is not immaterial in this case--this is not where you bought the sweater, but how it was made, and from what.

You want an inventory of assumptions? Please.

Again, all I've said is that what's most important to me is whether another being has, for lack of a better term, "the experience of experience". I don't care what happens to a computer with a monitor and light sensor because I don't believe it has any awareness of what happens to it. But I'm sickened by reports of abuse of horses, dogs, and cats because I believe that they -- like humans -- do have "felt experience".

All I am doing is examining why you believe that, and why others either do or do not agree with you. An analysis of how we have learned the terms is very useful in this. Again, you are free to disagree.

And I believe that Dennett's A/B-Brain model is very likely a correct and useful one.

I happen to agree.

If you're interested in why I believe that, then why not just ask me directly?

self-reports are notoriously unreliable. Besides, I have been addressing the question from the OP--my response to your post was as much to andyandy as to you.