The relationship between science and materialism

[Darat]

...snip....[/i]

You still don't understand.

This is a matter of the meanings of words. In one particular metaphysics "mind" means one thing, in another it may mean something quite different so if you use the wrong definition in the wrong metaphysics you'll keep (as you have repeatedly done) tripping yourself up.

As a few people have been trying to get you to understand your problem is that you can't let go of what you think the label mind means and even worse you impose your definition of mind on another system that uses a different definition for the label mind. It is hardly surprising then that the the system doesn't make any sense to you.

Just try to be open minded and consider that how you use a word may not be how someone else uses it - if you can do that it will clear up a lot of your misunderstandings.

 

[Darat]

Forget the mathematics. The only claim I making right now is that ultimate reality is mathematical.

Evidence?

If it isn't, why do you think it's behaviour follows mathematical laws?

We have a "TOE!? Surprised that didn't make the news... seriously Geoff - this is just an assumption and in my mind a huge assumption.

To stop people confusing the stuff which exists with material stuff, which doesn't (in the same way minds don't).

...snip...

Why use a label ("being") that has so much baggage when we have a perfectly good word with out any baggage "reality"?

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

I have no idea what the statement "purely physical mind" refers to. It is a meaningless phrase.

I stated earlier that you used exactly this tactic, and here we are going around the circle yet again.

You deny the possibility of purely physical minds, in this case by playing dumb. If someone challenges you to defend this nonsense, you will attempt to escape either by claiming you are using someone else's definitions, or by demanding that someone post some definitions for you. Then if they persist you will snip their arguments, pretend they don't understand, and try it again in a few pages time.

We have seen this all before.

Sorry, Kev. You still don't understand my position - not even remotely. I'm not going to respond to any of your posts unless you ask me a question worth answering.

Here's one: Are now admitting that purely physical minds might possibly supervene on purely physical brains, or do you deny that this is possible?

If you deny that it is possible, explain how on earth you plan to pass yourself off as anything other than some flavour of immaterialist if you have denied the possibility of purely material minds.

If you accept that it is possible, explain why you haven't apologised to everyone and slunk off yet.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You still don't understand.

This is a matter of the meanings of words.

No, Darat, once again it is you who does not understand.

I am very much aware that this is a matter of the meaning of words. That is why there is a standing challenge for any materialist here to define a set of terms and defend his position. The very fact that you do not realise that my entire argument through this very long thread has been based on claims about the meanings of words just demonstrates you haven't got a clue what I am talking about. You are now trying to teach your grandmother how to suck eggs.

In one particular metaphysics "mind" means one thing, in another it may mean something quite different so if you use the wrong definition in the wrong metaphysics you'll keep (as you have repeatedly done) tripping yourself up.

Errr...that'll be why my challenge is still standing and you haven't offered me any definitions?

Just try to be open minded and consider that how you use a word may not be how someone else uses it....

Oh! It had never occured to me that how I use words may not be how someone else uses them. I'll remember to discuss your brilliant observation with my fellow students before our philosophy of language exam.

Darat, why not stick to posting in "forum community"?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I stated earlier that you used exactly this tactic, and here we are going around the circle yet again.

You deny the possibility of purely physical minds......

Kevin, think back to our discussion about eliminativism. You stated that anything worthy of the label "physicalism" must be able to claim that all mental terms can be replaced by physical ones. If that is the case then the very word "mind" is useless. It's not theoretically needed at all. The reason I deny the possibility of "purely physical minds" is because upon YOUR definition of what physicalism is, the word "mind" doesn't mean anything at all. So when you say

"purely physical minds"

you might just as well be saying

"purely physical green fairy gidgets"

I am objecting on the grounds that what you are saying when you say "purely physical minds" SOUNDS like you are trying to give a physical definition of a mind - but you aren't - you are giving a purely physical description of a brain process and simply calling it a mind. So I am objecting on exactly the same grounds that YOU would object to the phrase "purely physical fairy gidgets." There aren't any fairy gidgets, and according to your worldview there aren't any minds either.

If you deny that it is possible, explain how on earth you plan to pass yourself off as anything other than some flavour of immaterialist....

I am denying it is possible that the word "mind", as it is being used by YOU, has no meaning apart from "brain process". Therefore the phrase "purely physical mind" has no meaning either. Get it? All you are really claiming is "there are purely physical brain processes". Which we all agree with. It justs sounds like you are saying something else, which is why I am objecting.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Why use a label ("being") that has so much baggage when we have a perfectly good word with out any baggage "reality"?

Because the word "reality" means something slightly different, and means different things to different people.

 

[Darat]

No, Darat, once again it is you who does not understand.

I am very much aware that this is a matter of the meaning of words. That is why there is a standing challenge for any materialist here to define a set of terms and defend his position. The very fact that you do not realise that my entire argument through this very long thread has been based on claims about the meanings of words just demonstrates you haven't got a clue what I am talking about. You are now trying to teach your grandmother how to suck eggs.

If you did understand this then you wouldn't keep misrepresenting "Eliminativism" statements and conclusions regarding mind.

Errr...that'll be why my challenge is still standing and you haven't offered me any definitions?

As I have said to many times I am not a materialist - I have no intention in trying to support a position I do not hold.

...snip....

Oh! It had never occured to me that how I use words may not be how someone else uses them. I'll remember to discuss your brilliant observation with my fellow students before our philosophy of language exam.

...snip...

This is meant to be an educational forum so I'm glad I've been able to teach you something. However I suspect you will find that many if not all of your fellow students and lecturers will already be aware of this.

 

[davidsmith73]

Sense data? It's a bit of both {quality and quantity}, isn't it? That's how things like science are possible in the first place.

Thats an interesting admission. If you think sense data is both qualitative and quantitative, then what would be your definition of quality? Wouldn't it onlt be possible to define it in an ostensive way, for example, "non-relational"?

At least you recognise the term that I am trying to say is cruical to this debate. What is your take on it?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

However I suspect you will find that many if not all of your fellow students and lecturers will already be aware of this.

You think it is possible to be a philosophy lecturer (which usually implies a Ph.D and several published books) and to not realise that people mean different things by different words?

 

[hammegk]

Just as there is quite definitely something that pain refers to.
~~ Paul

Er, yes. What do you think "I can feel your pain" might mean in the terms we are discussing?

.... the words we write are not merely some Rorschach ink-blot, for you to see what you want in them.

Or perhaps some are. What do you see in the term "physical mind"?

...
Human minds were plausible candidates for immaterial stuff five hundred years ago, but now we have taken them to bits and found out that the stuff that makes up these brains is just the same as all the other stuff, and that damaging the brain damages the mind in predictable and serious ways. So it's now the simplest view of what we are, that we are just more material stuff doing something interesting.

"Human minds" represent the ultimate consciousness we identify, but also represent an infinitesmally tiny fraction of "what-is", which is the stuff actually under discussion.

Remember that this question presupposes a dualistic view?

So, what was only assumed is what is being eliminated?

Would hammy agree? (Serious question, if you are reading, hammy)
I tend to agree; as I have said, all the terms you have chosen to use are dualistic. As long as you use them, you end up with your dualism-in-a-dress.

I do agree that Geoff's ongoing attempt to distinguish between reductive and eliminative materialisms is a valid argument... (noting that in the end each individual's worldview must color one's understanding of those positions).

I remain an objective idealist.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Say, in the real world, how do we tell the difference between "X reduces to Y" and "X supervenes on Y"?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Say, in the real world, how do we tell the difference between "X reduces to Y" and "X supervenes on Y"?

~~ Paul

If X and Y are mind and brain then we cannot - it would be asking for an empirical answer to a metaphysical question. If X and Y are both clearly physical then we are in a situation where empirical research can theoretically resolve the question.

And if anyone responds to this by saying "If physicalism is true then minds are physical" I think I am going to throw myself out of the window.

 

[davidsmith73]

Then we may be able to move foreward definition-wise, since we do have some kind of handle on what constitutes feelings. Now, we certainly do not know any of this info in detail, but we do have several different brain/body systems that account for different types of feelings -- emotion systems, motivational systems, several different somatosensory systems.

I think you have changed the meaning of "feeling" here. Before, we were refering to qualitative experience. Feelings that are defined by behavior do not refer to these aspects of experience. Indeed, I do not think it is conceivable that they could because behaviour is defined relationally whereas quality is non-relational IMO.

I think your obvious reply will be "all that is fine, but it can't explain what it really feels like to see red", but what we know of objective vs. other accounts is that describing an action from the outside does not capture the full essence of any action. The action itself is different from the description of it from the outside. So neuron firings described from the outside do not capture fully what happens when neurons fire.

I find this kind of position quite unsatisfactory. Essentially you are saying that:

a) we have a description of brain processes from the "outside" and the ontological brain processes themselves on the "inside", the latter of which equals experiences.

But consider the following:

b)we have a description of brain processes from the outside and the ontological brain processes themselves on the inside, the latter of which do not equal experiences (for example, cerebellum function)


If you accept that b) is possible ( and I think you will, correct me if I'm wrong) then you have posed the "hard problem of conscoiusness" which is how to account for the differing scenarios. In other words, you have to specify how a) and b) are simultaneously possible. Inevitably you have to come up with a definition of experience which gets you into all sorts of circular arguments I reckon.

The act of seeing red must be distinguishable in some way from the act of feeling pain for the brain to do anything with the information. Feelings serve as markers that relay motivational and informational content about experiences. Since we experience these things we cannot quite put a full label on them, which is why I think you had trouble giving a definition of what "quality" is. It seems very ineffable, but that ineffability could simply be the differing "tags" that emotion, feeling, etc. carry so that we can differentiate the information and motivation content of an experience. Does that make any sense?

Well yes, but I still think it suffers from my points above.

 

[Mercutio]

No third thing assumed.

Physicalists want to say "mind is an illusion" or "mind is an abstraction". I am simply saying "both mind and matter fall into this category", and declare the ONE real thing to be noumenal. So there is no "third thing". In reality, there is only ONE thing. It just doesn't happen to be matter.

Do you understand my position any better now?

Geoff

So when materialists say "all of reality is one kind of stuff", or idealists say "all of reality is one kind of stuff", and you say "all of reality is one kind of stuff", you are all saying the same thing? Then why do you disagree with them?

Hammy does not claim that what we perceive as being material is not, in fact, real--he just says it is not material. Still there, different stuff. He is not denying anything. A materialist does not claim that what we experience as being mental is not there--it is just not mental. Still there, different stuff. Neither is making any claims that eliminate part of what is real. Now, you say there is just "one thing". What is more, it is not a "third thing". So basically, then, you agree with both sides. You just want the convenience of being able to use dualistic language and make a real distinction between material and ideal, claim that materialists are insane for thinking everything is one stuff, and perhaps make the same claim about idealists (can't recall that specific claim at the moment, though).

A materialist not made of straw says something like "reality appears to be made of one kind of stuff. For our purposes, we will call it matter, treat it like matter is real, and see how far that assumption gets us." They recognise that it is an assumption. Hammy also, to the best of my understanding, does this, except that his axiomatic assumption is that thought is what is real. He (sometimes) recognises this as an assumption, too.

Which is more honest--to admit that your choice of monism is an assumption, or to circularly infer a third alternative and claim that it is no assumption, but fact?

 

[Mercutio]

Or perhaps some are. What do you see in the term "physical mind"?

Fluffy bunnies, mostly. I can see where in a particular conversation, that phrase might have meaning, but it would take some serious setting of ground rules first, and probably would be a poor term to try to gain consensus about. Odd...using dualistic terms to create an oxymoron where none need exist.

I do agree that Geoff's ongoing attempt to distinguish between reductive and eliminative materialisms is a valid argument... (noting that in the end each individual's worldview must color one's understanding of those positions).

I remain an objective idealist.

I fear that in the attempt to distinguish them, one may define "real" materialists, and the other straw-materialists. But hope springs eternal...

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

If X and Y are mind and brain then we cannot - it would be asking for an empirical answer to a metaphysical question. If X and Y are both clearly physical then we are in a situation where empirical research can theoretically resolve the question.

Then why waste a moment of time worrying about it?

Which is more honest--to admit that your choice of monism is an assumption, or to circularly infer a third alternative and claim that it is no assumption, but fact?

Perhaps someone can describe an experiment where we could distinguish the various monisms from one another. That would be cool. If there is no such experiment, then they are all equivalent.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So when materialists say "all of reality is one kind of stuff", or idealists say "all of reality is one kind of stuff", and you say "all of reality is one kind of stuff", you are all saying the same thing? Then why do you disagree with them?

Because we aren't all saying the same thing. Idealists and materialists make an additional claim - a claim of transcendental realism:

"All of reality is one kind of stuff and that stuff is mental stuff."
"All of reality is one kind of stuff and that stuff is physical stuff."

Both these are claims that one half of Descartes duality is the one stuff that exists and that the other does not. My position is fundamentally different to this. First Kant comes along and argues for transcendental idealism:

"Reality as we percieve it seems like is made of two kinds of stuff, but that's not actually reality. Reality is one kind of stuff and it's neither mind nor is it matter nor is it spatio-temporal (we can only make negative claims about it). The true nature of noumenal reality is beyond our comprehension."

The most important difference is the rejection of the claim that either of the concepts which constitute the poles of cartesian dualism are suitable concepts for describing mind-independent noumenal reality.

My position is descended from Kant's, in so much as it agrees with everything but the last sentence.

Hammy does not claim that what we perceive as being material is not, in fact, real--he just says it is not material. Still there, different stuff. He is not denying anything. A materialist does not claim that what we experience as being mental is not there--it is just not mental. Still there, different stuff. Neither is making any claims that eliminate part of what is real. Now, you say there is just "one thing". What is more, it is not a "third thing". So basically, then, you agree with both sides.

I've explained this in great detail, although I am glad you have now worked it out on your own. That is the whole point of my system. I can tweak it so it can turn into something very similar to either idealism or materialism by changing the status of Being/Nothing to either Being or Nothing. This is not an accident. It was a quite deliberate. There are many benefits to this, including the fact that I have not built naturalism or non-naturalism into my system so I can actually claim that if I don't believe in supernatural phenomena it is based on empirical results rather than a straightforward assertion which I have built into my belief system and subsequently refuse to question. Naturalism becomes a religion if it cannot be challenged. Materialism makes naturalism impossible to challenge. Therefore I can accuse people who take materialism too literally of turning it into a religion. That is the main point of the opening post of this thread.

Which is more honest--to admit that your choice of monism is an assumption, or to circularly infer a third alternative and claim that it is no assumption, but fact?

So long as I allow for either naturalism or non-naturalism to be true, I can claim that my position is that of the true agnostic and that materialism is not.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Then why waste a moment of time worrying about it?

I'm a philosopher.

Perhaps someone can describe an experiment where we could distinguish the various monisms from one another. That would be cool. If there is no such experiment, then they are all equivalent.

~~ Paul

Not true. They are empirically equivalent. Your claim depends on the implicit claim that metaphysics is impossible. I don't believe you are in a position to defend that implicit claim. Not without a decent grasp of the relevance of Kant to the history of human thought.

 

[Darat]

You think it is possible to be a philosophy lecturer (which usually implies a Ph.D and several published books) and to not realise that people mean different things by different words?

You do seem to have a basic comprehension problem.

I was informing you that unlike yourself (i.e. "... It had never occurred to me that how I use words may not be how someone else uses them ...") your fellow students and lecturers were probably already aware of the lesson you'd only just learnt.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Odd...using dualistic terms to create an oxymoron where none need exist.

Yet I'm accused by the purveyor of that particular phrase of "assuming my conclusion" if I point out that it is in fact an oxymoron which serves no justifiable purpose.