The relationship between science and materialism

[Jekyll]

One thing I don't understand is why the dualist position stops after a division into mind and matter.

Geoff is appears to be arguing that a description of the mind in terms of brain function doesn't capture the essence of the experience of the mind. So we can't rule out a duality.

The obvious riposte to this is that a functional description is not intended to capture an experience, but we can leave that to one side for a moment and simply repeat the argument.

A description of breath in terms of lung function doesn't capture the essence of the experience of breath.

A description of taste in terms of tongue function doesn't capture the essence of the experience of taste.

A description of excretion in terms of bowel function doesn't capture the essence of the experience of excretion.

And so on.

Now in order to not commit the same mistake as reductionist materialists, Geoff can not resort to Occam's razor and has to explain how we don't have a k-ality of physical, mind, breath, taste, excretion, etc..

I don't think it is possible to show equivalence of the experiences and to dismiss any of them as just physical phenomena opens the door for others to do the same to mind.

 

[Mercutio]

Erm, Merc....the discussion, for several pages now, has been about eliminative materialism.

...which A) is not my position, and B) is currently having troubles distinguishing itself from reductionist materialism. These labels you put on things do more to fog than to illuminate.

Nobody seems particularly interested in doing so. You haven't asked me any questions about it. Nobody else has mentioned it recently. I think I explained it as well as I am going to. And none of it makes any difference to the matter at hand, from which you wish to distract attention. i.e. the fact that you can't defend physicalism.

I thought you were trying to kill off physicalism purely as a competitor to your own ideas. (The intelligent design strategy.) I was kinda waiting for you to either do it or fail to, then get back to the main question of whether your monism-by-assertion is helpful.

Threads take on lives of their own. I figured, everything else has been circled back to, so will this.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

And what is reductionism's definition of mind?

~~ Paul

I assume you mean "materialistic reductionism". In which case, the definition of mind is obscure and never clearly specified.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductive_materialism

Reductive materialism (Identity theory) claims that there is no independent, autonomous level of phenomena in the world that would correspond to the level of conscious mental states. It also states that the level of conscious phenomena is identical with some level of purely neurological description. Conscious phenomena are nothing over and above the neural level, thus it can be reduced to that level.

You tell me. What is their definition of mind? It's seems to be a definition of what mind isn't without any explanation of what it is. It's trying to have it's cake and eat it. Here's why this particular description is incoherent:

Claim 1: mental things "can be reduced" to physical things.
Claim 2: "Conscious phenomena are nothing over and above the neural level."
Observation : The neural level is already a physical level.

So why is there a reduction needed at all? Claim 1 and Claim 2 are inconsistent. Claim 1 is there for one purpose only : to avoid eliminativism and slip in a little taste of cartesian dualism in order to define "mind". Claim 2 is a claim that seems to be no different to eliminativism. In other words, it's eliminativism with a sneaky bit of dualism to allow the inclusion of the word "mind", but no additional explanation as to what "mind" is over and above the physical. It's incoherent, because it's dualistic.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I thought you were trying to kill off physicalism purely as a competitor to your own ideas.

Nope. I am attacking it because it's false and lots of perfectly intelligent and educated people think it's true. I only mentioned my own position because people repeatedly asked me to do so.

(The intelligent design strategy.) I was kinda waiting for you to either do it or fail to, then get back to the main question of whether your monism-by-assertion is helpful.

You may have a long wait then.

You may have mistaken me for lifegazer.

 

[LW]

Is anybody reading this still willing to define a set of terms and defend a version of materialism which is both of the following?:

a) logically coherent
b) not insane/bizarre/unbelievable

The problem is that you have decided a priori that it is absolutely 100% certain that what we experience as a mind cannot be a product of our brains alone. So, it is not surprising that no one can't produce an explanation that would satisfy you: if the explanation includes the word "mind", you immediately classify it as dualistic because you assume that a mind is necessarily immaterial, and if it doesn't, you classify it "insane" because you think that an immaterial mind is necessary precondition for thought processes.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

The problem is that you have decided a priori that it is absolutely 100% certain that what we experience as a mind cannot be a product of our brains alone.

Correct. This statement is a priori false because it is internally logically inconsistent. It is like claiming there is such a thing as a square circle.

Only eliminativism avoids the logical contradiction, and it does so by refusing to define "mind" at all instead of making the incoherent claim that you just made.

So, it is not surprising that no one can't produce an explanation that would satisfy you: if the explanation includes the word "mind", you immediately classify it as dualistic............

This is not true. It is in fact Paul, Mercutio and the defenders of materialism who have repeatedly stated that any mention of the word mind implies dualism - NOT ME. So what you are saying is totally wrong. When it suits the materialists to do so, they accuse me of using "centuries old vocabulary laden with dualism". When I point out that this stance leads to eliminative materialism they accuse me of "loading the concept of mind with dualistic notions."

Sorry, LW, but the materialists cannot have it both ways. Either "mind" has dualistic connotations and cannot be used, or it doesn't. I don't care which line they take, but I'm pretty bored of them flipping between one and the other like ping pong balls and continually claiming that somebody else is to blame.

because you assume that a mind is necessarily immaterial, and if it doesn't, you classify it "insane" because you think that an immaterial mind is necessary precondition for thought processes.

You haven't followed the arguments. At no point did I make any such assumption and none of my arguments depend on it.

If you think otherwise, please say why.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Oh give over. He's spent 33 pages claiming he has "a position" which he's emailed to a couple of people. He keeps saying his position is a refutation of mine. But 33 pages into the thread, we are still waiting for mercutio to declare this position. And now he's trying to have a go at me for being rude to a new member by implying he lied about mercutio's proof. What a waste of time. Nobody is interested in reading this.

Now, I kindly ask you to get back to the actual topic.

Ok, agreed.

Answering your other post. Yes, all Im saying, and Im glad you agree, is that what you call "eliminative materialism" is logically coherent. Now, I think we also agree in that all that is doing is leaving some open questions, in the hope that "someday" they will vanish.

For starters, claiming that the mind is like the software and that the brain is a computer is a completely naive statement comming from materialists. Now, the interesting thing is that I still have to find some "hard core materialist" in the forum.

AFAIK everyone who defend some sort of materialistic approach do it only in an utilitarian fashion.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Reductive materialism (Identity theory) claims that there is no independent, autonomous level of phenomena in the world that would correspond to the level of conscious mental states. It also states that the level of conscious phenomena is identical with some level of purely neurological description. Conscious phenomena are nothing over and above the neural level, thus it can be reduced to that level.

You tell me. What is their definition of mind? It's seems to be a definition of what mind isn't without any explanation of what it is. It's trying to have it's cake and eat it. Here's why this particular description is incoherent:

Claim 1: mental things "can be reduced" to physical things.
Claim 2: "Conscious phenomena are nothing over and above the neural level."
Observation : The neural level is already a physical level.

So why is there a reduction needed at all? Claim 1 and Claim 2 are inconsistent. Claim 1 is there for one purpose only : to avoid eliminativism and slip in a little taste of cartesian dualism in order to define "mind". Claim 2 is a claim that seems to be no different to eliminativism. In other words, it's eliminativism with a sneaky bit of dualism to allow the inclusion of the word "mind", but no additional explanation as to what "mind" is over and above the physical. It's incoherent, because it's dualistic.

Wipe the mud out of your eyes, man!

First of all, it says there is "no independent, autonomous level of phenomena." This is a bald assertion against duality.

Next, it says that conscious mental states/phenomena is identical with purely neurological description. It says "some level" just because mental states is so poorly defined.

Then it says there is nothing over and above the neural level.

I do not know how much clearer this could be. The following statement:

"Mind is reducible to brain function."

makes no assertions about dualism whatsoever. You appear to read the word "mind" as "mind-with-dualism," regardless of the context of the statement.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

This is not true. It is in fact Paul, Mercutio and the defenders of materialism who have repeatedly stated that any mention of the word mind implies dualism - NOT ME.

Gah.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Wipe the mud out of your eyes, man!

Look who's talking. My position has been consistent for the last 34 pages.

First of all, it says there is "no independent, autonomous level of phenomena." This is a bald assertion against duality.

Yep, it doesn't think it's dualistic.

Next, it says that conscious mental states/phenomena is identical with purely neurological description.

Making it eliminative materialism in a dress.....

Wipe the mud from your eyes, Paul.

It says "some level" just because mental states is so poorly defined.

Ding! Ding! Ding!

"Mental states" is always poorly defined by reductive materialists.

Then it says there is nothing over and above the neural level.

I do not know how much clearer this could be.

It could admit it was eliminative materialism?

The following statement:

"Mind is reducible to brain function."

makes no assertions about dualism whatsoever. You appear to read the word "mind" as "mind-with-dualism," regardless of the context of the statement.

It does as soon as you define mind as anything other than "neural function."

It's a mirage, Paul. The oasis you think you just have found on your circular journey through the metaphysical desert is none other than the very same place you started from. Want me to prove it to you?

Remember where the carousel ride started? It started with you trying to define a coherent set of terms in order to defend reductive (not eliminative) materialism.

You have just arrived back exactly where you started. You want to defend reductive materialism?

Please define:

Subjective
Mind
Objective
Matter

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Sorry, LW, but the materialists cannot have it both ways. Either "mind" has dualistic connotations and cannot be used, or it doesn't. I don't care which line they take, but I'm pretty bored of them flipping between one and the other like ping pong balls and continually claiming that somebody else is to blame.

In the context of materialism, mind has no dualistic connotations. The particular flavor of materialism does not matter. There are no dualistic assumptions. The definition of reductive materialism has none. There is no dualism to be found.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Gah.

~~ Paul

What is that supposed to mean?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

In the context of materialism, mind has no dualistic connotations.

That is because in the context of materialism, mind can only mean "brain processes". It cannot mean anything else. In which case, eliminative materialism MUST BE true. No other position can actually be materialism. Reductive materialism is just eliminative materialism with some added words that mean nothing. As soon as you try to make the words mean something non-physical, it becomes dualism. But if they don't mean anything non-physical, it becomes eliminativism.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Making it [reductive materialism] eliminative materialism...

Thank you, that's what I thought. So now we know that both reductive and eliminative materialism are coherent.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Thank you, that's what I thought. So now we know that both reductive and eliminative materialism are coherent.

~~ Paul

No!

Reductive materialism is only coherent if you define it in such a way that it is actually eliminative materialism. If you think reductive materialism is coherent, just go ahead and define your terms and I'll produce you another proof it's incoherent in ten minutes flat.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Geoff, old buddy, old pal, I'm just using the definition of reductive materialism that we both cited. If there is another one that you think is incoherent, please cite it. Then send a message to one of the authors to tell him he's got it wrong.

You appear to think there are two kinds of materialism:

(a) eliminative materialism

(b) all the other ones, which have some sort of dualistic notion to them

Is that a mainstream philosophical view of the types of materialism? If so, why don't philosophers correct the definitions?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ooh, look. I found more incorrect definitions of reductive materialism:

The view that only the material world (matter) is truly real, and that all processes and realities observed in the universe can be explained by reducing them down to their most basic scientific components, e.g., atoms, molecules, and everything else thought to make up what we know as "matter." For example, a reductive materialist would view the miraculous and unexpected healing of a supposedly terminal cancer patient as a random coincidence of solely biological and physiological processes in the person's body. While, on the other hand, some might view the healing as stemming from factors contributing to the biological factors, e.g., prayer or meditation. ---meta-library

Reductive materialism (Identity Theory) claims that there is no independent, autonomous level of phenomena in the world that would correspond to the level of conscious mental states. It also states that the level of conscious phenomena is identical with some level of purely neurological description. Conscious phenomena are nothing over and above the neural level, thus it can be reduced to that level. ---answers.com

reductive materialism/type identity theory: mental states exist and each (type of) mental state is identical to a specifiable (type of) physical state of the brain; talk of mental states/properties can, in principle, be redefined in terms of talk of brain states/properties; i.e., mental states/properties are reduced to or identical to brain states/properties. ---Washington & Lee dictionary

Reductive materialism (Identity Theory) claims that there is no independent, autonomous level of phenomena in the world that would correspond to the level of conscious mental states. It also states that the level of conscious phenomena is indentical with some level of purely neurological description. Conscious phenomena are nothing over and above the neural level, thus it can be reduced to that level. ---reference.com

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Geoff, old buddy, old pal, I'm just using the definition of reductive materialism that we both cited. If there is another one that you think is incoherent, please cite it. Then send a message to one of the authors to tell him he's got it wrong.

He hasn't got it wrong. You didn't understand it.

You appear to think there are two kinds of materialism:

(a) eliminative materialism

(b) all the other ones, which have some sort of dualistic notion to them

Yep. As do the eliminativists themselves. That's why they're eliminativists.

The others flap around trying to figure out a version of materialism that's not elimininative, but makes sense - and fail. So you will find a whole plethora of non-eliminative but still purportedly materialistic theories of mind. Every single one of them, when examined closely, is either eliminativism (because it's definition of mind is equivalent to that of the eliminativists - it is simply a redundant term) or it is dualism (because it it's definition of mind is not eliminative).

Don't trust wikipedia. Think for yourself.

Paul : Reductive materialism is true
Geoff : define your terms
Paul : Defines 4 variations of mental and no definitions of physical
Geoff : define your terms coherently
Paul : defines some more terms but leaves physical out again
Geoff : delivers proof against reductive materialism
Mercutio : The terms were rigged, as soon as you use dualistic terms like mind there's going to be a contradiction
Geoff : So why are you defending reductionism? What you really mean is eliminativism
Paul : What does this mean? Am I an eliminativist then? I suppose I must be.
Hammegk: Oh dear, another p-zombie.
Paul : What do you mean? Eliminative materialism doesn't mean minds don't exist
Geoff, Hammegk and Q-Source : Oh yes it does
Paul : That's silly. Reductive materialism is true.
Geoff : Define your terms
Paul.....

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

He hasn't got it wrong. You didn't understand it.

So reductive materialism has been eliminative materialism all along. Then why did anyone invent eliminative materialism and why is there so much discussion of it and why do people distinguish the two?

You would have saved us a lot of time if you had said many pages ago "I think reductive materialism is the same thing as eliminative materialism."

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Don't trust wikipedia. Think for yourself.

I can't think for myself about what philosophical definitions are, can I, you condescending jerk?

~~ Paul