The relationship between science and materialism

[davidsmith73]

What is experience?

I can only give you ostensive definitions, examples. Experience is qualitative, it is redness etc.

Look, if you can't define a word -- you said you can't define "quality" -- how do you know if you have used it properly?

And we're back to Descarte. The quality "redness" is impervious to doubt. Your question is meaningless in this context.

If that is the case, then why do we not pass over what can not be spoken?

I don't understand this question. Can you rephrase?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

We were starting on subjectivity until you ran away from it. That is the place to start.

I did not run away. You ran away after I repeatedly asked you to tell me whether you defending eliminativism or non-eliminativism.

We had gotten as far as subjectivity being potentially awareness from an "internal" perspective. The "internal" perspective was the placeholder for that issue of outside descriptions not covering everything in an action. The action cannot be fully grasped by the third-person description -- the reason being that there is a "first-person" bit to the action itself (though there is no person in the action necessarily).

This paragraph is incomprehensible.

I need to know whether you are trying to defend eliminativism or non-eliminativism. I predict you will fail to answer this very simple question, because you do not know how to answer it.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

YOU!

You've already stated that it MUST be possible to replace *ALL* mental terms with physical terms. Therefore, the only possible meanings you could have for mental words is as temporary place-holders for purely physical descriptions. Therefore, any definition of "mental" which isn't merely a place-holder for a physical term, must be dualistic.

That doesn't mean that there are no non-dualistic definitions of "mental". It just means that non-dualistic definitions of "mental" refer to something that is also physical, just as non-dualistic definitions of "belief", "imagination" and so on refer to something that is also physical.

if you're going to claim that "mental" and "physical" are mutually exclusive, that just means you have begged the question by sneaking in dualist assumptions.

You can call such terms "a place holder for a physical term" if you really want to, but it's fairly silly. "Mouse pointer" is in a sense a placeholder for a physical accounting of a particular arrangement of memory register values, pixels, memory chips and so forth, but not in a useful sense. As long as it is still useful to talk about mouse pointers as mouse pointers, there is no reason to go in to the details of how that pointer appears on your screen.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Let's look at some of the "radical" claims about eliminative materialism:

The most radical claims of eliminativism include the challenging of the existence of conscious mental states such as pains and visual perceptions. ---Wikipedia

Are we challenging pain, or its "conscious mental state," whatever that is?

In other words, it is the view that certain common-sense mental states, such as beliefs and desires, do not exist. ---Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind

Ah, common-sense mental states don't exist.

Thus the conclusion is simply that what we call consciousness does not exist and is hence eliminated. Our concepts of mental states can be re-framed in terms of a physical neurological description and the advancement of science will make talk of mental states obsolete by fully understanding the physical processes that cause our perceptions of mental states. ---arrod.co.uk

Talk of mental states will be obsolete.

One extreme non-reductive account of the mind eliminates the non-physical aspects of the mind on the grounds that it is explanatorily useless. ---johndepoe.com

No non-physical aspects of mind.

One final argument against eliminative materialism comes from the recent writings of a former supporter, Stephen Stich (1991, 1996). Stich's argument is somewhat complex, but it can be presented in outline form here. Earlier we saw that eliminative materialism is committed to the claim that the posits of folk psychology fail to refer to anything. But as Stich points out, just what this claim amounts to is far from clear. For example, we might think that reference failure occurs as the result of some degree of mismatch between reality and the theory in which the posit is embedded. But there is no clear consensus on how much of a mismatch is necessary before we can say a given posit doesn't exist. Stich offers a variety of reasons for thinking that there are fundamental difficulties that will plague any attempt to provide principled criteria for distinguishing cases of reference success from cases of reference failure. Consequently, the question of whether a theory change should be ontologically conservative or radical has no clear answer, contrary to eliminative materialism. Of course, this is a problem for the folk psychology realist as well as the eliminativist, since Stich's skeptical argument challenges our grounds for distinguishing the two. ---Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

I'm having trouble finding the metaphysical difference between reductive and eliminative materialism.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Kevin,

I've now lost track of what position you are trying to defend. Oh yes, you are challenging my definition of "eliminative materialism". In which case you need to explain what your definition would be. Please explain:

a) Why it is eliminative and not merely reductive
b) How it also qualifies as materialism

I do not believe you can satisfy both these conditions. Please show me I'm wrong.

Geoff

 

[davidsmith73]

That doesn't mean that there are no non-dualistic definitions of "mental". It just means that non-dualistic definitions of "mental" refer to something that is also physical, just as non-dualistic definitions of "belief", "imagination" and so on refer to something that is also physical.

And this is major problem I see with materialism. When trying to explain experience, it refers to something else. Experience doesn't come into the picture at all. It's that simple.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

You ran away after I repeatedly asked you to tell me whether you defending eliminativism or non-eliminativism.

Nope. I was sitting there all ready to keep asking you questions. I am not definding my point of view. We are adressing what these words mean. This isn't about me. It concerns your definitions, your viewpoint, your system. Don't start accusing others of being obfuscatory when you are the one who simply will not answer questions. Do you want to do this or not?

This paragraph is incomprehensible.

Wow. You agreed to it earlier and now it is incomprehensible? You are the one who told me that subjectivity was the viewpoint. Then you retracted that statement and told me that it had nothing to do with the viewpoint. You told me that subjectivity was awareness. So what is it? Subjectivity in a particular person cannot simply be awareness could it? Awareness from any viewpoint? What is your definition of this term you keep using?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

STOP!

Remember the difference between subjective and objective? Remember that all experiences are subjective and "objective things" come via a line of reasoning? Remember that you agreed there was "no overlap"? We're back at that point in the circle again.

I tacitly agreed for awhile, then specifically disagreed. I do not believe your definitions of P1 and P2 are clear, nor do they appear to cover everything. At the very least, there is a spurious use of "external stimuli."

There are NO "non-dualistic" definitions of "mental". If you want to be non-dualistic (and physicalist) then you must resist the temptation to define it at all. That's what my seven-line proof demonstrated.

I do not have to resist the temptation to define it as something physical. Then you will call me an eliminative materialist. So be it. Now, let's determine what an eliminative materialist really is, shall we?

~~ Paul

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Kevin,

I've now lost track of what position you are trying to defend.

Mercutio isn't falling for it, and I'm not either.

I'm not defending a position, I'm attacking your position, sometimes by putting forward possible views which you claim are incoherent, but which are in fact coherent.

I'm not even saying they're true. Just coherent.

Now kindly defend your position instead of weaselling about. If your position is any good it must stand on its own.

Oh yes, you are challenging my definition of "eliminative materialism". In which case you need to explain what your definition would be.

No I don't.

You need to establish that your definition makes sense, does the work you claim it does, and actually represents the views of the people who call themselves eliminative materialists. So far you are scoring zero out of three.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Experience is qualitative

So, quality depends on "meaning". Meaning is experience. Experience is quality.

Do I have that right? Do all these terms mean the same thing?

If you can't make sense of the words you are using perhaps you should leave what you are talking about unspoken because it is not clear that you can ever make sense of a concept if the words don't have clear senses.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

And this is major problem I see with materialism. When trying to explain experience, it refers to something else. Experience doesn't come into the picture at all. It's that simple.

Explaining experience as "something else" is just fine. It's that simple.

If you want it to be a problem, it's up to you to make a case for that position.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Paul

Let's look at some of the "radical" claims about eliminative materialism:

The most radical claims of eliminativism include the challenging of the existence of conscious mental states such as pains and visual perceptions. ---Wikipedia

Are we challenging pain, or its "conscious mental state," whatever that is?

We are challening the mental experience. You KNOW what this is. It's thing it would be absurd to eliminate.

In other words, it is the view that certain common-sense mental states, such as beliefs and desires, do not exist. ---Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind

Ah, common-sense mental states don't exist.

This includes ALL terms that are irreducibly mental.

Talk of mental states will be obsolete.

No non-physical aspects of mind.

Yes and yes.

One final argument against eliminative materialism comes from the recent writings of a former supporter, Stephen Stich (1991, 1996). Stich's argument is somewhat complex, but it can be presented in outline form here. Earlier we saw that eliminative materialism is committed to the claim that the posits of folk psychology fail to refer to anything. But as Stich points out, just what this claim amounts to is far from clear. For example, we might think that reference failure occurs as the result of some degree of mismatch between reality and the theory in which the posit is embedded. But there is no clear consensus on how much of a mismatch is necessary before we can say a given posit doesn't exist. Stich offers a variety of reasons for thinking that there are fundamental difficulties that will plague any attempt to provide principled criteria for distinguishing cases of reference success from cases of reference failure. Consequently, the question of whether a theory change should be ontologically conservative or radical has no clear answer, contrary to eliminative materialism. Of course, this is a problem for the folk psychology realist as well as the eliminativist, since Stich's skeptical argument challenges our grounds for distinguishing the two. ---Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy


I'm having trouble finding the metaphysical difference between reductive and eliminative materialism.

For a start, Stich is a difficult case because he himself wobbles between two positions : eliminative materialism and mysterianism. As a result of these wobbles, what Stich says tends to be partially dependent on what mood he's in.

There is no metaphysical difference between reductive and eliminative materialism. They both make an identical metaphysical claim : physicalism is true. The difference between them is that the reductive versions allow for the continued usage of mind to refer to something which can both be reduced to the physical yet fundamentally isn't physical. This is impossible to do, so all reductive physicalism depend on making a distinction between mental and physical whilst at the same time being unable to explain in any detail what the distinction is. It is an attempt to have one's cake and eat it. Reductive materialism tries to get rid of the ontological mind without eliminating the vocabulary that is associated with it. Eliminative materialism makes an identical claim about ontology but also claims it must be theoretically possible to remove all the mental vocabulary. Kevin has already explained why all forms of materialism must in fact satisfy the basic criteria of eliminativism (he just seems to think there is some other form of eliminativism - as did you when you tried to have "eliminativism-A" and "eliminitavism-B" - but there is no such theory).

Geoff

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Perhaps it would be helpful if Geoff would succinctly state the difference between reductive materialism and eliminative materialism.

~~ Paul

 

[Z]

It was the one and only example given by the one and only person who has spent this thread trying to eliminate mental words.

I don't care if it was the one and only example provided by the Easter Bunny - it reeks.

There are no better examples of the elimination of an archaic term. If there are, let's hear them.

That may be, but it's a rotten example for attempting to analyze the elimination (actually, the clarification) of the term mind.

Correct. That's why it's hard to imagine the elimination of all the mental terms.

I think 'elimination' is too strong a term here. 'Correction' has a more appropriate ring to it.

Consider the word 'heart'. We know that this word has been used faultily again, and again, and again. The heart doesn't think; the heart doesn't feel (in the emotional sense). The heart is an organ for circulating blood. So the more appropriate definition is simply a correction, not an elimination, of the term.

Or, look at fear. Originally, we had this immaterial concept of fear; but now we understand that fear is a largely biochemical reaction in response to certain comprehensible forms of stimulation, on the basis of upbringing and other purely physical factors. So fear's definition has also been corrected to adjust for a physicalist point of view.

Why should mind be any different, unless you are starting with an inherently and irremovably dualistic definition of mind???

Then you have defined "mind" and you are defending a non-eliminative form of materialism. It has been proved in this thread that it all non-eliminative forms of materialism aren't materialism at all. They are forms of dualism.[/quote]

I'm not defending any point of view. Labels are for soup cans. Yes, I've defined mind, and used only purely material concepts. This would be called 'correcting a faulty definition'.

If our definition of couch referred to a creature that lives in the sea, has hundreds of teeth, and no bones, would we have eliminated 'couch' if we come in a hundred years later and redefine it to mean that thing fat Americans spend most of their time on? No. And I don't see anything in your definitions of 'eliminative materialism' that requires terms be done away with entirely, rather than simply corrected to eliminate non-material content.

That is what really is at the heart of eliminative materialism, btw - not the utter annhilation of mental terms, but the elimination of non-materialist concepts themselves. If we find that 'mind' is a purely physical phenomenon, do we then have to create a new term, like 'first-person experience of brain activity', rather than simply defining 'mind' to mean the same thing?

No - YOU are now claiming this. If you cannot eliminate "mind" then you are claiming that mind is inherently non-reducable to the physical.

Wrong. If this is what you think, I'd suggest re-engaging that third brain cell and reading what I wrote again.

Now you've gone back to trying to defend eliminativism. You have accused me of using dualistic vocabulary. Yet in the very same post you have told me that you don't see how we could possibly get rid of that dualistic vocabulary.

Not at all. I've merely demonstrated that vocabulary need not remain dualistic, no matter what its origins. Just because a definition changes, doesn't mean we have to get rid of the original word.

If you think otherwise, what do you call electric guitars? Do you ever just refer to them as guitars? Do you resort to retronyms when talking about acoustic guitars? I call them all guitars, regardless of whether electric or acoustic. The definitions have changed, and I can accept that fact.

Your position is therefore TOTALLY incoherent.

Not at all - provided you're using your brain for something other than maintaining the distance between your ears.

ZD, I think you need to sort your own "basic concepts" out. What are you trying to defend?

I'm not trying to defend anything. I'm a dualist at heart. But I accept that there can be an entirely physical/material definition of mind, without maintaining dualist concepts. This seems to be a big problem for you.

I suggest you study the history of semantics and language for a bit. Maybe then you'd learn how radically terms can change. Stop being a hard-core literalist and start thinking for yourself.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Nope. I was sitting there all ready to keep asking you questions. I am not definding my point of view. We are adressing what these words mean. This isn't about me. It concerns your definitions, your viewpoint, your system.

Sorry, wasp, but we've discussed my position. Now we are discussing what eliminativism actually entails. Do you feel uncomfortable with that? So you want to change the topic?

Don't start accusing others of being obfuscatory when you are the one who simply will not answer questions. Do you want to do this or not?

I want you to realise and admit that your own position is untenable before we go back to looking at mine.

Wow. You agreed to it earlier and now it is incomprehensible? You are the one who told me that subjectivity was the viewpoint. Then you retracted that statement and told me that it had nothing to do with the viewpoint. You told me that subjectivity was awareness. So what is it? Subjectivity in a particular person cannot simply be awareness could it? Awareness from any viewpoint? What is your definition of this term you keep using?

I clearly told you what these terms refer to. They refer to the totality of your subjective experiences. Your entire mental life.

Where do you think you are going with this, wasp? Apart from round in big circles?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

We are challening the mental experience. You KNOW what this is. It's thing it would be absurd to eliminate.

No, I don't know what this is, but I'm coming awfully close to calling it weasel words.

This includes ALL terms that are irreducibly mental.

There is no such thing as a term that is irreducibly mental. There are only definitions that are irreducibly mental. I agree we dump them.

here is no metaphysical difference between reductive and eliminative materialism. They both make an identical metaphysical claim : physicalism is true. The difference between them is that the reductive versions allow for the continued usage of mind to refer to something which can both be reduced to the physical yet fundamentally isn't physical.

I disagree completely. Reductive materialists explicitly state that there is nothing that cannot be reduced:

Reductive materialism (Identity theory) claims that there is no independent, autonomous level of phenomena in the world that would correspond to the level of conscious mental states. It also states that the level of conscious phenomena is identical with some level of purely neurological description. Conscious phenomena are nothing over and above the neural level, thus it can be reduced to that level.

This is impossible to do, so all reductive physicalism depend on making a distinction between mental and physical whilst at the same time being unable to explain in any detail what the distinction is. It is an attempt to have one's cake and eat it.

I don't see this in the above definition.

~~ Paul

 

[davidsmith73]

So, quality depends on "meaning". Meaning is experience. Experience is quality.

Do I have that right? Do all these terms mean the same thing?

In the context of my preceding statements, yes! Does that worry you and why?

If you can't make sense of the words you are using perhaps you should leave what you are talking about unspoken because it is not clear that you can ever make sense of a concept if the words don't have clear senses.

I certainly know what these words mean. I think I shall continue to use them because if I don't, nobody will know what I am refering to. Imagine us having a conversation about the paintings of Turner without using the word "yellow". Not very useful. Yet I would be unable to define the word to you, neither would you be able to define it to me.

Do you know what "quality" means?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I tacitly agreed for awhile, then specifically disagreed. I do not believe your definitions of P1 and P2 are clear, nor do they appear to cover everything. At the very least, there is a spurious use of "external stimuli."

You are now saying you don't understand why solipsism could be true?

You're backtracking to a position you've already been forced to abandon.

I do not have to resist the temptation to define it as something physical. Then you will call me an eliminative materialist.

I will. Because that is what you would be.

So be it. Now, let's determine what an eliminative materialist really is, shall we?

You already know what an eliminative materialist is. An eliminative materialist is a person who claims it is theoretically possible to eliminate all mental terms on the grounds that they have no referent which is non-physical. The one and only example we have seen of what could be meant by this is the elimination of the term "sunrise". Trying to apply this procedure to minds appears to be completely insane, which is why yourself and Zaydragon have claimed it is a bad example. The trouble is, there aren't any better examples. All the other examples you can locate are restricted to a domain which is clearly physical and in which both "perspectives" can easily be accounted for from a physical perspective. Therefore we have no existing example to tell us what it would mean to eliminate the mental terms. The eliminativist must take it on faith that however absurd and insane his theory appears to us, it MUST be true anyway because it is the only logical defence of materialism, and everybody knows that materialism is true.

If you think eliminative materialism is anything other than this, you'd better explain what you think it is. You won't be able to do it.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Sorry, wasp, but we've discussed my position. Now we are discussing what eliminativism actually entails. Do you feel uncomfortable with that? So you want to change the topic?

You're the one who said he wanted to get back to the definitions. If you don't want to do that, then fine.

I clearly told you what these terms refer to. They refer to the totality of your subjective experiences.

OK, subjectivity is the totality of subjective experiences. No, no, you never told me that. You did tell me that the totality of subjective experiences is mind, but you did not equate that with subjectivity. But now we can get somewhere if you want to continue. What is "subjective experience"?

I want you to realise and admit that your own position is untenable before we go back to looking at mine.

Really? What is my position? You've told me at least three times. I recall that you first told me what my position was after I simply asked you three simple questions. So let's hear the divination again. What is my position? So far I've been a materialist, a physicalist, a naturalist, a non-eliminativist, an eliminativist. Which one am I now?

 

[davidsmith73]

Explaining experience as "something else" is just fine. It's that simple.

If you want it to be a problem, it's up to you to make a case for that position.

See my discussion with Ichneumonwasp. Materialism refers to quality as the explanandum in the first instance but to brain processes as the explanandum in the second instance. Don't you see the problem there?