It was a proof that non-eliminative materialism is incoherent. And it was a valid proof. Nothing you said changed that.
Your proof rested on your (false) claim that we had agreed that we could not define "physical" to refer to all P1s and all P2s. As I and others pointed out at the time nobody had ever agreed about that with you, and there was absolutely no reason we could not define "physical" that way if we wanted to.
It's not a valid proof.
The confusion is all terminological. Does that make it not matter?
If your whole point all along was just that the naive application of Descarte-influenced labels to the brain didn't quite work, why didn't you say so at the start?
This is just you retreating in circles again, I think. As soon as we take our eye off you, you will go back to pretending that there is something more important at stake than mere labels.
When you're a physicalist, everything is supposed to be physical. Unfortunately this leads to the elimination of minds.
No.
It merely leads to the assertion that "mind" is a label that points vaguely toward a certain kind of structure or process found in physical human bodies.
The whole point in this thread is a demonstration that you cannot, in fact, do as you claim. That is why I want you to define some terms for me. If you would do so, I could show you that it is impossible to define subjective experience and also defend physicalism.
I did exactly that in the very post you are replying to! A physicalist would say that "subjective experience" is a label that gestures towards particular kinds of physical events that go on when a being is having experiences.
What is going on is that you are making claims you cannot back up. Define your terms and I will show you that your position is not only circular, but also illogical.
We have already chased you around this circle. You demand definitions that can exclude immaterialism, then you reject any definitions that do so on the grounds that they beg the question, and then you change the subject so the heat can die down before you try the same routine again.
No, Kevin, that won't help you.
That's a curious assertion.
Your proof explicitly rests on the claim that a physicalist cannot define what is physical in terms of P1 and P2. I have explicitly shown that claim to be false, by defining the physicalists view of what is physical in terms of P1 and P2.
How can you state this "will not help me"? I have shown your proof to be invalid. It's time to go back to the drawing board and get a new one, because that one is dead.
Mind you, I can make this clearer by shortening your "proof" for you.
Geoff's "Proof"
Premise Zero (Not disclosed): Subjective experiences are spooky.
Premise One: There is nothing spooky.
Premise Two: There are people, and they have experiences.
Conclusion: Physicalism is incoherent because it claims that there is nothing spooky but there are subjective experiences, and subjective experiences are spooky, so there is a contradiction.
We can fix this mess though.
Kevin's Physicalist "Proof"
Premise One: There is nothing spooky.
Premise Two: There are people, and they have experiences.
Conclusion: There are people and they have experiences, but whatever is going on it is not spooky.
That's perfectly coherent, despite your claims to the contrary. We just eliminate your covert axiom, and we are left with a coherent physicalist position. I'm not saying I know it to be true, but it's perfectly coherent.