The relationship between science and materialism

[Mercutio]

At least I'm getting happier with my objective idealism & the epriphenomena of matter.

Hey, I can understand you....most of the time. Still a few questions I am unclear on, but certainly mostly coherent.

(since you ask...the stuff about why you prefer your monism has never sat well as anything but assertion. Nothing wrong with that, but you seem to think it is more than that, so I remain confused.)

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Nope, I'm not asking why I don't experience your mind. I'm asking why there is any differentiated experience at all, since the experience is going on in the Being.

It's not "going on in the Being". Why does experience have to "going on somewhere"? Experiences aren't anywhere. They are not "in your head". They are not "in Being". They do not have a location. They certainly do not have a physical location and Being doesn't have a location at all. So what is "in" supposed to mean in your question?

You can think of it in terms of a shared homunculus if you like.

homunculus/being ---> Paul's "noumenal brain" ----> What it's like to be Paul.
homunculus/being ---> Geoff's "noumenal brain ----> What it's like to be Geoff.

You are thinking that because it is the same homunculus, that it should follow that there should be only one being and that it should experience being everything at the same time. But the system does not specify "what it is like to be the homunculus without also being either Paul or Geoff." What you are trying to ask me is "What is it like to be the homunculus?", especially since one of the manifestations of that homunculus is YOU. But I never even said there was anything like "what it is like to be the homunculus". The homunculus on it's own, without any noumenal brain, can't be aware of anything at all. It would be a bit like a film projector without a film in it. You can switch it on, but nothing will appear on the screen. So there isn't any reason to believe there is a "what it is like to be a homunculus." You are asking me a variation on what you asked me before "What is it like to Be Being?" The question doesn't make much sense. Although Heidegger tries to answer it anyway in the form "What is the Being of being".

Put more simply, without a noumenal brain you cannot have a mind at all because there is no content to be had. But as soon as you DO have a noumenal brain, and there is a mind, it must be individuated because it is partially dependent on the brain.

In Heideggerian terms - you are dasein, not Being. You are a being-in-a-world.

To be differentiated, the experiences must be going on in the noumenal brains, at least to some degree. Are they? If so, why do we need Being at all?

Experiences aren't "in" anything.

How can there be any spatio-temporal experience at all, if it is not grounded in the noumenal?

It is grounded in the noumenal. Just like physical things are grounded in the noumenal even though the noumenal isn't physical.

Does the noumental/Being experience engine just make it up out of whole cloth?

Don't understand the question.

If so, then clearly my experience of the physical does not map in any straightforward way to the noumenal.

It maps straight on to something in the noumenal brain. I can't tell you what that something is.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Paul

Better version of the film projector analogy:

Imagine a glorified multi-film projector. There is only one lamp (Being), but space for lots of different reels (noumenal brains), all running at the same time but pointing in different directions. The films are differentiated. What is the result? Lots of different images on different screens. Minds are not the homunculus. The images on the screens are not the lamp.

Your question was this

Nope, I'm not asking why I don't experience your mind. I'm asking why there is any differentiated experience at all, since the experience is going on in the Being.

So using the analogy:

"Nope, I'm not asking why my screen-image is not your screen-image. I'm asking why there are any differentiated screen-images at all, since all the images are generated by the same lamp."

Answer: The films are differentiated.
Answer: Noumenal brains are differentiated.

Does that make it clearer?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Becuase I'm always willing to debate metaphysics with people. However, to have a debate, there needs to be a coherant argument. I'm willing wait, if you're willing to provide one.



No. It's such a shame you can't make me, isn't it? If only wishing made it so.

I can, Taffer. That is what the "ignore" function is for. Bye.

 

[Taffer]

I can, Taffer. That is what the "ignore" function is for. Bye.

If you say so. However, don't you see how simply ignoring my questions with dodges of "read the rest of the thread, I answered it before", with no attempt to show where you've answered it, and then 'running away' (i.e. 'ignoring' me) when you are asked to make your position clear, seems to detract from your argument as a whole, especially for new readers to this thread? Wouldn't it make sense to simply take a few minutes to concisely write down your argument (in the form of premise 1, premise 2...premise n, conclusion) so as to avoid this? It might help others who'd be willing to engage in this debate, if only you could clearly explain your position? Don't you think it might help the rest of the people on this thread?

Obviously not. Oh well.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Mercutio

Is this asserted, or concluded?

I don't know which part of what you quoted you are refering to here.

Is there any way at all that we can know of this noumenal world?

That is a contentious question. Kant says no. That hasn't stopped people from trying. There is no agreement on the answer to your question. I can understand either a "yes" or a "no" as a response. Most of my argument would apply even if one answered "no", anyway.

You have said that we "naturally" split our phenomenal world into physical and mental; in what way are you able to describe that which is not phenomenal?

By specifying it entirely in terms of things which are both non-mental and non-physical. Those things are mathematical entities and nothing/everything/being.

But our experience of "it" is not of noumenal, but of phenomenal, which is experienced as mental and physical, no? (your "experienced as mental and physical", not mine. I do not hold this view.)

Or experiences are phenomenal. What's the question here?

Geoff posted:

Mental actually refers to the totality of our experiences. Everything in the phenomenal world comes to us via mind. Physical refers to individual objects with spatial extension - the very things which the word "physical" was always supposed to refer to.
---------------------------------

Mercutio: Which simply takes the dualism problem and pushes it here.

It didn't get "pushed" here. "Here" is where it came from. "Here" is where it belongs. "Here" it can be dualistic without it being a problem. It's only a problem when applied to the noumenal world.

So there are two difficulties with your critique: (1) I didn't push it anywhere, it's back in the place it was always supposed to be and (2) because it is where it is supposed to be instead of being "pushed" to the noumenal world where it doesn't belong, it doesn't cause a problem.

You still, at this level, have people claiming that the things you call physical here could not even be called, were it not for the fact that they are perceived, and others saying that they could not be perceived were it not for the fact that they physically exist. Your view does nothing to solve this problem, it merely asserts that the dualism is real at the level of the phenomenal, even though the dualism is not real at the level of what truly exists.

...and in doing so it solves the problem. I am not seeing why it is a problem to refer to the phenomenal world dualistically. The whole reason our language is dualistic is because it evolved to discuss the phenomenal world. Where is the problem? I see no problem.

Geoff posted:

You could possibly say that there is some part of the neutral system which correlates to what we call "mind" and what we call "matter", so in that sense they are real. But they are not real in the sense that they have any existence independent of the neutral, noumenal system.

Merc replies:

See? This is exactly what you are doing--saying that, at the level of the phenomenal, you accept dualism.

That is correct, Merc. Do you want me to write it in bold?

This does nothing to help. You are inventing a "real" reason to continue using an illusory dualism, and pretending that this makes the inherent problems of dualism go away.

Because they do go away, Merc. Please explain why they don't. In terms of the phenomenal world, I see no problem in calling my mind my mind and my body my body. Why is that a problem?

The problems are still there.....

Where....exactly?

You keep saying there is a problem but you haven't said what it is.

You have not avoided the problems of dualism.

You have made this claim at least five times in your post but failed on each occasion to provide an example of a problem caused by talking dualistically about the phenomenal world.

Geoff

 

[UndercoverElephant]

If you say so. However, don't you see how simply ignoring my questions with dodges of "read the rest of the thread, I answered it before", with no attempt to show where you've answered it, and then 'running away' (i.e. 'ignoring' me) when you are asked to make your position clear, seems to detract from your argument as a whole, especially for new readers to this thread? Wouldn't it make sense to simply take a few minutes to concisely write down your argument (in the form of premise 1, premise 2...premise n, conclusion) so as to avoid this? It might help others who'd be willing to engage in this debate, if only you could clearly explain your position? Don't you think it might help the rest of the people on this thread?

Obviously not. Oh well.

You are a moron.

Post 220:

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=54975&page=6

What's more, you are such a total moron that you won't read enough of the context of that post to understand the relevance of the proof and you will come straight back here and ask me a question that was already answered on pages 7, 9, 12, 13 and 14.

Do not expect any more responses unless you ask me a question which indicates you have made some sort of effort to read the interactions in this thread between Paul, Wasp, chriswl and myself. NOTHING you have said wasn't said by them in pages 1-5.

GO AWAY.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

So......the basic ethical upshot would be vegetarianism for the lot of us? Should we all be Jains?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So......the basic ethical upshot would be vegetarianism for the lot of us? Should we all be Jains?

I did my best not to incur any ethical implications. Those are another set of questions entirely. Questions to which I have no answers. I defer to Sartre, Heidegger and anyone else brave enough to go there.

More seriously, I think those questions are quite well addressed by Thomas Nagel in "The View From Nowhere". We have to cope with the difference between our 3rd-person conception of reality and our subjective "Me living my life". This causes major problems. Some of them are unresolvable.

Ethics is better when not mixed up with ontology. It's hard enough to get people to agree on an ethical theory without expecting them to agree on an ontology first.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It's not "going on in the Being". Why does experience have to "going on somewhere"? Experiences aren't anywhere. They are not "in your head". They are not "in Being". They do not have a location. They certainly do not have a physical location and Being doesn't have a location at all. So what is "in" supposed to mean in your question?

Experiences are somewhere, at least in part, because they are differentiated. It's not one amorphous experiencing.

You are thinking that because it is the same homunculus, that it should follow that there should be only one being and that it should experience being everything at the same time. But the system does not specify "what it is like to be the homunculus without also being either Paul or Geoff." What you are trying to ask me is "What is it like to be the homunculus?", especially since one of the manifestations of that homunculus is YOU. But I never even said there was anything like "what it is like to be the homunculus". The homunculus on it's own, without any noumenal brain, can't be aware of anything at all.

So the differentiation of the experiencing is accomplished in the noumenal brain. So why bother with the Being at all?

It is grounded in the noumenal. Just like physical things are grounded in the noumenal even though the noumenal isn't physical.

How can spatio-temporal experience be grounded in something with no spatio-temporal attributes?

It [my experience] maps straight on to something in the noumenal brain. I can't tell you what that something is.

It's not "straight mapping" if spatio-temporal experience comes from something with no spatio-temporal attributes.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I do not see how you can claim that the Being and the Neutral are the same sort of existent. You have finessed this issue by saying that Being is nothing, yet endowed it with various attributes, such as its ability to interact with the Neutral. You could say that the Neutral is nothing, too, but I think that messes things up. In any event, you have an interaction problem: How does nothing interact with something? It's the dualism interaction problem in another guise.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Where is my memory?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

What is the causal mechanism that allows actions on the physical to affect the Neutral?

~~ Paul

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I did my best not to incur any ethical implications.

I think they come with the territory. If everything with a brain (since brains are only enlarged neural ganglia, then everything with neural ganglia down to arthropods) is conscious and our reasoning for why we don't kill each other is because we are conscious, then we have quite the ethical dilemma to face here.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Experiences are somewhere, at least in part, because they are differentiated. It's not one amorphous experiencing.

Why does something have to be seperated in space in order to be seperated? I think this might be a hangover from the physicalist way of thinking about things. Think about, say, the concept of the difference branches of the multiverse in MWI. I'm not saying MWI is true, but you have there an example of things which are seperate but not seperated by physical space. So experiences are seperate in a similar sort of way.

So the differentiation of the experiencing is accomplished in the noumenal brain. So why bother with the Being at all?

Because then all you have is a noumenal brain. No minds. No matter. Being had to be added to make enough theoretical space in the neutral system to account for both mind and matter in the phenomenal world. If you try to remove Being from the picture then you take away that theoretical space and we are left back with the problem of explaining how to get rid of the dualism.

Put simply: Take Being out of the neutral picture and the reduction doesn't work any more.

How can spatio-temporal experience be grounded in something with no spatio-temporal attributes?

It's not "straight mapping" if spatio-temporal experience comes from something with no spatio-temporal attributes.

Why not?

We have already said that mental and physical things can be grounded in something with no mental and physical attributes. Why should time be any different?

Actually, I would be misleading you if I said anything other than the concept of time is a central key to where you go next with this. Your question is the question that Heidegger sets out to answer in "Being and Time" but by the end of the book he has only really accounted for "Dasein and temporality". According to experts on Heidegger he then spent the rest of his philosophical career completing this half-finished project.

IMO, time, as well as gravity/mass, seem to be deeply mysterious whichever way you look at them. I don't have a definitive answer.

 

[chriswl]

The entire content of your experiences are determined the state of your (noumenal) brain. That's all you ever experience. The reason you can't experience my experiences is that your brain isn't my brain.

So I can't directly perceive a noumenal chair, I experience the activities inside my noumenal brain when it perceives a chair, which is why what I experience is not the noumenal chair itself but the "physical world" representation of it in my noumenal brain. Is that correct?

But isn't this just physicalism with the prefix noumenal- attached to every physical entity? Doesn't it have the same (alleged) problem - aren't noumenal brains and conscious experiences just different sorts of things?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

What is the causal mechanism that allows actions on the physical to affect the Neutral?

~~ Paul

How do you act ON a component of your experiences?

Action by what?

I'm not sure I understand the question.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So I can't directly perceive a noumenal chair, I experience the activities inside my noumenal brain when it perceives a chair....

No. You have an experience of a physical chair. Also, nothing is "inside a noumenal brain" because the noumenal correlate of a brain is non-spatial.

But isn't this just physicalism with the prefix noumenal- attached to every physical entity?

No.

Doesn't it have the same (alleged) problem - aren't noumenal brains and conscious experiences just different sorts of things?

The noumenal world isn't a world of objects like the physical world. There aren't "noumenal brains". But there are noumenal correlates of brains.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I think they come with the territory. If everything with a brain (since brains are only enlarged neural ganglia, then everything with neural ganglia down to arthropods) is conscious and our reasoning for why we don't kill each other is because we are conscious, then we have quite the ethical dilemma to face here.

Is it any worse than the ethical dilemma we face in general?

I dont see how this ontological position makes much difference to anything ethical, political, economic or environmental. I'm not proposing this as a solution to those problems.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Sorry, Wasp, I was slow. You mean this suggests that animals are conscious so we shouldn't eat them. That's a good question. I like bacon though.