There are only claims about the world.
-
Security incident: ISF was recently accessed by intruders. Please change your password, and change it anywhere else you used it. Read more
Merged Is Scientism Really Justified?
- Thread starter Gubiosak
- Start date
Ryan O'Dine
OD’ing on Damitol
Gubiosak, can you explain why science needs an epistemological foundation? Would it be invalid if it didn't have one? What if science is just a heuristic that succeeds because it works when it works, and when it fails it's improved upon?
Basically you seem to be demanding a philosophical foundation for a practical approach to problem solving. Personally I believe in science because its approach makes the most sense to me (compared to alternatives), and because of its track record. Why demand more?
Basically you seem to be demanding a philosophical foundation for a practical approach to problem solving. Personally I believe in science because its approach makes the most sense to me (compared to alternatives), and because of its track record. Why demand more?
Mojo
Mostly harmless
Because it can't detect things that have no effect on the observable universe.
Bringing up the 'paranormal' is a straw man and a clear deflection. I never mentioned or defended anything paranormal.My critique of strong scientism isn't built on mysticism, but on contemporary philosophy of science and epistemology. The core issue you are avoiding is purely logical: strong scientism claims that 'all valid knowledge comes strictly from empirical science,' yet that statement itself is not an empirical data point and cannot be tested in a lab. It is a metaphysical premise.Instead of trying to tie my position to pseudoscience, address the actual point: how does strong scientism justify the validity of logic, mathematics, and its own epistemological assumptions without falling into circular reasoning?
The Beatles vs. Backstreet Boys isn't about knowledge, it's about taste; and rejecting scientism isn't about defending faith, but about recognizing logic and mathematics as valid, non-empirical forms of knowledge.
Treating science as a pragmatic heuristic that works based on its history is already adopting a philosophical position. Science needs epistemological foundations to justify why it works and to validate logic and mathematics, which cannot be proven in the laboratory. Using the successes of science to prove the empirical method is circular reasoning. The objective is not to limit scientific practice, but to demonstrate that strong scientism cannot sustain itself on its own.
To be clear: I am completely pro-science. Recognizing the necessity of science does not mean we must accept strong scientism. However, I am not dogmatic about this. If anyone here can provide a sound, non-circular philosophical argument demonstrating that empirical science is indeed the only valid form of knowledge, I am entirely open to changing my mind and accepting strong scientism. I am simply asking for the argument.
If no one here defends strong scientism, then we are in full agreement: scientific knowledge is not the only valid form of knowledge, and disciplines like logic and mathematics hold independent epistemological validity.However, if you agree with this, then asking for 'empirical evidence' to justify non-empirical philosophical claims is a contradiction. If no one holds the strong scientism position, there is no disagreement—unless, of course, that position is still being practiced while being disowned in name.
JayUtah
Penultimate Amazing
You're posting in the Paranormal section of the forum. You told us that paranormal claims "illustrate" problems with the scope of empirical science. We discussed your toy examples already. Now I want to move on to more interesting examples.
No one here ever claimed that empirical science is the only valid form of knowledge.
Actually, no, you never addressed the point @Dave Rogers raised.
How about asking for empirical evidence for claims of the paranormal? Is there something special about paranormal claims that is better addressed by "philosophical" methods? Or are paranormal claims sufficiently similar to ordinary phenomenology that empirical methods are appropriate?
I think you're dodging the hard question because you don't like the answer.
Are you claiming your critics are being dishonest about what methods they use?
W.D.Clinger
Philosopher
Noted.
You are repeating the same point (or should I say non-point?). Your repetition of the same non-point has achieved no purpose beyond avoiding the discussion.
You haven't clarified anything. Saying you're clarifying something is not the same as actually doing it.
Inviting others to disagree with your poorly stated distinctions, and repeating that invitation over and over, is a poor substitute for making a point or clarifying anything.
That's not a point. It's a question, a question that appears to matter to you and to no one else, and it's a question you're repeating because you don't know how to make a point or offer a coherent argument.
If anyone here can provide a sound, non-circular philosophical argument demonstrating that Dave really did place $7.5 million in my linen closet, I am entirely open to changing my mind and reporting that $7.5 million to the IRS. I am simply asking for the argument.
Dave Rogers
Bandaged ice that stampedes inexpensively through
It occurs to me in passing that a simple rotation of a Feynman diagram could result in the IRS owing a substantial amount to you.
Dave
Gord_in_Toronto
Penultimate Amazing
- Joined
- Jul 22, 2006
- Messages
- 26,878
Look. I did not come here for an argument!
Helen
Implicitly explicit
This is the thread for repetitive questioning of people who do not hold the opinions you want them to hold. Did you come here for that? You're in luck, in that case, there seems to be an endless supply!
Dave Rogers
Bandaged ice that stampedes inexpensively through
It's just occurred to me that there's a whole landscape of unexplored avenues of advance that we're all missing here. Suppose we try a different approach to generating knowledge, that of lateral thinking; effectively, let's take some random, unconnected elements, and throw them into the melting pot. In particular, I suggest constitutional law, itself another approach to generating knowledge, if only because I'll enjoy having Jay patiently explain to me how wrong I've got it all.
The stumbling block for comparatively assessing different approaches to knowledge generation, as I've already pointed out, is that it's such a fundamental logical impossibility that it borders on the oxymoronic. However, we're stuck on a paradigm where some consensus between methodologies is seen as desirable. In constitutional law - which we can certainly admit as a form of discovering knowledge, if only, by definition, knowledge about constitutional law - quite the reverse is the case. Separation of powers, typically between executive, legislature and judiciary, is seen as a vital aspect of a free society, and the fact that there is no single overriding authority to rule between the three is not a stumbling block but a strength.
Taking this approach, then, we have no need even to ask what is the criterion by which different forms of acquiring knowledge are assessed. We simply employ them all, indiscriminately, at any and all times. This may or may not result in any useful results (though, for example, votes could be held or prayers offered for guidance on which to use, religious revelation and the will of the people also being candidates for ways of acquiring knowledge), but it would achieve the most desirable outcome of all, that not just some but literally all discussions of anything or everything become endlessly bogged down in pointless nitpicking of irrelevant minutiae.
Dave
Afterword: Some might point out that elements of this post, as a means of generating knowledge that I've always found of great value, use passive-aggressive, sarcastic wit. To those who deny its utility on any terms whatsoever, I will simply defend it on its own terms by saying, "Well you would say that, wouldn't you?"
The stumbling block for comparatively assessing different approaches to knowledge generation, as I've already pointed out, is that it's such a fundamental logical impossibility that it borders on the oxymoronic. However, we're stuck on a paradigm where some consensus between methodologies is seen as desirable. In constitutional law - which we can certainly admit as a form of discovering knowledge, if only, by definition, knowledge about constitutional law - quite the reverse is the case. Separation of powers, typically between executive, legislature and judiciary, is seen as a vital aspect of a free society, and the fact that there is no single overriding authority to rule between the three is not a stumbling block but a strength.
Taking this approach, then, we have no need even to ask what is the criterion by which different forms of acquiring knowledge are assessed. We simply employ them all, indiscriminately, at any and all times. This may or may not result in any useful results (though, for example, votes could be held or prayers offered for guidance on which to use, religious revelation and the will of the people also being candidates for ways of acquiring knowledge), but it would achieve the most desirable outcome of all, that not just some but literally all discussions of anything or everything become endlessly bogged down in pointless nitpicking of irrelevant minutiae.
Dave
Afterword: Some might point out that elements of this post, as a means of generating knowledge that I've always found of great value, use passive-aggressive, sarcastic wit. To those who deny its utility on any terms whatsoever, I will simply defend it on its own terms by saying, "Well you would say that, wouldn't you?"
JayUtah
Penultimate Amazing
Only insofar as such a derail would be tolerated.
You have to distinguish between the concept of separation of powers and the corollary concept of checks and balancers. The U.K. for many years separated the judiciary from the legislative powers, but vested them both to a certain extent in the House of Lords. The U.S. Constitution inaugurated the form of separated government with mutual checks and balances among the branches.
Criminal law provides a much more interesting example since it is an attempt to implement a moral philosophy—philosophical "knowledge" that our OP assures us is non-empirical and does not require an explicit epistemological foundation.
We were presented with the moral proposition, "It is blameworthy to torture an innocent person." Well, yes. Also, water is wet. Maybe a less childish example would serve.
In American criminal law we have the notion of strict liability.
Let's say Tom, Dick, and Harry conspire to steal money from a bank. Tom agrees to drive the getaway car. Dick and Harry will enter the bank at night, when it's closed, and pilfer the vault. Unbeknownst to Tom, Dick and Harry have obtained handguns and in the process of opening the vault they shoot and kill the night watchman. Tom was outside waiting in the car the whole time.
Under the doctrine of strict liability, Tom can be charged with murder even though he was in no way involved with that offense. His willing involvement in the felony of burglary makes him liable for the death, even though he did not intend for anyone to die, nor did he take any specific steps toward that outcome.
Quite a lot of people think this is very unfair, including a lot of moral philosophers. Yes, Tom should be charged with his participation in the burglary, but only Dick and Harry are guilty of murder. "Knowledge" from moral philosophy is divided on whether blameworthiness should be outcome-based or intent-based. In Roman law, the doctrine is nullum crimen sine culpa—there is no crime in the absence of guilt.
If you drink to excess and drive home, but do not hurt anyone, you are blameworthy for your intent. But no harm followed. Are you guilty of anything? Conversely if a sober driver accidentally hits and injures a pedestrian, the driver is blameworthy for the outcome, but not for the intent. What's the right answer?
Advocates of strict liability warn that Tom willingly exhibited a depraved mind and a willingness to commit crime. Some moral philosophers believe that's blameworthy with respect to any potential outcome. Strict liability therefore serves to put citizens on notice that by deciding to be criminals, they have crossed a line and have accepted a moral risk. In Tom's case, an undesirable and avoidable outcome occurred as the unintended (but very real) consequence of a willful immoral act, whether the consequence was intended or not = actus rea alone determines blame.
The opposite question occurs in police stings. Police officers, say, posing as minors lure sexual predators into unlawful interactions and proposals. Here only the mens rea is enough to convict. No child was ever actually in danger—there is no actus rea. But people have no problem assigning blame to such entrapped perpetrators, generally claiming that if not the undercover police officer, then some actual child would have been endangered or harmed. Again, in Roman law iniuria (actual injury) was a thing. While crimes against "the people" were a thing (crimina publica), the prosecution still had to show an actual injury. Under Roman law, the fact that the "victim" was an adult playing along would void the charge.
Now we can (and do) debate the moral underpinnings of crime and punishment until the cows come home. The point is where this falls in the taxonomy of knowledge. If we "know" two completely opposite things (solos actus rea = crime, sola mens rea = crime) is it really knowledge? What kind of knowledge is it? Is it congruent with knowledge like, "Statistically significant impairment begins at a blood alcohol level of 0.05%?" That was determined empirically. Does it have sufficient epistemological foundation and authority to be "knowledge?"
That's why I want to talk about the paranormal.
Whether Tom should go to prison for murder is a hard question, unlike "Don't beat up the weak kids." Similarly, the inability to prove empirically that there are an infinite number of primes—you do it by mathematical induction—is a given. A hard question is whether there exists a class of hypotheses that sound in ordinary phenomenology (e.g., ghosts, UFOs) but which cannot be rightly investigated with reliable tools of empiricism—a proper paranormal claim. If pragmatic empirical science rejects the existence of ghosts, does it do so with the same authority by which it rejects luminiferous ether? If not, what other source of knowledge should we invoke?
Separation of powers between executive and legislative branches is actually quite uncommon in democracies. Most parliamentary government don't have it all, some only have partial separation of powers. So, not everyone sees it as vital to a free society. I think it's a good idea mind you, just not vital exactly. How we got here, I can only guess at.
Gord_in_Toronto
Penultimate Amazing
- Joined
- Jul 22, 2006
- Messages
- 26,878
Last edited:
JayUtah
Penultimate Amazing
In the Westminster system, cabinet ministers are traditionally members of Parliament. This is because Parliament is supreme in the Westminster system, and having executives also sit in Parliament keeps them accountable individually to Parliament. The Westminster system does not have the concept of executive privilege as exists in the U.S.
In the Hamiltonian-Madisonian system, executive officers cannot be members of Congress. Executive officers are accountable to the President, and the President and his officers may invoke an executive privilege to prevent Congress or the judiciary from inquiring too deeply into their official acts. The U.S. had "independent agencies" for about 100 years—beholden mostly to Congress—but no longer. Congress is not supreme in the H-M system, although it is clear that the Framers intended Congress to have and wield more power than it currently does.
JayUtah
Penultimate Amazing
No, you came here to post obscure Monty Python quotes.
Gord_in_Toronto
Penultimate Amazing
- Joined
- Jul 22, 2006
- Messages
- 26,878
Last edited: