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Merged Is Scientism Really Justified?

This debate has reached a standstill, so I’m stepping out. For those interested in moving past 20th-century assumptions, I strongly suggest diving into modern 21st-century philosophy of science and epistemology—specifically contemporary works on scientific realism, anti-realism, and structuralism (such as those by James Ladyman, Don Ross, or Timothy Williamson). Moving beyond outdated logical positivism is essential if we want to have a serious conversation about the foundations of knowledge. Goodbye!
AI again.
 
I would like to propose a short epistemological question.

Radical scientism claims that only empirical science yields valid knowledge.

However, this faces a clear logical issue:

  • The claim "only testable statements are valid" is not itself testable. It is a philosophical claim.
  • Science relies on logic and mathematics, which are non-empirical foundations.
My question:Is your core premise a testable empirical fact or a philosophical position?

If philosophical, non-empirical reasoning is necessary. If empirical, how do you test it without circular reasoning?
When you are crossing a road, how do you tell whether it's safe to do so?
 
This debate has reached a standstill, so I’m stepping out. For those interested in moving past 20th-century assumptions, I strongly suggest diving into modern 21st-century philosophy of science and epistemology—specifically contemporary works on scientific realism, anti-realism, and structuralism (such as those by James Ladyman, Don Ross, or Timothy Williamson). Moving beyond outdated logical positivism is essential if we want to have a serious conversation about the foundations of knowledge. Goodbye!

Bit rich considering that "scientism" is in itself a term popularised in the 20th century. Just because a "philosophy" is a 21st century doesn't make it any better "philosophy".

ETA And what about Popper's definition of "scientism": "the aping of what is widely mistaken for the method of science" or does that not count because it's a 20th century usage? This one fits more with the way - per previous posts - I've seen and heard it used.

Also, it seems to be supporting a lot of claims made by folk with a vested interest (Hayek) but with little evidence that it is A Real Thing, and that's before we get to the religionista nonsense. (And, yes, I can explain exactly why I use such a term...)

Anyway, every scientist I have ever known also appreciates art, film, theatre, literature, music and all and all; I have never met anyone from an arts/humanities background who has the slightest awareness of or knowledge of sciences.

Mebbe the boot is actually on the other foot...
 
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The same is true of any other methodology you may choose to evaluate. It is equally true that you cannot choose between two methodologies M1 and M2 using either M1 or M2 as a methodology, so you will require a third methodology M3 to choose. But M3 cannot be used to evaluate itself, so M4 is now required, and so on infinitely. Your original question, therefore, can trivially be seen as excluding the possibility of any conceivable answer, and your continued demand that somebody else answer your carefully constructed impossible question is simple rudeness. Stop wasting everybody's time.

Dave
That problem applies to every methodology, but it doesn't justify treating one methodology as the only reliable one; that's precisely the epistemic question at issue.
 
Yes we can, consider the scientific method to be a map, I can use other maps to show that my map is correct. (And then I can check that the maps do correctly describe the territory by taking a walk.)

ETA: It is quite standard when bods are seeing if a theory holds up that different experiments I.e. "maps" will be run not just repeating the exact same experiment as we have knowledge that reality is a tricky bastard.
Different experiments can test a theory, but they don't establish the foundational validity of the scientific method itself—that is the distinction I'm making.
 
Bit rich considering that "scientism" is in itself a term popularised in the 20th century. Just because a "philosophy" is a 21st century doesn't make it any better "philosophy".

ETA And what about Popper's definition of "scientism": "the aping of what is widely mistaken for the method of science" or does that not count because it's a 20th century usage? This one fits more with the way - per previous posts - I've seen and heard it used.

Also, it seems to be supporting a lot of claims made by folk with a vested interest (Hayek) but with little evidence that it is A Real Thing, and that's before we get to the religionista nonsense. (And, yes, I can explain exactly why I use such a term...)

Anyway, every scientist I have ever known also appreciates art, film, theatre, literature, music and all and all; I have never met anyone from an arts/humanities background who has the slightest awareness of or knowledge of sciences.

Mebbe the boot is actually on the other foot...
The issue is the argument, not the age of the terminology. Popper’s definition is a different sense of “scientism.”
 
Different experiments can test a theory, but they don't establish the foundational validity of the scientific method itself—that is the distinction I'm making.
That’s the “ (And then I can check that the maps do correctly describe the territory by taking a walk.)”
 
That problem applies to every methodology, but it doesn't justify treating one methodology as the only reliable one; that's precisely the epistemic question at issue.
Whoosh.

You have formulated a question to which there cannot under any circumstances be an answer. Even asking it is pointless.

Dave
 
Assuming my motives or inventing a backstory about "ghosts" is just another way to avoid the logical problem. An epistemological question about the circularity of radical empiricism stands or falls on its own logic, regardless of why anyone asks it. The question remains completely untouched: is the claim that "only empirical statements yield valid knowledge" itself an empirical statement, or a philosophical premise?
I don't understand how you can actually know the highlighted claim.

I guess this gets into the 'is math invented or discovered?' question. I think the fact that obscure mathematics can be found to have practical applications decades after being formulated suggests that the question isn't a simple one.
The usefulness of mathematics comes from its scope: In a sense, mathematics is about exploring all possible mathematics, while identifying the impossible as not mathematics. In that sense, mathematics describes all possible worlds, while refusing to describe any mathematically impossible worlds.

Consequently, scientists who want to give mathematical precision to their theories can choose from an extraordinarily wide range of mathematics. When the specific mathematics they choose works well as a model, we shouldn't forget about the vastly larger number of equally mathematical models they rejected because they don't model reality so well.

Using the scientific method to validate the scientific method is the textbook definition of begging the question (circular reasoning). You cannot use a framework to prove its own foundational validity without presupposing the very thing under test.
Your AI made a mistake with the highlighted. It should have said "is just one example of the". Other examples could be found within this thread.

This is beyond silly now.
Now?

Pointing out epistemological limits is a valid conceptual critique, not a secret code.
So asking how you could know the thing I highlighted in the first of the above quotes is a valid conceptual critique.

I knew that already. Did you?

Alex Rosenberg explicitly defends strong scientism in The Atheist's Guide to Reality, arguing physics is the only path to true knowledge. As for 'knowledge': in standard epistemology, it is justified true belief—a framework that requires logical coherence before empirical testing can even begin.
As for the pink, how could he know that? Does he really think it was physics that led him to that pink knowledge?

This debate has reached a standstill, so I’m stepping out.
Just when you were doing so well.

That problem applies to every methodology, but it doesn't justify treating one methodology as the only reliable one; that's precisely the epistemic question at issue.
How do you know that's precisely the epistemic question at issue? It seems to me there might be a few other epistemic questions at issue here.

For example: How did you know you were stepping out? Was that a justified true belief? Or was it an unjustified true belief? Or a justified false belief? Or an unjustified false belief? Or a justified true fact you just happened to believe? Or a justified true fact you didn't really believe? Or a justified false fact you just happened to believe? Or a justified false fact you didn't really believe? Or an unjustified true fact you just happened to believe? Or an unjustified true fact you didn't really believe? Or an unjustified false fact you just happened to believe? Or an unjustified false fact you didn't really believe?

I suspect the last of those, but all of those are epistemic questions raised by just that one sentence of yours. You (or your AI) have written other sentences as well, equally open to epistemic questions.
 
Anyway, every scientist I have ever known also appreciates art, film, theatre, literature, music and all and all; I have never met anyone from an arts/humanities background who has the slightest awareness of or knowledge of sciences.
What am I, chopped liver!?! :xtongue

I know what you mean, but I do know quite a few arts/humanities people who are extremely interested in the hard sciences as well.
 
The issue is the argument, not the age of the terminology. Popper’s definition is a different sense of “scientism.”

Humpty Dumpty has entered the conversation.

And you demonstrate again why I have a problem with terms like "scientism".

"No, not that 'scientism', the other 'scientism', the one which means what I want it to mean. Well, what I want it to mean today..."

The stuff about spiritism made more sense than this.
 
That problem applies to every methodology, but it doesn't justify treating one methodology as the only reliable one; that's precisely the epistemic question at issue.
It's moot, since neither you nor anyone else has proposed any other methodology as being reliable.

Give us another methodology to compare it to, and let's see how they match up.
 

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