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Merged Is Scientism Really Justified?

Mathematical proofs are used to establish the existence of mathematical objects. A prime number doesn't, in and of itself, exist in the world as an observable object. So a mathematical proof is only giving you knowledge of things that exist in the universe of mathematics.

The deeper question is: why do the discoveries of math work so well as tools in modelling the physical behavior of the world? Why does the world act as if math underlies it? And can those questions be answered using science?

If they can't, then maybe there is another path to knowledge.

Let us all meditate, Ommmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm
 
Mathematical proofs are used to establish the existence of mathematical objects. A prime number doesn't, in and of itself, exist in the world as an observable object. So a mathematical proof is only giving you knowledge of things that exist in the universe of mathematics.

The deeper question is: why do the discoveries of math work so well as tools in modelling the physical behavior of the world? Why does the world act as if math underlies it? And can those questions be answered using science?

If they can't, then maybe there is another path to knowledge.

Let us all meditate, Ommmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm
The applicability of mathematics to the physical world is indeed a deep philosophical question, but it does not change the distinction between mathematical proof and empirical testing.
 
Mathematical proofs are used to establish the existence of mathematical objects. A prime number doesn't, in and of itself, exist in the world as an observable object. So a mathematical proof is only giving you knowledge of things that exist in the universe of mathematics.

The deeper question is: why do the discoveries of math work so well as tools in modelling the physical behavior of the world? Why does the world act as if math underlies it? And can those questions be answered using science?

If they can't, then maybe there is another path to knowledge.

Let us all meditate, Ommmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm
Obviously god is a nerd.
 
No you don't.


If you understood my point, you'd understand that this question is meaningless.

My point is that the two things can be grouped together according to their fundamental similarity. Nothing about that erases, or requires erasing, the fundamental differences.

In fact, in some of my other posts, which you also mistakenly claimed to understand, I clearly recognized and upheld the fundamental differences between the two things, even while grouping them together according to a fundamental similarity.

So your question is meaningless. There's no need to justify an erasure that isn't happening, and that nobody wants to happen.



You know who else doesn't understand a point? Me. I don't understand your point at all. I keep asking you clarifying questions, so that I can understand your point, but you keep ignoring them.

Every time I do think I understand your point, you weasel away. You say your question is one thing, and then you answer your question. But when I point out that you've answered your question, you turn around and say your question is something else instead.



So I think maybe you don't want to understand my point, and you don't want me to understand yours.
I understand your point: you are grouping them by a shared methodology, not claiming they are identical. My question is whether that shared feature is the most important one for classifying them as the same kind of knowledge, given that their justification works differently.
 
I understand your point: you are grouping them by a shared methodology, not claiming they are identical. My question is whether that shared feature is the most important one for classifying them as the same kind of knowledge, given that their justification works differently.
Why is it important to you that they be classified as the same kind of knowledge? What different "kinds" of knowledge do you recognise?
 
Why is it important to you that they be classified as the same kind of knowledge? What different "kinds" of knowledge do you recognise?
The distinction matters because different methods justify claims in different ways. Deductive knowledge is justified by logical necessity, while empirical knowledge is justified by observation and evidence.
 
I understand your point: you are grouping them by a shared methodology, not claiming they are identical. My question is whether that shared feature is the most important one for classifying them as the same kind of knowledge, given that their justification works differently.
Because that's how hierarchical taxonomies work.

They're classified as the same kind of knowledge according to toolset. They're also classified as different kinds of knowledge within that parent classification, according to the context in which the tools are used. Both classifications are true at the same time.



I wouldn't normally presume to use an analogy for didactic purposes, but I'm all out of other ideas.

According to our hierarchical taxonomy of animals, cats and dogs are the same kind of animal. Cats and dogs are both carnivores, having that fundamental characteristic in common.

But according to the same taxonomy, cats and dogs are very different kinds of animals. Even though they both belong to the class of mammals, and the subclass of placental mammals, and even the same order of carnivores within the subclass, they're still considered different animals, one belonging to the canid genus, the other belonging to the felid genus. And at the level of genus, we see the same principle at work: Dogs and bears are the same animal: Canids. But at the species level of the hierarchy, they're considered very different animals. Same on the cat side. Cats and Hyenas are both the same animal: Felids. But when we step down to the species level, they're very different animals.

Same thing here. According to my preferred hierarchical taxonomy, logical proofs and empirical tests are the same kind of method, at the higher, more general level of toolsets. Within the category of the scientific toolset, my taxonomy provides for two distinct subcategories, where we recognize that the two methods are different from each other in fundamental ways.

That's the beauty of hierarchical taxonomies. They allow us to organize things according to nested categories, from broader and more general to narrower and more specific.

Cars and planes are the same thing: Vehicles.

Cars and planes are also different things: automobiles and aeroplanes.

Cars and trucks are the same thing: automobiles.

Cars and trucks are also different things: cars and trucks.

Men and women are the same thing: Humans.

Men and women are also different things: Men and women.

Bats and birds are the same thing: Winged creatures.

Bats and birds are also two different things: Bats and birds.

Americans and Brazilians are the same thing: Pan-Americans.

Americans and Brazilians are also two different things: Americans and Brazilians.

Logical proofs and empirical tests are the same thing: The toolset I call "the scientific method".

Logical proofs and empirical tests are also two different things: Logical proofs and empirical tests.



I really hope you understand now. If you can't understand how hierarchical categories work, and how things can be members of several nested categories that preserve both their similarities and their differences, then I don't see any point in continuing this conversation.

At this point, we're nowhere near your original question, which was whether there's ways of knowing that don't use the tools of the scientific method. I'm not going to keep answering questions that drag us further and further away from that, if you're not going to understand my answers anyway.
 
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This waddles and quacks like all the threads that try to deduce that God (or whatever) must exist, and everyone who demands proof of the whatever is going about it wrong.
What bemuses me is how far removed this thread is from that intent. It's obvious there's supposed to be some sort of build-up to that point, but he's started so far away, and is having no luck at getting the thread to move closer. All the Gubiosak-induced thread drift is in the wrong direction entirely.

He's somehow bamboozled me into trying to explain as to a precocious five year old how things can have similarities and differences at the same time. "Mommy and daddy are both grown-ups, but they're different kinds of grown-ups."

"But why?"



but-why-ism is age-appropriate from about 2 to 5 years old.

loophole-ism is age-appropriate from about 5 to 8 years old.

And yes, they're both isms, but they're different kinds of isms.
 
Since the claim 'only empirical science provides reliable knowledge' cannot be proven empirically, by which of these two standards do you justify it?
We've been to similar places before.

 
No, it isn't.

Science

Science only accounts for a small part of the sum of human knowledge. An important part for sure, but not even close to the majority of it. Most of the knowledge we gain is processed subconsciously by a method that science has yet to discover. If we had to consciously produce a hypothesis, test it with evidence, and draw conclusions about every observation we made it we would hardly get anything done. Just breathing and keeping your heart beating would be hard work.

Knowledge that isn't obtained directly is generally accepted on trust, not application of the scientific method. For most of it science is hardly relevant except in the broadest terms.
Spot on, @Roger Ramjets. Thank you for the clarity. You’ve hit the core of the issue: treating empirical science as the only valid path to knowledge completely ignores how logic, trust, and practical reasoning actually function.
 
Scientism

That puts you in the 'hard scientism' camp, which one poster here thinks isn't real and is only 'in your head' as opposed to 'real' science.

Now that we have this actual knowledge of what scientism is (as apposed to what some people think it is) we begin to see the problem. By insisting that science (ie. the scientific method) is the only way to know if some 'knowledge' is true or not, you imply that:-

1. Other methods of gaining knowledge are inadequate - which clearly isn't true. In many cases other methods are better, because they produce useful results without so much time and effort. Often the science isn't 'settled' until the knowledge is already in regular use.

2. It is inherently far more trustworthy than other methods which cannot tell you 'for sure' whether some knowledge is real. But science is only as trustworthy as its application, which is not comprehensive or faultless. In some fields the science is so unsure that scientists themselves have large disagreements, and what little 'knowledge' they do agree on is inadequate for practical application.

'Scientism' is often used pejoratively against those who elevate science to being the gatekeeper of all 'true' knowledge, dismissing everything else as untrustworthy or false. That is true in some cases (eg. religion) but not all. The OP asks about logic, mathematics, and philosophy, all of which are used by science but are not themselves science.

For example you can use logic alone to show that the supernatural doesn't exist, without the need to gather evidence, develop theories, and test them. You may say that without that process I can't be sure that eg. Jesus didn't perform miracles and come back to life as a god, but it works well enough in practice. Science OTOH has an impossible job trying to 'prove' a negative via lack of physical evidence and ability to test it.
Brilliantly put, @Roger Ramjets. Showing how science depends on non-empirical tools like logic and math without being identical to them is the exact clarity this thread needed.
 
I understand your point: you are grouping them by a shared methodology, not claiming they are identical. My question is whether that shared feature is the most important one for classifying them as the same kind of knowledge, given that their justification works differently.
What is your definition of “knowledge”?
 
What is your definition of “knowledge”?
I'm using the standard epistemological definition. Whichever one you pick, the question remains: is the claim that 'only empirical science yields knowledge' itself an empirical fact? I'll leave that to the readers. Thanks for the chat!
 

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