Well, this is just semantics, then. The origins of the term are very obscure, since these philosophers' work is only known through third parties who do not always agree. By 'original definition', do you mean "Academic skepticism" a la Philo? Or more like Cicero's description of the Middle Academy (Arcesilaus' counter-stoicism)?
No I don't. I mean scepticism before Americans hijacked the term.
This earlier model of skepticism claimed that certainty is unachieveable, so we must make a reasonable attempt to form an educated opinion by testing. Sounds like modern skepticism, to me.
This has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with modern skepticism. Modern skepticism is a belief system. A belief system moreover which has very little evidence or reason to support it.
Phyrro's skepticism was a little different, and sounds a more like what you're suggesting: nothing is certain, so make no committment. The only thing about this is that Phyrro's skepticism does not appear to have had any actual adherents. Phyrro himself, while admitting that he couldn't be certain whether the next bite of food is really food, would still eat.
You're talking about a radical philosophical scepticism here. It's impossible to live by.
I'm talking about scepticism in the sense of not simply believing something just because other people do so, or because many people say something occurred. If someone claims some phenomenon occurred and this phenomenon contravenes the way our experience tells us that reality behaves, then it is rational to exercise doubt. We don't just simply believe when there are alternative competing hypotheses to explain what happened.
I think such scepticism in its original meaning is absolutely fine. What I think is highly irrational is to take it as an axiom that reality operates by certain principles, and that therefore any reported phenomenon contravening such principles cannot therefore be accepted for what it straightforwardly appears to be.
David Hume was a skeptic in this modern sense. He said:
Hume
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.
It appears to me that this exactly expresses the sentiments of most people on here. Now I think David Hume is a truly excellent philosopher, but I'm afraid in this instance his reasoning is truly appalling. I won't go into why here because I'm sure no -one has an interest in my reasoning anyway (they never normally do).
What confuses me, though, is your contention that a skeptic should not endorse western metaphysic, which makes no sense as a critique, since skepticism can be argued to be the backbone of the western metaphysic, having been born and practiced in the Academy.
A skeptic can endorse whatever philosophical position he chooses. But scepticism is all about revising your beliefs should evidence indicate otherwise. In this sense David Hume and most people on here are not skeptics (of course Hume was very much a
philosophical skeptic).
I'm involved in organized skepticism in the form of being part of a local branch for over a decade, and CSICOP and skeptical mailing lists since the '80s:
I feel a great deal of hostility towards organised skepticism and its aims.
I have only been a member of this forum for a few weeks, and I share your frustration with the approach of a few members. On other threads, I have espoused the view that assertive atheism has no place in skepticism, for example.
I don't see why not. For skepticism in the modern sense I mean. After all God cannot be seen, cannot be touched. Physical laws govern the entirety of the world. There is just the vast coldness of space overlooking our purposeless lives. That's the sentiment expressed by most skeptics.
