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The sinking of MS Estonia: Case Reopened Part VII

Is this book your source for the claim that the JAIC said a ship would float on its superstructure?
(Just a reminder on what the discussion is about)
It refers to the JAIC claim in its part-report, 1995, which was a technical report. According to Bjorkman it does not explain (at
1.12.5, 2.16 and 5.5) how the vessel could have floated on its side with water on the car deck. He infers there was no water on the car deck prior to the sinking and that the car ramp door was only partly open (contrary to the opinion of the German Group of Experts and JAIC ). BUT a couple of Estonian athletes claimed they managed to climb down the car ramp door via the port side (now horizontal) to get to a life raft in the sea. Also, early divers couldn't access the car garage via this route. He claims it failed to carry out stability and righting arm calculations before issuing said report.
What does the highlighted numbers above refer to? In the next post you talk about 1.3:
In Point 1.3, The Voyage, it states:

View attachment 66054
What part of this is about "floating on the superstructure"? And exactly what is it that Björkman takes issue with?
 
You made the claim that no-one was named because that's the Swedish way, so the onus is on you to show that this is the reason we are not told who was responsible for what by name. It's very silly the idea that 'The captain can't be named because... Swedish privacy laws'. It's ridiculous.
I have not mentioned Swedish privacy laws. The pretend quote you have in your post is a lie.

I have shown that that when I sampled 1/3 of the accident reports available on the havkom.se web page, and posted before year 2000, none of them names the persons involved in the accidents. You may call that ridiculous but that doesn't change the fact.
 
(Just a reminder on what the discussion is about)

What does the highlighted numbers above refer to? In the next post you talk about 1.3:

What part of this is about "floating on the superstructure"? And exactly what is it that Björkman takes issue with?
It seems the 1.15 refers to a press release given out by Meister, Lehtola and Forssberg after the Oct 17th meeting in 1994. which states:

After the vessel had turned over to almost 90° starboard list, which is estimated to have taken place in less than twenty minutes after the damage to the forward ramp [aka 'bow ramp'] it started to sink with the stern first. The ship vanished from the screen of a Finnish radar surveillance station at 01:48.
And this is reiterated in the said chapter 1, part 3. in the technical part-report of 1995.
 
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I have not mentioned Swedish privacy laws. The pretend quote you have in your post is a lie.

I have shown that that when I sampled 1/3 of the accident reports available on the havkom.se web page, and posted before year 2000, none of them names the persons involved in the accidents. You may call that ridiculous but that doesn't change the fact.
We have the exact same privacy laws and customs in Finland. However, when something is of public interest people CAN be named.
 

:sarcasm:

Such pitiful lying. Why do you do it?
Stop applying your standards onto mine.
No one should ever trust a man whose standards disparage pitiful lying.

(Of course they must have.)
Well that settles it.

It only uses the testimonies of Third Engineer Treu and Watchman Linde.
Why should we trust the testimony of two witnesses who were there instead of opinions expressed by someone who was not?

Problem is, Linde changed his story and was witnessed being seen in a bar instead of patrolling, so how much weight can we give the narrative, especially as Linde was later sentenced to nine years imprisonment for drug smuggling?
An Able Seaman who drinks and later turns to drugs? Inconceivable!
 
It seems the 1.15 refers to a press release given out by Meister, Lehtola and Forssberg after the Oct 17th meeting in 1994. which states:


And this is reiterated in the said chapter 1, part 3. in the technical part-report of 1995.
And now you have introduced a new chapter (1.15), and apparently a new document. That still doesn't talk about "floating on the superstructure". Will you be able to actually find something that matches whatever it is that Björkman is unhappy with, that you find interesting enough to post here?
 
No, they make no sense. They tell a story, but the story omits all the assumptions that would be needed to have the story come out that way. I'll add more detail later when I have time. Björkman is trying to say, "This is what should have happened." But someone with knowledge of the field can say, "No, not necessarily." For example, the progression implied for steps 1E and 1F is purely fanciful. But it's presented as the expected outcome.

Here's what he is claiming with the diagrams:


2.16 Stability Assumptions.

The ship was not fully loaded on September 27, 1994. Assume that there were 500 tonnes fuel aboard, a couple of hundreds tons of resh water, 1000 tonnes of cargo (cars, lorries, trailers) and 100 ton passengers and luggage and port trim tank full, 185 tonnes, to balance heavy cargo on starboard side. Then the dead-weight (dwt) is about 2200 tonnes and the draft (d) is about 5.1-5.2 meter. Deck no. 1 below car deck is then below the waterline.

With its large beam (B) 'Estonia' had always good, built in ability. I estimate the metacentric height GoM to be about 2.1 meter, which is confirmed by other people. But see point 4.4. (GoM is a Basure of the 'lever' which together with the ship's displacement ps the vessel upright). 'Estonia' required approximately minimum Mabout 1.8 meter to fulfil the rule requirements of damage stability. ve estimated the lightship weight of 'Estonia's to about 9,000 ton. onia' was a 'two compartment' ship i.e. two watertight partments below the garage could be flooded without the vessel zing or sinking. See also point 5.5.

If water leaks into the car deck (figure 2.16.1), the vessel heels 12° with 600,000 litres on the deck. Fig. 2.16.1B. This water line and fitted with 20 cms high sills. The water is always not flow down to deck no. 1 as the door openings are at the ad on the side of the sloping deck.

You need about 1200 tonnes of water on the car deck 7.62 meter above the keel to list the vessel about 23 to starboard. This water, 1200 tonnes, forms a 2.8 meter high wedge with its base against the starboard side and with a lever about 7.22 meter from centreline, which lists the ship (a fair number of trucks and trailers were parked on the starboard side water filled the space below and beside the trucks and the centre of gravity of the water wedge was pushed inboard). Fig. 2.16.1C. The top of the wedge is many metres from the ship's centreline and almost a meter below the sills of the fire doors, when the ship lists. Some water flows out from the car deck via the existing scuppers. The more water that enters the car deck, the more Estonia' lists, and at a certain angle of heel with a certain amount of water on the car deck she tips upside down (see point 5.5). The reason for this is that the righting arm, GZ, becomes 0 at abt. 34° heel, fig. 2.16.1D, and the vessel then is unstable. The vessel cannot float with list 90°, fig 2.16.1E, which is an unstable position. Then the vessel is on its way of turning turtle with the whole superstructure flooded, fig. 2.16.1F. When 'Estonia's was turning upside down, she should have floated with the centreline (and the openings down to deck 1) three, four metres above the waterline, fig. 2.16.1E. Very little water could during that time flow down to spaces below the garage.

The volume below the car deck is abt. 18,000 m³, and that air cannot leak out when the ship is upside down. As the lightship was only 9000 tonnes and the dead-weight 2200 tonnes, there was plenty of buoyancy left inside the ship (abt. 7000 tonnes), so that the 'Estonia' should in the end have floated up side down, if she had capsized with water in the garage fig. 2.16.1F. But she did not do that. She sank!

It does not matter if there are errors in the weight assumptions, le. if the ship and the cargo, etc. were lighter or heavier, or if the stability was better or worse or the levers were longer or shorter, because the principal result is always the same. You need substantial amounts of water on the car deck to heel the ship 18°, and you need about 2000 tonnes of water on the car deck to heel the ship about 34°, where it turns turtle in minutes and floats up side down (see point 5.5).

Water in the garage does not only heel the vessel. The water also trims the vessel either on the bow or on the stern. The water always collects at the lowest point on the car deck, which shifts position when the ship heels and trims. With 1200 tonnes of water in the garage the ship trims about one meter either on the stern (1200 tonnes water aft the opening in the bow moves up several metres above the waterline and makes further water entry more difficult or on

few minutes the bow (1200 tonnes forward) which means that the car deck almost below the waterline forward and facilitates water entry. In the latter case you would expect that the 'Estonia' had turned turtle in a as Herald of Free Enterprise outside Zeebrügge 1987 (but 'Herald of Free Enterprise' only ended up on the side as the water depth was 8-9 metres where she capsized, i.e. she never sank below the water surface but rested on the bottom with the side above water see point 4.16).

It took about 33 minutes for the 'Estonia' to list to 70° after she had first suddenly listed to 15° (witnessed by several survivors). It means that about one hundred tonnes of water per minute should have leaked into the garage above the waterline during 30 minutes. It seems quite strange. We know that if the inner ramp was completely open and if the ship trimmed on the bow and if there was speed forward, that the vessel would have turned turtle in a few minutes, alternatively if the water ended up in the stern, that the bow opening would have been about 2-3 metres above the waterline and no or little water could get in. My conclusion is that there was no water in the garage.

If a watertight compartment below deck no. 1 below the car deck of 'Estonia' is flooded (figure 2.16.2) with abt. 1000 tonnes of water the stability, the metacentric height GoM, is reduced by 0.8 meter due to free water surfaces (loss of inertia to prevent the vessel to list). If two compartments are flooded (fig. 2.16.2B) the metacentric height is reduced 1.6 metres and there remains only 0.5 meter of GoM. It means that the ship is still stable, but that she rolls slower. This is the rule requirement. Ships shall survive with two flooded compartments.

If three compartments are flooded (>2200 tonnes) the initial stability becomes negative and the ship may suddenly list 50°. But because it is only 2200 tonnes of water in the ship, it becomes stable again, when it has listed a certain angle fig. 2.16.2D, because the free water surfaces are reduced by the heeling, when the water is pushed up against the watertight car deck. Open watertight doors are temporarily on the dry and no water spreads. Also the righting lever (GZ) is positive at larger angles of heel.

the night of the accident is clear. The watertight doors between all six That three or more spaces could be flooded on 'Estonia' during watertight compartments on deck no. 1 forward of the engine room were open. The following probably happened. First (at abt. 00.40) one or two compartments (the sauna (11)) on deck 0 were flooded due to a shell damage, and the vessel was still stable fig. 2.16.2B. When the water reached deck no. 1 (at abt. 00.50) it spilled out there (fig.2.16.2C), which was observed by many passengers on deck no. 1 who complained at the reception, which in turn informed the bridge (00.54) by telephone. SL was sent to check! While a large number of passengers on deck no. 1 started to evacuate their cabins and doors on deck no. 1, and filled other spaces on and below deck climb to deck no. 7, the water spread through open watertight no. 1. The result was that the initial stability (GOM) became zero and that the ship listed to starboard at 01.02 (fig. 2.16.2D). Then the ship became temporarily stable, when the water could not spread through the watertight doors and the free surfaces were reduced. But water continued to flow in fig. 2.16.2E, water could again spread through the open watertight doors and the superstructure was flooded, so that the ship heeled more and more 70° at 01.35 - and sank 01.55. -

-That the ship finally sank (01.55) and did not, e.g. tip over up side down, was due to the fact that there was a hole below waterline fig. 2.16.2F and plenty of water (weight) below the car deck, which stabilised the ship. All air in the ship below the car deck and forward of the engine room escaped through the ventilation system while the angle of heel was less than 90° and the buoyancy was reduced to <12000 tonnes. The engine room was still dry, but its buoyancy was maybe only 5000 tonnes, so 'Estonia' could not float on that. Thus she sank, probably with the bow first.


[OCR conversion. Excerpt Lies and Truths about M/V Estonia Accident, AB

Notes: The German Group of Experts and JAIC state the car deck was flooded. It is accepted as an established fact that the ship sank stern first, as per witnesses and impact with seabed position.
 
We have the exact same privacy laws and customs in Finland. However, when something is of public interest people CAN be named.
I have never claimed that persons cannot be named, so that comment does not answer anything. You claim that "not naming" people is supposed to be telling us something about the investigation, but have totally failed to support that with anything but your personal comment that "It's ridiculous".
 
I have never claimed that persons cannot be named, so that comment does not answer anything. You claim that "not naming" people is supposed to be telling us something about the investigation, but have totally failed to support that with anything but your personal comment that "It's ridiculous".
Saying that the captain and key crew personnel were not named because 'Swedish Accident Reports don't usually name them' is a non-answer. Were all of the other accident reports you looked at of public interest?
 
Saying that the captain and key crew personnel were not named because 'Swedish Accident Reports don't usually name them' is a non-answer. Were all of the other accident reports you looked at of public interest?
Define public interest. Why do you find it important to have the names spelled out?

But the sample I looked at does for example include when Silja Symphony with 1112 passengers and 192 crew ran aground in February of 1996.

And you claiming that a report followed normal praxis is "a non-answer" doesn't make it so.
 
An Able Seaman who drinks and later turns to drugs? Inconceivable!
I was going to post stories of drunken escapades as a sailor.
Just imagine if there was a navy that actually gave their sailors a beer allowance every day.
I was going to post pictures of some of the navy stores beer cans but csn only find crap about rum rations and ◊◊◊◊◊◊ craft beer.
 
Here's what he is claiming with the diagrams:


2.16 Stability Assumptions.

The ship was not fully loaded on September 27, 1994. Assume that there were 500 tonnes fuel aboard, a couple of hundreds tons of resh water, 1000 tonnes of cargo (cars, lorries, trailers) and 100 ton passengers and luggage and port trim tank full, 185 tonnes, to balance heavy cargo on starboard side. Then the dead-weight (dwt) is about 2200 tonnes and the draft (d) is about 5.1-5.2 meter. Deck no. 1 below car deck is then below the waterline.

With its large beam (B) 'Estonia' had always good, built in ability. I estimate the metacentric height GoM to be about 2.1 meter, which is confirmed by other people. But see point 4.4. (GoM is a Basure of the 'lever' which together with the ship's displacement ps the vessel upright). 'Estonia' required approximately minimum Mabout 1.8 meter to fulfil the rule requirements of damage stability. ve estimated the lightship weight of 'Estonia's to about 9,000 ton. onia' was a 'two compartment' ship i.e. two watertight partments below the garage could be flooded without the vessel zing or sinking. See also point 5.5.

If water leaks into the car deck (figure 2.16.1), the vessel heels 12° with 600,000 litres on the deck. Fig. 2.16.1B. This water line and fitted with 20 cms high sills. The water is always not flow down to deck no. 1 as the door openings are at the ad on the side of the sloping deck.

You need about 1200 tonnes of water on the car deck 7.62 meter above the keel to list the vessel about 23 to starboard. This water, 1200 tonnes, forms a 2.8 meter high wedge with its base against the starboard side and with a lever about 7.22 meter from centreline, which lists the ship (a fair number of trucks and trailers were parked on the starboard side water filled the space below and beside the trucks and the centre of gravity of the water wedge was pushed inboard). Fig. 2.16.1C. The top of the wedge is many metres from the ship's centreline and almost a meter below the sills of the fire doors, when the ship lists. Some water flows out from the car deck via the existing scuppers. The more water that enters the car deck, the more Estonia' lists, and at a certain angle of heel with a certain amount of water on the car deck she tips upside down (see point 5.5). The reason for this is that the righting arm, GZ, becomes 0 at abt. 34° heel, fig. 2.16.1D, and the vessel then is unstable. The vessel cannot float with list 90°, fig 2.16.1E, which is an unstable position. Then the vessel is on its way of turning turtle with the whole superstructure flooded, fig. 2.16.1F. When 'Estonia's was turning upside down, she should have floated with the centreline (and the openings down to deck 1) three, four metres above the waterline, fig. 2.16.1E. Very little water could during that time flow down to spaces below the garage.

The volume below the car deck is abt. 18,000 m³, and that air cannot leak out when the ship is upside down. As the lightship was only 9000 tonnes and the dead-weight 2200 tonnes, there was plenty of buoyancy left inside the ship (abt. 7000 tonnes), so that the 'Estonia' should in the end have floated up side down, if she had capsized with water in the garage fig. 2.16.1F. But she did not do that. She sank!

It does not matter if there are errors in the weight assumptions, le. if the ship and the cargo, etc. were lighter or heavier, or if the stability was better or worse or the levers were longer or shorter, because the principal result is always the same. You need substantial amounts of water on the car deck to heel the ship 18°, and you need about 2000 tonnes of water on the car deck to heel the ship about 34°, where it turns turtle in minutes and floats up side down (see point 5.5).

Water in the garage does not only heel the vessel. The water also trims the vessel either on the bow or on the stern. The water always collects at the lowest point on the car deck, which shifts position when the ship heels and trims. With 1200 tonnes of water in the garage the ship trims about one meter either on the stern (1200 tonnes water aft the opening in the bow moves up several metres above the waterline and makes further water entry more difficult or on

few minutes the bow (1200 tonnes forward) which means that the car deck almost below the waterline forward and facilitates water entry. In the latter case you would expect that the 'Estonia' had turned turtle in a as Herald of Free Enterprise outside Zeebrügge 1987 (but 'Herald of Free Enterprise' only ended up on the side as the water depth was 8-9 metres where she capsized, i.e. she never sank below the water surface but rested on the bottom with the side above water see point 4.16).

It took about 33 minutes for the 'Estonia' to list to 70° after she had first suddenly listed to 15° (witnessed by several survivors). It means that about one hundred tonnes of water per minute should have leaked into the garage above the waterline during 30 minutes. It seems quite strange. We know that if the inner ramp was completely open and if the ship trimmed on the bow and if there was speed forward, that the vessel would have turned turtle in a few minutes, alternatively if the water ended up in the stern, that the bow opening would have been about 2-3 metres above the waterline and no or little water could get in. My conclusion is that there was no water in the garage.

If a watertight compartment below deck no. 1 below the car deck of 'Estonia' is flooded (figure 2.16.2) with abt. 1000 tonnes of water the stability, the metacentric height GoM, is reduced by 0.8 meter due to free water surfaces (loss of inertia to prevent the vessel to list). If two compartments are flooded (fig. 2.16.2B) the metacentric height is reduced 1.6 metres and there remains only 0.5 meter of GoM. It means that the ship is still stable, but that she rolls slower. This is the rule requirement. Ships shall survive with two flooded compartments.

If three compartments are flooded (>2200 tonnes) the initial stability becomes negative and the ship may suddenly list 50°. But because it is only 2200 tonnes of water in the ship, it becomes stable again, when it has listed a certain angle fig. 2.16.2D, because the free water surfaces are reduced by the heeling, when the water is pushed up against the watertight car deck. Open watertight doors are temporarily on the dry and no water spreads. Also the righting lever (GZ) is positive at larger angles of heel.

the night of the accident is clear. The watertight doors between all six That three or more spaces could be flooded on 'Estonia' during watertight compartments on deck no. 1 forward of the engine room were open. The following probably happened. First (at abt. 00.40) one or two compartments (the sauna (11)) on deck 0 were flooded due to a shell damage, and the vessel was still stable fig. 2.16.2B. When the water reached deck no. 1 (at abt. 00.50) it spilled out there (fig.2.16.2C), which was observed by many passengers on deck no. 1 who complained at the reception, which in turn informed the bridge (00.54) by telephone. SL was sent to check! While a large number of passengers on deck no. 1 started to evacuate their cabins and doors on deck no. 1, and filled other spaces on and below deck climb to deck no. 7, the water spread through open watertight no. 1. The result was that the initial stability (GOM) became zero and that the ship listed to starboard at 01.02 (fig. 2.16.2D). Then the ship became temporarily stable, when the water could not spread through the watertight doors and the free surfaces were reduced. But water continued to flow in fig. 2.16.2E, water could again spread through the open watertight doors and the superstructure was flooded, so that the ship heeled more and more 70° at 01.35 - and sank 01.55. -

-That the ship finally sank (01.55) and did not, e.g. tip over up side down, was due to the fact that there was a hole below waterline fig. 2.16.2F and plenty of water (weight) below the car deck, which stabilised the ship. All air in the ship below the car deck and forward of the engine room escaped through the ventilation system while the angle of heel was less than 90° and the buoyancy was reduced to <12000 tonnes. The engine room was still dry, but its buoyancy was maybe only 5000 tonnes, so 'Estonia' could not float on that. Thus she sank, probably with the bow first.



[OCR conversion. Excerpt Lies and Truths about M/V Estonia Accident, AB

Notes: The German Group of Experts and JAIC state the car deck was flooded. It is accepted as an established fact that the ship sank stern first, as per witnesses and impact with seabed position.
Because the car deck was flooded, the bow fell off.
It sank stern first because of the location of the large open machinery spaces, they also flooded.
 
Saying that the captain and key crew personnel were not named because 'Swedish Accident Reports don't usually name them' is a non-answer. Were all of the other accident reports you looked at of public interest?
The captain didn't have any contribution to make to the investigation, he was dead
 
Yes. As I said, open-minded.
No, there's nothing praiseworthy about relying on an obvious crackpot as a source. You've been excoriating your critics for what you said was their obsession with Anders Björkman: a person you supposedly hardly knew or cared about. Come to find out you own his book and he has been your primary source all along for your beliefs about ship buoyancy and stability. You can flap your gums all you want about being lofty and high-minded. But as usual, in the end your critics were right all along and you're just lying.
 
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Here's what he is claiming with the diagrams:
I've already debated Björkman himself at length. But since you claim his ideas are sound, why don't you restate this in your own words. Then I'll ask you some questions about it. (Hint: they'll be very similar to the questions I asked you earlier about metacentric height, which you never answered.)
 
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I've shown that is is not standard practice to name persons in Swedish accident reports. Your spin does not make sense.
It is a worldwide convention not to use the names of participants in forensic engineering reports. In some cases it is even a matter of treaty. The purpose of an accident report is to determine the root and contributing causes of an accident, not to place individual blame. The various causes may in some cases owe to the action or inaction of persons involved. But whether that results in individuals being held accountable in any way is usually a matter of national law. The investigation of a transportation accident typically involves parties from different countries and investigators from different countries. Because there is no unifying law, the engineering investigation is a finding of fact only. And because it is limited to a finding of fact and not a theory of liability, the participants remain unnamed. The only interest to the investigation is what those participants did or did not do, not who they are.

There is nothing whatsoever unusual about the JAIC report declining to name the participants.
 

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