A proof that p-zombies are logically incoherent.

[PixyMisa]

Regarding Daniel Dennett:

I have no respect for him whatsoever.

You have demonstrated no understanding of what he says, and you have already stated you have no intention of reading his work, so I have no respect for your lack of respect.

 

[PixyMisa]

This argument shows only that you can't be sure Ian isn't a p-zombie, not that he can't be sure he isn't one.

Nope.

P-zombies necessarily labour under the same illusion. Otherwise it would be impossible for them to answer questions the way they are defined to.

Remember, p-zombies not only claim they are conscious, but can answer all questions on the nature of their conscious experience in exactly the same way a conscious being can. They are, of necessity, aware, self-aware, and self-referential, as this can be established by questioning. That means that they have an internal informational process that acts exactly the same as consciousness in all ways.

As I have said before - and Ian has studiously ignored - the nature of that process is irrelevant. It can be material, immaterial, or some of each. The point is, without it, the p-zombie could not answer the questions. And by definition, it can answer the questions.

 

[PixyMisa]

It's hard to give a good definition of consciousness, but I think it's safe to say that an unconscious being can't perceive at all, illusions or anything else, and that nothing can seem like anything to it. So, while I'm happy to agree that lots of people have lots of misconceptions about consciousness, and that nobody fully understands it, I can't see how anyone can be mistaken about the simple fact that they are conscious. Even just being mistaken about anything presupposes consciousness.

So... If a p-zombie claims to be conscious, it is either right, in which case it is conscious and the concept is incoherent, or it is wrong, in which case it is mistaken, and therefore it in fact is conscious... and the concept is incoherent.

 

[.13.]

No, that's absolutely impossible. To assume reductive materialism is true is, by definition, to assume that p-zombies are logically impossible.

Am I missing something or isn't that the point? Assume reductive materialism is true. Reductive materialism states that p-zombies are logically impossible. You show that p-zombies are logically possible and you have a contradiction.

 

[69dodge]

True. The point is that the physical means is largely irrelevant (as shown by Turing and others).

It's irrelevant to anything that doesn't depend on the specific physical instantiation. Some things do depend on that. (If you want to listen to music, you need sound waves; a CD by itself won't do. If you want to play frisbee, you can use a CD; you can't use sound waves.)

How do you know that consciousness isn't one of those things that depend on the physical instantiation?

Doesn't matter. Our sense of hearing converts the physical sound waves back into information. The computer simply skips the whole mess of turning information into physical waves back into information, and processes it directly.

I do not understand what you're saying. Sound waves that enter our ears result in nerve impulses and other physical processes in our brain. One can view those physical processes as being the processing of information; but one can also view the sound waves themselves as embodying information. There's no such thing as information by itself, without a physical embodiment. Saying that something is information doesn't mean that it's not physical too; it's just one way of thinking about the physical thing. One can't process information "directly"; any information processing is done by means of some physical process or other.

See upthread. The concept of qualia is incoherent, so I don't worry about it.

I have read the whole thread.

Your arguments obviously won't be very convincing to people who think that qualia are exactly what needs worrying about.

P-zombies necessarily labour under the same illusion. Otherwise it would be impossible for them to answer questions the way they are defined to.

I don't see why that would be impossible.

Remember, p-zombies not only claim they are conscious, but can answer all questions on the nature of their conscious experience in exactly the same way a conscious being can. They are, of necessity, aware, self-aware, and self-referential, as this can be established by questioning. That means that they have an internal informational process that acts exactly the same as consciousness in all ways.

In all ways that are visible to you.

But when I say that I'm conscious, I am not referring to how anything appears to you. I'm referring to how things appear to me. I'm referring to the fact that things appear to me.

If a p-zombie appears to you the same as I appear to you, why does that mean that it appears to itself the way I appear to myself? Why does it mean that the p-zombie is, in the first place, the sort of being to which anything could appear like anything?

As I have said before - and Ian has studiously ignored - the nature of that process is irrelevant. It can be material, immaterial, or some of each. The point is, without it, the p-zombie could not answer the questions. And by definition, it can answer the questions.

I haven't ignored it. I've explained why I am not convinced that an unconscious p-zombie couldn't answer questions the same way a conscious person could.

So... If a p-zombie claims to be conscious, it is either right, in which case it is conscious and the concept is incoherent, or it is wrong, in which case it is mistaken, and therefore it in fact is conscious... and the concept is incoherent.

It is wrong, but I didn't intend "mistaken" to be a synonym for "says something false". More like, "has a conscious belief which is false."

If my calculator says that 1+1=3, I call it broken, not mistaken. "Mistaken" is for conscious beings, and a p-zombie isn't one.

 

[cpolk]

It's irrelevant to anything that doesn't depend on the specific physical instantiation. Some things do depend on that. (If you want to listen to music, you need sound waves; a CD by itself won't do. If you want to play frisbee, you can use a CD; you can't use sound waves.)

How do you know that consciousness isn't one of those things that depend on the physical instantiation?

I think he's trying to say that consciousness is informational, and your experience of consciousness is your processing of information. There is no music on a CD, only indiscriminate code. It is the processing of that code is how "awareness" is performed.

 

[Interesting Ian]

This argument shows only that you can't be sure Ian isn't a p-zombie, not that he can't be sure he isn't one. You can see only that he claims to be conscious, and you would see a p-zombie make the same claim. So you can't tell the difference. But the reason Ian gives for knowing he's conscious is that he is conscious, not merely that he claims to be conscious. Were he a p-zombie, he wouldn't be conscious, though he would claim to be. (I wanted to say, "The reason Ian knows he's conscious is that he's conscious of his consciousness", but that probably adds nothing.)

It's hard to give a good definition of consciousness, but I think it's safe to say that an unconscious being can't perceive at all, illusions or anything else, and that nothing can seem like anything to it. So, while I'm happy to agree that lots of people have lots of misconceptions about consciousness, and that nobody fully understands it, I can't see how anyone can be mistaken about the simple fact that they are conscious. Even just being mistaken about anything presupposes consciousness.

Just to say I agree 69dodge on this one. It makes no sense to say that my own consciousness is an illusion. Note that the same cannot be said for the self.

 

[Dancing David]

This brings out the major error in the p-zombire argument again.

To be exhibiting 'all apparrent consiousness', the p-zombie must have the awareness of self that is generaly defined to be consiousness.

I state this because of the following:
1. The p-zombie is in a state where it is not self aware but states that it is, or lies.
2. The p-zombie is aware of itself but for some reason the level of awareness does rise to the level of consciousness.

In 1. the p-zombie is aware that it is not conscious and lies to state that it is conscious, but under the behavioral definition of psychology, it is not the external behaviors but the internal behaviors which are allowed under 'all appearances', because the p-zombie itself would either have the experience of self awareness or not.
So this leads to the dual situation of the p-zombie being aware that it is not conscious and fabrication the stiry, or that the p-zombie is solely an automata and therefore does not have the internal behavior of self awareness.
Both of these show the error of the p-zombie argument, in that the p-zombie is either aware that it is not aware or it is not aware and therefore not able to exhibit all appearances of being conscious.

In the 2. case it would be that a supernatural defintion of conscious would be needed.

 

[Interesting Ian]

This brings out the major error in the p-zombire argument again.

To be exhibiting 'all apparrent consiousness', the p-zombie must have the awareness of self that is generaly defined to be consiousness.

I state this because of the following:
1. The p-zombie is in a state where it is not self aware but states that it is, or lies.
2. The p-zombie is aware of itself but for some reason the level of awareness does rise to the level of consciousness.

In 1. the p-zombie is aware that it is not conscious and lies to state that it is conscious, but under the behavioral definition of psychology, it is not the external behaviors but the internal behaviors which are allowed under 'all appearances', because the p-zombie itself would either have the experience of self awareness or not.
So this leads to the dual situation of the p-zombie being aware that it is not conscious and fabrication the stiry, or that the p-zombie is solely an automata and therefore does not have the internal behavior of self awareness.
Both of these show the error of the p-zombie argument, in that the p-zombie is either aware that it is not aware or it is not aware and therefore not able to exhibit all appearances of being conscious.

In the 2. case it would be that a supernatural defintion of conscious would be needed.

If something is not conscious then that something cannot be aware of anything.

 

[HypnoPsi]

As I've said before, I'm not going to get into infinate regression here. I say consciousness, you say define it. I say awareness, you say define it. I say experience, you say define it. And on, and on, and on.

There is nothing wrong with asking someone to define an unclear term so that the conversation can continue on equal footing.

There is when, as I explained above, people are just going to be evasive through infinite regression (define consciousness... now define awareness... now define experience, ad nausium). And I specifically don't want to influence any of you either way.

I'm asking how atheist-materialists define and describe consciousness. Why would they need my definition in order to do that? That I disagree that thermostats and toilet cisterns are conscious is beside the point. I'm looking for the atheist-materialist account.

And bear in mind that I am specifically not wanting to influence you.

That is not true, or you wouldn't be in the conversation; you would merely lurk and observe.

Huh? Again, I'm just asking for the raw atheist-materialist explanation of consciousness. How can that be "not true"?

If you want to know what the western athiest materialist skeptic view is, start a new thread asking what it is. That way, the boundries of discussion are set, and everyone is aware of what the intended goal of the conversation is.

What makes you think it's irrelavant to this thread? Consciousness, again, seems to be at the root of the matter here.

You agree that you're aware, right? Would it then be correct to say that the consciousness you believe exists in a cock-and-ball toilet cistern (in your model) is limited solely to just the awareness of the tank full/empty state and nothing more? What's the difference between awareness and experience as you would define those terms? That is to say, would you agree that the cisterns consciousness is limited to just the experience of the tank full/empty state?

You ask this, but you don't want to examine anyone else's system. You want to take their words and apply it to your system, so that you can ridicule.

Awww... poor widdle skeptic. Look, dude, comparing and contrasting models is part of science and I think that I'm being 100 times more tolerant with the atheist-materialist account of information processing being consciousness than they've ever been with people who, say, believe in psi.

I know this not merely on faith - I have observed you doing it in previous posts, and you are performing the exact same mannerisms now.

Well, yeah, I won't deny that I think it's nuts to believe that a toilet cistern is conscious. But, I think you are criticizing me extremely unfairly here. My main disagreement with skeptics is that they have all too rarely, in the past, been willing to propose and defend their own theories and models as is expected of a scientist.

Yes, I think that conscious thermostats and toilet cisterns are ridiculous - but I think that burying your heads in the sand and ignoring the issue deserves much harsher criticism. At least with the theory that "consciousness is information processing" some of you are being consistent and coherent. You're not quite being completely scientific about it yet, but you've moved in the right direction re an investigative strategy, even if I think you're utterly wrong.
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HypnoPsi

 

[69dodge]

I think he's trying to say that consciousness is informational, and your experience of consciousness is your processing of information. There is no music on a CD, only indiscriminate code. It is the processing of that code is how "awareness" is performed.

Yes. I think I understand what he's claiming. What I don't understand are his reasons for being so sure about it. I don't have a strong opinion about whether his claim is correct or not. I just don't know.

 

[Dancing David]

If something is not conscious then that something cannot be aware of anything.

Then it does not meet the definition of 'to be conscious from appearnces', because then it is either an automata which is programmed to just answer questions.

I am stating the same argument as Pixy Misa but slightly altered, part of appearances is the events that occur in the p-zombie.

In the case of the android, it could just have a wide repetoire of answers preprogrammed into it, which would not be the most effective way to create an android. The easier way would be a system that mimics biological perception and thinking. The android is exposed to stimuli and has to program how to percieve in response to stimuli, and learn language and interactive expeince through feed back loops.
Under this learned android experience the android would have the potential to develop consciousness the same way that a human does.

If we define a p-zombie as solely an automata that responds to questions, then it doesn't really sound like a p-zombie under the defintion of behavioral psychology.

All appearances would include the appearnce of events to the p-zombie and therefore it's perception would be included in the defintion.

I agree that an automata that just is programmed to answer questions that relate to consciousness would not be conscious.

 

[Dancing David]

There is when, as I explained above, people are just going to be evasive through infinite regression (define consciousness... now define awareness... now define experience, ad nausium). And I specifically don't want to influence any of you either way.

I'm asking how atheist-materialists define and describe consciousness. Why would they need my definition in order to do that? That I disagree that thermostats and toilet cisterns are conscious is beside the point. I'm looking for the atheist-materialist account.

Huh? Again, I'm just asking for the raw atheist-materialist explanation of consciousness. How can that be "not true"?

What makes you think it's irrelavant to this thread? Consciousness, again, seems to be at the root of the matter here.

Awww... poor widdle skeptic. Look, dude, comparing and contrasting models is part of science and I think that I'm being 100 times more tolerant with the atheist-materialist account of information processing being consciousness than they've ever been with people who, say, believe in psi.

I know this not merely on faith - I have observed you doing it in previous posts, and you are performing the exact same mannerisms now.

Well, yeah, I won't deny that I think it's nuts to believe that a toilet cistern is conscious. But, I think you are criticizing me extremely unfairly here. My main disagreement with skeptics is that they have all too rarely, in the past, been willing to propose and defend their own theories and models as is expected of a scientist.

Yes, I think that conscious thermostats and toilet cisterns are ridiculous - but I think that burying your heads in the sand and ignoring the issue deserves much harsher criticism. At least with the theory that "consciousness is information processing" some of you are being consistent and coherent. You're not quite being completely scientific about it yet, but you've moved in the right direction re an investigative strategy, even if I think you're utterly wrong.
_
HypnoPsi

There is no good clear defintion for concsiousness from the cognitive behavioral side, although Mercution may enligten us.

Consciousness as defined in common usage is a series of conflated events and a rubric for describing the multiple events that are involved in the 'self-awareness'.

Therefore there is no direct consciousness, there are memories of past events and thoughts, there are cognitive events related to perception and cognition. These are called consciousness by some, they are truely thoughts about thinking or memories, they are thoughts about perceptions or they are the direct experience of perception which is called sensation.

I have tried to argue that there is no consciousness, there are merely seperate events that we lump under a rug and call the lump 'consciousness'.

 

[HypnoPsi]

As I've said before, I'm not going to get into infinate regression here. I say consciousness, you say define it. I say awareness, you say define it. I say experience, you say define it. And on, and on, and on.

Everyone else in these discussions is able to provide concrete definitions of these terms. No regression required, infinite or otherwise.

As I have said before, I am aware of my self, my thoughts, feelings, ideas and surroundings. I call that awareness consciousness. But I wouldn't say you have to be self-aware to be conscious and, accordingly, I agree with the wikipedia definition of sentience "Sentience is a capacity for basic consciousness—the ability to feel or perceive, not necessarily including the faculty of self-awareness." http://www.answers.com/sentience?gwp=11&ver=1.1.2.381&method=3

You agree that you're aware, right? Would it then be correct to say that the consciousness you believe exists in a cock-and-ball toilet cistern (in your model) is limited solely to just the awareness of the tank full/empty state and nothing more?

I don't "believe" any such thing. It is a true by deductive proof from the definition.

You've said that, to you, information processing is consciousness. So you think that the cock-and-ball toilet cistern has a rudimentary form of awareness? That seems to be it.
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HypnoPsi

 

[Z]

If something is not conscious then that something cannot be aware of anything.

This, too, demonstrates why p-zombies are not logically coherent. After all, how would the zombie respond to language-oriented stimuli, if it were not aware?

 

[cpolk]

You've said that, to you, information processing is consciousness. So you think that the cock-and-ball toilet cistern has a rudimentary form of awareness? That seems to be it.

What I am trying to argue, and I think PixyMisa is too, is that you are looking at it from the human perspective only, with no regards to a universe that is broader. It has no senses to "feel" things in the same way you do.

I guess part of our human condition, being that we are the only life form like us on the planet, is that we want to think of ourselves as special. Therefore, it seems, we don't want to define a term like consciousness, because by doing so, we are making it specifically non-special.

 

[Interesting Ian]

What I am trying to argue, and I think PixyMisa is too, is that you are looking at it from the human perspective only, with no regards to a universe that is broader. It has no senses to "feel" things in the same way you do.

I guess part of our human condition, being that we are the only life form like us on the planet, is that we want to think of ourselves as special. Therefore, it seems, we don't want to define a term like consciousness, because by doing so, we are making it specifically non-special.

Oh we are definitely special -- very special indeed.

Your comment reminds me when people say that people who think animals possess a sense of humour, or are self-conscious, are anthropomorphising. Your comment is as absurd as theirs.

 

[cpolk]

Oh we are definitely special -- very special indeed.

Your comment reminds me when people say that people who think animals possess a sense of humour, or are self-conscious, are anthropomorphising. Your comment is as absurd as theirs.

The sentiment is mutual, then.

Let me ask you this - a dog is capable of emotion through its senses. It is capable of a desire for companionship. It is capable of "humor" through this companionship (for instance, playing fetch). They have a sense of 'right' and 'wrong', and somewhat an understanding of how to deceive.

It is not the same as humans, because humans have a greater ability to process information from the senses and make conclusions based on them. Does that mean it isn't as real as humans?

 

[Iacchus]

Does that mean it isn't as real as humans?

Yes, less spiritual perhaps ... albeit everything has a spirit. This is what gives rise to intelligence.

 

[cpolk]

Yes, less spiritual perhaps ... albeit everything has a spirit. This is what gives rise to intelligence.

That's one theory - in that case, what we're missing is the ability to create a spirit. If it is a real thing in the real world (which it must be if it interacts with the real world), then it is possible to locate, isolate, and recreate it. We simply haven't stumbled across the method of doing so yet. If it is the truth, though, we will.

It appears we have a large difference in perception, which gives rise to a differences in definitive language. I feel that there are only two states concerning reality - either someone is real or it is not. I do not believe that reality has varying states. If a dog's consciousness is not as complex as a human's, it must still be just as real to exist at all.

That is only according to my definition, though, because in my thought process, that is what makes appliable sense. In order to have a conversation with another individual, who may hold a different application for the term, I may need to alter my definition for the sake of the conversation. Once again, it boils down to semantics.