Cont: The Trials of Amanda Knox and Raffaele Sollecito: Part 32

Based on my understanding, Amanda could be eliminated due to....
  • There are 11 alleles missing from Amanda's profile (50 RFU threshold) or 6 (no threshold)
  • There are 16 alleles that Amanda shares between Meredith (10), Raffaele (3), and Guede (3)
  • There are only 3 alleles (50 RFU threshold) or 7 (no threshold) unique to Amanda found on the clasp.
So, in summary;

When adhering to the 50 RFU threshold, out of 30 alleles evaluated, 10 can be attributed to Meredith, Raffaele and Guede, and there's another 11 that are missing. Only three are detected and unique to Amanda.

With no threshold, the number of missing alleles from Amanda's profile drops to 6, the number attributed to Meredith, Raffaele and Guede goes up to 17, and the number unique to Amanda increases to 7.

In either case, it would seem there is no argument to be made that would suggest Amanda's DNA profile is present.
It was never part of the prosecution's that Amanda's DNA was on the clasp or mentioned in any motivation report. This post and others shows Amanda's DNA was not on the clasp. If there was hard evidence against Amanda and Raffaele as Vixen constantly boasts, why resort to using false evidence to argue your case? Why constantly repeat falsehoods such Amanda's DNA being on the clasp?
 
I wanted to expand upon something that I wrote earlier: Pro-guilt blogger Maundy Gregory appeared to find Amanda's DNA, but he also appeared to find Casey Anthony's DNA. He concluded, "For me, it seems hard to see how you could justify being confident that Knox’s profile is there without also thinking that there is a least a decent chance that Anthony’s could also be there." He did not discuss suspect-centered analysis by name, but I think that his exercise illustrates a weakness of this approach. I have looked for good citations to the topic of suspect centered analysis* over the years and only found a few.

I have long been intrigued by the fact that probabilistic software requires knowledge of the reference profiles. This requirement may help to rationalize (in the good sense of the word) why it is important to construct the numerator and denominator of a likelihood ratio in an objective manner. I also am concerned that the specifics of any single piece of software might give different results versus another piece of software. IMO what a likelihood ratio is and all of these matters must be explained to the jury by a competent, objective expert witness.
*EDT There are guidelines which direct the analyst away from suspect centered analysis, from which I quoted in these threads a long time ago.
What troubles me in these probabilistic and suspect-centered analyses is that they tend to gloss over the legal principle that a person is to be found guilty only on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. There appears to be a tendency to suggest that if there is a match of alleles at some loci, but not the full complement tested, one can attribute guilt on the basis of that partial match.

It's to be expected that some loci in randomly selected persons may have identical alleles. Although CODIS, the FBI STR DNA profile database, used only 13 loci when it was initiated, concerns about assuring a high level of confidence in the uniqueness of an STR DNA profile has led to the use of more loci for investigations more recently. One source recommends or states that currently that no fewer than 22 loci should be used.*

In DNA identification cases, 22+ autosomal STR locations (loci) are now used as the forensic DNA standard, and as a result, examining the 22+ loci produce a DNA profile that is essentially unique to a person (barring identical twins.) In general, when DNA profiles consist of the same alleles at these loci the probability that two unrelated individuals will have the same DNA profile, purely by chance, is very small. Typically this number is smaller than 1 over the world’s population.

* https://sorensonforensics.com/a-deep-dive-into-str-analysis/
 
I have some reservations about probabilistic genotyping software, one of which is indicated in the NIST report. The other concerns how one sets up the likelihood ratio; I believe that Dan Krane might have written something on this matter, but I don't have a citation handy. I initially had some reservations about Professor Balding's work; Professor Balding was kind enough to answer questions, which I posted at my blog. With time I became more inclined to trust both of his conclusions, namely, that Raffaele Sollecito's DNA was present, and Amanda Knox's was not.
Yes, I've read your interview with Balding. Interesting. When you say "Raffaele Sollecito's DNA was present, and Amanda Knox's was not," are you referring to the bra HOOK or the bra FABRIC?
 
Yes, I've read your interview with Balding. Interesting. When you say "Raffaele Sollecito's DNA was present, and Amanda Knox's was not," are you referring to the bra HOOK or the bra FABRIC?
I would have to go back and look at what was sampled, but I thought that it was the hook. To reiterate something that we have discussed before, the key issue is how Raffaele Sollecito's DNA arrived on there. The presence of two other male profiles from the Y-chromosomal DNA experiment is a huge problem for the prosecution's hypothesis.
 
I would have to go back and look at what was sampled, but I thought that it was the hook. To reiterate something that we have discussed before, the key issue is how Raffaele Sollecito's DNA arrived on there. The presence of two other male profiles from the Y-chromosomal DNA experiment is a huge problem for the prosecution's hypothesis.
I don't think anyone disputes that RS's DNA was on the bra hook. As you say, the question is how it got there. I do find it relevant that his DNA was not found on the cloth the tiny hook was sewn to or on the other hook just next to it. Because no other evidence of him at all was found in the bedroom and the collection team violated so many basic anti-contamination protocols , I think that also points to it being contamination and not direct deposit.

The reason I wanted to confirm hook vs fabric is because our discussion was not about the hook but this claim by Vixen:
 
I would have to go back and look at what was sampled, but I thought that it was the hook. To reiterate something that we have discussed before, the key issue is how Raffaele Sollecito's DNA arrived on there. The presence of two other male profiles from the Y-chromosomal DNA experiment is a huge problem for the prosecution's hypothesis.
If we look at the video the police made of their collection of the bra clasp and its surrounding material, one telling image is of one of the collectors holding the assembly, using gloves with some dark-colored deposit on its finger(s) by one of the clasps. We - and the scientific police and the Italian courts - should have called a halt to the DNA testing, its introduction of any DNA profile results from the bra clasp, and our discussions of the relevance at that point. I should add all the other peculiar and technically and legally improper collection actions done to the bra clasp sample (placing it back on the floor, handing it back and forth among the collectors, rather than not simply picking up initially with sterile tweezers (forceps) and placing it in a sterile paper bag and sealing and labeling the bag, the proper collection procedures) also are of concern.

The method of collection of the bra clasp assembly made it and any DNA profile results from it inadmissible evidence in any fair trial.

Under Italian law, the DNA profile results could not lawfully be used to infer a judicial fact, under CPP Article 192, paragraph 2:

2. L'esistenza di un fatto non può essere desunta da indizi a meno che questi siano gravi, precisi e concordanti.

Google translation (bolding and italics are my emphasis; words in square brackets are my clarification):

2. The existence of a [judicial] fact cannot be deduced from evidence unless it is serious, precise, and consistent.

The DNA profile results showed more than one male's DNA on the bra clasp, suggesting contamination. While one of the DNA profiles in the DNA profile mixture could be attributed to Sollecito, there was no other credible evidence showing that he was in the murder room or present in the cottage at the time of the murder/rape. Furthermore, detaching a hook and eye closure (such as a bra clasp) does not involve touching either the hook or the eye; rather, the material nearby on each side of the assembly is gathered toward the closed assembly, releasing the engagement of the hook and eye. The method of collection of the bra clasp, documented by the police video, showed that the bra clasp evidence could not be considered as serious or reliable evidence because the collection method clearly suggested a probability of contamination.
 
I don't think anyone disputes that RS's DNA was on the bra hook. As you say, the question is how it got there. I do find it relevant that his DNA was not found on the cloth the tiny hook was sewn to or on the other hook just next to it. Because no other evidence of him at all was found in the bedroom and the collection team violated so many basic anti-contamination protocols , I think that also points to it being contamination and not direct deposit.

The reason I wanted to confirm hook vs fabric is because our discussion was not about the hook but this claim by Vixen:
DId the evidence presented by the prosecution ever mention that DNA analysis of the fabric had been done? I don't recall ever reading of such evidence being presented. I have only read about evidence of DNA profiling of the clasp - meaning the hook and/or the eye (the circular open structure that accepts the hook).
 
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DId the evidence presented by the prosecution ever mention that DNA analysis of the fabric had been done? I don't recall ever reading of such evidence being presented. I have only read about evidence of DNA profiling of the clasp - meaning the hook and/or the eye (the circular open structure that accepts the hook).
I assume you mean the fabric on the clasp as we know Guede's DNA was found on the bra strap fabric. I can't imagine any even half-competent forensic officer NOT taking samples from several places including the fabric so I would assume so. But then again, they didn't swab the outside door handle of Meredith's room either....
 
I assume you mean the fabric on the clasp as we know Guede's DNA was found on the bra strap fabric. I can't imagine any even half-competent forensic officer NOT taking samples from several places including the fabric so I would assume so. But then again, they didn't swab the outside door handle of Meredith's room either....
Yes, I meant the fabric around the clasp. The bra strap fabric had been tested earlier, relatively soon after Kercher's body was discovered, the bra clasp was tested more than 40 days later, after being recovered from the floor. The bra strap, IIRC, had been cut or ripped indicating that the bra had been cut or torn from Kercher's body, and leading to the questionable probative value of the bra clasp and surrounding fabric.
 
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Obviously, I agree that the collection and storage protocols regarding the bra clasp were not what they should have been. Even if they had been perfect, the presence of other contributors to the YSTR profiles weakens the strength of the evidence. If one were to say, "Raffaele's DNA is present because he participated, but the other male profiles arose from innocent transfer of some sort," one would be making a statement that is not grounded in science. IMO such a statement sits very uneasily alongside of a fundamental tenet of DNA profiling, namely that the existence of a profile cannot give evidence on when or how it arrived on the object.
 
Obviously, I agree that the collection and storage protocols regarding the bra clasp were not what they should have been. Even if they had been perfect, the presence of other contributors to the YSTR profiles weakens the strength of the evidence. If one were to say, "Raffaele's DNA is present because he participated, but the other male profiles arose from innocent transfer of some sort," one would be making a statement that is not grounded in science. IMO such a statement sits very uneasily alongside of a fundamental tenet of DNA profiling, namely that the existence of a profile cannot give evidence on when or how it arrived on the object.
Science? We don't need no stinkin' science!

It's amazing how many PGP I've come across, including here, who believe the mixed DNA proves Knox was there at the time of the murder and it's from blood. They almost always refer to Garofano. They can't seem to grasp that the source of Knox's DNA could not be determined yet claim that it's a) her blood or b) her epithelial cells proving she washed her hands of Kercher's blood. Nor do they understand that when or how it was deposited cannot be determined either. But they are absolutely firm in their pro-guilt opinions.

There's a guy on another forum who is absolutely firm in his belief that all the TMB negative luminol revealed footprints were just too diluted from a clean-up for TMB to detect the blood. At the same time, he claims that a clean-up capable of that level of dilution would leave that footprint INTACT.

Logic is not strong in that one.
 
Let's get back to the future.

I don't know whether or not Knox and her lawyers have sent an application to the ECHR claiming that Italy violated Knox's rights under the Convention in the re-conviction trial, but I believe that would be extremely likely if they are seeking a means to overturn the re-conviction. I believe that Italian law (CPP Article 628-bis) requires a final ECHR judgment that specifically finds the re-conviction trial was unfair to lawfully quash the re-conviction.

I don't believe the supervisory action of the CoM, even if the CoM soundly scolds Italy for the re-conviction, by itself can lawfully lead to Italy quashing the re-conviction, again because of the specific wording of CPP Article 628-bis. However, if the CoM sends its own application to the ECRH, which would require the agreement of 2/3 of the ECHR member states, asking the ECHR to find that Italy has violated Convention Artilce 46, paragraph 1 ( binding force of ECHR judgments), and that the re-conviction trial was unfair (a violation of Convention Article 6). To date, this CoM process has only been tried twice, and against states even more resistant to abiding by ECHR judgments than Italy. Therefore, it would be in Knox's interests, and the interests of justice, for Knox and her lawyers to have applied to the ECHR rather than choosing to wait for the CoM supervisory action to seek an ECHR judgment on a violation of Article 46.

I believe that if Knox or the CoM argue that the re-conviction must be overturned on the basis of the 2019 final ECHR judgment Knox v. Italy, that the Italian government and Italian CSC will insist that the re-conviction is a new trial based on new evidence not presented in the original conviction for calunnia, and therefore the 2019 Knox v. Italy ECHR judgment does not apply to it. I believe that the Italian government and CSC will insist that only a new ECHR judgment specifically on the re-conviction trial can satisfy CPP Article 628-bis and cause the CSC to quash the re-conviction. The Italian government and CSC can also argue that, according to paragraph 2 of CPP Article 628-bis, the request to the CSC for an action resulting from an ECHR final judgment of unfairness must be brought to the CSC within 90 days of the relevant final ECHR judgment; because CPP Article 628-bis was a new law, this requirement did not apply to Knox's original request to the CSC, but I suspect that the Italian government and CSC would impose it on a new request because, they would argue, the re-conviction trial was new and not itself reviewed by the ECHR. Some readers here might think that such behavior by the Italian government or CSC would be unethical or dishonest; I would not disagree. The re-conviction itself, based on the text of the Motivation Report was unethical and dishonest, in my opinion.

Here's the first paragraph of CPP Article 628-bis:

Art. 628-bis. Richiesta per l'eliminazione degli effetti pregiudizievoli delle decisioni adottate in violazione della Convenzione per la salvaguardia dei diritti dell'uomo e delle libertà fondamentali o dei Protocolli addizionali

1. Il condannato e la persona sottoposta a misura di sicurezza possono richiedere alla Corte di cassazione di revocare la sentenza penale o il decreto penale di condanna pronunciati nei loro confronti, di disporre la riapertura del procedimento o, comunque, di adottare i provvedimenti necessari per eliminare gli effetti pregiudizievoli derivanti dalla violazione accertata dalla Corte europea dei diritti dell'uomo, quando hanno proposto ricorso per l'accertamento di una violazione dei diritti riconosciuti dalla Convenzione per la salvaguardia dei diritti dell'uomo e delle libertà fondamentali o dai Protocolli addizionali alla Convenzione e la Corte europea ha accolto il ricorso con decisione definitiva, oppure ha disposto la cancellazione dal ruolo del ricorso ai sensi dell'articolo 37 della Convenzione a seguito del riconoscimento unilaterale della violazione da parte dello Stato.

Google translation (with help from Reverso Context):

Art. 628-bis. Request for the elimination of the prejudicial effects of decisions adopted in violation of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or the Additional Protocols thereto

1. The convicted person and the person subject to a detention measure may request the Court of Cassation to revoke the criminal sentence or the criminal decree of conviction pronounced against them, to order the reopening of the proceedings or, in any case, to adopt the measures necessary to eliminate the prejudicial effects resulting from the violation established by the European Court of Human Rights, when they have filed an application for the determination of a violation of the rights recognized by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or the Additional Protocols to the Convention and the European Court has upheld the application with a final decision, or has ordered the removal of the application from the register pursuant to Article 37 of the Convention following the unilateral recognition of the violation by the State.
Source: https://www.altalex.com/documents/n...ecuzione-decisioni-corte-europea-diritti-uomo
 
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Let's get back to the future.

I don't know whether or not Knox and her lawyers have sent an application to the ECHR claiming that Italy violated Knox's rights under the Convention in the re-conviction trial, but I believe that would be extremely likely if they are seeking a means to overturn the re-conviction. I believe that Italian law (CPP Article 628-bis) requires a final ECHR judgment that specifically finds the re-conviction trial was unfair to lawfully quash the re-conviction.

I don't believe the supervisory action of the CoM, even if the CoM soundly scolds Italy for the re-conviction, by itself can lawfully lead to Italy quashing the re-conviction, again because of the specific wording of CPP Article 628-bis. However, if the CoM sends its own application to the ECRH, which would require the agreement of 2/3 of the ECHR member states, asking the ECHR to find that Italy has violated Convention Artilce 46, paragraph 1 ( binding force of ECHR judgments), and that the re-conviction trial was unfair (a violation of Convention Article 6). To date, this CoM process has only been tried twice, and against states even more resistant to abiding by ECHR judgments than Italy. Therefore, it would be in Knox's interests, and the interests of justice, for Knox and her lawyers to have applied to the ECHR rather than choosing to wait for the CoM supervisory action to seek an ECHR judgment on a violation of Article 46.

I believe that if Knox or the CoM argue that the re-conviction must be overturned on the basis of the 2019 final ECHR judgment Knox v. Italy, that the Italian government and Italian CSC will insist that the re-conviction is a new trial based on new evidence not presented in the original conviction for calunnia, and therefore the 2019 Knox v. Italy ECHR judgment does not apply to it. I believe that the Italian government and CSC will insist that only a new ECHR judgment specifically on the re-conviction trial can satisfy CPP Article 628-bis and cause the CSC to quash the re-conviction. The Italian government and CSC can also argue that, according to paragraph 2 of CPP Article 628-bis, the request to the CSC for an action resulting from an ECHR final judgment of unfairness must be brought to the CSC within 90 days of the relevant final ECHR judgment; because CPP Article 628-bis was a new law, this requirement did not apply to Knox's original request to the CSC, but I suspect that the Italian government and CSC would impose it on a new request because, they would argue, the re-conviction trial was new and not itself reviewed by the ECHR. Some readers here might think that such behavior by the Italian government or CSC would be unethical or dishonest; I would not disagree. The re-conviction itself, based on the text of the Motivation Report was unethical and dishonest, in my opinion.

Here's the first paragraph of CPP Article 628-bis:



Google translation (with help from Reverso Context):


Source: https://www.altalex.com/documents/n...ecuzione-decisioni-corte-europea-diritti-uomo
OK. Here are my concerns so far:

  • Any new application to find out whether the reconviction of calunnia would surely take as much time to get a judgment as the ongoing Knox v Italy case? We're talking years?
  • The CM might regard Italy's use of the memoriale, if presented in an action plan or report, as not resolving the violations as confirmed in the ongoing Knox v Italy judgment. I.e. that it was still tainted with the previous and ongoing human rights abuses. In other words, the shortcomings might be considered self-evident with no need for any further referral or "application" to the ECHR.

In the event of a new application:

  • I'd need to be reassured that Amanda can have 2 ongoing cases without the one influencing the other to the detriment of timescales and a favourable outcome. In other words that it might be possible that the ongoing Knox v Italy might be put on hold pending any new application to find out whether the reconviction violated Article 46 or not.
  • I'd also need to be reassured that if Amanda doesn't submit a new application, it doesn't mean that the existing Knox v Italy case lapses or becomes invalid, or compromises any chance of success.
  • That Italy wouldn't weaponise "the reopening of unfair court proceedings" as an apparatus to keep the current events in a perpetual loop of non-compliance, resulting in more human rights violations regarding timescales to resolve cases.
  • The CM hasn't even received an action plan or report. It's conceivable that Italy might not even use the reconviction as part of any submitted action plan. Amanda might have to wait to find out what the contents of the action plan or report are before she applies again. In that case, any new application would miss the deadline of 4 months.
  • Any new application might not show up in any Hudoc search results if it has not yet been accepted and communicated to Italy.

So, yes to another application as long as it can be evaluated concurrently with the ongoing Knox v Italy proceedings and doesn't compromise her chances of a favourable outcome.
 
Our sensitive friend:


Regarding the Narducci thing or the MOF case he failed in a civil court against a blogger and tries it now in a criminal court.
Here's a Google translation of one paragraph from the Italian media article cited by euroneighbour (words in square brackets are my clarification):

Blogger Segnini alleges that former prosecutor Mignini confused dates, events, and names, claiming, according to him, that the hairdresser's story [of being threatened in phone calls] was false, and that no names were revealed. At least according to the documents obtained. Furthermore, the doctor who died at Lake Trasimeno was not Narducci, but a dentist who died in tragic circumstances. Prosecutor Mignini brought the case before the judge, arguing that police reports, documents from the parallel trial for the threats, and testimonies from his investigators perfectly reconstruct the origins of the investigation.
When Mignini prosecutes, it's a confusing entertainment, unless you're the subject of the prosecution and the Italian courts go along with his nutty ideas.
 
From the number of lawsuits Mignini has brought, one might begin to suspect that he does not like being criticized. I notice he mentions Mario Spezi, too. Such a sensitive guy.
 
OK. Here are my concerns so far:

  • Any new application to find out whether the reconviction of calunnia would surely take as much time to get a judgment as the ongoing Knox v Italy case? We're talking years?
  • The CM might regard Italy's use of the memoriale, if presented in an action plan or report, as not resolving the violations as confirmed in the ongoing Knox v Italy judgment. I.e. that it was still tainted with the previous and ongoing human rights abuses. In other words, the shortcomings might be considered self-evident with no need for any further referral or "application" to the ECHR.

In the event of a new application:

  • I'd need to be reassured that Amanda can have 2 ongoing cases without the one influencing the other to the detriment of timescales and a favourable outcome. In other words that it might be possible that the ongoing Knox v Italy might be put on hold pending any new application to find out whether the reconviction violated Article 46 or not.
  • I'd also need to be reassured that if Amanda doesn't submit a new application, it doesn't mean that the existing Knox v Italy case lapses or becomes invalid, or compromises any chance of success.
  • That Italy wouldn't weaponise "the reopening of unfair court proceedings" as an apparatus to keep the current events in a perpetual loop of non-compliance, resulting in more human rights violations regarding timescales to resolve cases.
  • The CM hasn't even received an action plan or report. It's conceivable that Italy might not even use the reconviction as part of any submitted action plan. Amanda might have to wait to find out what the contents of the action plan or report are before she applies again. In that case, any new application would miss the deadline of 4 months.
  • Any new application might not show up in any Hudoc search results if it has not yet been accepted and communicated to Italy.

So, yes to another application as long as it can be evaluated concurrently with the ongoing Knox v Italy proceedings and doesn't compromise her chances of a favourable outcome.
TomG, your post brings up a number of issues of concern, some of which are "knowable" from ECHR documents and others that are really issues about what Italy might or might not do, and therefore only "guessable".

One issue I am confident about from ECHR documents is that a second application can be evaluated concurrently with the ongoing Knox v. Italy CoM supervision, from the viewpoint of the ECHR. There have been several ECHR cases like that in the past, some of which I believe I have discussed on this thread. The main issue the ECHR must determine in such cases in whether the facts brought before the ECHR are in a real sense "new". Based on my reading of the ECHR case law, I am confident that a re-conviction based on allegedly new evidence, not explicitly using Knox's interrogation statements as evidence, and consisting of the Italian courts' questionable reinterpretation of the ECHR final judgment Knox v. Italy would qualify as "new". Whether or not Italy filed an Action Plan or Report or not has nothing to do with the timing of Knox filing an application; the application would be based upon the re-conviction trial and must be received or post-marked no later than 4 months after the date Knox or her lawyers received an official copy of the motivation report providing the reasoning for the re-conviction final judgment. Applications that aren't rejected for "trivial" reasons (such as being submitted out of time) will show up in HUDOC when they are Communicated to the Respondent State. Applications that the ECHR rejects for being "manifestly unfounded" or other significant reasons may appear under "Decisions" rather than "Judgments" even if they were not Communicated.

The CoM does not stop its supervision of a case even if a new case involving the same applicant and same respondent state is started by the ECHR in response to an application. My rhetorical question is what is it that the CoM has done so far to supervise the current case Knox v. Italy. If the DEJ of the CoM began investigating whether Knox v. Italy should be placed on Enhanced Supervision that might be a big step forward, and if the DEJ suggested to the CoM that Italy had apparently violated Convention Article 46.1, that would be a giant step forward.

Examples of ECHR cases that involve violations of the Convention committed in a re-trial of a case previously found by the ECHR to be in violation of the Convention include:

SERRANO CONTRERAS v. SPAIN (No. 2) 2236/19 26/10/2021

Summary of case by the ECHR's Registry:

Art 6 § 1 (criminal) • Unfairness of revision proceedings before Supreme Court due to distortion of European Court judgment which had found a violation of the applicant’s right to a fair trial • Complaint connected with execution of Court’s earlier judgment but sufficiently distinct to permit its examination • Art 6 § 1 safeguards applicable to revision proceedings in present case, in light of the scope of Supreme Court’s scrutiny

See: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-212691
 
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I don't have time for a lengthy post, but I wanted to mention a problem in the analysis of DNA mixtures, namely that of a "suspect-centered analysis." Although it seems counterintuitive, one should not begin an analysis of a mixture with the suspect's DNA reference profile in hand. Although I do not believe that the host of the blog Maundy Gregory is an expert in DNA profiling, his exercise concerning the bra clasp illustrates one problem with suspect-centered analyses: He demonstrates that it is possible to find Casey Anthony's DNA on the clasp. Another problem in the interpretation of DNA mixtures are addressed in this introduction to the topic. A more advanced discussion can be found here.
Professor Tagliabracci for the defence argued 'suspectcentrism'

He specified, as well, that noise is an artefact consisting of a peak that is one repetition unit shorter with respect to the principal allele. Usually noise does not exceed 15 per cent of the height of the reference allele; if it is greater than 15 per cent, then it cannot be considered to be noise and must be held to be an allele. He then turned to the Exhibit 165/B electropherograms (pages 47 and following) and emphasised that, as regards the mixed trace, there are rules which have been issued, some just recently, by the International Society for Forensic Genetics which give recommendations on how the interpretation of a mixture must be done. ‚In particular,‛ the consultant said, ‚they recommend following a different method to the one that was used by Forensics (Polizia Scientifica)‛, who had adopted a suspectcentric method.

Professor Tagliabracci censured them therefore for not having considered the possible genotypes of this mixture, or the possible artefacts, or the peak heights present in this mixture, which can give rise to different genotypes, and saying: ‚I find the subject’s alleles in the mixture and, for me, the subject is there, it is compatible‛ (page 50). On the contrary, while it is necessary to make a comparison with the reference samples of the subject or of the suspect; only once the analysis of the mixture is complete < will I go on to make the comparison with the suspect’s DNA, and thus I avoid the urge < to find the suspect’s DNA anyway/*i.e., irrespective of the actual results+ in the mixture that we have examined‛ (page 51).
Professor Tagliabracci then maintained that this suspect-centric method was detectible in Dr. Stefanoni’s report and presentation because, he affirmed, it was a case of ‚forcing the profile obtained < eliminating or leaving out alleles [257] solely for the purpose of making that profile compatible with Raffaele Sollecito’s profile‛ (page 51). He pointed out, also, that interpreting a peak as an allele or as noise results in the identification of a different profile. He then indicated, in the electropherogram, various peaks which were considered noise whereas they ought to have been considered alleles, and specified that ‚this is especially so for locus D21S11 (page 55), where there was a peak present whose height exceeded the 15% that constitutes the threshold between noise and allele. This peak’s height is 15.8% with respect to the reference allele, he added, and therefore could not be considered as noise (page 56); on the contrary, the Forensics service considered it was noise, and this in had given rise to a genetic profile that leads to compatibility with that of Raffaele Sollecito which, otherwise, would not have been the case (page 57).~ Massei Report

Massei references Tagliabracci fifty-five times and quotes him in detail. At the end of the trial, the panel of judges and lay judges preferred Dr. Stefanoni's testimony. The DNA issue was revisited at the Nencini Appeal Court and once again, the 'suspectcentric' claim was rejected after being given full due and fair consideration by the court.
 
Some posters (with pro-guilt opinions) have made, in previous posts on the thread, false statements about the ECHR process or have stated that the Knox case was unimportant because its importance level was previously rated, before the publication of the ECHR final judgment Knox v. Italy as "3". As I point out a a previous post, the "importance" in this ECHR context has a special meaning: it is, before a case is judged, an estimate of whether and to what extent a case will involve the ECHR setting new case law or instead relying only on previously set case law; the lower the importance number, the more likely new case will be required. "Key Case" is the highest level of case law novelty, while the numbers 1 through 3 are assigned to cases of lower novelty in descending order. This information is provided on the HUDOC database, and is displayed if one clicks on the small question mark next to the field title on the main page of HUDOC. Thus, the guilters who posted falsely either didn't bother to do the small amount of research required to understand the "importance" or decided to lie about it.

Before publication of a judgment, the importance level is an estimate of whether the case will be cited in one or more of the various ECHR guidance documents, now consolidated in an online library called ECHR Knowledge Sharing (ECHR-KS)*. After publication of a judgment, the importance level is an indication of whether or not the case is cited in an ECHR-KS document.

The ECHR final judgment Knox v. Italy is assigned the importance level of 2 and is indeed cited in an ECHR-KS document, the Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Right to a Fair Trial (Criminal Limb), paragraph 588**:

588. The obligation of the competent authorities is not limited to the appointment of an interpreter but, if they are put on notice in the particular circumstances, may also extend to a degree of subsequent control over the adequacy of the interpretation. Thus, a failure of the domestic courts to examine the allegations of inadequate services of an interpreter may lead to a violation of Article 6 § 3 (e) of the Convention (Knox v. Italy, 2019, §§ 182-187).

* https://ks.echr.coe.int/web/echr-ks/home
** https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng
 

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