Readers here and others who follow the Knox - Sollecito case may wonder how the Italian judiciary can reach some of the conclusions it does in violation of long-held principles of law that are indeed actual written Italian laws to be found in the articles of the CPP and/or written in the case law of the ECHR and thus binding on Italy.
For instance, take the assertion in the Chieffi CSC MR that the defense must indicate how contamination of DNA happened in order for the Court to accept that an empirically, scientifically obvious - that is, in at least one control sample, detectable and measurable contamination had occurred, while allowing the prosecution and its prinDNA technician to not present a complete report of the full range of negative and positive control sample and to not provide the fundamental automatically digitally recorded evidence of the DNA quantification and profiling. According to ECHR case law, this is a violation of the presumption of innocence:
In the recent re-conviction of Knox for calunnia, the ambiguities of Knox's Memoriales written by her in English are not interpreted as initial renunciations of her signed Italian-language statements written by the police or prosecutor, but as independent statements falsely accusing Lumumba while she knew him to be innocent - that is, calunnia. This is a violation of the principle that doubts should benefit the accused:
In addition, the re-conviction did not remove the effects of the violations of Articles 6.3c or 6.3e on the trial as a whole, meaning that each of those violations resulted in a violation of Article 6.1:
The ECHR has developed a non-exhaustive list of considerations that it uses to help determine whether denial of the rights of a suspect/accused during the investigative or initial phase of criminal proceedings has undermined the fairness of the proceedings as a whole, shown in paragraph 489:
Furthermore, the Knox v. Italy case itself represents a cornerstone of the ECHR case law regarding the need for a fair trial to provide a fair interpreter from the very beginning of the investigative phase; allegations of unfair or inadequate interpretation must be objectively examined by the domestic court:
Source: Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights - Right to a Fair Trial (Criminal Limb)
For instance, take the assertion in the Chieffi CSC MR that the defense must indicate how contamination of DNA happened in order for the Court to accept that an empirically, scientifically obvious - that is, in at least one control sample, detectable and measurable contamination had occurred, while allowing the prosecution and its prinDNA technician to not present a complete report of the full range of negative and positive control sample and to not provide the fundamental automatically digitally recorded evidence of the DNA quantification and profiling. According to ECHR case law, this is a violation of the presumption of innocence:
406. The presumption of innocence is violated where the burden of proof is shifted from the prosecution to the defence....
In the recent re-conviction of Knox for calunnia, the ambiguities of Knox's Memoriales written by her in English are not interpreted as initial renunciations of her signed Italian-language statements written by the police or prosecutor, but as independent statements falsely accusing Lumumba while she knew him to be innocent - that is, calunnia. This is a violation of the principle that doubts should benefit the accused:
407. The Court has also held that the in dubio pro reo principle (doubts should benefit the accused) is a specific expression of the presumption of innocence .... An issue from the perspective of this principle may arise if the domestic courts’ decisions finding an applicant guilty are not sufficiently reasoned ..., or if an extreme and unattainable burden of proof was placed on the applicant so that his or her defence does not have even the slightest prospect of success....
In addition, the re-conviction did not remove the effects of the violations of Articles 6.3c or 6.3e on the trial as a whole, meaning that each of those violations resulted in a violation of Article 6.1:
487. .... Where access to a lawyer was delayed, and where the suspect was not notified of the right to legal assistance, the privilege against self-incrimination or the right to remain silent, it will be even more difficult for the Government to show that the proceedings as a whole were fair.... It should also be noted that an issue from the perspective of the privilege against self-incrimination arises not only in case of actual confessions or directly incriminating remarks but also with regard to statements which can be considered as “substantially affecting” the accused’s position ....
The ECHR has developed a non-exhaustive list of considerations that it uses to help determine whether denial of the rights of a suspect/accused during the investigative or initial phase of criminal proceedings has undermined the fairness of the proceedings as a whole, shown in paragraph 489:
1. Whether the applicant was particularly vulnerable, for example, by reason of his age or mental capacity;
2. The legal framework governing the pre-trial proceedings and the admissibility of evidence at trial, and whether it was complied with; where an exclusionary rule applied, it is particularly unlikely that the proceedings as a whole would be considered unfair;
3. Whether the applicant had the opportunity to challenge the authenticity of the evidence and oppose its use;
4. The quality of the evidence and whether the circumstances in which it was obtained cast doubt on its reliability or accuracy, taking into account the degree and nature of any compulsion;
5. Where evidence was obtained unlawfully, the unlawfulness in question and, where it stems from a violation of another Convention Article, the nature of the violation found;
6. In the case of a statement, the nature of the statement and whether it was promptly retracted or modified;
7. The use to which the evidence was put, and in particular whether the evidence formed an integral or significant part of the probative evidence upon which the conviction was based, and the strength of the other evidence in the case ... [for example, an unjustified denial of a defense lawyer at the very beginning of a case overcame an alleged "global sufficiency of evidence" in convincing the ECHR that a trial was unfair in the case of Brus v. Belgium].
8. The weight of the public interest in the investigation and punishment of the particular offence in issue;
9. Other relevant procedural safeguards afforded by domestic law and practice.
Furthermore, the Knox v. Italy case itself represents a cornerstone of the ECHR case law regarding the need for a fair trial to provide a fair interpreter from the very beginning of the investigative phase; allegations of unfair or inadequate interpretation must be objectively examined by the domestic court:
All the above suggests that the re-trial of Knox for calunnia with its re-conviction will be viewed as an unfair trial or extension of the original unfair trial by the CoM and, if Knox and her lawyers submit a new application, the ECHR.585. The obligation of the competent authorities is not limited to the appointment of an interpreter but, if they are put on notice in the particular circumstances, may also extend to a degree of subsequent control over the adequacy of the interpretation. Thus, a failure of the domestic courts to
examine the allegations of inadequate services of an interpreter may lead to a violation of Article 6 § 3 (e) of the Convention (Knox v. Italy, 2019, §§ 182-187).
Source: Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights - Right to a Fair Trial (Criminal Limb)
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I'm glad I bought a few extra ones last week when they were on sale.
