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Largest ever miscarriage of justice?

I'm not astonished, but I am increasingly infuriated that no prosecutions seems to have been brought or even considered for officers within the Post Office or Fujitsu now that evidence is clearly available that shows that they conspired, lied, obsfucated and interfered with the whole Horizon process.
 
She's a posh vicar, she'll have received an invite to turn up to a police station at her leisure, when she deserves to have had her door kicked down by a platoon in riot gear at four o'clock in the morning

I think she will face what David Duckenfield has experienced since he was match Commander at Hillsborough. Years of hatred, having to be careful where he goes and what he does, uncertainty over a trial and knowing even if found not guilty, everyone will know that is a legal technicality over responsibility and their name will forever be associated with a tragedy they could have stopped.
 
I'm not astonished, but I am increasingly infuriated that no prosecutions seems to have been brought or even considered for officers within the Post Office or Fujitsu now that evidence is clearly available that shows that they conspired, lied, obsfucated and interfered with the whole Horizon process.

It will be like Hillsborough and since establishment figures face trial, there will be delays and a lot of attempts to wriggle out of responsibility.
 
It will be like Hillsborough and since establishment figures face trial, there will be delays and a lot of attempts to wriggle out of responsibility.

As I have said mentioned this before. As far a miscarriages of justice in the British justice system go, until this case came along, nothing surpassed the wrongful convictions of the Guildford Four, the Maguire Seven and the Birmingham Six. In all three cases, and in subsequent appeals, the Police involved lied under oath, submitted false, edited reports, testified that the evidence they gave was from contemporaneous notes when it was clear they were heavily edited copies, and hid exculpatory evidence from the defence.

Yet for all that, only three cops were charged - then cleared in a whitewash trial. Not one person involved in the miscarriage ever served a day in prison. Unless this attitude changes, I do not expect to see anything different here.
 
As I have said mentioned this before. As far a miscarriages of justice in the British justice system go, until this case came along, nothing surpassed the wrongful convictions of the Guildford Four, the Maguire Seven and the Birmingham Six. In all three cases, and in subsequent appeals, the Police involved lied under oath, submitted false, edited reports, testified that the evidence they gave was from contemporaneous notes when it was clear they were heavily edited copies, and hid exculpatory evidence from the defence.

Yet for all that, only three cops were charged - then cleared in a whitewash trial. Not one person involved in the miscarriage ever served a day in prison. Unless this attitude changes, I do not expect to see anything different here.
I wish I could disagree with your assessment.
 
I am unclear about whether money actually went missing, or whether transactions were 'created' that never happened leading to a deficit in the accounts? Physically since the local PO is a mostly cash business, missing money would have to have been a physical local action.

It appears that the accounts could have been altered remotely, but to create a negative balance this would have required creating a record of transactions that never occurred. Has anyone identified examples of these factitious transactions? Is there any suggestion as who was remotely accessing the accounts to do this?

What I haven't seen (and I may have missed this) is any suggestion the software had a glitch that spontaneously created transactions.
 
From what I've read one major problem was that updates from the remote terminals to the Fujitsu server were sometimes lost during broadband/power outages, which is why so many of those affected were in rural communities where such outages are most common. It's easy to see how a discrepancy between the amount of money actually held by the branch and the amount the server recorded as being held could arise if records of transactions never arrived. The Fujitsu team with remote access may actually have been trying to fix the discrepancies manually, with limited success.

ETA: I also read something about a bug which meant one particular type of transaction never got sent at all.
 
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I am unclear about whether money actually went missing, or whether transactions were 'created' that never happened leading to a deficit in the accounts? Physically since the local PO is a mostly cash business, missing money would have to have been a physical local action.

It appears that the accounts could have been altered remotely, but to create a negative balance this would have required creating a record of transactions that never occurred. Has anyone identified examples of these factitious transactions? Is there any suggestion as who was remotely accessing the accounts to do this?

What I haven't seen (and I may have missed this) is any suggestion the software had a glitch that spontaneously created transactions.

Mostly, there was never any actual money missing.

https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news...s-horizon-system-failed-a-technical-breakdown

If you don't want to read the whole thing, here are a couple of salient points

What sort of bugs resulted?

As early as 2001, McDonnell’s team had found “hundreds” of bugs. A full list has never been produced, but successive vindications of post office operators have revealed the sort of problems that arose. One, named the “Dalmellington Bug”, after the village in Scotland where a post office operator first fell prey to it, would see the screen freeze as the user was attempting to confirm receipt of cash. Each time the user pressed “enter” on the frozen screen, it would silently update the record. In Dalmellington, that bug created a £24,000 discrepancy, which the Post Office tried to hold the post office operator responsible for.

Imagine you have just entered a bunch of transactions that total $550. You press the Enter key to finalize the transaction, and nothing happens. You press it again, and again and again. Finally, the screen posts up the transaction and shows you the details. The customer hands you the $550, and you put it in the till, you print the receipt and hand it to them. But unknown to you, every time you pressed that Enter key, the whole transaction was recorded each time - total $2,200, but you have only taken $550 from the customer. You now have a shortfall of $1,650, and it doesn't take many of those in a week to have a shortfall in the tens of thousand of $$$

But in some cases, you didn't even have to have multiple presses of Enter


Another bug, called the Callendar Square bug – again named after the first branch found to have been affected by it – created duplicate transactions due to an error in the database underpinning the system: despite being clear duplicates, the post office operator was again held responsible for the errors. :jaw-dropp

So not even pressing the Enter key could still result in multiple transactions being recorded.
 
I happened to catch some of it live. He comes across as a thoroughly decent chap, and the portrayal by Toby Jones seems pretty accurate. If I understand correctly, he refused to accept liability for the discrepancies, which is why he didn't get prosecuted, and was sacked instead (for no good reason, but probably because he was constantly, legitimately, complaining about Horizon and other problems).
 
I happened to catch some of it live. He comes across as a thoroughly decent chap, and the portrayal by Toby Jones seems pretty accurate. If I understand correctly, he refused to accept liability for the discrepancies, which is why he didn't get prosecuted, and was sacked instead (for no good reason, but probably because he was constantly, legitimately, complaining about Horizon and other problems).

One aspect that may have saved him from the terrible trauma suffered by many of the others is that, in the past, he had been involved with developing bespoke software packages for systems similar to Horizon. He understood the types of things that could go wrong, so perhaps was better placed to recognize these were computers errors not human fraud.
 
Bates stood up to the bullying by the investigators, and like all bullies, they don't like that and will often back down.
 
From the BBC live feed from the inquiry:

******
Former Post Office managing director Alan Cook is appearing at the inquiry into the Horizon IT scandal

He says he didn't realise the Post Office itself brought prosecutions against sub-postmasters

"I knew there were court cases, I didn't realise the Post Office, in about two-thirds of cases, had initiated the prosecution," he says
******

And this is why they are paid the big bucks...

One almost wondered what he did know about the business he was meant to be managing.. Presumably the bonus scheme and where to send his expenses.
 
So, its 11:05 on Friday night here in NZ, and I have just finished watching (for the first time) the docu-drama "Mr Bates v The Post Office" followed by "The Real Story" which has interviews with some of the actual people portrayed in the series, and some snippets from that series....


HOLY **** !!!
 
Looking at the testimony today and its amazing how many of these highly paid executives were apparently oblivious to the workings of the business they were in charge of. Either they are lying or they should return whatever remuneration they received since they clearly weren't competent to their jobs.
 
What the actual ******* **** is the point of non-executives?

We are always fed the BS that they are there to hold management to account, but then they know **** all about the organisation.

As Steve Miller had it, "Ooooh, oooooh, take the money and run!"

'Twas just the same in the NHS: our non-execs were just a bunch of chancers who knew nowt about MH and never challenged management. Useless twunts all!
 
Looking at the testimony today and its amazing how many of these highly paid executives were apparently oblivious to the workings of the business they were in charge of. Either they are lying or they should return whatever remuneration they received since they clearly weren't competent to their jobs.

It is typical management behaviour. It was bad, they know nothing. If it was good, they would know all about and be responsible for it.
 
It is typical management behaviour. It was bad, they know nothing. If it was good, they would know all about and be responsible for it.

See also "plausible deniability" or "Don't bring me problems, bring me solutions!" and any number of other management tics. Like threatening me with disciplinary action after co-writing (an award winning) multi-agency care pathway, but not running it by corporate services, who, of course, are experts in assessment of self-harming adolescents. So, somehow I'd breached some trust policy I didn't know existed and I reviewed draft policies before they were signed off...
 

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