John Stossel Goes After PETA Tonight...

Responsibility is a social construct, and therefore I do not think it should not be taken into consideration when determining the nature of right and wrong. First we define right and wrong, then we decide if a particular social construct such as "responsibility" happens to be right or not.

Right and wrong are happiness and unhappiness. Simple as that. From the point of view of a particular individual, right and wrong are defined with respect to how much happiness it produces, because epistemologically speaking, all a person absolutely knows exists are his mental states. Thus, a situation is good if the corresponding mental state is good. A good mental state is by definition happiness, because happiness is that which "feels good."

If you want an objective standard of ethics, then surely you need to take everyone's opinion. Thus, everything which can be considered to have a mental state should be taken into consideration. Of course, not all minds are capable of the same amount of depth. The depth of a cockroach is far less than the depth of a human, therefore a human should be taken more seriously.

Of course, the question arises why people should act ethically. Just because something is "good" doesn't mean people have any reason to actual obey it. And indeed, there are many situations where it is logical to act unethically.

I suppose a good argument is that, as you say, in order to live a comfortable life in a community of persons, we have to act at least relatively ethically to each other. However, the definition of person is not a discrete thing. For any given creature, it is possible to imagine another creature who is slightly more or less persony. It is possible to create artificial lines of personhood and non-personhood, because as it currently stands, things are neatly divided into human beings (who are clearly persons) and non-humans (who aren't going to be getting involved in social contracts any time soon, at least.) However, I do not think this convenient division will last forever. There are already debates about the borders of personhood regarding fetuses and the like, and I think that as technology advances, we might discover more oddities. (Artificial intelligences, cyborgs, and all sorts of wacky scifi nonsense like that.) Therefore, I think it is more advantageous to all involved parties if we can use a smooth continuous definition of personhood instead of discretely lumping people into person or non-person, and that as a result, we should be ethical to an entity even if we're not sure if said entity is a person. When you construct a continuous definition of ethics, you don't have to worry about borderline cases.

...being as I just topped off my argument by referencing superintelligent computers, feel free to take my argument with a grain of salt. I thought up the "animal rights so we can be ready for cyborgs" argument while writing this post and I'm beginning to question my sanity. :) Of course my ethical opinons are still very much under construction.
 
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Your use of the term absolute, which I learned from previous threads and postings, lacks recognizable meaning.
Non-argument. There are no absolute or universal morals. End of story.

This is the fallacy of deriving an ought from an is.
No, it is simply explaining how humans acquired the means for moral philosophy. "Interests" are the result of evolution.

I only use the word "highest" because, as you acknowledge earlier, it is enforceable: the three can decide to murder the one and not commit any ethical wrong-doing.
Yes, "can" decide to murder. From the perspective of the two that is correct. Not "highest" to the third however.

You see, you don't need to interrupt the flow of discussion to make this kind of remark.
Wrong. It is necessary because one is not analogous to another. The truth of one is based on objective data. Perspective won't change the truth. The other is relative and there is no objective data. This is where you are making your fatal error.

This is confusing now. By admitting that what the majority says "could be [moral]" you are implying that there exists a morality independent of our beliefs.
Your statement is logically invalid. Mine is not. There is no morality independent of OUR beliefs. There are two statements and they are coherent.

1.) I don't hold that what is moral is what the majority says it is.
2.) I hold that what is moral could be what the majority says it is.
3.) There are no axiomatic morals.
4.) If there were we would have to protect the zebra from the lion.

Lion and zebra statement restated because it is axiomatic.

It is wrong for a human to hunt and kill a zebra like a lion.
And you are certainly entitled to your opinion. Why should anyone else agree?

And why is the propagataion of the species important again?
It might not be. It is a human "interest". Why is any "interest" important?

As for the "why not" -- I already said why not right there! Because it's hopelessly arbitrary.
Claiming that it is hopelessly arbitrary is just silly gainsaying. It is a simple mathematical argument. One moral agent alone on a desert island has no need of moral codes.

2 moral agents on a desert island do. Yelling "hopelessly arbitrary" is just sticking your fingers in your ears. If you refuse to accept such a simple concept there is nothing more I can do or say.

So what if non-human animals cannot look after the interests of humans.
There is no utility in looking after the interests of those who cannot look after mine.

We cannot expect the severly retarded, infants, etc., to look after the interests of rational moral agents. Almost nobody considers that a good argument for eating babies.
Let's be honest enough to admit that eating babies is counter to most of our own feelings based on innate feelings to perpetuate our own species. An argument could be made based on the moral agent philosophy that these examples are not moral agents and therefore could be disposed of or eaten.

Animals don't share such a position in the human psyche because a prohibition against eating animals is not as likely to perpetuate the human race.
 
RandFan, I'm glad Mycroft is here to give you the occasional reach-around. You need it, as we see from the outset.

Unfortuantely, as has become the case, it's important for me quote my original words just to highlight how poor your responses have become.

Cain:
Your use of the term absolute, which I learned from previous threads and postings, lacks recognizable meaning.

Non-argument. There are no absolute or universal morals. End of story.

Interestingly, you accuse me later on of sticking my fingers in my ears. Despite resorting to the old "non-argument" saw -- without argument, I should note -- and several bold assertions, punctuated by rhetortical nonsense (Hell, why not say, "End of story, period"), my remark is an important one. Your use of the term "absolute" has been incorrect -- i.e., in error, wrong -- and I think I settled the matter in my previous posting with the aid of several concrete examples. You never bothered to address that crucial paragraph so I take it we're on the same page now.

Cain:
This is the fallacy of deriving an ought from an is.

RandFan:
No, it is simply explaining how humans acquired the means for moral philosophy. "Interests" are the result of evolution.

I see: instead of answering the counter-argument, you will restate your (mistaken) assertion. Yes, our "interests" are the product of our evolution. Very good. Again, this harkens back to the normative/descriptive distinction. The central point is that evolutionary pressures do not determine morality (normatively speaking). It is not moral to rape women even if rape is an efficient strategy for the propagation of selfish genes. Do you see the distinction now?

Yes, "can" decide to murder. From the perspective of the two that is correct. Not "highest" to the third however.

Ah, so you're equivocating. I "can", for example, murder the person sleeping in the next room. Of course I was never talking about the ability of two people to subdue one (read it over again). I was talking about what is morally permissable, not who is physically capable. That such a simple and fundamental distinction has been lost on you is... inauspicious.

Wrong. It is necessary because one is not analogous to another. The truth of one is based on objective data. Perspective won't change the truth. The other is relative and there is no objective data. This is where you are making your fatal error.

Or so you've said multiple times.

Your statement is logically invalid. Mine is not. There is no morality independent of OUR beliefs. There are two statements and they are coherent.

1.) I don't hold that what is moral is what the majority says it is.
2.) I hold that what is moral could be what the majority says it is.
3.) There are no axiomatic morals.
4.) If there were we would have to protect the zebra from the lion.

Lion and zebra statement restated because it is axiomatic.

I see you've gone back to repeating yourself without clarification (though adding the muscular rhetoric of logical validity -- sans argument). In the interests of supporting my meat-eating friends, I will point out that 4 does not necessarily follow from 3. The other statements apparently clarify nothing. What did I say that was "logically invalid"? In the section you quoted I was attempting to paraphrase your argument.

And you are certainly entitled to your opinion. Why should anyone else agree [not to kill the Zebra]?

Well, I don't want to spoil the answer for anyone... but I already did. Pages earlier. This is, after all, what the thread fundamentally comes down to.

It might not be. It is a human "interest" [to propagate the species]. Why is any "interest" important?

Contemporary evolutionary theorists disagree. First of all, we are propagating our selfish genes, not the "speicies". Since your posts tend to be rich irony I will point out that the view you are espousing goes back to my anarcho-socialist buddy Kropotikin. He was mistaken, unfortunately. See _The Selfish Gene_. In fact, if we believe Dawkins (and we probably should), his provocative thesis claims you have it backwards. It is in the "interest" of genes to create humans. We're merely vessels; vehicles. What does he say again? Something about "lumbering robots"...?

The second question is interesting because previously you claimed to have an answer: Your interests are important because they're yours. Then again, you seem to have a charming disregard for consistency. Which brings me to the next bit of text:

Claiming that it is hopelessly arbitrary is just silly gainsaying. It is a simple mathematical argument. One moral agent alone on a desert island has no need of moral codes.

2 moral agents on a desert island do. Yelling "hopelessly arbitrary" is just sticking your fingers in your ears. If you refuse to accept such a simple concept there is nothing more I can do or say.

Now you're just using a poor example. If you recall, I asked why two was important in the context of an entire society. In your example above your entire society consists of only two people. I have said earlier that a moral agent who has no prospects of interacting with any other moral agents, or moral patients, does not have a morality.

There is no utility in looking after the interests of those who cannot look after mine.

This is demonstrably false (a phrase you like to use to no effect). Of course there is utility in aiding those who cannot reciprocate. I think you mean there's "nothing in it for you", which deals with personal utility. I thought I dispensed of this short-sighted egoism a while ago.

Let's be honest enough to admit that eating babies is counter to most of our own feelings based on innate feelings to perpetuate our own species. An argument could be made based on the moral agent philosophy that these examples are not moral agents and therefore could be disposed of or eaten.

This is an argument that rests on a couple of false premises. 1) Who cares if eating babies goes against our own feelings? What do you say to the sort of person who strongly feels that he should rape lots and lots of women? 2) This talk about perpetuating our species is mistaken for reasons enunciated above. In fact, the example offerred here (and earlier) is more consistent because it emphasizes *selfish genes*.

I would like to make a few concluding remarks. Your arguments have taken several different approaches that most decent conservatives should find horrifying: majoritarian domination, moral relativism, and appeals to emotion. What's funny is that if I said anything remotely as crazy, hordes of right-wing troglodytes would descend on this thread faster than Republican politicans spend money.
 
{non-argument snipped}

The central point is that evolutionary pressures do not determine morality (normatively speaking). It is not moral to rape women even if rape is an efficient strategy for the propagation of selfish genes. Do you see the distinction now?
What you don't see is that this is not my argument. In this case I'm not justifying any specific behavior I'm explaining the foundations of that behavior.

Ah, so you're equivocating.
No, I'm stating logically consistent argument.

I was talking about what is morally permissable, not who is physically capable.
So was I. In a society of 3 people what is morally permissable is what two people agree is morally permissible. You are demonstrating over and over the inability to grasp that morals are not absolute.

Or so you've said multiple times.
Because it is true.

In the interests of supporting my meat-eating friends, I will point out that 4 does not necessarily follow from 3.
If murder is wrong for me then it is wrong for the lion. Yes, it does follow.

What did I say that was "logically invalid"?
You said:
By admitting that what the majority says "could be [moral]" you are implying that there exists a morality independent of our beliefs.
No, that is invalid. I'm saying that morality is dependent (to an extent) on our beliefs (that IS my point). MY belief however is that morality is not simply what the majority says it is unless the majority truly believed what they said it was.

If the majority wants the possesions of the minority it is not moral for them to simply take from the minority for selfish purposes. However if the majority truly believed that it was moral to take from the minority then it would be so.

Just because you and I share a belief does not mean that another incapable of a different perspective.

Both of those positions are logically valid. Your statement is not.

In the section you quoted I was attempting to paraphrase your argument.
Thus the source of the problem. Stick with what I say and not what you think I say.

... but I already did.
I'm sure you think you did.

RandFan
It is a human "interest" [to propagate the species]

Contemporary evolutionary theorists disagree. First of all, we are propagating our selfish genes, not the "speicies".
A meaningless distinction.

It is in the "interest" of genes to create humans. We're merely vessels; vehicles.
I absolutely agree. At TAM4 this week Dennet explained that sheep herders are used by sheep to propagate the sheep. Domestic sheep are far more successful than their wild counterparts.

The second question is interesting because previously you claimed to have an answer: Your interests are important because they're yours.
They are important to me. Your interests are important to you. If they were not they would not be "interests". This does not obviate the question of "why is any interest important". That they are does not explain why. Also, to simply ask "why an interest is important" is not to suggest that they are not important. Don't read into my question what is not there.

Now you're just using a poor example. If you recall, I asked why two was important in the context of an entire society.
Then you are failing to grasp what I am saying. In a society of 3, 2 are sufficient to declare what is moral (assuming they truly believe that which they declare). In a society of 4, 3 are sufficient.

I have said earlier that a moral agent who has no prospects of interacting with any other moral agents, or moral patients, does not have a morality.
Then stop claiming that I am arbitrary.

Morals are not absolute.

1.) If the majority believed that killing the minority where moral then that is moral. You may find that notion unsettling but there is simply no way around it.

2.) If the majority didn't believe that killing the minority was moral but killed the minority for selfish purposes any way and they knew that what they were doing was wrong and acted contrary to their beliefs then their act would be immoral.

Of course there is utility in aiding those who cannot reciprocate.
Agreed. I was impercise. The utility of aiding non humans is not the same as aiding humans. If I treat a human with respect I am more likely to gain respect. I am more likely to survive in a society that values human life therefore it is incumbent on me to value human life.

Valuing the life of a pack of wolves will not increase the likelyhood of my survival.

I think you mean there's "nothing in it for you"...
Actually there is. If I'm a sheep herder there is utility to tending to my flock.

This is an argument that rests on a couple of false premises. 1) Who cares if eating babies goes against our own feelings?
I care. Those who believe it wrong will work to protect babies.

What do you say to the sort of person who strongly feels that he should rape lots and lots of women?
I would say that society has decreed that it is wrong and that those who do eat babies will be punished if they are caught.

Society you see has a way to increase the chances that members adhere to the moral codes of society. It is called punishment.

2) This talk about perpetuating our species is mistaken for reasons enunciated above. In fact, the example offerred here (and earlier) is more consistent because it emphasizes *selfish genes*.
Again, a meaningless distinction. The "selfish gene" ensured that we would care to propagate the species. It is an "interest" to humans regardless of its origin just as sheepherders are an "interest" to sheep.

I would like to make a few concluding remarks. Your arguments have taken several different approaches that most decent conservatives should find horrifying: majoritarian domination, moral relativism, and appeals to emotion. What's funny is that if I said anything remotely as crazy, hordes of right-wing troglodytes would descend on this thread faster than Republican politicans spend money.
  1. I'm not a conservative.
  2. I don't claim to speak for anyone else.
  3. I don't believe in the domination of the majority. I point out that majority domination could be moral if the majority believed that such domination was moral.
  4. I do not appeal to emotion. I point out that emotions are in part a basis for morality. Caring about other people is an emotion. Caring about animals is an emotion. If we didn't care then there would be no morals. The trick is to craft moral codes that are rational and not simply emotional so as to be equitable, to maximize benifits and to ensure our own intersts.
 
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{non-argument snipped}
What you don't see is that this is not my argument. In this case I'm not justifying any specific behavior I'm explaining the foundations of that behavior.

*sigh... stares past the monitor* How many times must this be pointed out? I wholly accept (for the purposes of this discussion) any and all neo-Darwinian narratives as functional explanations for human and non-human behavior. However, this does not play a prominent role in the ethics of refraining from eating animals, or as a rational argument in favor of eating animals.

No, I'm stating logically consistent argument.

Well, that settles it.

In a society of 3 people what is morally permissable is what two people agree is morally permissible. You are demonstrating over and over the inability to grasp that morals are not absolute.

As I've said, your first statement leads to absurd conclusions: it is morally permissable for two people to torture, flay, and set afire the pariah of the group. The second statement -- accusation, really -- has become tiresome. If in your mind you think aboslute = universal, then just say universal.

[snip]

If murder is wrong for me then it is wrong for the lion. Yes, it does follow.

No; "murder" is a loaded term with a highly specific legal meaning. This is actually where a kind of "moral relativism" would apply. Lions kill; they do not commit murder.

You said:
No, that is invalid. I'm saying that morality is dependent (to an extent) on our beliefs (that IS my point). MY belief however is that morality is not simply what the majority says it is unless the majority truly believed what they said it was.

This seems to be a difference without a distinction. Barring special circumstances we might as well trust that people believe what they say. When people lie about what they "truly believe", as some do on issues of racism, sexism, and homophobia, then is exactly because they find dominant social norms intimidating.

If the majority wants the possesions of the minority it is not moral for them to simply take from the minority for selfish purposes. However if the majority truly believed that it was moral to take from the minority then it would be so.

Provide a concrete example. Were segregation and slavery morally unimpeachable because people believed in those institutions, laws and norms?

Let me just say that you've added another level of confusion and incoherence to the views espoused here. Now you're saying motives crucially matter. To compound difficulties, whereas earlier you were an apologist for egoism, now you're saying selfishness could void the views of the moral majority.

Thus the source of the problem. Stick with what I say and not what you think I say.

On the contrary, the source of the problem -- a problem -- is your inability to cogently express your inherently muddled views. Taking an example at random: I can only believe what I think you're saying, and vice-versa.

A meaningless distinction.

Not at all. I'm rather certain Dawkins spends the better part of a chapter fleshing out the distinction.

They are important to me. Your interests are important to you. If they were not they would not be "interests".

This is only true in a vacuous (i.e., tautological) sense.

This does not obviate the question of "why is any interest important". That they are does not explain why. Also, to simply ask "why an interest is important" is not to suggest that they are not important. Don't read into my question what is not there.

You had already said an interest was important because it was yours. Revealingly you later went on to confuse utility with self-advantage.

Then you are failing to grasp what I am saying. In a society of 3, 2 are sufficient to declare what is moral (assuming they truly believe that which they declare). In a society of 4, 3 are sufficient.

Now let us take a blast to the past:

Where does this moral calculus come from? I ask because it's strikingly arbitrary. Why not three people, or three thousand people?

The number requires at least two. Any group of people require morals for social cohesion and to protect members from anarchy and to ensure the propagation of the species.

Here you could have very easily said, "oh, yes, three people would be the appropriate number in a society of four." Instead you couched your rationale in stability and the by now well-worn canard of "propagating the species".

1.) If the majority believed that killing the minority where moral then that is moral. You may find that notion unsettling but there is simply no way around it.

2.) If the majority didn't believe that killing the minority was moral but killed the minority for selfish purposes any way and they knew that what they were doing was wrong and acted contrary to their beliefs then their act would be immoral.

The problem with 2) is that humans are very, very good at rationalizing their behavior. It would be almost impossibly difficult to peer into another's soul -- so to speak -- and understand what she "truly" believes.

Agreed. I was impercise. The utility of aiding non humans is not the same as aiding humans. If I treat a human with respect I am more likely to gain respect. I am more likely to survive in a society that values human life therefore it is incumbent on me to value human life.

But then this just tells us -- and it is consistent with subjective egoism -- to go ahead and be free-riders, which, incidentally, results in sub-optimal outcomes.

Valuing the life of a pack of wolves will not increase the likelyhood of my survival.

Here again I see a conundrum. What if I valued a pack of wolves, or went on some politically correct crusade, because it got me laid? That is to say, I did not "truly" believe in it, but it brought me fame, fortune, mates.

I care. Those who believe it wrong will work to protect babies.

And on what grounds? On what grounds could you then possibly criticize any proponent of animal rights/liberation/obligations?

[rest snipped, mostly because I am short on time]
 
No; "murder" is a loaded term with a highly specific legal meaning. This is actually where a kind of "moral relativism" would apply. Lions kill; they do not commit murder.

Nonsense. The legal meaning of "murder" does not apply to the lion precisely because it is an animal and not a human. If you are going to compare the morality of animals to humans you must ignore such distinctions.
 
Nonsense. The legal meaning of "murder" does not apply to the lion precisely because it is an animal and not a human. If you are going to compare the morality of animals to humans you must ignore such distinctions.
If a baby were to knock a knife onto the back of his mother as she cleaned up the juice he spilled, killing her, no one would go on a fact-finding mission to determine if the baby had murdered his mother. In fact, I think we'd consider that ridiculous. Premedited malice is essential in the legal definition of murder (and differentiates between various types of homicide), and that does not seem to be a quality that animals or infants possess (at least, not as we generally understand it).

That the victim must be human is a simple instance of speciesism. Again, there are no morally relevant qualities to distinguish a baby from a dog--the dog is in every imaginable way more personable--yet we consider infanticide murder.

This would not be the first time that our legal system rendered morally arbitrary distinctions.
 
Murder all depends on your society. If you live in a tribe and you kill someone in another tribe you are having war with, then it isn’t murder. If it is a friendly tribe, now there may be war, and if they don’t know who killed whom, then it is less competition for resources and still not murder. If it is someone from your own tribe, and they know you did it, now it is murder. Murder is a concept of humankind, and its laws, it is no more then that.

Now about animals, I saw a show about wild Africa dogs. The alpha female dog of the pack did not like one of the another lower females of the pack. And she killed one by one the another female’s pups, all but one, and when then the pack traveled to a new location the alpha female would not let the mother dog help it’s pup as they traveled, and the pup got further and further behind. The camera crew finally stepped in and helped the pup. Do some animals know how to murder, the answer is yes.

Paul

:) :) :)
 
If a baby were to knock a knife onto the back of his mother as she cleaned up the juice he spilled, killing her, no one would go on a fact-finding mission to determine if the baby had murdered his mother.

If a bull were to accidently knock over some bales of hay that crushed a cowboy, nobody would hold the bull responsible for the accident. If the same bull were to get angry and trample a cowboy to death, then off to the slaughterhouse it goes.
 
If a bull were to accidently knock over some bales of hay that crushed a cowboy, nobody would hold the bull responsible for the accident. If the same bull were to get angry and trample a cowboy to death, then off to the slaughterhouse it goes.
Sure, but would we characterize this as punishment for a murder?

Richard Dawkins has an interesting answer to the Edge's recent World Question ("What is your dangerous idea?"). He points out that this idea of retribution as a moral principle is incompatible with science, and something that we consider absurd unless it is directed at an actor we feel should know better.

Strangely, accusing animals of 'murder' implies a very strong animal rights perspective; by arguing that they are capable of murder, we effectively afford them not only status as a moral patient, but personhood.

Of course, I think what's missing here is the idea of premeditation, which implies an ability to plan someone's death, and I don't think it's something a bull could do. Killing someone in a fit of passion is not quite the same thing as premeditated malice, which is why we have this popular notion of crimes of passion (I don't think this has any particular legal weight, but it's a successful defense strategy).
 
But certainly the lion premeditates the death of the gazelle.
 
So the lion should eat grass, and or go to the supermarket. I am sure that a dead gazelle would be easier.

Paul

:) :) :)
 
Nonsense. The legal meaning of "murder" does not apply to the lion precisely because it is an animal and not a human. If you are going to compare the morality of animals to humans you must ignore such distinctions.

This is a simple confusion, addressed earlier, but I'll add my toothpick to the pile. Murder does not apply to animals -- including some animals who happen to be human -- because they lack the capacity to murder. A non-human animal, like some human animals (i.e., aforementioned marginal cases), cannot be blamed for its actions. If you think that they can be held responsible -- and remember that responsibility has been the standard for moral agency throughout this thread -- then you're taking a stance that goes well beyond most animal rights activists. In order to reconcile this with your lifestyle choices you'd have to believe -- oh, I dunno -- that predatory non-humans somehow overwhelmingly choose to do evil. Except for dolphins. Dolphins would have to be made honorary citizens because they murder sharks. Plus they're cute. Almost everyone loves dolphins, except for sharks.

If a bull were to accidently knock over some bales of hay that crushed a cowboy, nobody would hold the bull responsible for the accident. If the same bull were to get angry and trample a cowboy to death, then off to the slaughterhouse it goes.

What do you think is the reason it goes to the slaughterhouse? Mumblethrax assumes you're talking about punishment for murder. Is that so? Instead I think the rationale for killing the bull is that it presents a danger to human society. Incidentally punishment, as Dawkins explains in the cited _Edge_ piece, is "unenlightened" even when it comes to humans. Or at least that's what I remember him saying.

But certainly the lion premeditates the death of the gazelle.

Yes indeed. He plots it days in advance, draws up a detailed schematic, and then puts his diabolical plan into motion. A little known fact: Roadrunner cartoons are based on true events. Do you think lions have malicious intentions? Maybe, just maybe, they cannot choose to do otherwise. Maybe.

Paulhoff
Murder all depends on your society. If you live in a tribe and you kill someone in another tribe you are having war with, then it isn’t murder. If it is a friendly tribe, now there may be war, and if they don’t know who killed whom, then it is less competition for resources and still not murder. If it is someone from your own tribe, and they know you did it, now it is murder. Murder is a concept of humankind, and its laws, it is no more then that.

Yes, indeed. This is why I said murder is troublesome concept. Anti-choice n activists claim that "abortion is murder". Well, in a legal sense that's just not true. Maybe it "ought" to be the case if, as anti-choicers believe, the law were applied consistently.

In a discussion of ethics it might make more sense to talk about "justified" and "unjustified" killing in the context of accountability.
 
There is no need to sigh. I'm just answering your question.

Well, that settles it.
Yes, it does.

As I've said, your first statement leads to absurd conclusions: it is morally permissable for two people to torture, flay, and set afire the pariah of the group.
Why is that absurd? It is only absurd from a perspective that sees such behavior as immoral. Are the criminally insane absurd to the criminally insane? To me it is immoral but I'm capable of viewing the world outside of my own moral perspective. A coyote eating baby ducks is understandable from the perspective of the coyote.

Lions kill; they do not commit murder.
And now you have your solution. Lions are amoral. Lions and humans don't share the same responsibilities, interests or rights because Lions are not moral agents and humans are.

This seems to be a difference without a distinction.
On the contrary. I don't think a coyote eating baby ducks is a good thing. It is sad. But I can't enforce my moral code on the coyote. If there were a group of people who like the coyote had a different perspective where such behavior were moral then the majority would be moral but I would still see the actions as immoral.

Provide a concrete example. Were segregation and slavery morally unimpeachable because people believed in those institutions, laws and norms?
"Unimpeachable"? Not relevant to my argument. What are the moral perspectives of the people who believed in those institutions and why? Could the people you refer to be seen as behaving morally? Perhaps. For many who did practice slavery I would have to say no. They knew better. For many if not the vast majority of those who practiced slavery I would say that they went out on a limb to justify their actions.

Let me just say that you've added another level of confusion and incoherence to the views espoused here. Now you're saying motives crucially matter. To compound difficulties, whereas earlier you were an apologist for egoism, now you're saying selfishness could void the views of the moral majority.
My view has not changed. An amoral person like the lion cannot act in an immoral manner. A person who truly believes that he or she is acting morally or amorally then it is so.

{tiresome rhetoric snipped}

Not at all. I'm rather certain Dawkins spends the better part of a chapter fleshing out the distinction.
Not for the purpose of our discussion which Dennet so eloquently demonstrates.

This is only true in a vacuous (i.e., tautological) sense.
Just stating the obvious and the relevant because you fail to take it into account.

The problem with 2) is that humans are very, very good at rationalizing their behavior. It would be almost impossibly difficult to peer into another's soul -- so to speak -- and understand what she "truly" believes.
No "problem". One can rationalize all he or she wants. Rationalizing doesn't make something ok.

Here again I see a conundrum. What if I valued a pack of wolves, or went on some politically correct crusade, because it got me laid? That is to say, I did not "truly" believe in it, but it brought me fame, fortune, mates.
Whatever floats your boat. I think I understand your point but I think you will need a better example.

And on what grounds?
Innate sense.

On what grounds could you then possibly criticize any proponent of animal rights/liberation/obligations?
"Any"? I support many organizations who work to reduce animal suffering. I criticize those who would set humans as second priority or who act irrationally.
 
There is no need to sigh. I'm just answering your question.

Sorry, I'm just expressing my frustration. I must say, I think you're just making up things as you go along: from invoking Cohen to impresice language relating "absolute" morality and legalisms such as "murder." Here's another main sticking point:

Why is that absurd? It is only absurd from a perspective that sees such behavior as immoral. Are the criminally insane absurd to the criminally insane? To me it is immoral but I'm capable of viewing the world outside of my own moral perspective. A coyote eating baby ducks is understandable from the perspective of the coyote.

There's not much purpose discussing animal rights because you don't even believe in basic human rights. I do find it curious how you conveniently venture off into the realm of relativism -- where all views, no matter how silly, are rendered equal -- when discussing the subject of non-human animals.

Lions are amoral. Lions and humans don't share the same responsibilities, interests or rights because Lions are not moral agents and humans are.

I can fully agree with these statements, though I would add a slight nuance: most humans are moral agents. Notice this leads to a substantive distinction. We can slightly reword your observation: Not all humans share the same responsibilities, interests or rights because some humans are moral agents and some are not.

On the contrary. I don't think a coyote eating baby ducks is a good thing. It is sad. But I can't enforce my moral code on the coyote. If there were a group of people who like the coyote had a different perspective where such behavior were moral then the majority would be moral but I would still see the actions as immoral.

First off, virtually no one is advocating an activist role for humans in the animal kingdom. Indeed, the animal rights crowd takes a rather laissez-faire stance. So it's not a matter of you "enforcing" your "moral code" on a coyote vis-a-vis ducks. Instead we're talking about how humans treat animals, mostly domesticated animals. You have already agreed that it is legitimate to set limits on what humans can do with animals (see above anti-cruelty posts).

"Unimpeachable"? Not relevant to my argument. What are the moral perspectives of the people who believed in those institutions and why? Could the people you refer to be seen as behaving morally? Perhaps. For many who did practice slavery I would have to say no. They knew better. For many if not the vast majority of those who practiced slavery I would say that they went out on a limb to justify their actions.

I'm not going to bother disputing our respective impressions of different times and places in history. Again, it doesn't matter to me whether or not I know what people believed "deep down"; that's just a profoundly confused approach to morality, in my opinion. I can also turn it on its head: many Americans don't want to meet their meat because they're afraid of what they'll find out, so animal consumption might be immoral.

I want to add that your relativist views encounter a problem of geography. What is the relevant society? What if the majority in an insulated town believes in X, Y, Z, as does the region, but the state/country disagrees? What majority are we talking about when it comes to morality? State structures? Because I share more in common with citizens in "foreign" cosmopolitan cities than farmers in bumf*ck, Alabama.

That opinions change (mostly driven by demographics) are also gives rise to another absurdity in this relativist scheming.

My view has not changed. An amoral person like the lion cannot act in an immoral manner. A person who truly believes that he or she is acting morally or amorally then it is so.

So if you're a self-deluded homophobic, racist, misogynist, and you have an intense dittohead following, then those views can give rise to legitimate political institutions.

Not for the purpose of our discussion which Dennet so eloquently demonstrates.

Just stating the obvious and the relevant because you fail to take it into account.

The first statement is puzzling. The second is wrong. Neither is important.

No "problem". One can rationalize all he or she wants. Rationalizing doesn't make something ok.

Whatever floats your boat. I think I understand your point but I think you will need a better example.

Innate sense.

"Any"? I support many organizations who work to reduce animal suffering. I criticize those who would set humans as second priority or who act irrationally.

This is just emotivist agent relative "morality." There's little or nothing to add. I trust that in the future, when threads come up relating to homophobes, racists, rapists, murderers, torturers, dictators, anything that contradicts your market fundamentalist beliefs etc., you will say, "Yes, well, that viewpoint is as equally valid as anyone else's.
 
Sorry, I'm just expressing my frustration. I must say, I think you're just making up things as you go along: from invoking Cohen to impresice language relating "absolute" morality and legalisms such as "murder."
{blah blah blah}

There's not much purpose discussing animal rights because you don't even believe in basic human rights.
Absolutely not true and this doesn't follow from anything I have said.

I do find it curious how you conveniently venture off into the realm of relativism -- where all views, no matter how silly, are rendered equal -- when discussing the subject of non-human animals.
No.

Indeed, the animal rights crowd takes a rather laissez-faire stance.
Precisely. The interests of animals is out of sight out of mind when humans are not involved.

Instead we're talking about how humans treat animals...
But it is important to understand that you want the interests of animals considered on one hand but not the other.

You have already agreed that it is legitimate to set limits on what humans can do with animals (see above anti-cruelty posts).
Yes. And please note that I have also agreed that laws that would curtail or eliminate animal domestication and the consumption of meat could also be legitimate.

Again, it doesn't matter to me whether or not I know what people believed "deep down"; that's just a profoundly confused approach to morality, in my opinion.
Well you are entitled to your opinion but it is not one rooted in science.

I want to add that your relativist views encounter a problem of geography. What is the relevant society? What if the majority in an insulated town believes in X, Y, Z, as does the region, but the state/country disagrees? What majority are we talking about when it comes to morality? State structures? Because I share more in common with citizens in "foreign" cosmopolitan cities than farmers in bumf*ck, Alabama.
?

You are outlining a classic ethical problem as though I discovered it or that it only exists in the abstract. This is Ethics 101.

Comparative morality among cultures

There has been considerable work done in studying comparative morality among cultures. To such researchers, morality is not seen as a constant essential "truth" but as a series of values that is influenced by (and influences) the cultural context. One well known commentator is Fons Trompenaars, author of Did the Pedestrian Die?, which (among other values) tested the proposition of what expectation did the driver of a car expect to have his friend, a passenger riding in the car, lie to protect the driver from the consequences of driving too fast and hitting a pedestrian. Trompenaars found that in different cultures there were quite different expectations (from none to almost certain), and in some cultures it mattered whether the pedestrian died what assistance would be expected.

That opinions change (mostly driven by demographics) are also gives rise to another absurdity in this relativist scheming.
"Absurdity"? You might want to avoid any courses in ethics.

You can't really escape the moral conflicts based on ideology, theology, age, sex, etc. This is the subject of much research on the part of social anthropologists. You might want to let them know that their research is absurd.

So if you're a self-deluded homophobic, racist, misogynist, and you have an intense dittohead following, then those views can give rise to legitimate political institutions.
"Self-deluded"? I never said self delusion was basis for morality. I understand your point but it misses the point.

The first statement is puzzling. The second is wrong. Neither is important.
No reason to be puzzled. Dennet's explanation which I posted earlier is pretty self-explanatory. And yes, they are important.

I trust that in the future, when threads come up relating to homophobes, racists, rapists, murderers, torturers, dictators, anything that contradicts your market fundamentalist beliefs etc., you will say, "Yes, well, that viewpoint is as equally valid as anyone else's.
That would be fine if there were any reason for me to believe that. This has nothing to do with my position.
 

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