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Can a Skeptic Believe in God? Responses to Panel Discussion

I see Alliebubs's point, but at the same time, Ellen Johnson is the head of a special-interest organization whose raison d'etre is to advocate for the interests of atheists. Much like Nadine Strossen seemed a bit fanatical about the ACLU's work at times, I don't think it's possible to be effective in such a position without a commitment level above and beyond the mainstream. I thought that Ms. Johnson made some interesting points during the panel discussion, though I do wish she had let someone else field the very interesting question about the appropriate level at which skepticism should be applied, because she was entirely incompetent to address that issue.
 
You're absolutely right that none of us, myself included, behave 100% logically, but isn't that the ideal to which we, as skeptics, aspire? Are we not justified in pointing out and criticizing faulty logic where we find it? Your fuzzy pink unicorns example is quite apt; if Bidlack had made a presentation at TAM defending his belief in fuzzy pink unicorns on the grounds that it gave him comfort to believe that they exist, would you really be objecting to my criticism of that view as vehemently as you are?

So I think we're agreed that Dr. Bidlack is a skeptic who believes in God. So can a skeptic believe in God? Yes. Can a scientist believe in a God? Yes, for all the same reasons.

I think we're getting closer to being on the same page here, but I can honestly say that if he believed in fuzzy pink unicorns that did not impact our world in any way, I'd also let him have that delusion and leap to his defense just as I have now. It was clear from his presentation that the man is his own worst critic of his logic. Pointing out the flaws in his thinking is pointless. He knows them.

The point of Dr. Bidlack's talk was that we should be careful about being too dismissive or flippant or angry at those who believe in a God (or fuzzy pink unicorns, if you will.) We shouldn't call them stupid or say that they aren't skeptics. Based on some of the talks (especially Ellen Johnson's) I think toning down the language and being more welcoming to people that have a certain delusion that is common in our culture is a good idea. Especially when we can't prove they're wrong.

That said, I also think we all have to have a sense of humor about ourselves. Hal seems the type that could laugh at himself, but there are so many who believe in a God that couldn't. If we have a laugh at the fundies expense or criticize the religious right, those believers in the crowd need to not be so sensitive to think that we're laughing at them or calling them stupid.

Finally, I should explain why I'm so eager to leap to Dr. Bidlack's defense. I also lost someone very dear to me when I was 12, and at the time I was a devout Christian. My grief took form as a deep anger with my imaginary friend named "God." I was furious that he let someone so dear to me die so suddenly.

Eventually, I only found comfort in understanding that there probably was no God and that nothing that happened was personal. While my position might be more logical than Hal's, is my motivation to believe a God is unlikely any worse than his motivation to believe there is a God? Aren't we both essentially reacting to our circumstances and accepting what makes us more comfortable?
 
All I'm saying is the fact that historical documents exist (Greek manuscripts for example) speaking of the existence of God gives slightly more credibility to that belief than believing in pink elephants.

Sure, but that's not Hal's argument. As I noted in my first post that discussed Dr. Bidlack's presentation, I would have actually preferred a theist who argues that a belief in God can be supported by the available empirical evidence. I might disagree with the theist's interpretation of that evidence, but at least such an argument would conform to the skeptical methodology. My primary criticism of Dr. Bidlack is that he conceded that there is no good evidence for a belief in God and that his belief is therefore irrational, but implicitly argued that it is nevertheless still justified because it gives him emotional comfort to think so.

I see your point, but can a case ever be made for holding an irrational belief? Would faith in humanity despite the odds of surviving long-term be considered irrational? I.e. One's hope for humanity is frequently dashed by what they see around them, yet faith allows them to persevere. I don’t find this kind of irrational thought worrisome as long as faith isn’t displaced by working toward that goal. I’m sure there are other understandable positions. SETI must have seemed irrational in its early days. Emotions are powerful motivators that come at a cost. Logic alone won’t drive us to succeed. Uniting the two seems to be the best strategy, but expect us all to stumble often.

This isn't toward you James. I just hope we don’t get into the practice of alienating anyone from the skeptic movement because of some irrational stance on any given issue. It doesn’t make sense to push people away that you seek to enlighten without strong reason.
 
So I think we're agreed that Dr. Bidlack is a skeptic who believes in God. So can a skeptic believe in God? Yes. Can a scientist believe in a God? Yes, for all the same reasons.

I think we're getting closer to being on the same page here, but I can honestly say that if he believed in fuzzy pink unicorns that did not impact our world in any way, I'd also let him have that delusion and leap to his defense just as I have now. It was clear from his presentation that the man is his own worst critic of his logic. Pointing out the flaws in his thinking is pointless. He knows them.

The point of Dr. Bidlack's talk was that we should be careful about being too dismissive or flippant or angry at those who believe in a God (or fuzzy pink unicorns, if you will.) We shouldn't call them stupid or say that they aren't skeptics. Based on some of the talks (especially Ellen Johnson's) I think toning down the language and being more welcoming to people that have a certain delusion that is common in our culture is a good idea. Especially when we can't prove they're wrong.

That said, I also think we all have to have a sense of humor about ourselves. Hal seems the type that could laugh at himself, but there are so many who believe in a God that couldn't. If we have a laugh at the fundies expense or criticize the religious right, those believers in the crowd need to not be so sensitive to think that we're laughing at them or calling them stupid.

Finally, I should explain why I'm so eager to leap to Dr. Bidlack's defense. I also lost someone very dear to me when I was 12, and at the time I was a devout Christian. My grief took form as a deep anger with my imaginary friend named "God." I was furious that he let someone so dear to me die so suddenly.

Eventually, I only found comfort in understanding that there probably was no God and that nothing that happened was personal. While my position might be more logical than Hal's, is my motivation to believe a God is unlikely any worse than his motivation to believe there is a God? Aren't we both essentially reacting to our circumstances and accepting what makes us more comfortable?

I didn't get a chance to read your post before I submitted mine. My heart goes out to you. So sorry about your loss. Your skepticism is well tempered and in the right place.
 
Again, and always: It's the evidence, stupid.

You claim evidence, you're dog meat.

You don't claim evidence, let's have a beer.

.....who ees thees "Dr" Bidlack? It's either "Hal" or "The Bidlack".
 
RE: whether you can be a skeptic and believe in irrational things -

I think that there are at least five different levels of rationality here, and most people only recognize three or four.

The first one is belief in things which both can and have been observed. Like gravity, or evolution. This is pretty much the definition of "rational".

One of the converses of this is the disbelief in things which both can and have been observed. This is pretty much the definition of "irrational".

The other converse to this is belief in things which can but have not been observed. Like ESP, or homeopathy. To me this is irrational. But I can accept the fact that it might not be. It would be rational, for instance, to believe in craters on the far side of the moon back before we had taken pictures of it.

The fourth and fifth cases are belief/disbelief in things which cannot be observed. Like the Deist's definition of God. I submit that "rational" is an inappropriate word to describe such beliefs, regardless of whether one professes belief or disbelief in them, simply because there cannot be any reason to believe one way or another. (It's usually at this point that someone mentions Occam's Razor as a reason to disbelieve; my response to that is that Occam's Razor is not a reason in the same way that a law of physics, for instance, is a reason. It's a very handy rule of thumb, but that's all it is, and the act of elevating it to a law is itself irrational.)

If belief in an unobservable thing is neither rational nor irrational, then it is incorrect to tie the description "skeptic" to such a belief or disbelief. So my answer to the question "Can you be a skeptic and believe in God?" would be "As long as that God is unobservable, yes."


RE: Ellen Johnson's panel comments about skeptics -

It was clear to me that she had a far different definition of "skeptic" than we do. She thought the word only applied to paranormal, non-religious, beliefs such as Bigfoot and UFOs. I don't think she thought the word applied to religion at all.
 
Beleth,

I don't think that your proposed distinctions of rationality make much sense, but in any case, would you say that belief in any phenomenon for which no evidence exists is rational? I would not, and therein lies my problem with Dr. Bidlack's view. Your example of craters on the far side of the moon doesn't work because, although we had not seen them, we could reason inductively that they were probably there, because we could see that the light side of the moon had craters, and it would make sense to think that the dark side would not be different in that regard. Obviously this is not conclusive evidence, but it is evidence sufficient to form a reasonable belief. The deistic God described by Dr. Bidlack is different in that, by his definition, there could be no evidence for or against the existence of such an entity.

Carl Sagan has a good discussion of this in The Demon-Haunted World, in which he points out that, if someone assures you that there is an invisible, intangible dragon that breathes heatless fire living in his garage, the rational thing to do would be to withhold belief in the absence of any testable attribute. I see the deistic God in the same way. Of course I can't disprove its existence, but in the absence of any evidence in its favor, I'm comfortable holding a provisional belief in its non-existence.
 
Beleth,
I don't think that your proposed distinctions of rationality make much sense, but in any case, would you say that belief in any phenomenon for which no evidence exists is rational? I would not, and therein lies my problem with Dr. Bidlack's view.
As I said, it depends on whether the possibility for evidence exists or not. If evidence is possible, then the rationality of belief in something for which no evidence has yet been collected has to be taken on a case-by-case basis. But if evidence is impossible, then describing such a belief/disbelief as "rational" is as nonsensical as calling the belief "green". The word just simply does not apply.

Your example of craters on the far side of the moon doesn't work because, although we had not seen them, we could reason inductively that they were probably there, because we could see that the light side of the moon had craters, and it would make sense to think that the dark side would not be different in that regard. Obviously this is not conclusive evidence, but it is evidence sufficient to form a reasonable belief.
But it's not evidence. It's inductive reasoning. And that's exactly my point. Not all beliefs-without-evidence are irrational, just as believing in craters on the far side of the Moon was not irrational.

The deistic God described by Dr. Bidlack is different in that, by his definition, there could be no evidence for or against the existence of such an entity.
Again, that's exactly my point, and my conclusion is that we can't call such a belief either "rational" or "irrational".

Carl Sagan has a good discussion of this in The Demon-Haunted World, in which he points out that, if someone assures you that there is an invisible, intangible dragon that breathes heatless fire living in his garage, the rational thing to do would be to withhold belief in the absence of any testable attribute. I see the deistic God in the same way. Of course I can't disprove its existence, but in the absence of any evidence in its favor, I'm comfortable holding a provisional belief in its non-existence.
The difference between that dragon and the Deistic God is that the dragon has logical impossibilities built into its very description. The definition of the word "dragon" has visible, tangible aspects to it, so describing something as "an invisible, intangible dragon" is an absurdity. Likewise the term "heatless fire". On the other hand, "Deistic God" has no such contradictions built into it. It's a standoffish God that started the process of the creation of the universe and then stood back to watch it all unfold. No contradictions there.

And it's fine if you choose to believe in such a being's non-existence. All I'm saying is that it's no more rational or irrational to hold your belief than it is for Hal to hold his.
 
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(It's usually at this point that someone mentions Occam's Razor as a reason to disbelieve; my response to that is that Occam's Razor is not a reason in the same way that a law of physics, for instance, is a reason. It's a very handy rule of thumb, but that's all it is, and the act of elevating it to a law is itself irrational.)

Interesting clarification. I totally agree with your description of Occam's razor. Something I realized early on as I attempted to apply it to various subject matter... easy to be lead astray from oversimplification. It can be useful I would think when paring down complex ideas or theories though.
Again, thanks for clarifying… something more to think about.
 
Again, and always: It's the evidence, stupid.

You claim evidence, you're dog meat.

You don't claim evidence, let's have a beer.

.....who ees thees "Dr" Bidlack? It's either "Hal" or "The Bidlack".

I prefer "El Bidlaco del Fuego"
 
I have to take issue with the idea that belief in craters on the dark side of the moon iwas a belief without EVIDENCE--there is plenty of evidence that supported the conclusion

the moon is spherical and we can only see the lighted part but we can observe evidence about that part... Craters exist on the moon...
Craters are made when objects strike the surface of the moon.

objects fly around in the expanding universe

there is nothing about the position of the dark side to protect it any more from crater forming impacts than the light side

this leads one to logically induce BASED on the AVAILABLE EVIDENCE outlined above that the dark side of a spherical moon is likely to resemble the light side...it is evidence based...just as a sample of blood is sufficient to make statements about your whole blood composition without seeing every drop, because of the evidence of what we know about how the blood is formed, etc...so seeing the evidence of part of the moon is enough to say things about the other non observable side (nonobservable back before we observed it)
 
Lots of logical induction going on there, Fun2BFree, but no evidence until we actually took pictures of the far side.

It turns out that the far side looks very little like the near side. There's only one mare, for instance, and it's a tiny one compared to the ones on the far side.

Here are pictures of the near side vs. the far side.
 
Beleth,

Are you under the impression that the word "evidence" refers only to direct observation? Dictionary.com defines "evidence" as "A thing or things helpful in forming a conclusion or judgment." Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed., defines the term as "Something... that tends to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged fact." Inductive reasoning can only be based on evidence, although direct observation is not necessary for valid induction. Has anyone ever seen a quark, for example? No, but we have abudant evidence from which to infer their existence.
 
Lots of logical induction going on there, Fun2BFree, but no evidence until we actually took pictures of the far side.

I can't see the problem with induction and how exactly it removes its self from evidence?

And it's fine if you choose to believe in such a being's non-existence. All I'm saying is that it's no more rational or irrational to hold your belief than it is for Hal to hold his.

Not true. Other than extremely weak evidence, we have to believe in (at least the traditional form of) God. To then claim that because the existance of a supernatural being is beyond what can possibly be proven/disproven means that to believe in something without evidence is now ok... is illogical. The most logical thing to do (imo) is to first and foremost be agnostic, say 'we cannot know one way or the other' and then secondly to be atheist to the point of almost infinite improbability because no evidence is a reason to not believe.
 
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Are you under the impression that the word "evidence" refers only to direct observation?
In the case of skeptical inquiry, you betcha. And your definitions agree with me. Evidence is not the process by which we reach a conclusion, it is the "thing or things" which the conclusion bases itself on.

What else could be the "something" in those definitions, if not observations?
 
So are you essentially claiming that all inductive logic... is wrong? or merely imperfect? because I think most people are aware of this.
 
Beleth,

We've already given you plenty of examples of "somethings" other than direct observation that count as evidence for the purpose of inductive reasoning, all of which fall into the broad and legitimate category of circumstantial or indirect evidence. A blood sample containing the HIV virus is good evidence that the rest of the donor's blood is infected with HIV. Craters on the light side of the moon are good evidence that the dark side of the moon will also have craters. Fresh animal tracks are good evidence that an animal has passed by recently, in the direction in which the tracks are pointed.

I think you may also be making the error that a logically warranted conclusion must be free of all doubt. Obviously this is untrue, even in the case of direct observation.
 

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