Cont: The Russian invasion of Ukraine part 7

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USA is no better then Russia, right?

Can you imagine if we're weren't? All the historical and cultural and shared language excuses Russia's used to justify invading Ukraine would also apply to the US invading Canada. Who would stop us if we did? And yet we don't, and the possibility is considered so remote nobody bothers to fortify that border at all. It's almost as if, as retarded and backwards as America is, even it has matured beyond the conquer-your-neighbors stage of development.
 
Difficult to disentangle. Mostly (4) and (5), I spelled out what I think Mr. Iron was getting at.

Cheers.

Also with reference to the incursion.

It's an economic use of force, as the Kremlin has to expend a lot against small scale incursions.

And with the (probably unlikely) possiblity of a Maginot Line bypassing attack for Ukraine's counteroffensive.
 
Can you imagine if we're weren't? All the historical and cultural and shared language excuses Russia's used to justify invading Ukraine would also apply to the US invading Canada. Who would stop us if we did? And yet we don't, and the possibility is considered so remote nobody bothers to fortify that border at all. It's almost as if, as retarded and backwards as America is, even it has matured beyond the conquer-your-neighbors stage of development.

I dunno, the US almost came to world-ending blows with the USSR over our little neighbor Cuba deciding they didn't want to be our friend. Presumably if Canada had tried to join the Warsaw Pact there would have been trouble. Our seeming stability at the border probably has more to do with our interests and ideologies being closely aligned than any enlightened peace-loving attitude.

The invasion of Iraq seems like a pretty good recent example that the US doesn't care about sovereignty of countries they assume are too small and friendless to effectively resist naked aggression.

I have no problem condemning Russia's aggression in Ukraine (wars of aggression are the mothers of all war crimes), but the notion that what they're doing is uniquely aggressive or unprecedented is quite the ridiculous statement for any American to make especially.
 
I have no problem condemning Russia's aggression in Ukraine (wars of aggression are the mothers of all war crimes), but the notion that what they're doing is uniquely aggressive or unprecedented is quite the ridiculous statement for any American to make especially.

"Show me what Trump has done that is UNIQUELY bad!" - Every Republican Troll for the last 6 years.
 
"Show me what Trump has done that is UNIQUELY bad!" - Every Republican Troll for the last 6 years.

??? Trump is not unique, he's a run-of-the-mill demagogue.

Russia's land grab attempt is not unique.
 
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I dunno, the US almost came to world-ending blows with the USSR over our little neighbor Cuba deciding they didn't want to be our friend.

Yeah, with the USSR, not Cuba. Cuba itself couldn't have stopped us from taking it. And once the USSR ceased to be...did we make any attempts to take Cuba? I don't remember any.

Presumably if Canada had tried to join the Warsaw Pact there would have been trouble. Our seeming stability at the border probably has more to do with our interests and ideologies being closely aligned than any enlightened peace-loving attitude.

And yet Canada felt no need to run to the Soviets for protection from us, and we felt no need to threaten them over the possibility. Because the US isn't the territory-snatching jerk that Russia is.

The invasion of Iraq seems like a pretty good recent example that the US doesn't care about sovereignty of countries they assume are too small and friendless to effectively resist naked aggression.

Iraq is a good example because the US didn't annex it. When we go to war we may change a regime, but we don't add the territory to our own. Iraq is not US territory, that was never even considered.

I have no problem condemning Russia's aggression in Ukraine (wars of aggression are the mothers of all war crimes), but the notion that what they're doing is uniquely aggressive or unprecedented is quite the ridiculous statement

I didn't say it's "uniquely aggressive or unprecedented"; it's got a lot of precedent: in prior centuries. Russia is behaving like it's the nineteenth century, when it was considered not unreasonable to just march into your neighbor's territory and kill them until the survivors surrendered and now their territory is part of your country. Despite all of America's military power, despite all our use of that military power, we don't conquer and keep territory. When was the last time we kept something we took by force?

for any American to make especially.

Yeah, I don't think so.
 
I smell some on the left preparing to sell Ukraine down the river in the interests of "Peace:.


I don't know about smell, but it seems like most of the grumbling in the U.S. I've heard about our involvement with Ukraine has been coming from the right.

Repugnican pols* courting MAGAchuds especially.

(*Although I am willing to concede that they are rather exceptionally noisome, at least in some senses of the word.)
 
Cheers.

Also with reference to the incursion.

It's an economic use of force, as the Kremlin has to expend a lot against small scale incursions.

And with the (probably unlikely) possiblity of a Maginot Line bypassing attack for Ukraine's counteroffensive.

And of course, if Russia dies put in sufficient troops to deal with a small raid, there is always the option/threat for a larger "official" Ukrainian raid/attack
 
I don't know about smell, but it seems like most of the grumbling in the U.S. I've heard about our involvement with Ukraine has been coming from the right.

Repugnican pols* courting MAGAchuds especially.

(*Although I am willing to concede that they are rather exceptionally noisome, at least in some senses of the word.)

Oh, its coming from both the extreme left and extreme right. Its just that the extreme right has about 100 times more political power in the US than the extreme left, and probably outnumber them several times over.
 
I don't know about smell, but it seems like most of the grumbling in the U.S. I've heard about our involvement with Ukraine has been coming from the right.

Repugnican pols* courting MAGAchuds especially.

(*Although I am willing to concede that they are rather exceptionally noisome, at least in some senses of the word.)

Yes, the right has been doing most of the complaining, but now I am seeing some bitching on the left as well.generally of the "poor Ukraine, we must stop the fighing now" style. That there will not be any Ukraine if Russia Wins seems beyond them.
 
I think much of international law is intended to avoid molon labe.

How successful it is at that is, of course, a different question.

You mean the much of international law that is neither binding nor enforceable, unless one nation or another nuts up and molons another nation's labe?

You mean the international law of the Budapest Memorandum?

Or do you mean the international law of military aid to Ukraine in the face of repeated red line statements by Moscow that they seem unwilling or unable to enforce?
 
Pretty much that. Like I said, whether it is actually effective is a different question.

Molon labe is super effective. "We hope it won't come to that, and if it does we have no way to stop it", not so much.

The Russia-Ukraine war is a perfect example. NATO is a textbook example of molon labe as a global peace enforcement regime. But Ukraine wasn't under that aegis. Which goes to show how much the Budapest Memorandum wasn't international law.

You want to say that unenforced aspirations count as international law, even though they're not effective. I'm saying that if it's unenforced and ineffective, it's not international law.
 
I'll try to summarize the strategic perspective of this Australian expert (and round it out with my own conclusions, where he does not spell them out):

(1) Whether and when a negotiated settlement (or other resolution of the conflict) happens depends chiefly on these factors:
a) The assessed military situation, or how the parties envision it in the not-too-distant future
b) The internal and external pressures on the Russian leadership
c) The internal and external pressures on the Ukrainian leadership and its Western supporters

(2) No acceptable negotiations will be possible with Putin, as Putin is indictedfor war crimes and too much personally chained to the project of conquering and eliminating Ukraine to ever credibly refrain from those goals

(3) The main strategic importance of the coming Ukrainian offensive lies in its influence on the three factors above:
a) Whatever measure of success, or lack thereof, Ukraine can achieve will affect either sides assessment of how the military situation may change in the future
b) Ukrainian success will increase pressure on Putin, possibly to the point where his leadership becomes assailable, while decreasing pressure on Kyiv and the West
c) Ukrainian failure will relieve ressure on the Ruscist regime and increase it on the West, possibly to the point where Western support drops below a threshold where Ukraine can prevail.

(4) The best move therefore for the West is to help Ukraine NOW in any way it can to make the offensive a resounding success

(5) The West should not automatically assume that whatever comes after Putin is necessarily as bad or worse; instead it should watch out for possible non-fascist movements and leaders. There should be a message "if you negotiate in good faith and with a view to return to decency, the rule of law, even perhaps democracy, here is our outstreched hand"

(6) As for what Australia can do beyond supporting diplomatically, financially and with military supplies: Push for a smarter personal sanctions regime - one that does not drive the Russian elites out of the world and firmly back into Russia, but gives them an out and a chance to signal opposition to the regime.


The West was as surprised as anyone else when Russia didn't conquer Ukraine quickly.


The need for the F16 is not what you might think. The air defences of Ukrained were Soviet based and actually very effective. The problem is that they are running out and there are no replacements. The F16 is the easiest way to replace the air defence systems since Western technology, rather than being ground launced, is air launched. That means a Western air launch platform. Without that being done ASAP, then Ukraine will be defenceless against the Russian air force which is still very capable but has been mostly standing off up till now.


Ukrainians are still much better motivated than the Russians, which counts for a lot, despite the heavy losses they have also suffered. One Ukrainian commander related how none of his original men are still fighting. They have all be replaced by new recruits.



Ukraine has been keeping it's best in reserve for the offensive that is coming.


Russia had hoped to have a winter offensive but it came to nothing. You even have Russians denying there was any attempt at an offensive other than Backhmut.

I like the presentation as it ties up a lot of concepts quite neatly.
 
A reminder or primer to those discussing "law":

The leading current theories of law fall somewhere within the spectrum of "Legal Positivism", whereby law arises from social fact, or in other words what people think and agree the law is. Be it Hobbes' theory of social contract, Kelsen's approach that there are basic norms from which, like in a constitution, all other norms follow, or HLA Hart's work which is more influential in the common-law / English-speaking world.

These theories mostly give little weight to enforcement or morality:
The law simply is what people think it is. And from this comes its authority: The USA surely excercises Molon labe - but not willy-nilly: They mostly restrain themselves by the law as US citizens may view it, who are at least vaguely aware of what the International Law established in the wake of the World Wars is, and how it is to no small degree an American creation. So in fact, US governments better adhere to those rules. That system of international law also had the recognition of a very significant part of the rest of the world, and generally states find it in their interest to act at least roughly or superficially in accordance with it, lest they get in conflict with other states or their own constituencies.
It is then mostly autocrats, who feel they are powerful enough to ignore and then shape internal opinions, who do what they can to also ignore what even they realise is international law.

I submit that a part even of the Russian population is aware of, and profoundly unhappy with, the fact that Russia is breaking international law.

And again, Russia does so in ways far more blatant than the USA does, even if the USA does it more often.
 
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