Cont: The Sinking of MS Estonia: Case Reopened Part V

[JayUtah]

But then any real evacuation is likely going to be heavily complicated by something, be it bad weather, darkness, lack of time, smoke, blocked escape routes or the reason for the evacuation itself.

Yes, this is the problem in any practical empirical test of evacuation factors. For the Boeing 777 I was a non-qualifying evacuation test subject. That means I was a participant in Boeing's internal evacuation drills that helped them refine their procedure prior to the qualifying drill that established their evacuable capacity under FAR. It's fun; you get to go down the slides. But after doing those drills a half-dozen times, there's no real panic.

Conversely I've been in an ordinary airliner where the cabin lights failed. From that experience I can testify there's a lot of wishful thinking regarding how easy it would be to get out of a cabin under actual conditions. I've also been on a number of seagoing vessels under a number of adverse conditions, including sailing the Great Lakes on a schooner.

But to bring this back to general principles and practice: you're right, every attempt at testing evacuation behavior with real human subjects and achievable apparatus is going to fall short of duplicating the actual circumstances. You have genuinely panicked people. You have smoke. The lights fail. You're disoriented. People are shouting conflicting instructions. You're trying to keep hold of your children.

Which does seem to indicate that using this type of data to pin the starting assumptions of a study, as the Hamburg Report did, is a pretty bad idea.

It's certainly short of ideal. I'm presently in "regulatory hell" on a new product line, so I haven't had enough opportunity to find the paper in which Valenta justifies his use of empirical baselines. The above section is how I feel about the empirical validity of such an approach. It's evidently how you feel. It's how a lot my peer engineers feel. But I don't know if it's how Valenta feels, and I have no clue what his rationale might have been.

In general, people are more comfortable with your models if you can tie them to an empirical foundation. Specifically, regulatory approval that allows simulation models to be used as the verification process will fare better if you can tied the model to an empirical basis, even if it's known to be inadequate. This bites into the constant tension between extremely conscientious engineers who really want to expend their limited resources toward practical safety, and regulators who really demand that you expend your limited resources toward jumping through their hoops.

But I'm not bitter...

IMHO in the MS Estonia case there at the point where the correct coarse of action went from "keep passengers aboard and take rapid efforts to save the ship" to "abandon ship" it was already too late.

I can teach a whole lecture on this. In fact, I have. The decision-making in situations like this follows a predictable pattern. I won't try to reproduce that lecture here. But the salient point of it is what we agree on above: a mandatory evacuation presents real risk of injury and death. Hence you don't order one until you're willing to incur that risk, because you are responsible for the actual consequences should the evacuation later prove unnecessary.

So yes, poor decisions were made here as in many other such tragedies. But don't be too eager to armchair-captain it.

 

[JayUtah]

The engineering problem, as I understand it, was that nearly every Baltic RO-RO ferry had under engineered bow door locks, due to systematic engineering design failures underestimating expected wave loads.

That's probably a fair comment, especially since the industry moved to clamshell bow doors rather than visor bow doors, which provide opportunities to engineer for greater strength. The lack of regulatory standards for these designs may also have played a part.

 

[Everett]

I can teach a whole lecture on this. In fact, I have. The decision-making in situations like this follows a predictable pattern. I won't try to reproduce that lecture here. But the salient point of it is what we agree on above: a mandatory evacuation presents real risk of injury and death. Hence you don't order one until you're willing to incur that risk, because you are responsible for the actual consequences should the evacuation later prove unnecessary.

So yes, poor decisions were made here as in many other such tragedies. But don't be too eager to armchair-captain it.

Actually, I don't think a justified evacuation could have been done any better than it was. Before the "first big heel" there wasn't justification for an evacuation into a storm, afterwards a successful one was impossible. And I would "assume" that a captain would reasonably expect his ship not to suffer catastrophic structural failure even if they were pushing it too hard. Near the outer edges of the operating envelope with reduced margin of safety, yes, but still within the loads it should have been capable of withstanding. Except the bow doors were under-designed.

Now as for what they did after the first bangs from the bow, now that's where the incompetence comes in. IMHO the ship was savable up to a few tens of seconds after the bow door detached - after that point most aboard were doomed.

 

[LondonJohn]

Actually, I don't think a justified evacuation could have been done any better than it was. Before the "first big heel" there wasn't justification for an evacuation into a storm, afterwards a successful one was impossible. And I would "assume" that a captain would reasonably expect his ship not to suffer catastrophic structural failure even if they were pushing it too hard. Near the outer edges of the operating envelope with reduced margin of safety, yes, but still within the loads it should have been capable of withstanding. Except the bow doors were under-designed.

Now as for what they did after the first bangs from the bow, now that's where the incompetence comes in. IMHO the ship was savable up to a few tens of seconds after the bow door detached - after that point most aboard were doomed.

All true. But in fact, the warning signs were there long before the ship set sail that night. The bottom lock on the bow visor had been malfunctioning and failing for some time (months, not weeks): deckhands had to hammer the bolts home because the flange had become so distorted that the holes didn't align properly. This should clearly have been reported up the chain, and any competent company engineer should easily have been able to figure out that the lock was in obvious danger of failure from fatigue shearing.

In short, that bottom lock should have been properly fixed or replaced well before the fateful night.

 

[Everett]

RE: JayUtah: Here's the link for the "Hamburg Report" I mentioned. (Since I don't have enough posts to post a link the normal way.) https://estonia1994 (dot) ee/media/348/download
https://estonia1994.ee/media/348/download

And here's the link to the SSPA report:

https://lounaeestlane (dot) ee/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/0_Final_Report_Research_Study_on_the_Sinking_Sequence_of_MV_Estonia.pdf

https://lounaeestlane.ee/wp-content...udy_on_the_Sinking_Sequence_of_MV_Estonia.pdf

added working links

Posted By: jimbob

 

[JayUtah]

RE: JayUtah...

Thanks; I know these materials and have read parts of them. They refer to a 2006 paper by Valenta that I think will have his rationale for connecting scant empirical data to an augmented evacuation model. I want to hold off any more judgment until I see that one.

 

[Everett]

@Vixen: You mentioned how the communications for the rescue effort and the delays involved were unacceptable. Guess what? The JAIC agrees with you!

Read up until the start of section 17.7. And the JAIC is scathing. Trust me, I've read a lot of accident investigation reports and while it may seem modest, this is actually some of the harshest and bluntest criticism I've I've seen in an investigation report.

 

[Vixen]

@Vixen: You mentioned how the communications for the rescue effort and the delays involved were unacceptable. Guess what? The JAIC agrees with you!

Read up until the start of section 17.7. And the JAIC is scathing. Trust me, I've read a lot of accident investigation reports and while it may seem modest, this is actually some of the harshest and bluntest criticism I've I've seen in an investigation report.

This has all been fully discussed before, so no point doing so again. The ship sunk within 35" so there was very little leeway to do anything much. However, I will say, that blockage on communications was noted in Finland, Sweden and at the Ålands.



The Captain of the On Scene Commander (OSC) ship, Silja Europa, Esa Mäkelä doesn't believe it was 'just an accident'.

 

[zooterkin]

This has all been fully discussed before, so no point doing so again. The ship sunk within 35" so there was very little leeway to do anything much. However, I will say, that blockage on communications was noted in Finland, Sweden and at the Ålands.



The Captain of the On Scene Commander (OSC) ship, Silja Europa, Esa Mäkelä doesn't believe it was 'just an accident'.

That would have been suspicious!

 

[Everett]

This has all been fully discussed before, so no point doing so again. The ship sunk within 35" so there was very little leeway to do anything much. However, I will say, that blockage on communications was noted in Finland, Sweden and at the Ålands.



The Captain of the On Scene Commander (OSC) ship, Silja Europa, Esa Mäkelä doesn't believe it was 'just an accident'.

That's just it - you've never read this section. It wasn't a blockage in communications. It was one-man rescue stations handling radio traffic, or later understaffed ones - they (mostly) did the best they could, but they had too many things to do to also issue prompt communications. The "unable to reach the shore station by radio" was almost certainly a result of the only person there monitoring a different frequency at the time. Or perhaps he was in the bathroom. Afterwards with knowledge of a emergency of course the distress radio was continuously monitored. Simply adequately staffing the rescue stations and better procedures would have prevented the mess. (And the problems with the winches and winch wires being known ahead of time and nothing but done about it is a scandal in itself.)

 

[LondonJohn]

That would have been suspicious!

Quite what is to be gained by attempting (and failing, sadly) to express the term 35 minutes by writing it as 35" (should be 35' of course...), rather than writing 35 mins or just 35 minutes...

...is totally beyond my ken.

 

[LondonJohn]

The Captain of the On Scene Commander (OSC) ship, Silja Europa, Esa Mäkelä doesn't believe it was 'just an accident'.

And explain again why the captain of a ship that was near to the Estonia when it sank, who acted as the OSC in the first couple of hours after the Mayday....

...is more qualified/expert to know how the Estonia sank than the board of people who are actually expert in maritime accident investigation, whose combined knowledge, experience and expertise in this area - coupled with their extensive investigation into this particular sinking - is many orders of magnitude greater than that of the captain of the Silja Europa.

 

[Vixen]

That's just it - you've never read this section. It wasn't a blockage in communications. It was one-man rescue stations handling radio traffic, or later understaffed ones - they (mostly) did the best they could, but they had too many things to do to also issue prompt communications. The "unable to reach the shore station by radio" was almost certainly a result of the only person there monitoring a different frequency at the time. Or perhaps he was in the bathroom. Afterwards with knowledge of a emergency of course the distress radio was continuously monitored. Simply adequately staffing the rescue stations and better procedures would have prevented the mess. (And the problems with the winches and winch wires being known ahead of time and nothing but done about it is a scandal in itself.)

At around 01.22 ESTONIA received the first weak vague request for assistance on VHF channel 16. At 01.24 ESTONIA called Channel 16 on Silja and Viking Line on VHF channel, passenger ferries which it knew would be nearby. After SILJA EUROPA responded to the invitation, ESTONIA stated distressed Mayday a couple of times and said they have a bad tilt to the right, while asking for help. ESTONIA was not able to report its position at that time. At 01.29 ESTONIA was able to announce its location while saying it looked really bad. After this, the vessel no longer responded. ESTONIA quickly sank behind the stern and disappeared from the radar images of ships in the area at about 1:50 a.m. The place of sinking was about 40 km south of Utö.

Actual fact

Only Silja Europa and Viking Mariella made contact with Estonia and then it was apparent Estonia was not responding or responding in a way that indicated they had not heard.

1:43 Finnjet Finnmerchant and Mariella are told by Silja Europa that they have now managed to get in touch with Helsinki Radio by NMT.

1:46 Radio Helsinki to Europa asks whether Europa has Estonia’s position yet (NB: Estonia sank at 1:48!)

The Nauvu coast guard Winberg said he got the Mayday about 1:23 but could not get Estonia on his radar so he turned the frequency up to 24 from 12 and then saw ‘a target on the outer edge of the screen just southeast of Ut ö which he later discovered was where Estonia had been located. He said there were ‘radar disturbances’ and the ‘target’ was only visible for a moment before disappearing into the ‘clutter’. and immediately contacted MRCC Turku.

Coastguard Kärppälä of MRCC Turku says he got the Mayday at 1:24 (so missed the first Mayday at 1:21:55) and he contacted Nauvo (Nagu) and Pärgäs and they confirmed they also heard it. Kärppälä contacted Duty Officer of MRCC Turku, Mikko Montonen at 1:33 and he was on duty by 1:40. The Coastguard ship, M/V Tursas was on its way towards the scene at 1:37.
At 1:40 Kärppälä contacted the helicopter centre.

Kärppälä also contacted the duty Lieutenant Commander Heikki Himanen and he arrived at his duty desk at 02:03. He said although he heard the Mayday exchanges, he did not join in but at 1:50 had heard the Helsinki Mayday relay.

At 1:48 (the same time the Estonia disappeared from radar) MRCC Turku had contacted Helsinki Radio to instruct them to put out a Mayday call. This was now half an hour since Ainsalu made his first (received) Mayday.

The JAIC states:

At 0142 hrs the MARIELLA informed Helsinki Radio about the accident. Instead of transmitting a Mayday Relay Helsinki Radio transmitted a Pan-Pan message at 0150 hrs.

As we see from the transcript of the messages conveyed what Radio Helsinki actually radioed Europa about was whether she had Estonia’s position yet.

From the transcript – which the JAIC must surely have had – the pan-pan message was at 1:54, not 1:50, as they state in the report.

Kärppälä says he can’t remember who or when Sweden was called but according to an operations log in Sweden this was confirmed as 0202 and ETA 0300. (Expected arrival time: 3:00am)

Yet JAIC claims the first Swedish helicopter, Q97 ‘took off at 02:50’. If this was local time (for Sweden) that would be 03:50 for the Estonia local time, allowing another hour for it to get there.

At 2:27 (distress transcript) Turku MRCC informs Europa (now designated leader ship)’The first helicopter from Sweden will be here in about ten minutes’.

The JAIC writes:

OH-HVG arrived as the first helicopter at the scene of the accident at 0305 hrs, arriving from Turku, about 80km away setting off at 2:30 and Q 97 arrived at 0350 hrs.


Question for Everett:

• What took so long for Stockholm to get the Mayday message?
• What took so long for the first helicopter from Sweden to arrive?
• Or did the helicopter arrive OK but the information has been classified, being the rescue of the senior Estonia crew now missing.
• Why did Ensign Kenneth Svensson, surface rescue worker at the sinking of M/S Estonia on September 27, 1994, assigned on January 15, 1996, receive Sweden's highest military medal, he alone of all the rescuers?

 

[Everett]

Kärppälä says he can’t remember who or when Sweden was called but according to an operations log in Sweden this was confirmed as 0202 and ETA 0300. (Expected arrival time: 3:00am)

Yet JAIC claims the first Swedish helicopter, Q97 ‘took off at 02:50’. If this was local time (for Sweden) that would be 03:50 for the Estonia local time, allowing another hour for it to get there.

Question for Everett:

[*]What took so long for Stockholm to get the Mayday message?

Essentially, they were out of range of VHF communication from the Estonia and nearby vessels, and nobody transmitted a Mayday Relay. As should have been done, but Helsinki Radio seems to have been utterly incompetent or not doing their jobs. It seems that MRCC Stockholm did find out about it though before the 2:02 your mention, since MRCC Stockholm offered assistance to MRCC Helsinki and MRCC Torku. starting at about 1:57. It actually seems they were on the ball as well as the Fins were, since it only became completely clear that the Estonia had sunk at about that time.
Of course the way it should work (but not the procedure there at the time) was that immediately upon receiving a Mayday from a large passenger ship on local channels the vessels should have transmitted a Mayday Relay about 1:25 or so.

[*]What took so long for the first helicopter from Sweden to arrive?

At the time of the accident Swedish rescue helicopters were on almost immediate standby during office hours, but on a 1 hour standby with the crews at home the rest of the time, while the staffing at the MRCC etc. was cut in half.
Taking off at 2:50 (50 minutes later) actually is about to be expected, and a 1 hour flight time would put them at the Estonia's position at 3:50, which doesn't seem to be in dispute.

Of course the assumption that a major emergency would happen during office hours is ridiculous, and they should have been rapid (such as 15 minute) standby and the MRCC/MRSC fully staffed around the clock, but apparently there was some combination of wishful thinking and budget cuts.

Kärppälä says he can’t remember who or when Sweden was called but according to an operations log in Sweden this was confirmed as 0202 and ETA 0300. (Expected arrival time: 3:00am)

Considering the above that can't be correct as a time of arrival, but is correct for a time of takeoff. I'd like to see this log and have it translated by a person rather than computer before I fully buy that it said "arrival at the scene 0300."

[*]Or did the helicopter arrive OK but the information has been classified, being the rescue of the senior Estonia crew now missing.

The basic problem is that it only became confirmed/obvious that the Estonia had sunk about 2:00 or so, give or take a few minutes. With an arrival time of the first two helicopters known, there's simply not enough time to prepare for the flight, fly to the Estonia's position, find a lifeboat, rescue several people and return to base in time to take off at the "official" time.

Also, there's not enough evidence to suppose that such a flight took place.

At 2:27 (distress transcript) Turku MRCC informs Europa (now designated leader ship)’The first helicopter from Sweden will be here in about ten minutes’.

Good question. He had also just said that the "first helicopter" would be there in about 10 minutes, which assuming he meant the Finnish one was wrong by 10 minutes too soon.

I'm assuming that either there's a google translation error or that he was simply operating on bad information.

Also, a Swedish helicopter couldn't arrive at 2:40 or so due to basic flight time issues.

[*]Why did Ensign Kenneth Svensson, surface rescue worker at the sinking of M/S Estonia on September 27, 1994, assigned on January 15, 1996, receive Sweden's highest military medal, he alone of all the rescuers?]

IIRC (going from memory here), he started as Y 64's rescue man, was winched down and rescued a survivor (just doing his job), began to winch up anther survivor but the survivor fell, and despite the which being inoperable (couldn't be winched back up) jumped into the water after the survivor (medal worthy), was rescued after spending quite some time in very cold water by Y 74, during which Y 74's rescue man was injured, and then took over for Y 74's rescue man, and rescued 6 more people until he was injured badly enough he couldn't continue. (Also medal worthy.) The "jumping into the water unable to be winched out after a survivor" and "taking over for another helicopter's rescue man until he was injured" bits are what none of the other rescue men did.

 

[junkshop]

Quite what is to be gained by attempting (and failing, sadly) to express the term 35 minutes by writing it as 35" (should be 35' of course...), rather than writing 35 mins or just 35 minutes...

...is totally beyond my ken.

My assumption is that it was a failed attempt by that poster to give the impression that they had expertise in the matter, unlike the ignorant plebs that need to use mere words to signify the units they refer to.

That the poster used the wrong symbol for the unit in question (given their history in this and other threads) is not surpising.

Disappointing...frustrating, even. But not surprising.

 

[Vixen]

Essentially, they were out of range of VHF communication from the Estonia and nearby vessels, and nobody transmitted a Mayday Relay. As should have been done, but Helsinki Radio seems to have been utterly incompetent or not doing their jobs. It seems that MRCC Stockholm did find out about it though before the 2:02 your mention, since MRCC Stockholm offered assistance to MRCC Helsinki and MRCC Torku. starting at about 1:57. It actually seems they were on the ball as well as the Fins were, since it only became completely clear that the Estonia had sunk at about that time.
Of course the way it should work (but not the procedure there at the time) was that immediately upon receiving a Mayday from a large passenger ship on local channels the vessels should have transmitted a Mayday Relay about 1:25 or so.






At the time of the accident Swedish rescue helicopters were on almost immediate standby during office hours, but on a 1 hour standby with the crews at home the rest of the time, while the staffing at the MRCC etc. was cut in half.
Taking off at 2:50 (50 minutes later) actually is about to be expected, and a 1 hour flight time would put them at the Estonia's position at 3:50, which doesn't seem to be in dispute.

Of course the assumption that a major emergency would happen during office hours is ridiculous, and they should have been rapid (such as 15 minute) standby and the MRCC/MRSC fully staffed around the clock, but apparently there was some combination of wishful thinking and budget cuts.




Considering the above that can't be correct as a time of arrival, but is correct for a time of takeoff. I'd like to see this log and have it translated by a person rather than computer before I fully buy that it said "arrival at the scene 0300."






The basic problem is that it only became confirmed/obvious that the Estonia had sunk about 2:00 or so, give or take a few minutes. With an arrival time of the first two helicopters known, there's simply not enough time to prepare for the flight, fly to the Estonia's position, find a lifeboat, rescue several people and return to base in time to take off at the "official" time.

Also, there's not enough evidence to suppose that such a flight took place.





Good question. He had also just said that the "first helicopter" would be there in about 10 minutes, which assuming he meant the Finnish one was wrong by 10 minutes too soon.

I'm assuming that either there's a google translation error or that he was simply operating on bad information.

Also, a Swedish helicopter couldn't arrive at 2:40 or so due to basic flight time issues.









IIRC (going from memory here), he started as Y 64's rescue man, was winched down and rescued a survivor (just doing his job), began to winch up anther survivor but the survivor fell, and despite the which being inoperable (couldn't be winched back up) jumped into the water after the survivor (medal worthy), was rescued after spending quite some time in very cold water by Y 74, during which Y 74's rescue man was injured, and then took over for Y 74's rescue man, and rescued 6 more people until he was injured badly enough he couldn't continue. (Also medal worthy.) The "jumping into the water unable to be winched out after a survivor" and "taking over for another helicopter's rescue man until he was injured" bits are what none of the other rescue men did.

From HS:

4.10.1994 2:00
TURKU - Information about the Estonian emergency message was forwarded to the Swedish maritime rescue authorities half an hour after the message was received in Turku. Estonia's distress message did not carry until Stockholm.

<snip>

The captain of the Stockholm Maritime Rescue Center, Sea Captain Lennart Johansson, confirms that the information about the sinking of Estonia came via Mariehamn at 1.55. The distress message broadcast on Estonian VHF radio was not part of Stockholm's coastal radio.
"We called Helsinki first and then Turku. We agreed with the Turku Rescue Center to send helicopters and alerted the Arlanda Air Rescue Center," says Johansson. The Swedes alerted their first helicopters at 1.58, and the first took off from Visby at 2.35.

HS


From JAIC: Chapter 7
A second distress call from the ESTONIA was received at 0124 hrs by 14 radio stations. One of these was MRCC Turku, which assumed control of the SAR operation.

At 0129 hrs the ESTONIA’s position became known, and after receiving the distress message vessels in the vicinity turned towards the scene of the accident. The MARIELLA was by that time about nine nautical miles away from the ESTONIA. The SILJA EUROPA, which had direct radio contact with the ESTONIA during the distress traffic, assumed control of the distress radio traffic and at 0205 hrs MRCC Turku designated her master as the On-Scene Commander (OSC).

Maritime Rescue Subcentre (MRSC) Mariehamn informed MRCC Stockholm of the accident at 0152 hrs, whereupon the alerting of Swedish maritime rescue helicopters was initiated. The first of these, stand-by$ helicopter Q 97, took off at 0250 hrs.


That is almost an hour after initial notification. The Visby station is on a fifteen-minute readiness alert.

"I did my job as well as I could" – Ilkka Kärppälä listened to the entire radio broadcast of the accident in Estonia, and "mayday, mayday" is not forgotten

In his work, Ilkka Kärppälä listened to the entire radio traffic of the Estonia accident, from the first emergency message to the communications of the surface rescuers. For his work, he received the Order of Merit of the Order of the Cross of Mariana of Estonia in 1995. PHOTO: JAMI JOKINEN

Jami Jokinen
26/09/2019 6:00 | Updated 26/09/2019 18:30
When Ilkka Kärppälä was preparing for the evening shift on Tuesday, a storm raging at sea could be felt all the way to the mainland. The wind snapped the branches of the yard trees in the dark, and the lieutenant thought.

- Now the weather is such that anything can happen, Kärppälä told his wife before leaving for the Turku Sea Rescue Center.

Satakunta sanomat paywall

What happened to Q64 which took off according to Aftonbaldet just after 0200 and with an ETA of 3:30, as stated by Kärppälä in his police statement, in which he confirms Operations in Sweden logged the request for helicopters at 0202 and confirmed ETA at 3:30 (Sweden being one hour behind Finnish time)?

The pilot of Q64 received a medal for his heroism and according to Aftonbladet saved nine persons, one of whom was dead, whom he transported to Huddinge Hospital in Stockholm.

Yet JAIC claims Svensson and Q64:

Y b4 (Boeing Kawasaki)
Y 64 took off from Berga at 0445 hrs, picked up a physician and a nurse from Huddinge Hospital and arrived at the scene of the accident at 0552 hrs. <snip> Y 64 brought the survivor to Utö.

Wait! A hero yet only arrived 0552 and rescued one?

Are you thinking what I am thinking? Yes, JAIC are less than transparent. Not the distress transcript, not Kärppälä of MRCC Turku, not the operations log in Sweden. Y64 DID arrive at 0330 did rescue nine people did transport them to Huddinge, did return at 0552, was fatigued and did injure himself.

I also believe that OH-HYD Augusta Bell 412 which was also on standby in Helsinki with the crew all present at 0255 but only arrived 0532 for a 40 minute journey at most was possibly also an early arrival, which like Q64 made a return journey with the first made classified due to the missing Estonia survivors. The JAIC has made no attempt to explain this.

The JAIC writes:
At 0320 hrs MRCC Helsinki reported that the ESTO- NIA had sunk and ordered OH-HVD to take off. The helicopter arrived at the scene of the accident at 0532 hrs.

Who believes Helsinki only knew the ship had sunk at 0320 when she disappeared off Finland’s own radar at 1:48 and indeed, Silja Europa reports in the Mayday transcript the ship cannot be seen.

The journey time from Visby is circa one hour and from Berga 40 minutes.

You can pick up details of the rescue operation details here:

https://www.estoniaferrydisaster.net/estonia final report/chapter22.htm

 

[Here_to_learn]

The Nauvu coast guard Winberg said he got the Mayday about 1:23 but could not get Estonia on his radar so he turned the frequency up to 24 from 12 and then saw ‘a target on the outer edge of the screen just southeast of Ut ö which he later discovered was where Estonia had been located. He said there were ‘radar disturbances’ and the ‘target’ was only visible for a moment before disappearing into the ‘clutter’. and immediately contacted MRCC Turku.

I find this just as fun as the last time you posted it. Apparently you still haven't learned anything about radar, or what he actually changed...

 

[Vixen]

I find this just as fun as the last time you posted it. Apparently you still haven't learned anything about radar, or what he actually changed...

Ok, sorry, magnitude, not frequency.

 

[Here_to_learn]

Ok, sorry, magnitude, not frequency.

Nope. Range is what he changed, from 12NM to 24NM. In a simplified way we could say that he zoomed out to see further.

 

[Jack by the hedge]

The pilot of Q64 received a medal for his heroism and according to Aftonbladet saved nine persons, one of whom was dead, whom he transported to Huddinge Hospital in Stockholm.

Yet JAIC claims Svensson and Q64:

Y b4 (Boeing Kawasaki)
Y 64 took off from Berga at 0445 hrs, picked up a physician and a nurse from Huddinge Hospital and arrived at the scene of the accident at 0552 hrs. <snip> Y 64 brought the survivor to Utö.

Wait! A hero yet only arrived 0552 and rescued one?

Are you thinking what I am thinking?

You still appear to be thinking Kenneth Svensson was the pilot of helicopter Y64. He was not. So no, I am definitely not thinking what you're thinking.