Science V.S. Philosophy

[PixyMisa]

I disagree. Science requires methodological naturalism, not metaphysical. Science does not rule out the supernatural (gods, et caetera), it just doesn't have anything to say about it.

Not quite.

To perform a scientific experiment, you're absolutely right, you only need methodological naturalism. To construct a theory, same thing.

But Science, conceived as a system of explaining the Universe, relies on the idea that you can only do that by applying methodological naturalism to all your inquiries - and that is metaphysical naturalism.

 

[PixyMisa]

Even these are, strictly speaking, conclusions reached by inductive reasoning; when scientists
find ways to test these assumptions, they are tested (and so far have held valid).

Yes, but also no.

Strictly speaking, you need both these assumptions before you have a basis for applying inductive logic to the natural world. However, once you make the assumptions, you can indeed test them to see if they work - and as you say, so far they do.

 

[epepke]

That's what I'd call Natural Philosophy, not Science.

Science as a system has a goal of making predictions that are (a) testable and (b) space-time invariant.

Testability is basically a rewording of what I wrote.

As for space-time invariance, you're simply wrong.

All the work on linking symmetries with conservation laws (a la Noether's theorem), the controversies over whether energy is conserved (Newton held that it wasn't), the linking of symmetries with the existence of particles in the Standard Model, the work on CP, T, and CPT reversibility, the questions about energy in quantum fluctuations, all of it involved empirical investigation into what you call space-time invariance.

This would not have been needed, at all, if it were an assumption.

 

[UserGoogol]

I really think people overstate the value of causality in Science. F = ma has nothing to do with causality. It merely states that the time-derivative of velocity is equal to the sum of the forces at the objects location at that particular point in time divided by the mass of the object. (Techncially that's a = F/m, but never mind that.) You can interpret this formula as saying that the force "causes" the object to move, but that's not neccesary to use the theory, and I think that in some ways this interpretation is misleading.

Similarly, most theories do not actually require causality, although causality does make things a lot easier to understand.

1. Metaphysical Naturalism: The material Universe is what exists, or if there is a more fundamental level of reality, it cannot be determined by observation.

I was under the impression that the observable world and the material world were by defintion the same. But if not, I don't see why science requires that the universe be made out of "matter." Anything that can be observed can have the scientific method applied to it. If there are observable patterns, then science should in principle be able to find them.

And frankly, I have trouble imagining a completely patternless phenomenon. Even if it was completely random, "completely random" seems to be a testable claim. So if you can observe it, you can apply science to it.

And of course, the Scientific Realism interpretation of science (which I think is silly) implies that there is a more fundamental level of reality, the numbers underlying the physical phenomenon.

2. The Principle of Uniformity: The Universe follows laws that apply uniformly and universally.

The way I see it, science isn't about truth, it's about "seeming to work." It is not thus not neccesary that a law apply universally. It is merely neccesary to have a theory which has fit all the data so far. (And which isn't just the result of just rigging up the formula to fit the data.)

And in my opinion, "seeming to work" is the very highest degree to which we can support any belief about the nature of the external world as true.

 

[KingMerv00]

Exist: to interact with, directly or indirectly, an observer. That's the quick-and-easy version.
Supernatural: being outside of the natural world.
Natural: part of the world; included within the bounds of the descriptions generated from observations of existing things.

When science discovers something new, something its currently-existing principles cannot explain, it changes its working definition of 'natural' to include the new data. Thus, science can never discover anything 'supernatural' because it does not include the concept.

You are just playing word games. In an attempt to put some absolutes into science, you have sacrificed meaning.

Using your definitions above the sentence "Supernatural things do not exist" is the same as saying "I cannot observe things that are unobservable." A trivial discovery at best.

Definitions are arbitrary of course so there is nothing technically wrong with your statement. However, you are using non-standard definitions and this confuses the issue. For example, God is seen by the vast majority of people to be "supernatural" but he interacts with the earth.

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I define "exist" as the ability to interact with anything. Not just me.

The galaxies that are "moving" away from us faster than the SOL do not exist according to you since there is no way for them to influence the Earth in any way. On the other hand, if we happened to live closer to the non-existant galaxy...*poof* it exists again.

If existance is relative then you have not proven an absolute.

 

[BeProf]

The way I learned it from my freshman philosophy professor:

Imagine for a moment that the whole of human endeavor is a pie where each "slice" is a different way of finding things out about life, the universe, and everything. Over here you've got Science. Over here you've got Theology. Over here you've got the English Lit. majors. That piece over there belongs to the Mathematicians.

Is Philosophy just another slice? No. Philosophy is the crust that holds the pie together and gives it its shape. It's the bedrock upon which all other methods are built. It's the sine qua non of any meaningful discourse about... well... anything.

 

[Melendwyr]

You are just playing word games. In an attempt to put some absolutes into science, you have sacrificed meaning.

No, because SCIENCE DOES NOT ATTACH ABSOLUTE MEANING TO THE WORD 'NATURAL'.

Definitions are arbitrary of course so there is nothing technically wrong with your statement. However, you are using non-standard definitions and this confuses the issue. For example, God is seen by the vast majority of people to be "supernatural" but he interacts with the earth.

'Theory' is seen by the vast majority of people to represent an unconfirmed guess.

Guess what difference that makes to science?

 

[KingMerv00]

'Theory' is seen by the vast majority of people to represent an unconfirmed guess.

Guess what difference that makes to science?

Uh, I never said the majority definition is more important than the minority. In fact, I specifically said that definitions are arbitrary.

"Supernatural" means something different to you than most people. Good for you. But don't be surprised if you cause confusion.

I can define "apple" to mean "the glowing ball of hydrogen and helium in the sky". Doing so will obviously cause misunderstandings.

 

[Renee Rynn]

You asked the question of what is the relationship between science and philosophy? And does science have philosophical presuppositions?
First let me explain that Science is a proven fact, AFTER the philosophical thinking of It could be like this and it could be like that.
Philosophy in general is the mind thinking within itself, working out angles and probable causes and effects. Science is material change to make the people enjoy life easier and happier and with understanding. Science puts the picture clearly in the mind of our present life and Philosophy dreams of the future and the paths that life can take if it takes either path.
So in that way, science, through its very ability to change thinking, will presupposition philosophy of modern day thinking of future events.

 

[epepke]

The way I learned it from my freshman philosophy professor:

Imagine for a moment that the whole of human endeavor is a pie where each "slice" is a different way of finding things out about life, the universe, and everything. Over here you've got Science. Over here you've got Theology. Over here you've got the English Lit. majors. That piece over there belongs to the Mathematicians.

Is Philosophy just another slice? No. Philosophy is the crust that holds the pie together and gives it its shape. It's the bedrock upon which all other methods are built. It's the sine qua non of any meaningful discourse about... well... anything.

Yes, that's what philosophers generally think.

In practice, what philosophers do far too often is take anything they encounter (sushi, roast pigs, raw celery, french fries), put it into a food processor, pour it into a pie crust and then say quo erat demonstrandum.

 

[Nick Bogaerts]

Not quite.

To perform a scientific experiment, you're absolutely right, you only need methodological naturalism. To construct a theory, same thing.

But Science, conceived as a system of explaining the Universe, relies on the idea that you can only do that by applying methodological naturalism to all your inquiries - and that is metaphysical naturalism.

Yes, agreed.

 

[PixyMisa]

Testability is basically a rewording of what I wrote.

No it isn't. You wrote:

Whatever works, works, and maybe it's sometimes possible to tell if it works.

That's simply not adequate for building the system of Science.

As for space-time invariance, you're simply wrong.

No.

All the work on linking symmetries with conservation laws (a la Noether's theorem), the controversies over whether energy is conserved (Newton held that it wasn't), the linking of symmetries with the existence of particles in the Standard Model, the work on CP, T, and CPT reversibility, the questions about energy in quantum fluctuations, all of it involved empirical investigation into what you call space-time invariance.

Yes.

This would not have been needed, at all, if it were an assumption.

Whyever not? Just because that assumption is necessary to perform Science doesn't mean we should ignore possible empirical tests to falsify it.

The point is this: Without the Principle of Uniformity, there is no logical basis for using inductive methods to describe the natural world. Without that, you can't infer anything at all from the work on CPT symmetry.

So although both the assumptions, naturalism and uniformity, are testable once you accept them as axioms, you can't do anything until you do accept them.

 

[PixyMisa]

I was under the impression that the observable world and the material world were by defintion the same.

Well, yes, that's my impression too.

But if not, I don't see why science requires that the universe be made out of "matter." Anything that can be observed can have the scientific method applied to it. If there are observable patterns, then science should in principle be able to find them.

Yes. That's what Metaphysical Naturalism is saying. What we observe represents reality.

The way I see it, science isn't about truth, it's about "seeming to work." It is not thus not neccesary that a law apply universally.

Yeah, it is. Well, it's necessary for the real laws, the correct ones, to apply universally. Approximations like Newtonian Mechanics don't have to.

Remember, we use Science to make predictions. Take a law derived inductively in one place and time and apply it to another place and time.

Can't do that if the law isn't universal.

And in my opinion, "seeming to work" is the very highest degree to which we can support any belief about the nature of the external world as true.

Yes. That's the nature of inductive logic.

 

[Melendwyr]

The way I learned it from my freshman philosophy professor:

Imagine for a moment that the whole of human endeavor is a pie where each "slice" is a different way of finding things out about life, the universe, and everything. Over here you've got Science. Over here you've got Theology. Over here you've got the English Lit. majors. That piece over there belongs to the Mathematicians.

Is Philosophy just another slice? No. Philosophy is the crust that holds the pie together and gives it its shape. It's the bedrock upon which all other methods are built. It's the sine qua non of any meaningful discourse about... well... anything.

Mathematics is language, without which philosophy cannot function. Your professor was wrong.

 

[PixyMisa]

Funnily enough, this argument is the exact inverse of one I had at the Skeptic Society forum. There we had someone arguing that David Hume had proved that induction had no logical foundation, and I replied that the axioms of Science - naturalism and uniformity - provided the foundation to use induction in the natural world.

He replied that (a) I couldn't use axioms like that and (b) in any case, Hume had proved that there was no logical basis for induction.



I could be wrong. But I don't see how. Science uses induction, and if you assume that induction works in the natural world, you've assumed naturalism and uniformity.

 

[epepke]

That's simply not adequate for building the system of Science.

OK, maybe I see your problem. You think that Science (capitalized) is a system. I'm guessing that you think this because philosophers build systems based on analytic gumbo, and so you assume that everyone else works the same way, because it satisfies your vanity. But you're wrong.

Whyever not? Just because that assumption is necessary to perform Science doesn't mean we should ignore possible empirical tests to falsify it.

If it were an assumption, then there would be no need to spend so much time trying to find out if it were true. Besides, the investigations resulted in models of symmetry, which are far more nuanced than your suggested "space-time" invariance.

Anyway, it's also wrong for quite another reason. There are plenty of things in science that are not space-time invariant. If the experiment is to look out the window and try to see the aurora borealis, then you're going to get a different result in Oslo from the one you're going to get in Quito.

The point is this: Without the Principle of Uniformity, there is no logical basis for using inductive methods to describe the natural world. Without that, you can't infer anything at all from the work on CPT symmetry.

The "logical basis" and "inferring" are particular fetishes of philosophers, not of people who do science. Sure, people might do this from time to time, but there's no requirement in science that there has to be a logical basis.

At most, it's something that you might as well try, because it has worked well in the past, and so why not? And if you find something that seems logically easy, great! But if you don't, you scratch your head, and maybe you can come up with something else, and maybe you can't.

So although both the assumptions, naturalism and uniformity, are testable once you accept them as axioms, you can't do anything until you do accept them.

You're just simply wrong about this. I'm pretty sure that it's impossible to convey this, but you're just wrong.

 

[drkitten]

Mathematics is language, without which philosophy cannot function.

Interesting how much philosophy was done before anyone bothered to formalize mathematics, then.

What do you think is the mathematical content, for example, of Plato's Phaedrus?

 

[drkitten]

Whyever not? Just because that assumption is necessary to perform Science doesn't mean we should ignore possible empirical tests to falsify it.

I don't think you've understood the ramifications of your position.

You've admitted that the Principle of Uniformity is falsifiable. You've even admitted that it's been tested.

What do you think would have happened if it had failed the test (and been falsified)? Do you think science as an endeavour would have simply shut up shop, banked the fires, and gone home to lick its wounds? (Just think, thousands of Ph.D. scientists at universities all over the world, suddenly forced to take real jobs!)

So although both the assumptions, naturalism and uniformity, are testable once you accept them as axioms, you can't do anything until you do accept them.

That's not what "axiom" means. I don't have to believe something in order to examine it "for the sake of argument (and testing)." Nor, for that matter, do I need to use "logic" or "induction" in order to come up with testable propositions. If the fairies at the bottom of my garden speak to me, and tell me that there's gold ore underneath my house. I can simply grab a shovel and start digging. Maybe I'm right. Maybe I'm wrong. But I can test the proposition without regard to where it cam e from, or whether the process by which I came by it was "logical" or "inductively valid" or any of the other philosophical buzzwords that get thrown around....

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I don't know if uniformity is an axiom or what, but it's certainly an assumption. Without that assumption, a scientist would have to retest all scientific knowledge every time he ran a new experiment. After all, something may have changed. But scientists don't seem to do that, so they are assuming some sort of uniformity.

Now, you can blow this off and say it isn't an axiom and that science just chugs along and will trip over the nonuniformity if it ever occurs. Of course. But meanwhile, it seems like a (falsifiable) assumption.

Drkitten, I don't think we need to worry about what happens to science if uniformity is ever falsified. If it was false, it probably would have been false all along, and science as we know it would never have gotten off the ground to begin with.

I can simply grab a shovel and start digging.

Don't you have to retest the conclusion that digging goes down?

~~ Paul

 

[Pae]

No; that's a conclusion reached by inductive logic.

What if one were to say that inductive logic uses presuppositions in itself since we don't have total knowledge of what ''reality'' is? I'm not claiming this, but I would imagine this is what a philosophy major would counter with.