Science V.S. Philosophy

[Pae]

What is the relationship between science and philosophy? Do you think science has philosophical presuppositions?

 

[KingMerv00]

What is the relationship between science and philosophy?

Both science and philosophy are attempts to understand the nature of existance. To me, science is a subset of philosophical thought.

Do you think science has philosophical presuppositions?

The only presupposition I can think of is that the universe is consistant. The laws of the universe need to apply at least most of the time. If the laws jumped around willy-nilly, the scientific process would be meaningless. Even then, there are some observations that we could make to see that laws are inconsistant.

Reality need not be "real". The universe could be in the Matrix and science would still work.

 

[Pae]

The only presupposition I can think of is that the universe is consistant.

I believe that when I drop a piece of wood it's always going to hit the ground. Would you consider this a presupposition?

 

[PixyMisa]

I believe that when I drop a piece of wood it's always going to hit the ground. Would you consider this a presupposition?

No; that's a conclusion reached by inductive logic.

There are two basic assumptions in science:

1. Metaphysical Naturalism: The material Universe is what exists, or if there is a more fundamental level of reality, it cannot be determined by observation.*

2. The Principle of Uniformity: The Universe follows laws that apply uniformly and universally.

You need Naturalism because you have to decide what you are studying. Science is a study of what we observe (directly or indirectly), so you can't do this with [most forms of] Idealism, or of course with Dualism.

You need Uniformity because the point of science is to make predictions. If what you observe in one place and time doesn't apply in another place and time, that doesn't work. (This is the same as saying that without this principle, induction doesn't work.)

* In which case, scientifically speaking, it doesn't exist. That's why I describe myself as a materialist rather than a naturalist; from the perspective of practical utility they are the same.

 

[KingMerv00]

I believe that when I drop a piece of wood it's always going to hit the ground. Would you consider this a presupposition?

Well let's not forget that there are no absolutes in science.

Suppose the earth exploded at the moment you let go of the wood. It might never hit the ground. This may seem like pointless speculation but I think it is important to remember that science is only about probability, not certainty.

Of course if you actually said, "I will now drop this piece of wood. Most likely it will hit the ground." I would think you are a jackass. "Most likely" is implied.

 

[Nick Bogaerts]

1. Metaphysical Naturalism: The material Universe is what exists, or if there is a more fundamental level of reality, it cannot be determined by observation.

I disagree. Science requires methodological naturalism, not metaphysical. Science does not rule out the supernatural (gods, et caetera), it just doesn't have anything to say about it.

 

[drkitten]

No; that's a conclusion reached by inductive logic.

There are two basic assumptions in science:

1. Metaphysical Naturalism: The material Universe is what exists, or if there is a more fundamental level of reality, it cannot be determined by observation.*

2. The Principle of Uniformity: The Universe follows laws that apply uniformly and universally.

Even these are, strictly speaking, conclusions reached by inductive reasoning; when scientists
find ways to test these assumptions, they are tested (and so far have held valid).

An example of this is the Oklo Fossil Reactors. In the 1970s, researchers found that uranium samples from the Oklo mines had the wrong isotope ratio, and eventually concluded that the local geography had been acting as a natural nuclear reactor, "burning" the U-235 naturally, at a low rate, for umpteen zillion years, starting two billion years ago or so. But, aside from the gee-whillikers factor here, the Oklo reactors also show that the "laws" of nuclear fission have not changed (much) in the past two billion years, since the same kinds of nuclear reactions were happening then that we can produce now.

Similarly, astronomers and cosmologists are continually looking further and further back into time (and across space), in part to see whether any of the apparent laws of physics are violated elsewhere or elsewhen.

 

[Melendwyr]

Well let's not forget that there are no absolutes in science.

Of course there are absolutes in science.

"No supernatural things exist", for example.

 

[KingMerv00]

Of course there are absolutes in science.

"No supernatural things exist", for example.

I guess you'll have to define "supernatural" and "exist".

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

There are two basic assumptions in science:

1. Metaphysical Naturalism: The material Universe is what exists, or if there is a more fundamental level of reality, it cannot be determined by observation.*

2. The Principle of Uniformity: The Universe follows laws that apply uniformly and universally.

Don't we also need something like:

3. We can determine the laws that govern the universe through observation of cause and effect.

Or does that go without saying?

~~ Paul

 

[epepke]

Don't we also need something like:

3. We can determine the laws that govern the universe through observation of cause and effect.

Or does that go without saying?

~~ Paul

No; it doesn't go without saying, and it's also wrong. As is Number 2, of course. Only Number 1 comes close, but it's still mostly wrong.

It never seems to work to try to explain this to philosophy fans, but I never lose hope. Cause-and-effect is a model, and it is no more privileged as a model than, say, the Standard Theory. If it turns out that we can model something in terms of cause and effect, then great, we can do that. If it turns out that we can't, well, then perhaps we can come up with some different model. And if we can't do that, then we say "I don't know." It's really that simple.

This does address the point in the OP of science vs. philosophy, because philosophers don't seem to be able to deal with something that isn't based on some sort of analytic gumbo with file sprinkled on top, and when you ask them to look at things in a different way, they either get weird or make stuff up or both.

 

[GreedyAlgorithm]

Even these are, strictly speaking, conclusions reached by inductive reasoning.

Number 2 is often a problem for people. It is not a conclusion, it is an assumption. And it is an assumption that is necessary to the application of science. The way I view number 2, as a mathematician, is that the universe as a function of time, at least right now, where humans investigate it, is a "nice function". We can expect short extrapolations from known data to behave well. If not for this assumption, science would be nothing more than history, attempting to model the past as well as possible but saying nothing about the future. It would not be predictive.

The reason some people think (the ideal wording of) Number 2 is derived or a conclusion is because it's often mistated. For example, from a site explaining the Principle of Uniformity of Nature:

"A more hopeful version of the principle may say that mere position in space or time cannot by themselves be relevant to whether some phenomenon occurs or not."

This is good. Most sources, however, will leave out the "a more hopeful version" part.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

No; it doesn't go without saying, and it's also wrong. As is Number 2, of course. Only Number 1 comes close, but it's still mostly wrong.

My mistake. I did not mean to refer to any mechanism of cause and effect. Let me try this:

3. We can determine the laws that govern the universe through observation of the effects that material events have.

So Epepke, give us your idea of the axioms of science.

~~ Paul

 

[Melendwyr]

I guess you'll have to define "supernatural" and "exist".

Exist: to interact with, directly or indirectly, an observer. That's the quick-and-easy version.
Supernatural: being outside of the natural world.
Natural: part of the world; included within the bounds of the descriptions generated from observations of existing things.

When science discovers something new, something its currently-existing principles cannot explain, it changes its working definition of 'natural' to include the new data. Thus, science can never discover anything 'supernatural' because it does not include the concept.

 

[epepke]

My mistake. I did not mean to refer to any mechanism of cause and effect. Let me try this:

3. We can determine the laws that govern the universe through observation of the effects that material events have.

So Epepke, give us your idea of the axioms of science.

~~ Paul

It's still wrong, and the parts that aren't are equivalent to Number 1.

I have to say that I used to think that there was at least one metaphysical assumption to science. However, in the past couple of months, I've seen some essays that other people have written that have caused me to question this.

At this point, I can't prove that science doesn't have axioms. But if it does have an axiom or a metaphysical assumption, then it is this:

1) Whatever works, works, and maybe it's sometimes possible to tell if it works.

You can determine for yourself if that's an axiom or a tautology or a definition or whatever.

Everything else is really either a practical model or a job description. As I pointed out elsewhere, carpentry does not rely on the axiom that the universe is made of wood. It's just that, if there's some wood, and you have some tools, then you might be able to make a nice set of bookshelves. The only sine qua non is the set of bookshelves, and it has to work.

The same is true of science. If you have some reality, and you have some tools (even if you just make up the tools, which happens all the time), then you might be able to make a nice theory, and the only sine qua non is that it has to work.

Note that this doesn't mean that it has to work, only that it sometimes does, and when it does, you might be able to tell that it works, and if you can, great. However, there's no axiom or set of logical steps that leads to the conclusion that it has to happen. It so happens that it has, at least to such a degree that a lot of people can conclude that it works.

Let's throw a monkey wrench into it. Let's say that solipsism were correct. It would still be possible to do science, only, those other people would be figments of one's imagination. It would still be possible to do science in the Matrix.

That science explains and predicts so much, impressive though it may be, is just what has happened as a consequence of doing science. It doesn't logically follow from any axioms.

 

[epepke]

Number 2 is often a problem for people. It is not a conclusion, it is an assumption. And it is an assumption that is necessary to the application of science. The way I view number 2, as a mathematician, is that the universe as a function of time, at least right now, where humans investigate it, is a "nice function".

You think that because you do a lot of mathematics and probably not much science.

It isn't an assumption. It's a conclusion. People bring up historical or special-case assumptions about physics all the damn time. It always happens.

Let's take a case. During the early days of Quantum Mechanics, it wasn't at all obvious that the universe was a nice function. Yet science did not grind to a halt, nor did all scientists go mad and run laughing maniacally into the streets. The did drink a lot, though, but they showed up at work, and it turned out that it was a nice function. Whew! But still, science did not crumble, which is what one would expect if it were absolutely necessary. People could still do science through that period.

 

[KingMerv00]

Exist: to interact with, directly or indirectly, an observer. That's the quick-and-easy version.
Supernatural: being outside of the natural world.
Natural: part of the world; included within the bounds of the descriptions generated from observations of existing things.

When science discovers something new, something its currently-existing principles cannot explain, it changes its working definition of 'natural' to include the new data. Thus, science can never discover anything 'supernatural' because it does not include the concept.

So things you can't interact with cannot exist? What if there was another universe out there completely separate from our own? Would its inhabitants have a right to say that you don't exist?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Let's throw a monkey wrench into it. Let's say that solipsism were correct. It would still be possible to do science, only, those other people would be figments of one's imagination. It would still be possible to do science in the Matrix.

This suggests that science makes no ontological assumptions. Still seems to me that it makes some epistemological ones, even if they are potentially falsifiable. Perhaps you're right in that the epistemological framework is something we describe after the fact, that is, after we've done a pile of science and found that it basically works. Yet that framework allows us to keep going without too much concern that the universe is an inscrutable mess or that it is tampered with by some capricious entity. Doesn't that make the framework axiomatic?

Hmm.

~~ Paul

 

[Melendwyr]

So things you can't interact with cannot exist?

Not relative to me, they don't.

What if there was another universe out there completely separate from our own?

In a sense, we can guarantee that there are - such a statement has no truth value within our universe. It is neither true nor false, and simultaneously true AND false.

Would its inhabitants have a right to say that you don't exist?

Yes! That is, they would if they existed, which they don't.

 

[PixyMisa]

At this point, I can't prove that science doesn't have axioms. But if it does have an axiom or a metaphysical assumption, then it is this:

1) Whatever works, works, and maybe it's sometimes possible to tell if it works.

That's what I'd call Natural Philosophy, not Science.

Science as a system has a goal of making predictions that are (a) testable and (b) space-time invariant. You have to have both my assumptions before you can do that. I may have missed some other implicit assumption, and certainly it may be possible to state those assumptions more clearly, but you can't get anywhere without them.

The same is true of science. If you have some reality, and you have some tools (even if you just make up the tools, which happens all the time), then you might be able to make a nice theory, and the only sine qua non is that it has to work.

Note that this doesn't mean that it has to work, only that it sometimes does, and when it does, you might be able to tell that it works, and if you can, great. However, there's no axiom or set of logical steps that leads to the conclusion that it has to happen. It so happens that it has, at least to such a degree that a lot of people can conclude that it works.

No.

To do Science, you need to apply inductive logic to the natural world. Without both of my assumptions, you have no basis for doing so. And if you do apply induction to the natural world, well...

Let's throw a monkey wrench into it. Let's say that solipsism were correct. It would still be possible to do science

No. Science works by observation, so you have to assume that those observations reflect the reality of the Universe, and in Solipsism they don't, by definition.

If you start with Solipsism, you have to also assume Naturalism before you can do Science.