Cont: The Sinking of MS Estonia: Case Re-opened Part III

[Jack by the hedge]

You will find a lot of nonsense on the internet about how the Estonia sank because of water on the car deck, when even the JAIC itself admits that this would not be enough to capsize the ship.

You don't need to look beyond this thread to find a lot of nonsense about the Estonia. The JAIC report does not suggest the Estonia sank due to water entering the car deck alone. And you know that. Throwing out a lifeline that claims there are people on the internet who are also wrong does not make your position look much better to be honest.

Yes, there are people devoid of critical ability who have assumed that because the EPIRB's did not emit a signal, 'someone forgot to turn them on'. However, if they were in the hydrostatically operated shell and had just been passed as AOK then they should have operated as soon as they were hydrostatically released and reached the surface.

Automatically released but manually activated buoys were fitted on the Estonia. You don't want that to be true but more than one source says it's so. What have you got except a conspiracy theory to defend?

 

[JesseCuster]

The Government of the Republic of Estonia
Final report on the MV ESTONIA disaster Chapter 19

https://onse.fi/estonia/chapt19.html

Couldn't see the reference to Estonia in your link.

All of Chapter 19 is about the Estonia.

Based on Herald of Free Enterprise. Says nothing at all about the ultra-rapid sinking or the hole in the hull. Or what happened to the Captain.

Captain_Swoop linked to the JAIC report, chapter 19, in reference to the a discussion about the type of EPIRB used on the Estonia.

Why in God's name would his link contain anything ultra-rapid sinking or what happened to the captain or holes in the hull, when that's not what he was discussing when he referenced it?

 

[Andy_Ross]

Stop lying. The Herald of Free Enterpise only partially sank.

You are quite shameless.

It was on the bottom of the sea, it sank.

From the court of enquiry

The HERALD passed the outer mole at 18.24. She capsized about four minutes later. During the final moments the HERALD turned rapidly to starboard and was prevented from sinking totally by reason only that her port side took the ground in shallow water.

We aren't discussing the HOFE

 

[Jack by the hedge]

Now you are trolling. Had The Herald of Free Enterprise been in open sea, you don't know how long it would have taken to sink.

You by contrast seem never to have ceased trolling. How long did the Estonia take to list and sink as far as the Herald did in around two minutes? About half an hour.

 

[Jack by the hedge]

Stamuel, Kari Lehtola, Head of the Finnish JAIC said the buoys had not been tuned. That is very different from not being turned on.

We've been over this. The context plainly indicates they meant the buoys were not activated. Find a technically-aware native speaker of Finnish and ask them what the phrase means.

 

[Andy_Ross]

Does this mean that if someone threw water-activated EPIRBs overboard, they could float for miles without activating? If so, my mistake. Thanks.

Yes, if you throw them in to the water they will not activate.
If being wet was sufficient then by their very location on the outside of a ship superstructure they would stand a good chance of getting wet.
Similarly if one was washed overboard by accident you would not want it to activate and send a false distress signal.

 

[Andy_Ross]

Stamuel, Kari Lehtola, Head of the Finnish JAIC said the buoys had not been tuned. That is very different from not being turned on.

What does that mean?

EPIRB buoys work straight out of the box. there is nothing to tune.

You can order buoys with a customised signal that identifies your vessel but that is done by the supplier, not by the user.

They are sealed units with nothing that can be 'tuned'

 

[Andy_Ross]

Now you are trolling. Had The Herald of Free Enterprise been in open sea, you don't know how long it would have taken to sink.

A very similar car ro-ro ferry, the MS Jan Heweliusz took five days to sink fully.

HOFE sank very rapidly.

Read the court of enquiry transcript

The HERALD passed the outer mole at 18.24. She capsized about four minutes later. During the final moments the HERALD turned rapidly to starboard and was prevented from sinking totally by reason only that her port side took the ground in shallow water

https://assets.publishing.service.g...estigation_HeraldofFreeEnterprise-MSA1894.pdf

 

[LondonJohn]

A very similar car ro-ro ferry, the MS Jan Heweliusz took five days to sink fully.

The Jan Heweliusz had an entirely different cause of sinking from the Estonia (and the HOFE).

It didn't sank on account of the bow opening being very significantly compromised, causing a huge volume/mass of water to enter very quickly into the ship via the vehicle deck.

It sank because it was all-round unseaworthy, and sailed full-speed into a storm to make up lost time. It already had grossly improper balance (caused by multiple factors, including an improper repair using a large mass of concrete), and when it started to list, several large trucks that were untethered toppled to the low side and spilt their cargo that way as well.

But the ship was, and remained, very significantly more watertight than the Estonia (and the HOFE) even as it capsized. And that's precisely why it remained afloat upside down for a number of days.

The sinking of the Jan Heweliusz and the sinking of the Estonia are in no way comparable.

 

[Andy_Ross]

Oh, for ****'s sake, a hydrostatic release mechanism doesn't tell you the EPIRBs were hydrostatically activated. It just tells you how they were released.

As far as whether it was manual or not, someone here claimed to have found a technical manual covering this model, though I don't think I've seen a link to it. Moreover, if the EPIRBs were found floating and were not transmitting despite being in good working order, that's pretty good evidence they were not a hydrostatically activated model, ain't it?

No manual has been found for the buoys aboard the Estonia.

there are manuals for current models by the same manufacturer but they are completely different units.
Am manual for a unit with a similar model name was found but it is a n aircraft unit but it is a current model and works in a different way.

 

[Andy_Ross]

I guess you missed this post (and probably several more earlier in this and the previous thread:



And if that is not clear - disturbances from Hogland could of course also interfere with Estonian coastal radio stations.

Mayday calls from Estonia were picked up, there was no interference.

Transcripts have been posted in this thread today

 

[Vixen]

Kannad 406F - Free Floating Automatically Activating

This settles it once and for all.

The Kannad 406 F was one of:

The float free type (automatic activation):• KANNAD 406 F/P: Container made of polyester with an internal membrane (CAL87).
• KANNAD 406 FH/PH: Container fitted with a HAMMAR release system (CAL 89).

And here is a picture of it. This is a facsimile of Estonia's EPIRB as used by Asser Koivisto in his presentation of what happened to the EPIRB's.

On 27 January 1995, the navigation expert Asser Koivisto in Helsinki presented his study of Estonia's EPIRB buoys: radio buoys on the command bridge which, in floating position, are to start transmitting an exact GPS position and trigger a major international alarm.

According to Koivisto, the emergency buoys were tested and serviced in Stockholm a week before the disaster, but the crew had forgotten to put the buoys in on-position again. The buoys are usually switched off during land transport, to avoid false alarms.

Today, not only the emergency buoys have disappeared without a trace. Asser Koivisto's report has also gone up in smoke. Spotlight has searched in Tallinn, Kotka, Helsinki, Turku and Stockholm.

Now, 25 years later, Koivisto is referring to a confidentiality agreement and refuses an interview through his wife.But the strange thing is that the Estonian newspaper Postimees reported on October 8, 1994, that the first Finnish robot dives at the wreck showed that the emergency buoys had got stuck on the bridge and remained in their mounts.

The Commission gave high priority to the emergency buoys and Asser Koivisto valued their role. "This is the rescue system I trust the most," he told journalists Anders Jörle and Anders Hellberg, who published the book Disaster Course: Estonia's Road to Destruction (1997).

There, Koivisto says that the emergency buoys were sandy and really looked like they had floated ashore.

"But both transmitters were turned off," he says.

He also mentions rumors that the EPIRB buoys would never have been on board, but planted on the beach just to give the impression of being Estonias.

"I do not believe in those speculations," Koivisto says in the book.

In the final report, the Accident Investigation Board claims that the radio buoys were picked up near Dirhami on the Estonian north coast as early as 2 October. But if so, why did the Estonians not tell the rest of the Accident Investigation Board about the matter until December, when the dives off Estonia had already ended?

The divers of the diving company Rockwater were evidently looking for the EPIRB buoys on Estonia's command bridge in December 1994. This can be heard in the video that the Accident Investigation Board (Otkes) keeps in Helsinki. The Accident Investigation Board's colorful Finnish chairman and spokesperson Kari Lehtola, who died in 2019, worked here.


<snip>

There is no trace of any report written by Asser Koivisto in the archives where Estonia material is found. The emergency buoys themselves are said to have been tested first by Finnish experts in Helsinki and then on the Estonian icebreaker Tarmo in January 1995. There, they are said to have worked flawlessly for four hours and made contact with a Russian satellite.

But then the buoys disappeared.

YLE

 

[Andy_Ross]

This settles it once and for all.

The Kannad 406 F was one of:

The float free type (automatic activation):• KANNAD 406 F/P: Container made of polyester with an internal membrane (CAL87).
• KANNAD 406 FH/PH: Container fitted with a HAMMAR release system (CAL 89).

And here is a picture of it. This is a facsimile of Estonia's EPIRB as used by Asser Koivisto in his presentation of what happened to the EPIRB's.

YLE

That is a manual for a KANNAS 406 PH
It is dated 09/06/06
Do you ever check any of your sources?

From your quoted text

According to Koivisto, the emergency buoys were tested and serviced in Stockholm a week before the disaster, but the crew had forgotten to put the buoys in on-position again. The buoys are usually switched off during land transport, to avoid false alarms.

They are always turned off unless they are transmitting.
If your 'expert' thinks they should have been put in an on-position' he is ignorant of their function. Not much of an expert.

Also if the buoys are the rescue system he 'trusts most' he is a fool.

Direct radio mayday messages are the best system.

 

[Vixen]

I guess you missed this post (and probably several more earlier in this and the previous thread:



And if that is not clear - disturbances from Hogland could of course also interfere with Estonian coastal radio stations.

From an early newspaper report - Helsinki Sanomat 15 Oct 1994, two weeks after the accident.

The carrier of the Russian radio transmitter has been interfering with the traffic of marine VHF telephones on the emergency channel 16 since the end of last month.

The disturbance is worst in front of Kotka, but the channel is noisy all the way to Helsinki. The Telecommunications Administration Center has located the cause of the disturbance in the direction of Suursaari.

Noise from Russian transmitter interferes with emergency channel A carrier coming from the direction of Suursaari could interfere with an Estonian VHF call

10/15/1994 2:00 AM The carrier of the Russian radio transmitter has been interfering with the traffic of marine VHF telephones on the emergency channel 16 since the end of last month. The disturbance is worst in front of Kotka, but the channel is noisy all the way to Helsinki. The Telecommunications Administration Center has located the cause of the disturbance in the direction of Suursaari.

An interference can occur when the frequency user is left "tangent down", i.e. the transmitter is turned on after the conversation. The same can happen if the transmitter is defective. The first observations of the noise were received on 23 September. Sometimes the noise has stopped to start again. According to Jorma Karjalainen, the director of the radio administration, the Finnish Telecommunications Administration has pointed out the matter to the Russian authorities several times, but the disturbance has not ended. According to the Kotka Coast Guard, noise interferes with the listening of the emergency channel all the time, but the channel has nevertheless been able to be used so far. The disturbance is also heard on Helsinki-Radio, which is constantly on duty on the emergency channel.

Helsinki-Radio listens to the entire coast from Tornio to St. Petersburg. Although the coverage of the VHF is about one hundred kilometers in good conditions and a few tens of kilometers from one ship to another, coastal radio stations can hear distress calls via coastal link connections. Lifeguards use the same links.

For example, the accident ship Estonian 28.9. The distress call was issued to nearby passenger ships, but it was heard at the Turku Maritime Rescue Center via a link.

According to Heimo Iivonen, a member of the investigation committee investigating the accident, the noise coming from Suursaari may have disturbed Estonia's first emergency channel call, which was extremely weak a couple of minutes before the actual mayday call.

VHF is a licensed radio. Merchant ships using it and coastal stations responsible for maritime safety are required to continuously listen to the distress channel. The system is being changed so that a so-called digital selective call could be sent to lifeguards without a voice connection. For example, the alarm would be displayed on the Guards' display terminal and the same transmitter would also indicate the position of the ship in distress. In connection with the reform, it is planned to abolish the obligation to listen to the emergency channel. In other words, rescue centers, guards and ships sailing at sea would no longer listen to the channel 16.

Heimo Iivonen considers this plan to be a clear deterioration in the current system from the point of view of maritime safety. Senior Engineer Kari Koho from the Finnish Telecommunications Administration points out that a digital selective call is a safer way to send an emergency message than a voice call. The system should send a message until the lifeguards acknowledge receipt. With these prospects, the obligation to listen could be lifted at the earliest in 1999. The problem has been noted several times.

 

[Vixen]

That is a manual for a KANNAS 406 PH
It is dated 09/06/06
Do you ever check any of your sources?

From your quoted text



They are always turned off unless they are transmitting.
If your 'expert' thinks they should have been put in an on-position' he is ignorant of their function. Not much of an expert.

Also if the buoys are the rescue system he 'trusts most' he is a fool.

Direct radio mayday messages are the best system.

Here is a picture of Asser Koivisto presenting the EPIRB just four months after the accident, in January 1995.

Asser Koivisto in TV news on January 27, 1995. The emergency buoy in the picture is obviously not Estonia's, but a brand new copy.

Koivisto is a navigation expert. Who are you to call him a 'fool'?

 

[Andy_Ross]

From an early newspaper report - Helsinki Sanomat 15 Oct 1994, two weeks after the accident.

Your own hilite shows that the distress signal was heard by the ships and the official report shows that the second signal was heard by 14 ships and the Turku Marine rescue Centre.

 

[Andy_Ross]

Here is a picture of Asser Koivisto presenting the EPIRB just four months after the accident, in January 1995.

Asser Koivisto in TV news on January 27, 1995. The emergency buoy in the picture is obviously not Estonia's, but a brand new copy.

Koivisto is a navigation expert. Who are you to call him a 'fool'?

Your link was to a different and much later model.

He is a fool if he thinks the buoys are the rescue system he 'trusts most'.

They are a last fallback. He may consider himself a 'navigation expert' but he is obviously not a sailor.

 

[Jack by the hedge]

Yep, like the captain said, Vixen you linked to the same 2006 service manual everyone else has linked to already. If you'd like to indicate to us any model described there which has a transport switch to disable it that would be interesting. I don't see one.

It very much looks to me as if the user gets a test button and an on/off switch to manually activate the emergency transmitter. These modern models also have an immersion switch as an extra way to activate them. I don't see any sign of a switch to disable that function. Do you?

 

[Andy_Ross]

Yep, like the captain said, Vixen you linked to the same 2006 service manual everyone else has linked to already. If you'd like to indicate to us any model described there which has a transport switch to disable it that would be interesting. I don't see one.

It very much looks to me as if the user gets a test button and an on/off switch to manually activate the emergency transmitter. These modern models also have an immersion switch as an extra way to activate them. I don't see any sign of a switch to disable that function. Do you?

In all probability there was a model with an immersion switch around at the time of the Estonia sinking but we know that they weren't using one.

Manual models are still available, you just can't use one as the only equipment aboard a commercial vessel.

From that document, the manual version available in 2006 was the 406 S

 

[Jack by the hedge]

Yes, the digging I've done around SOLAS suggest automatic activation models were already recommended.

e.g. A 1993 resolution on recommended standards here: https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresourc...MOResolutions/AssemblyDocuments/A.763(18).pdf