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The Sinking of MS Estonia: Case Re-opened Part II

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Captain_Swoop said:
In a calm harbour what would the inspectors have seen to cause concern?

What components and systems are checked?

What is the extent of the check?

JAIC had no way of knowing the exact condition of the ship, they can only go on what was said last time the ship was inspected.
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The 'German Expert Group', presumably Werner Hummel acting for Meyer Werft - claim there had been plenty of written requisistions for repairs.

This severe damage to the port outer hinge and to the ramp itself was reported by the crew to the technical managers and also put on the repair list several times according to Börje Stenström (see Enclosure 12.5.166). However, nothing was done to rectify this damage despite the fact that it constituted a severe violation of the SOLAS - and Class - requirements because evidently the open car deck was, via the leaking bow ramp, connected to the visor which at sea was filled with water.
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Estonia Ferry Disaster
 
Vixen said:
That is the JAIC diagram.

The JAIC says the bow visor falling off, took the car ramp with it, except a couple of witnesses claim to have climbed down the car ramp as the ship was on its side.


Heiwa.co

You can also see from the Strathclyde University reproduction of the shop at 90° list how this might look.

In addition, neither Sillaste, Kaduk nor Linde could possibly have seen 'the bow visor was missing' from the monitor showing inside the car ramp, which showed the car ramp up, as does Sillaste's numerous drawings of what the car ramp looked like - it was shut every time, with water at the sides, not the top - so the idea the car ramp was pulled down is just a theory to back up Bildt's Day One hypothesis.
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Why do you keep going back to nutters' websites as "trusted sources"?

Once again: only quote from either a) primary sources, or b) properly-accredited news outlets.

Have you still got your fingers in your ears over this issue as well?
 
What do you think a '9cm' barrier would do to stop water on a rolling ship.

If water is getting in to the lower hull it will seem to 'rise up' as the level increases.

Until an order is given to close the openings the water will spread through the ship, liquids tend to do that.


As for passengers not seeing water in the stairways, we also have passengers reporting water in the stairways.

How many sets of stairways do you think there are on a ship that size?
 
Vixen said:
The 'German Expert Group', presumably Werner Hummel acting for Meyer Werft - claim there had been plenty of written requisistions for repairs.

Estonia Ferry Disaster
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Because something is reported for repair doesn't mean it wasn't seaworthy at the time it was inspected.
If the requests for repairs were ignored and the captain didn't follow them up it shows the culpability of the company management and the captain.

No wonder the CEO was trying to blame sea mines, his ship was a disaster waiting to happen.

Maybe you should also take to task the lax inspection regime if you think the inspectors missed the problem.
 
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Vixen said:
The alarm for 'we are sinking' is a continuous 'häiriste' (distress) one throughout the ship with the followup message, please make your way to the nearest deck (this was all in Estonian, which was another criticism of the evacuation). This is a loud foghorn type highly irritating noise that passengers and crew cannot fail to miss. Problem is, it was activated far too late to have been any use in this scenario.
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Hooooo man.

You seriously don't understand that there was/is one alarm to alert crew, then another alarm to alert passengers?

This is precisely why codewords such as "Mr Brightside" are used for the crew alarms. If a crew alarm said something like "Message to all crew: the ship is in significant trouble", even you might be able to understand the effect on passengers.

In the incident we're discussing here, the general-alert "Mr Brightside" alarm was broadcast (with the passengers having no idea what that even meant, and thus not panicking upon hearing it). Then later, after it became apparent to the crew that the ship was sinking and needed to be abandoned, an explicit alarm for passengers was broadcast.

This really isn't difficult at all. To most of us, at least.
 
LondonJohn said:
Why do you keep going back to nutters' websites as "trusted sources"?

Once again: only quote from either a) primary sources, or b) properly-accredited news outlets.

Have you still got your fingers in your ears over this issue as well?
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THE DIAGRAM OF THE BOW VISOR IS THE ONE PROVIDED BY THE JOINT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE.

The visor was NOT swinging upwards like a car boot door which someone failed to shut properly.
 
Captain_Swoop said:
What do you think a '9cm' barrier would do to stop water on a rolling ship.

If water is getting in to the lower hull it will seem to 'rise up' as the level increases.

Until an order is given to close the openings the water will spread through the ship, liquids tend to do that.


As for passengers not seeing water in the stairways, we also have passengers reporting water in the stairways.

How many sets of stairways do you think there are on a ship that size?
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You are still not getting it. Look at the time line. The survivors from deck 1 - the very lowest cabins, below the car deck - were amongst the first to realise there was an emergency and got to the upper deck before the other passengers in the higher decks (Oun, Rentaam). Why? This is because they knew there was a problem before any listing or alarm went off, as did Sillaste and Treu, who had turned on all of the pumps in a desperate attempt to rectify the seawater seeping into the engine room.

If you have ever had your home flooded, you know perfectly well whether the water came from the ground level 1 or from above, level 2 or the roof.
 
Anders Bjorkman is a lunatic who thinks that the 911 collapse can accurately be simulated with pizza boxes or bathroom scales, and has long since lost any credibility he might have had.

Hint: Even his own profession think he's a nutter.

I haven't claimed expertise in the field of naval engineering, nor would I ever do so. I don't know the first thing about it and unlike some people wouldn't try to luff that I do. However I do know Anders. He used to be a poster here. He's certifiable.
 
LondonJohn said:
Hooooo man.

You seriously don't understand that there was/is one alarm to alert crew, then another alarm to alert passengers?

This is precisely why codewords such as "Mr Brightside" are used for the crew alarms. If a crew alarm said something like "Message to all crew: the ship is in significant trouble", even you might be able to understand the effect on passengers.

In the incident we're discussing here, the general-alert "Mr Brightside" alarm was broadcast (with the passengers having no idea what that even meant, and thus not panicking upon hearing it). Then later, after it became apparent to the crew that the ship was sinking and needed to be abandoned, an explicit alarm for passengers was broadcast.

This really isn't difficult at all. To most of us, at least.
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That's the difference with a military ship. An alert is very specific, there are no passengers to panic.
 
Vixen said:
After all this time nd you still haven't grasped that the bow visor detached from the top. It was hanging by its hydraulic arms after the side locks failed and was held in place by the atlantic lock at the bottom. The bow visor never 'pivoted upwards' as you falsely claim (and this proves you have no idea what you are talking about and are just improvising with your customary 'would, could, should' pontifications). It hung forwards and downwards, with only the atlantic lock holding it.

See the official diagram and make a note of the position of the bow visor when it supposedly came loose.
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Oh dear. This has backfired rather spectacularly for you. :D :thumbsup:

The first lock to fail on the bow visor was indeed the bottom lock*. The bow visor was thus allowed to pivot upwards, since it was now held in place only by the upper pivot points and the hydraulic actuator pistons. And the resulting stresses placed on those other components - stresses far beyond those for which these components were designed - caused them eventually to fail in turn.

So for all your condescending "gotcha" nonsense, I'm afraid it's you who have "no idea what you're talking about" and "pontificating" on something you don't understand. From the wikipedia site on the sinking (purely because I can't be bothered to search in the official report, and because wikipedia is a perfectly good trusted source):

The first metallic bang was believed to have been the sound of the visor's lower locking mechanism failing, and that the subsequent noises would have been from the visor 'flapping' against the hull as the other locks failed, before tearing free and exposing the bow ramp
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinking_of_the_MS_Estonia


* and note in passing that this bottom lock is referred to by just that name in the illustration from the official report that you've provided - to the best of my knowledge, you still haven't explained where this term "atlantic lock" comes from......
 
Vixen said:
THE DIAGRAM OF THE BOW VISOR IS THE ONE PROVIDED BY THE JOINT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE.

The visor was NOT swinging upwards like a car boot door which someone failed to shut properly.
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It would be if the lower fastening failed.
You don't seem to appreciate the energy in a waves, especially if the ship is driving in to them at 18 kt.
 
Captain_Swoop said:
Because something is reported for repair doesn't mean it wasn't seaworthy at the time it was inspected.
If the requests for repairs were ignored and the captain didn't follow them up it shows the culpability of the company management and the captain.

No wonder the CEO was trying to blame sea mines, his ship was a disaster waiting to happen.

Maybe you should also take to task the lax inspection regime if you think the inspectors missed the problem.
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These were serious repairs that were needed.

As a result of the sustained severe structural damages and in combination with the different lifting speeds of the actuators and severely worn out hinge bushings, the visor became increasingly misaligned and out of geometry.

<snip>

Åke Eriksson - who travelled on the ESTONIA in September 1994 reported: Upon departure from Stockholm the crew was unable to close the visor. Quite a number of crew members were jumping around on the forecastle deck until they finally managed. On departure from Tallinn, one week later, the departure was delayed by two hours because the visor could not be closed.

Anton B. Paulomo - In July 1994 two of his friends were travelling by bus from a place in Lithuania together with a couple of others via Tallinn on the ESTONIA to Stockholm for shopping. On the way back they had to wait for 3 hours in Tallinn before the crew was able to open the visor, which was only possible after some burning/cutting had taken place. They left the bus and went up to the 8th deck overlooking the forecastle deck from where they observed what the crew and subsequently also workers from ashore were doing. The respective letter from Paulomo is attached as Enclosure 12.5.170.

Gerhard Stenhammer - Stockholm pilot and now retired, had observed shortly before the casualty that after departure from Frihamn Terminal the crew tried to close the visor for 15 minutes by opening/closing with loud bangs until it became silent. The master explained that the crew again had problems with closing the visor. The pilot asked the master whether the locking devices would still fit and the answer was "no problem". In the opinion of pilot Stenhammer the visor was 'out of geometry'.

Note: Rapid closing of the visor is only possible by opening the hydraulic valves at the actuators (hydraulic lifting cylinders) manually. Thereafter the simultaneous movements of the cylinders has to be readjusted by service engineers.

<snip>

Torbjörn Cederqvist had very often waited on the car deck for 1-2 hours, once in May 1994 even 4 hours before the crew was able to open the visor and/or bow ramp. In May 1994 the crew was unable to open the visor in spite of all sorts of attempts. Finally crew members brought two gas bottles plus burning gear to the door in the starboard side house.

Jan-du-Rietz - retired captain, ca. 70 years old.
He made 4 trips on the ESTONIA, the last one was in May 1994. <snip> after departure the crew told every passenger that it was strictly forbidden to go to the car deck, he went down, nevertheless, because he was curious due to the strange behaviour of the crew and saw that they were welding the forward part of the car deck in at least 3 different locations, but he was chased away by a gorilla-type sailor.

Anders - travelled on the ESTONIA 26/27 June 1994. Observed on 26.06.94 at Stockholm that the visor was partly open and that the bow ramp was down. He saw the flickering blue light from welding under the bow ramp and that people were working in the area of the Atlantic lock below the ramp.

ad infinitum.
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Estonian Ferry Disaster

Reports of crew having to use sledgehammers to get the atlantic bolt in place, which had been unassembled anyway and parts removed or modified - gas cylinders and welding machinery in to enable passengers to drive their vehicles off - tells yoiu the Bureau Veritas inspectors were grossly negligent and also the JAIC for not even investigating all these reports from former passengers and crew attempting to help them.
 
Vixen said:
THE DIAGRAM OF THE BOW VISOR IS THE ONE PROVIDED BY THE JOINT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE.

The visor was NOT swinging upwards like a car boot door which someone failed to shut properly.
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It's probably best to check which post of yours I was actually responding to, before launching into something like this shouty nonsense.

(Go back and have a check, unless you'd like me to do it for you. But as a hint: my post had nothing to do with your post that included the diagram of the bow visor....)
 
Vixen said:
Anders Bjorkman is a qualified naval architect. And yourself..?
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He's also - demonstrably - gone deep down the rabbit-hole.

You do realise that (for example) a fair few structural engineers and architects were vocal proponents of the various 9/11 conspiracy theories, don't you?
 
Vixen said:
You are still not getting it. Look at the time line. The survivors from deck 1 - the very lowest cabins, below the car deck - were amongst the first to realise there was an emergency and got to the upper deck before the other passengers in the higher decks (Oun, Rentaam). Why? This is because they knew there was a problem before any listing or alarm went off, as did Sillaste and Treu, who had turned on all of the pumps in a desperate attempt to rectify the seawater seeping into the engine room.

If you have ever had your home flooded, you know perfectly well whether the water came from the ground level 1 or from above, level 2 or the roof.
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They noticed because water tends to be subject to gravity. Where would water entering the car deck end up?

A house is not a ship.

Those in the upper decks wouldn't have noticed anything wrong until the ship started to list.
Can you think of a reason why the upper decks didn't flood until the ship was far enough over for water to enter through windows and doorways?
 
LondonJohn said:
Hooooo man.

You seriously don't understand that there was/is one alarm to alert crew, then another alarm to alert passengers?

This is precisely why codewords such as "Mr Brightside" are used for the crew alarms. If a crew alarm said something like "Message to all crew: the ship is in significant trouble", even you might be able to understand the effect on passengers.

In the incident we're discussing here, the general-alert "Mr Brightside" alarm was broadcast (with the passengers having no idea what that even meant, and thus not panicking upon hearing it). Then later, after it became apparent to the crew that the ship was sinking and needed to be abandoned, an explicit alarm for passengers was broadcast.

This really isn't difficult at all. To most of us, at least.
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You can talk about gross generalisations all you like. I am talking about this specific ship, the Estonia, and as set out by the JAIC report itself: 'Mr Sylight 1 and 2' were the specific fire drill codes as agreed and as practised by the crew in their regular fire/bomb drills, and as confirmed by Linde and his interrogator in his interview of 2002. That coded message on the Estonia told crew to go to their designated fire station ASAP.
 
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