Does Matter Really Exist?

[Mercutio]

The fact is, I know what I know, outside your "formal" parameters of trying to extinguish it.

And like I say, I'm not going to change, just because you guys don't get it.

And the doors slam shut...

Too bad, Iacchus. Once again, some effort was put forward by some knowledgeable folks here, trying to help you understand the problems with the example you chose. You really could have learned something.

I hope that any lurkers reading this thread are not as closed-minded as you.

 

[bruto]

The fact is, I know what I know, outside your "formal" parameters of trying to extinguish it.

And like I say, I'm not going to change, just because you guys don't get it.

Iacchus, you remind me of the urban-legendary New Jersey hunter who shot a goat and cussed out the game wardens when they wouldn't put a deer tag on it.

Participating in this thread is like falling down a rabbit hole into an alternate universe, where the simplest laws of equivalency and set membership become unfathomable mysteries. Here in Iacchus's world, logical and ontological mingle promiscusously, and their chimerical offspring rule.

Where else but in the world of Iacchus could the logical statement "the elements of a set must all belong to the set" imply a logical contradiction?

In the world of Iacchus the transitive property is declared illegal. From now on, because you can assemble a two out of ones, even a single one is counted as an element of the set of twos, and a horse's a$$ is defined as a subspecies of horse.

 

[Iacchus]

It appears that you are simply not capable of understanding what a set is, or not willing to accept any definition but your own private one. Subassemblies are not subsets. Subcategories are not subsets. Component parts are not subsets.

Well, if I worked with statistics all day long as some folks do around here, maybe I would have a greater appreciation for what you're trying to say. At the present time I don't.

For the world other than Iacchus, a set is an unordered logical group of objects treated as a single object. All members of the set, and all subsets of the set, and all members of all the subsets of the set, must, at the very least, be whatever it is that the set is a set of. For example, if the set is a set of horses, no object other than a horse can ever conceivably be a member of the set or a member of any subset of the set.

And maybe what you fail to realize is that all these sets and subsets are all part of a single set (singularity?) called the Universe. Everything is interconnected you see, and all comes from the same place. Indeed, how can the Universe be broken up into any other "Universal" subets if what you're saying is true? Does that mean it is not part of a set? If so, then what are you doing trying to break it up into all these other sets and subsets? How is the entirety of the Universe any less complete than a horse? What is a horse, in relation to the entirety of the Universe?

 

[Mercutio]

Iacchus, you remind me of the urban-legendary New Jersey hunter who shot a goat and cussed out the game wardens when they wouldn't put a deer tag on it.

Participating in this thread is like falling down a rabbit hole into an alternate universe, where the simplest laws of equivalency and set membership become unfathomable mysteries. Here in Iacchus's world, logical and ontological mingle promiscusously, and their chimerical offspring rule.

Where else but in the world of Iacchus could the logical statement "the elements of a set must all belong to the set" imply a logical contradiction?

In the world of Iacchus the transitive property is declared illegal. From now on, because you can assemble a two out of ones, even a single one is counted as an element of the set of twos, and a horse's a$$ is defined as a subspecies of horse.

 

[Mercutio]

Well, if I worked with statistics all day long as some folks do around here, maybe I would have a greater appreciation for what you're trying to say. At the present time I don't.

Hey, that's not a problem. We are all ignorant of some things. The problem only arises when you take something you are wholly ignorant of, and blunder on regardless, redefining concepts as you go, mis-applying constructs and adamantly claiming that your new definitions are the right ones!

But then, you wouldn't do that, would you? After all, you just, just above, right there, admitted you don't have an understanding of set theory. You'd never try to blunder ahead and mis-apply it, would you?

Oh, I guess you would:

And maybe what you fail to realize is that all these sets and subsets are all part of a single set (singularity?) called the Universe. Everything is interconnected you see, and it all comes from the same place. Indeed, how can the Universe be broken up into any other "Universal" subets if what you're saying is true? Does that mean it is not part of a set? If so, then what are you doing trying to break it up into all these other sets and subsets? How is the whole of the Universe any less complete than a horse? What is a horse, in relation to the whole of the Universe?

 

[Iacchus]

In the world of Iacchus the transitive property is declared illegal. From now on, because you can assemble a two out of ones, even a single one is counted as an element of the set of twos, and a horse's a$$ is defined as a subspecies of horse.

I am strictly thinking in terms of context. If something exists within the parameters of something else, then it exists within context of that something else. And if it exists within context of that something else, then it is a sub-whatever of that something else. Maybe "set" is the inappropriate term here? ... I don't know, I'm still not sure?

 

[Iacchus]

But then, you wouldn't do that, would you? After all, you just, just above, right there, admitted you don't have an understanding of set theory. You'd never try to blunder ahead and mis-apply it, would you?

Oh, I guess you would:

Really, to me, it sounds like it all depends on how you define the set, like in the example given above. You can't escape the fact that you're just breaking things up into categories.

 

[Mercutio]

I am strictly thinking in terms of context. If something exists within the parameters of something else, then it exists within context of that something else. And if it exists within context of that something else, then it is a sub-whatever of that something else. Maybe "set" is the inappropriate term here? ... I don't know, I'm still not sure?

Iacchus, if your local library has access to it, find a paper by Mary Calkins, entitled "the philosophical credo of an absolutistic personalist". I think it is in the american journal of philosophy, but I am not 100% certain without checking. You would absolutely love it. But the point is, she grapples with pretty much the same question you have, which I quoted above. Her solution is quite a bit different from yours (that is, her logic is), but she does come out with a conclusion of a universal "self".

This one is worth overcoming your fear of libraries. It is even worth ordering via interlibrary loan if your local library does not have it.

And to top it off, she writes beautifully. It is from about a century ago--she was the first female prez of the American Philosophical Association (and the first female prez of the American Psychological Association, for that matter).

Oh, and her view of an "absolute self" did not stop her from being one of the first psychologists to objectively study dreams...

 

[Mercutio]

Really, to me, it sounds like it all depends on how you define the set, like in the example given above. You can't escape the fact that you're just breaking things up into categories.

But in that example, your set is of "constituent parts", which means that the set is not a whole, but a set of things called "constituent parts". Whether or not they combine to make a whole is irrelevant to set theory; to set theory, you have merely a set labeled "constituent parts".

So yes, it depends on how you define the set. And no, you still do not understand set theory.

 

[Iacchus]

But in that example, your set is of "constituent parts", which means that the set is not a whole, but a set of things called "constituent parts". Whether or not they combine to make a whole is irrelevant to set theory; to set theory, you have merely a set labeled "constituent parts".

So yes, it depends on how you define the set. And no, you still do not understand set theory.

Ah, but the only thing which can truly be considered a whole is the Universe (according to materialists anyway), and everything else is a constituent part thereof. So, how are we to look at it in that respect? Sorry.

 

[ImaginalDisc]

Iacchus, how can you continue to say that you don't understand statistics, set theory, and every other concept you use to support your *opinion* (as it lacks support, I could hardly call it a conclusion), and then turn right around and espouse it again? If you won't entertain any ideas but religious ones, consider the following:

"...be likened unto a foolish man, which built his house upon the sand, and the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell: and great was the fall of it."

-Matt 7:26-27

Your opinion = house. Your arguements = shifting sand. Reason = rain, floods, wind.

Shall I draw you a picture?

Edit: Omited the source, corrected that.

 

[Mercutio]

Ah, but the only thing which can truly be considered a whole is the Universe (according to materialists anyway), and everything else is a constituent part thereof. So, how are we to look at it in that respect? Sorry.

You should be sorry.

You are quite simply wrong.

Your usage of set theory was wrong, and it has thrown off your other arguments. Go back, reconsider, think for a week or two, and bring something new.

 

[hammegk]

Re Calkins ... http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Mary_Whiton_Calkins

That, the universe contained distinct mental realities, and although the mind was from a lower level of existence, it emerged from that level to one higher that answered to new special laws. This level of reality was ultimately personal & consciousness as such never happened impersonally. She asserted that the universe was mental throughout, and whatever was real was ultimately mental and therefore personal. Concluding that the universe was an all-inclusive self, an absolute person and a conscious being.

 

[Iacchus]

You should be sorry.

You are quite simply wrong.

Your usage of set theory was wrong, and it has thrown off your other arguments. Go back, reconsider, think for a week or two, and bring something new.

So, what else would you call what I'm talking about then? Because I honestly don't know. I could say something like sub-"level" or sub-"group," but that still doesn't sound right. As far as the word "set" is concerned, it brings to mind something which is defined and has boundaries, and therefore seemed like the logical choice of words.

 

[ImaginalDisc]

So, what else would you call what I'm talking about then? Because I honestly don't know. I could say something like "sub-level" or "sub-group," but that still doesn't sound right. As far as the word "set" is concerned, it brings to mind something which is defined and has boundaries, and therefore seemed like the logical choice of words.

May I suggest you use a dictionary and a thesaurus, or do you not believe in dinsaurs?

Try finding a way to express yourself without making up your own word, with their own meanings. It's English, the language of Poe, Milton, and Shakspeare, keep it sacred.

 

[Mercutio]

Re Calkins ... http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Mary_Whiton_Calkins

Actually, hammy, you would also, I think, like to read her original. Having someone else describe it just does not do justice to her writing. Or her logic, for that matter; my students found that if they accepted her first premise, they were pretty much on for the whole ride. It will not surprise you that I did not accept her first premise...that mental entities exist.

 

[bruto]

Well, if I worked with statistics all day long as some folks do around here, maybe I would have a greater appreciation for what you're trying to say. At the present time I don't.

And maybe what you fail to realize is that all these sets and subsets are all part of a single set (singularity?) called the Universe. Everything is interconnected you see, and it all comes from the same place. Indeed, how can the Universe be broken up into any other "Universal" subets if what you're saying is true? Does that mean it is not part of a set? If so, then what are you doing trying to break it up into all these other sets and subsets? How is the whole of the Universe any less complete than a horse? What is a horse, in relation to the whole of the Universe?

I'll try once more, but it's hard to figure out how to say the same simple things in a way that might finally disabuse you of your erratic personal definitions.

A set is a logical construct, not an ontological one. It is not the only way of looking at things.

If you define the universe as "everything" and if by everything you mean that anything less than the universe cannot be called a universe, then there can be only one universe. If you must think of this universe as a set, that set contains only itself and the null set as subsets. Any other thing IN the universe cannot be a subset of the universe, because, obviously (at least I think its's pretty obviously) anything that is not the whole universe cannot be the same as the whole universe, by the definition of what a set is and what a subset is (remember these are logical not ontological terms - we are not talking about how the universe is constructed!). A subset is also an element of the set, and any element of the set must by definition an example of what the set is a set of! You cannot include partial universes in the set of universes. It is a logical impossibility. A contradiction. A violation of the very definition of what a set is. As usual, as always, as ever, as forever apparently, you have the set-subset relationship backwards. A set is logically defined as a member of itself, and any member of a subset must be AT LEAST EVERYTHING that any other member of the set is, including the set of which it is a subset. If the universe is defined as anything more than a set of horses, a horse cannot be a subset of the universe because a horse not all of the other things that the universe is. A subset is generated by ADDING properties, not subtracing them.

If you redefine the universe as the logically necessary "set of all sets," the set that contains all other sets, it must be defined in the most non-specific terms possible. It is the set of any kind of stuff you can possibly think of. Nothing can be excluded from it, and no properties that are not shared by any element within it can be attributed to it except for its logical dimension - its cardinality -i.e. the number of its elements. In every other way its elements are, for the purposes of the set, undifferentiated, undefined and unordered. This is what a set is. This is how a set is defined. A set asserts nothing else about its elements other than the rule that defines their inclusion in it, and nothing else about itself other than its size. If a set is a set of "anything" it can by logical necessity say nothing about anything except the rather obvious truism that everything is something. Now in this logical configuration of the universe, a horse can be a subset of the universe, because both the horse and the universe are "something." But this logical configuration of the universe cannot denote any diifference of any kind between the horse and the universe except for the cardinality. In other words, the only differentiation between the horse and the universe in this set is the acknowledgement that the horse is in the universe, but the universe is not in the horse. Since everything including the universe itself is in the universal set, you have said nothing at all about the nature of the universe. If the universe is an entity with any attribute that in any way differentiates it from its smallest and most insignificant element in any way other than its cardinality, it cannot be the universal set. If by singularity you mean anything other than its logically required ultimate and infinite cardinality, you are declaring the universe unique in a way nothing else is unique, and as such it can have no subsets except for itself and the null set.

The same goes for calling God the superset of all supersets. If God is the superset of all supersets, god MUST then be defined as having NO attribute other than cardinality. If God has any organization, any character, any ontological standing beyond cardinality, he is no longer the superset of all sets, because by logical necessity and definition, the superset of all supersets can have no property other than cardinality, and all sets are by definition unordered. If you are looking at an ordered thing it is not a set. It is something else. Remember, this is a logical issue, not an ontological one. If you have another idea about how god includes or enfolds or envelopes the universe, you are welcome to it but set terminology will not describe it.

by the way, Iacchus, this is not rocket science. This is not the stuff that requires that you work all day with statistics. This is the stuff I learned in ninth grade. It does not go much beyond the first few pages of the first chapter on sets. It is VERY basic and very simple, if you think about it, and try just for the moment to set aside your previous, incorrect notion about what a set is and what a subset is.

 

[Iacchus]

It's English, the language of Poe, Milton, and Shakspeare, keep it sacred.

Yes, but if it were so universal, why do we have other languages?

 

[Mercutio]

Yes, but if it were so universal, why do we have other languages?

Sheesh. He did not say it was universal. Come on, Iacchus...

 

[Iacchus]

Sheesh. He did not say it was universal. Come on, Iacchus...

You noticed I put that in italics don't you? In other words I was roughly equating his notion of "sacred" (which, in a sense means there could no other) with universal.