And technically, they didn't wait "until the last minute." They waited until after the election, which is after the event.
In the case of Pennsylvania, after
two elections. The primary election was conducted according to the same laws that the plaintiffs now contend have always been unconstitutional. And those laws were actually passed in November of
last year. A cause of action for facial unconstitutionality of a law does not require a fact pattern to adjudicate. Hence the clock for such causes of action starts ticking the moment the law is enacted. It doesn't suddenly become ripe the moment you decide you can now benefit from the disappearance of some law.
The Republicans' desired goal here is clearly not to have free and fair elections, which would have been better served by contesting the complained of laws before elections were held according to them. The goal instead is to get the artifact of an election thrown out if, after the fact, it does not result in a Republican victory. Doing it the right way would have foreclosed such an action, since they would have been unable later to claim that balloting was unlawful.
This sort of prejudicial outcome achieved by timing one's lawsuit is exactly why the doctrine of laches exists. The judiciary aims to provide equitable relief, not strategically amplified relief.
If they had a problem with other states having non-legislative actors making voting rules, aside from the fact that it happened in Texas itself, they should have said something when it happened.
Indeed it is suspicious that voting procedure was challenged only in states the plaintiffs did not carry. Many states modified their voting procedures to accommodate health guidelines, and many such hasty modifications could probably be scrutinized for conformance with good lawmaking. For the relief to be truly equitable, in the manner desired by the plaintiffs, then all states whose voting practices cannot survive constitutional scrutiny should be discarded, regardless of who the electors were going to vote for. The suit all but claims that unconstitutional balloting occurred only in states the plaintiffs lost.
The notion that "the Legislatures thereof" means the
literal legislatures are the only powers within a state authorized by the Constitution to regulate elections is a complete red-herring denial of how legislation actually works. Even though substantial power is vested by the people in their legislatures to carry out tasks assigned to them, they routinely delegate some of that power to the executive -- even, at times, discretionary power. When that discretion (or ordinary discretion) is exercised, it is still according to power that ultimately derives from the legislature. "Non-legislative actors" operating by authority delegated to them by the legislature are within the purview of "the Legislatures thereof."
And acts of all legislatures necessary leave gaps into which certain facts may fall, and in other cases create contradictory overlaps that encompass certain other facts. In those cases it is the proper role of the state's judiciary to apply sound principles of reasoning, binding precedent, and nonpartisan equanimity to decide how the prior determination of "the Legislatures thereof" should apply to some pattern of facts and to direct the affected parties accordingly. Those actors then are still acting according to the laws given by the legislature. The fact that a court helped them understand how best to do that matters not a bit.