An Absolute Right to Abortion?

[RandFan]

A newborn human is such a crappy piece of protoplasm by any objective standards that it has to go somewhere between grass and a rat. It's got more going on than lettuce does but a whole lot less going on than someone's pet rat.

This is just a position based on an arbitrary standard. While it is a logically valid standard it is not the only possible position nor is it the only logically valid standard.

Websters defines "moral" as "of or relating to principles of right and wrong in behavior".

Excluding religious prescriptions of right and wrong, what is right and what is wrong? If we can't turn to the bible or the Koran or some other religious text then how are we to determine what is moral? What basis do we choose? Well there is no universal right or wrong. There is nothing that is intrinsically good or bad.

Absent axiomatic morals humans are left to their own devices as to morality. We can choose any basis for our morality but one basis is not necessarily as good as another.

Ok, let's set a baseline for morality: It stands to reason that if we as individuals want to be treated with dignity, in a fair and just manner and to be free of pain and suffering then a strategy where everyone treats everyone else in such a manner is a good basis for morality.

But this raises a question, why is it that we want to be treated fairly and justly? Is it because when we are not treated in such a manner it offends our senses? Don't we feel badly? We don't want to be enslaved or beaten or killed? Is it because we innately don't like to feel pain, that we innately desire freedom and that we innately value our life?

Answer: Yes! And why? Because these were instilled in us by evolution.

Does the fact that these feelings are rooted in nature and evolution make these feelings right or rational?

Answer: No, it just helps us understand how and why we feel these things. If we understand that these feelings promote our own survival and we can find a utility in them and the we can find a reason why we might choose them as a basis for morality.

So innate feelings are at the heart of all morality. A moral agent is one who can experience pleasure, pain and desires and also understands that others experience pleasure, pain and desires.

Any argument?

So, as a society that can choose any standard it wants to base morality what should we choose. Well there are many logical ways to achieve this goal.

Aristotle and Virtue Ethics
Contemporary Anti-Theory
Ethical Egoism
Ethical Relativism
Gender and Moral Theory
Kant and Deontology
Pluralism & Meta-Ethical Concerns
Rights Theories
Theories against Theories
Utilitarianism

Kantian theory is beneficial because of it's precision. This apparently is why you like it so much. But that it is precise is not the only reason humans might choose a theory. Further Kantian theory suffers from three major flaws.

1.) Kantian theory can't deal with a situation in which there are two imperatives and you can only fulfill one of them.

2.) Kantian theory is absolute so trying to protect another's feelings by telling a little white lie for a greater purpose is not allowed. Kantian theory rules out lying to a murderer to protect another human being.

3.) Kantian theory can't take into account babies or the mentally impaired. A father who has Alzheimer's has no moral value and therefore a society that choses only to follow Kantian theory would have no responsibility to those individuals. If society chose to euthanize Alzheimer's and those who are retarded it would be moral. Eugenics is appropriate under Kantian theory.

But you say that caring for a father who has Alzheimer's is irrational. Really? Why? Because it is based in part on feelings?

What the heck does Kantian theory have at it's basis? Feelings. Why is it wrong to hurt another "morally valuable" person if not for the fact that it will affect that person's feelings?

What if the suffering of children causes me pain? What if the suffering of children causes most people in society pain? Can we really say that any steps to alleviate suffering in so-called "morally invaluable" individuals is incompatible to a just society? Of course not. The pain I feel as a result of being hit in the head by a brick is just as real as the pain I feel as a result of witnessing cruel behavior to the weakest in society.

Morals aren't what YOU say they are. Morals aren't what I say they are. If a society outlawed the killing of animals because most citizens were offended by the suffering caused by the killing of animals then that would be the prerogative of such a society. I could accept such moral strictures even though I didn't agree because in the end morals need only have a logically valid basis. They must be cogent and coherent. And not wanting to feel the pain of witnessing another living thing suffer is both real and logically valid.

The problem Kevin is that you have seized on Kantian theory as if it were the only logically valid or even desirable theory. Fact: Kantian theory is not the only logically valid and coherent theory for morality.

 

[RandFan]

There's only so far I'm inclined to backtrack over this argument. If you can really manage to persuade yourself that two organisms of equal sensitivity and intelligence, who differ materially only in that one is of species A and the other is of species B, are of vastly different moral value and that this is coherent then there isn't anything more to talk about.

Only if you lack the ability to follow a logically valid argument. Further, I never said that they are of vastly different moral value. It is still a false dilemma.

The conclusion that your preferred way of doing things is moral or coherent does not follow from this.

It absolutely follows. There are no absolutes. An individual can value anything he or she wants.

If an individual values survival and if a society values it's existence then the strategy is a logically valid one.

It is neither necessary nor sufficient for a thing to be moral that it be instinctive or that it was useful in the past.

And I have not argued that it is. I have only argued that we can look to the past to determine a path to the future. That is logical and it is one of the important reasons why there are scientists including anthropologists.

Sure, but coherence and a grounding in empirical fact are still necessary for a given moral system to have any appeal to a rational human being.

I don't reject coherence. This is a straw man.

There are many theories that are not Kantian that are coherent (see above).

So if X is a rule that "preserves our species", by which you mean increases the population, X is moral? I don't think you want to go there.

I didn't say "increases the population". It is possible to "preserve the species" without increasing the population.

You missed the point. Unless you are a theist there is absolutely no basis for inferring a moral rule from our instincts, because our instincts are the result of amoral evolutionary pressures. I know you're not a theist, I'm pointing out to you that you are running a line of argument that only makes sense if you are a theist of some sort.

It doesn't matter at all if the pressures were amoral. It only matters if it provides a utility that we value.

That's why the naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy.

And one I didn't make. If I had said it was natural and therefore it is good then that would be a fallacy. I didn't say that. I said that we can look at evolution to understand why there is utility and therefore why it could be valued by humans.

No fallacy.

Well, if you get to ignore my points about adoption or other solutions to the problem you might get to that conclusion.

You are the one ignoring the fact that adoption and other solutions are not solutions in this case. People don't want to adopt morally invaluable children so why should they be forced to?

Further I can make any hypothetical I want to test a hypothesis. That it makes you uncomfortable does not make it bogus. Rejecting a premise is not an intellectually honest or productive way to debate.

Einstein: If I could ride a beam of light...
Joe Obtuse: You can't travel at the speed of light!

It's a straightforwardly bogus way to make an argument though. I can prove any damn thing is moral if I'm allowed to ignore every solution other than the one I want.

I'm not trying to prove something is moral in this case. I'm trying to test your logical consistency. Changing premises to a logically valid hypothetical is what is bogus.

FWIW, if adoption were such a good alternative then why is it not being used? If there is mass starvation due to overpopulation then how is adoption a solution?

Not more or less than any other instance of survival cannibalism as far as I can see.

Thank you. That is all you needed to say. Straining to change the premises of a a logically valid hypothetical because you don't like the conclusion of the hypothetical is a bogus way of answering a hypothetical.

You have rational desires. The argument you present for why it is moral to pursue those desires via the particular moral rules you want to establish is not rational however, no matter how rational your desires are. Getting the rationality of your desires and the rationality of your argument muddled is woolly thinking.

Vacuous. There is no argument there.

You are begging the question of whether there is any conceivable way this goal could be achieved other than adhering to your personal set of taboos.

Labeling a moral standard a "taboo" doesn't help your position. Of course there are conceivably other ways to achieve the goal than simply valuing all human life. This is simply the one that is most likely to achieve that goal. It's utility is it's rationale.

Whoopsie, Randfan. The intent of that remark to was to point out bigotry directed towards animals.

Doesn't change the fact that it is a straw-man.

Go start a thread about that if you really want to talk about it. None of this is relevant to anything I have said, as you would know if you paid attention.

I like you Kevin and I understand your arrogance. I suffer from it myself at times. Perhaps your arrogance has more basis than mine but it doesn't change that fact that you can really be a pompous jerk.

A.) You didn't start the thread and it is not up to you to decide what is relevant. If you are uncomfortable with my arguments then you can ignore me.

B.) Of course it is relevant. You make a claim that babies are not morally valuable. How can we understand your basis for saying that if you won't explain how you arrived at that understanding. Morally valuable is not an axiomatic position that you get to just insert into an argument without justification. If you choose not to participate or defend your positions then that is your prerogative but don't go telling me that I'm not paying attention.

C.) It was my explanation that was not required and therefore not relevant because it was not my claim. I had the courtesy to answer you anyway.

 

[RandFan]

In the R&P forum there is a discussion with some similarities in this thread. In that thread there is a great link. I have reposted some of the information here.

WHOSE LIFE WOULD YOU SAVE?
Carl Zimmer
Discover, April 2004


“Let’s say you’re walking by a pond and there’s a drowning baby, ” Greene says, over chicken tikka masala. “If you said, ‘I’ve just paid $200 for these shoes and the water would ruin them, so I won’t save the baby,’ you’d be an awful, horrible person. But there are millions of children around the world in the same situation, where just a little money for medicine or food could save their life. And yet we don’t consider ourselves monsters for having this dinner rather than giving the money to Oxfam. Why is that?”

As Patel ponders this question—and others like it—the MRI scans his brain, revealing crackling clusters of neurons. Over the past four years, Greene has scanned dozens of people making these kinds of moral judgments. What he has found can be unsettling. Most of us would like to believe that when we say something is right or wrong, we are using our powers of reason alone. But Greene argues that our emotions also play a powerful role in our moral judgments, triggering instinctive responses that are the product of millions of years of evolution. “A lot of our deeply felt moral convictions may be quirks of our evolutionary history,” he says.

Greene’s research has put him at the leading edge of a field so young it still lacks an official name. Moral neuroscience? Neuroethics? Whatever you call it, the promise is profound. “Some people in these experiments think we’re putting their soul under their microscope,” Greene says, “and in a sense, that is what we’re doing.”

The puzzle of moral judgments grabbed Greene’s attention when he was a philosophy major at Harvard. Most modern theories of moral reasoning, he learned, were powerfully shaped by one of two great philsophers.: Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. Kant believed that pure reason alone could lead us to moral truths. Based on his own pure reasoning, he declared that it was wrong to use someone for your own ends, and that it was right to act only according to principles that everyone can follow.

John Stuart Mill, by contrast, argued that the rules of right and wrong should, above all else, achieve the greatest good for the greatest number of people, even though particular individuals may be worse off as a result (an approach known as utilitarianism, based on the “utility” of a moral rule.) “Kant puts what’s right before what’s good,” says Greene. “Mill puts what’s good before what’s right.”

But by the time Greene came to Princeton for graduate school in 1997, he had become dissatisfied with utilitarians and Kantians alike. None of them could explain how moral judgments work in the real world. Greene became dissatisfied with Consider, for example, this thought experiment concocted by the philosophers Judith Jarvis Thompson and Philippa Foot: Imagine you’re at the wheel of a trolley and the brakes have failed. You’re approaching a fork in the track at top speed. On the left side, five rail workers are fixing the track. On the right side, there is a single worker. If you do nothing, the trolley will bear left and kills the five workers. The only way to save five lives is to take responsibility of changing the trolley’s path by hitting the switch. Then you will kill one worker. What would you do?

Now imagine that you are watching the runaway trolley from a footbridge. This time there is no fork in the track. Instead, five workers are on it, facing certain death. But you happen to be standing next to a big man. If you sneak up on him, and push him off the footbridge, he will fall to his death. Because he is so big, he will stop the trolley. Do you willfully kill one man, or do you let reality play out and allow five people to die?

Logically, the questions have similar answers. Yet if you poll your friends, you’ll probably find that many more are willing to throw a switch than push someone off a bridge. It is hard to explain why what seems right in one case seems so clearly wrong in another. For mysterious reasons we act more like Kant in some situations, and sometimes more like Mill. ”The trolley problem seemed to boil that conflict down to its essence,“ Greene realized. ”If I could figure out how to make sense of that particular problem, I could make sense of the whole Kant-versus-Mill problem in ethics.“

The crux of the matter, Greene decided, lay not in the logic of moral judgments but in the role our emotions play in forming them. He began to explore the psychological studies of the 18th-century Scottish philosopher David Hume. Hume argued that people call an act good not because they rationally determine it to be so, but because it makes them feel good. They call an act bad because it fills them with disgust. Moral knowledge, Hume wrote, comes partly from an ”immediate feeling and finer internal sense.”

Primatologists have found that moral instincts have deep roots. In September, for instance, Sarah Brosnan and Frans de Waal of Emory University reported that monkeys have a sense of fairness. Brosnan and De Waal trained capuchin monkeys to take a pebble from them; if the monkeys gave the pebble back, they got a cucumber. Then they ran the same experiment with two monkeys sitting in adjacent cages, where they could see each other. One monkey still got a cucumber, but the other one got a grape—a tastier reward. More than half the monkeys who got cucumbers balked at the exchange. Sometimes they threw the cucumber at the researchers; sometimes they refused to give the pebble back. Apparently, de Waal says, they realized that they weren’t being treated fairly.

In an earlier study, de Waal observed a colony of chimpanzees that only got fed by their zookeeper once they had all gathered in an enclosure. One day, a few young chimps dallied outside for hours, leaving the rest to go hungry. The next day, the other chimps attacked the stragglers, apparently to punish them for their selfishness. The primates seemed capable of moral judgment without benefit of human reasoning. “Chimps may be smart,” Greene says. “But they don’t read Kant.”

The evolutionary origins of morality are easy to imagine in a social species. A sense of fairness would have helped early primates cooperate. A sense of disgust and anger at cheaters would have helped them avoid falling into squabbling. As our ancestors became more self-aware and acquired language, they transformed those feelings into moral codes that they then taught their children.

This idea made a lot of sense to Greene. For one thing, it showed how moral judgments can feel so real: “We make moral judgments so automatically that we don’t really understand how they’re formed,” he says. It also offered a potential solution to the trolley problem: Although the two scenarios have similar outcomes, they trigger different circuits in the brain. Killing someone with your bare hands is an act that would likely have been recognized as immoral millions of years ago. It summons ancient and overwhelmingly negative emotions—despite any good that may come of the killing. It simply feels wrong.

Throwing a switch for a trolley, on the other hand, is not the sort of thing our ancestors confronted. Cause and effect, in this case, are separated by a chain of machines and electrons, so they do not trigger a snap moral judgment. Instead, we rely more on abstract reasoning—weighing costs and benefits, for example—to choose between right and wrong. Or so Greene hypothesized. When he arrived at Princeton, he had no way to look inside people’s brains. But in 1999, Greene learned that the university was building a brain-imaging center.

The heart of the Center for the Study of Brain, Mind, and Behavior is an MRI scanner in the basement of Green Hall. The scanner creates images of the brain by generating an intense magnetic field. Some of the molecules in the brain line up with the field, and the scanner wiggles the field back and forth a few degrees. As the molecules wiggle, they release radio waves. By detecting the waves, the scanner can reconstruct the brain as well as detect where neurons are consuming oxygen—a sign of mental activity. In two seconds, the center’s scanner can pinpoint such activity down to the resolution of a peppercorn.

When neuroscientists first started scanning brains in the early 1990s, they studied the basic building blocks of thought, such as language, vision, and attention. But in recent years, they’ve also tried to understand how the brain works when people interact. Humans turn out to have special neural networks that give them what many cognitive neuroscientists call “social intelligence.” Some regions can respond to smiles, frowns, and other expressions in a tenth of a second. Others help us get inside a person’s head and figure out intentions. When neuroscientist Jonathan Cohen came to Princeton to head up the Center, he hoped he could dedicate some time with the scanner to study social networks. Greene's proposal to study morality was a perfect fit.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Okay Randfan, you win. I'm not wading through eleven pages of your arguments to criticise them point by point, especially since I feel that there is so damn much wrong with them that it would take hours.

In very brief, you're not reading or understanding what I am saying. For example, you have convinced yourself I'm arguing a Kantian position. If you scroll up far enough, you'll see that the only mention I have made of Kant is to point out that Kant is useless for answering questions about abortion. (I personally think Kant is useless in general for difficult questions, which is why I'm a utilitarian).

But if you are going to fall into misunderstandings that broad, what's the point of me writing this stuff? You might read it, but for whatever reason it doesn't seem like you are going to grasp what I'm saying to the extent required for a joined-up conversation.

Let's just agree to differ. I don't think we can come to a meeting of minds on this one.

 

[RandFan]

Okay Randfan, you win. I'm not wading through eleven pages of your arguments to criticise them point by point, especially since I feel that there is so damn much wrong with them that it would take hours.

No, there is not "so damn much wrong". I don't care if you don't respond but simply claiming that another is wrong without arguing why is unfair to say the least.

In very brief, you're not reading or understanding what I am saying.

There isn't much to cause missunderstanding. You have locked on a single idea and won't even justify that position. The position being that babies are not "morally valuable" which is a major component under Kantian theory though not the only theory that addresses what is "morally valuable". I ask under what theory and you say under "any system of moral values that stands up to scrutiny." A sweeping claim that you refuse to justify with any logical argument. Instead you seek to put it to me to justify that babies are morally valuable which I then do.

For example, you have convinced yourself I'm arguing a Kantian position.

I can only respond to the arguments that you make. I asked point blank under which theory and you threw them all in. The problem is the only arguments that you so far have made have been Kantian so that is the only thing I can respond to.

I don't think we can come to a meeting of minds on this one.

Through no fault of mine I assure you. You seem unable to fathom that anyone you see below you is capable of articulating an argument that is counter to your own beliefs. So, I'm guessing, to preserve your world view you convince yourself that I simply am not understanding your arguments.

 

[mumblethrax]

The line of argumentation Kevin has been advancing is very obviously utilitarian, RandFan. He doesn't deserve scorn for losing patience with you when you refuse to minimally educate yourself on the topic and instead rely on cut-and-paste argumentation.

For example, you listed a bunch of ethical frameworks and argued that this shows that there are several different coherent moral systems to choose from. But several of those you listed are not coherent. I think the problem here is that you don't understand that coherency has special meaning in philosophy, and doesn't just mean 'incorrect.'

Assuming the Kevin is a deontologist because he says that Kant isn't useful here is the sort of error that should maybe give a reasonable person cause to consider that there might be a gap in his education.

I do think this was interesting, however:

It absolutely follows. There are no absolutes.

And it might also give you insight into why most rational people don't take the particular form of relativism you're advancing seriously.

 

[RandFan]

The line of argumentation Kevin has been advancing is very obviously utilitarian, RandFan.

Kantian theory holds that babies and the mentaly retarded are not "morally valuable" so how it is "obviously utilitarian" is beyond me. I have labored from the very beginning to understand Kevin's basis for his claim. He has only said referring to the killing of babies

"I'd say they aren't morally important under any system of moral values that stands up to scrutiny."

He then pressed me to explain why babies are morally any more important than a rat.

He doesn't deserve scorn for losing patience with you when you refuse to minimally educate yourself on the topic and instead rely on cut-and-paste argumentation.

This is demonstrably wrong. Very little of my discussion had anything what-so-ever to do with cut and past. What I did cut and paste was a very good article that mirrored what I orginially said that many of our morals are based in part on evolution and why. It would seem that you didn't take the time to read the article. Unfortunate.

I would go a lot further than that, I'd say they aren't morally important under any system of moral values that stands up to scrutiny.

My only point is that humans can create a rational moral standard for valuing babies and I gave arguments in support of such a standard.

For example, you listed a bunch of ethical frameworks and argued that this shows that there are several different coherent moral systems to choose from.

I didn't say that they were all coherent. I noted that societies could choose any number of systems that they wanted to base morals on.

But several of those you listed are not coherent.

I didn't claim otherwise. I did say that there were other coherent systems referring to my list but I didn't mean that they were all necessarily coherent. If I was imprecise then I apologize.

I think the problem here is that you don't understand that coherency has special meaning in philosophy, and doesn't just mean 'incorrect.'

I never did think that coherency meant "incorrect". I never thought that it meant "correct" either.

Assuming the Kevin is a deontologist because he says that Kant isn't useful here is the sort of error that should maybe give a reasonable person cause to consider that there might be a gap in his education.

That is not why I assumed that Kevin was a deontologist. It's because I presumed it from the beginning based on his conversation with Thanz and told him that giving him an opportunity to correct the presumption. He left it unchallenged. This was before the passage you referenced.

Let me state that I asked him point blank what his argument was from the very beginning and he refused to answer. I tried to understand but he would not oblige. Any confusion is on Kevin's part not mine.

RandFan
I don't see the need to justify the morals of society based on the theory of morally "valuable" humans (Kantian I presume).

So please go back and read the thread and not just jump to conclusion.

I do think this was interesting, however:

It absolutely follows. There are no absolutes.

Yeah, I found it interesting also. Please note that the first absolute was a rhetorical figure of speech. The second is a logical statement. There are no absolutes but humans use them in their speech all of the time. I concede that it was a poor choice of terms.

And it might also give you insight into why most rational people don't take the particular form of relativism you're advancing seriously.

There is no "particular form of relativism". This is just rhetoric. To actually base a conclusion from the proximity of two seemingly contradictory terms is silly. I'm sure you would never use an absolute as a figure of speech while simultaneously believing that there are no absolutes, right?

Thank you for the response. I wish it had been something more concrete. Oh well,

RandFan

 

[mumblethrax]

Kantian theory holds that babies and the mentaly retarded are not "morally valuable" so how it is "obviously utilitarian" is beyond me.

Because he is "arguing for the importance of consequence" which "Kant" would "never do."

This is demonstrably wrong. Very little of my discussion had anything what-so-ever to do with cut and past. What I did cut and paste was a very good article that mirrored what I orginially said that many of our morals are based in part on evolution and why. It would seem that you didn't take the time to read the article. Unfortunate.

Well, it seems demonstrably true, then, doesn't it?

The point I'm getting at is that you are presenting arguments of which you have very little understanding, but which you are nevertheless taking as authoritative. So when someone points out the problems with the argument, you can't possibly hope to respond intelligently, which I think you've demonstrated nicely.

I did take time to read the article, and it's basically restating what Kevin has already told you: the obviously correct course of action there is to kill the fat man and save the lives of the people on the trolley. Because of irrational behaviors that we have inherited as a result of evolution (such as placing undue importance on qualities such as immediacy and proximity), we are unlikely to be able to act according to what we can see is right from a neutral point of view. It makes sense then, to make concessions to these irrational impulses where failing to do so would create more misery than it would prevent. It's not a particularly difficult problem for utilitarianism to address.

My only point is that humans can create a rational moral standard for valuing babies and I gave arguments in support of such a standard.

Silly and repugnant arguments. I can just as easily construct a sociobiological argument in favor of racism. I could probably do it while actually being coherent, which I doubt you can do with regard to species.

I didn't say that they were all coherent. I noted that societies could choose any number of systems that they wanted to base morals on.

Well, yes, they can. You also said that such a system must be coherent. Because you do not know what this means, you have been unable to craft a coherent moral system that allows you to consider infants more intrinsically important than rats.

Yeah, I found it interesting also. Please note that the first absolute was a rhetorical figure of speech. The second is a logical statement. There are no absolutes but humans use them in their speech all of the time. I concede that it was a poor choice of terms.

I was absolutely sure you would say that.

Take a close look at the statement, "There are no absolutes." Do you notice anything about it?

 

[RandFan]

Because he is "arguing for the importance of consequence" which "Kant" would "never do."

Please to show me this?

Well, it seems demonstrably true, then, doesn't it?

More than seems.

The point I'm getting at is that you are presenting arguments of which you have very little understanding, but which you are nevertheless taking as authoritative. So when someone points out the problems with the argument, you can't possibly hope to respond intelligently, which I think you've demonstrated nicely.

I'm not so arrogant as to be unteachable. I don't think you are correct but I will entertain your point. Would you please explain when Kevin points out the problems with my argument?

I did take time to read the article, and it's basically restating what Kevin has already told you: the obviously correct course of action there is to kill the fat man and save the lives of the people on the trolley. Because of irrational behaviors that we have inherited as a result of evolution (such as placing undue importance on qualities such as immediacy and proximity), we are unlikely to be able to act according to what we can see is right from a neutral point of view. It makes sense then, to make concessions to these irrational impulses where failing to do so would create more misery than it would prevent. It's not a particularly difficult problem for utilitarianism to address.

Thank you, I appreciate that. I readily concede that evolution did not instill in us perfectly rational morals and this is an important aspect of the article. It is not the only salient point of the article though and if this is all you got out of it then I'm rather disappointed. Evolutionary instincts are not irrational. Our decisions and behavior on the other hand can be irrational if we act on our instincts in an irrational way.

From the article:

The crux of the matter, Greene decided, lay not in the logic of moral judgments but in the role our emotions play in forming them.

Take the instinct (drive, impulse) for survival. To act on it is not in and of itself irrational. If that drive causes us to fear flying in planes then that fear and any decision not to fly is irrational.

So there is no question that our instincts and emotions can lead to irrational behavior. But to only take this from the article is to miss quite a lot.

The evolutionary origins of morality are easy to imagine in a social species. A sense of fairness would have helped early primates cooperate. A sense of disgust and anger at cheaters would have helped them avoid falling into squabbling. As our ancestors became more self-aware and acquired language, they transformed those feelings into moral codes that they then taught their children.

The important point of this is that morals codes have allowed humans to survive. It worked for us. There was utility in the behavior and it was rational. That it was natural does not make it right. That it works demonstrates the utility of the instinct. Survival, socialization, pro-creation, and the rules that permits us those abilities were ingrained in us through evolution. Human societies can and have based moral codes on those instincts. Understanding how and why we developed those instincts can be a basis for understanding why we act irrationally at times but also why we might want to keep some of those moral standards.

Silly and repugnant arguments.

Rhetoric. This doesn't address the arguments does it? Is that what passes for logical debate in your mind?

You also said that such a system must be coherent.

No, it doesn't need to be coherent. It comes back to what is good. What an individual or a society values. I would argue that rational-moral codes are by-and-large the best standards for society.

Because you do not know what this means, you have been unable to craft a coherent moral system that allows you to consider infants more intrinsically important than rats.

"intrinsically important"? I know you think me stupid and that is fine. You are engaging me in dialog and doing so with a minimum degree of decorum so I will humor you as long as you like. Please understand that my responses are sincere. I concede that it has been more than 20 years since I stepped into a classroom and took philosophy and ethics. Further I concede that what I think I know falls quite short of the mark in many areas. In any event, and I ask this not out of complete ignorance, what is "intrinsic value"?

Let me give you an example. It can be said that being healthy is intrinsically valuable. Correct? So, if Ted is healthy then his health is intrinsically valuable to Ted. But what if Ted is a mass murderer? In this case it could be argued that Ted's health is intrinsically bad, good for Ted but bad for society. Intrinsic value depends on what one values. It is commonly held that to be intrinsically valuable something must be valuable in itself. Christine Korsgaard argued that frying pans are, by virtue of what they provide us, intrinsically good.

Like Korsgaard I believe that babies are intrinsically valuable for what they provide us.

Some would argue that babies and frying pans are extrinsic. At best they derive their value from the goodness of something else. Regardless it is possible to create a coherent moral standard that does not morally equate babies with rats.

Can you tell me why you believe that it is not possible to coherently argue that babies are morally intrinsic? Doesn't it depend on your rejection of Korsgaard's argument and that intrinisic value can only be that which is valued in and of itself?

"There are no absolutes." Do you notice anything about it?

{sigh} It is a paradoxical statement but not one that humans are incapable of deciphering.

"There are no absolutes (with the exception of this statement)"

I've made the point a number of times. Fun for discussing logic but only relevant to the pedantic. It still holds.

 

[mumblethrax]

Please to show me this?

I'm not sure what you're asking me to show you, but Kevin made a consequentialist argument here:

It's an unhygienic and inefficient solution, and it would lead to a future world which is horridly suboptimal compared to a future world we might get to if we addressed the problems of overpopulation and starvation in a sensible manner.

Thank you, I appreciate that. I readily concede that evolution did not instill in us perfectly rational morals and this is an important aspect of the article. It is not the only salient point of the article though and if this is all you got out of it then I'm rather disappointed. Evolutionary instincts are not irrational. Our decisions and behavior on the other hand can be irrational if we act on our instincts in an irrational way.

Instincts are not necessarily irrational, but they are often self-defeating given that the environment we live in today is radically different from the one we adapted to. It's very useful, of course, to discover what those instincts are, if only so that we can understand when they're likely to come up and cause us to act against our own interests. As I said earlier, from the perspective of the selfish gene, things like genocide are justifiable. So we can't just wholesale introduce something that results from evolution good. The question, then, is when can we make concessions to these impulses, even where they are not rational? The answer, I think, is that we can do that to the extent that doing so does not produce consequences that are worse than not.

The important point of this is that morals codes have allowed humans to survive. It worked for us.

Yes, although not without producing some horrific atrocities along the way.

There was utility in the behavior and it was rational.

Only from the perspective of the selfish gene. But we are not our genes. It does help us understand how altruism emerged, however, and why it makes sense regardless of whether we choose to acknowledge it or not.

That it was natural does not make it right.

True.

That it works demonstrates the utility of the instinct.

No. That it once worked demonstrates that it once had a function from an amoral biological perspective. It provided utility (so to speak) to the gene, not to us.

Understanding how and why we developed those instincts can be a basis for understanding why we act irrationally at times but also why we might want to keep some of those moral standards.

Yes, absolutely. Recognizing that moral reasoning happens on an unconscious emotional level as well as at a critical level is important. The rational perspective is informed by science; we can use that information to produce more realistic expectations, among other things.

The cognitive neuroscience behind this approach is interesting, and tends to reinforce the consequentialist viewpoint. Unfortunately, the values that biology emphasizes are not necessarily those we might choose to emphasize if we seek better outcomes for ourselves, rather than our genes.

Rhetoric. This doesn't address the arguments does it? Is that what passes for logical debate in your mind?

It's silly because everyone can recognize it for what it is: a kludge. You start from a reasonable principle (something about the importance of suffering, if I remember correctly), and reason your way along. When you derive a conclusion that presents you with the problem that the way you treat animals is not consistent with the way you treat infants, you introduce a new proposition: an entity is morally important if it is a member of the human species. When it's pointed out that some members of the human species, like zygotes and the braindead really don't seem to be that important, you might then likely patch the system again, until you eventually end up with something that more or less reflects what you already believe, with maybe a few concessions to minor behaviors that you feel comfortable changing.

The problem here is that when you use more than one argument to address the same problem, you reduce the coherency of your ethical theory. Someone who needs only one proposition to come to conclusions that satisfy a few universal requirements is doing a better job than you are. If you're just going to keep introducing new propositions until you feel comfortable with the result, why not just presume that the result you want is true to begin with?

"intrinsically important"? I know you think me stupid and that is fine. You are engaging me in dialog and doing so with a minimum degree of decorum so I will humor you as long as you like. Please understand that my responses are sincere. I concede that it has been more than 20 years since I stepped into a classroom and took philosophy and ethics. Further I concede that what I think I know falls quite short of the mark in many areas. In any event, and I ask this not out of complete ignorance, what is "intrinsic value"?

I don't think you're stupid. I just think you get a bit defensive. Try to be a little bit more generous about other people's intentions, maybe.

Some would argue that babies and frying pans are extrinsic. At best they derive their value from the goodness of something else. Regardless it is possible to create a coherent moral standard that does not morally equate babies with rats.

If Korsgaard is correct, you would still have the problem that some people care about rats, they play a role in our lives, and so they would still have final value.

However, I don't think she's correct. I don't think frying pans of any stripe are important because of the role they play, I think the role itself is important and frying pans have a relationship with that role.

Can you tell me why you believe that it is not possible to coherently argue that babies are morally intrinsic?

No, because I don't believe that.

{sigh} It is a paradoxical statement but not one that humans are incapable of deciphering.

"There are no absolutes (with the exception of this statement)"

I've made the point a number of times. Fun for discussing logic but only relevant to the pedantic. It still holds.

This is not just an exercise in pedantry.

Once you correct the statement and acknowledge its absoluteness, you now have the problem that you are giving the new version a privileged position without any reason for doing so. You have the same problem that other varieties of moral absolutism have.

 

[RandFan]

I'm not sure what you're asking me to show you, but Kevin made a consequentialist argument here

I will concede that he did. I did not spot it but more importantly it was not a direct argument but instead a rebuttal to mine. That does not mean that I shouldn't have concluded his position was consequential.

Instincts are not necessarily irrational, but they are often self-defeating given that the environment we live in today is radically different from the one we adapted to. It's very useful, of course, to discover what those instincts are, if only so that we can understand when they're likely to come up and cause us to act against our own interests. As I said earlier, from the perspective of the selfish gene, things like genocide are justifiable. So we can't just wholesale introduce something that results from evolution good. The question, then, is when can we make concessions to these impulses, even where they are not rational? The answer, I think, is that we can do that to the extent that doing so does not produce consequences that are worse than not.

No argument.

Yes, although not without producing some horrific atrocities along the way.

To be precise some of them led to horrific atrocities.

Only from the perspective of the selfish gene. But we are not our genes. It does help us understand how altruism emerged, however, and why it makes sense regardless of whether we choose to acknowledge it or not.

Thank you. Agreed.

No. That it once worked demonstrates that it once had a function from an amoral biological perspective. It provided utility (so to speak) to the gene, not to us.

I see this as a distinction without much difference. We want to live. We want to avoid injury. We want to experience pleasure. We want to socialize. We want to procreate.

Yes, absolutely. Recognizing that moral reasoning happens on an unconscious emotional level as well as at a critical level is important. The rational perspective is informed by science; we can use that information to produce more realistic expectations, among other things.

The cognitive neuroscience behind this approach is interesting, and tends to reinforce the consequentialist viewpoint. Unfortunately, the values that biology emphasizes are not necessarily those we might choose to emphasize if we seek better outcomes for ourselves, rather than our genes.

Agreed.

It's silly because everyone can recognize it for what it is: a kludge. You start from a reasonable principle (something about the importance of suffering, if I remember correctly), and reason your way along. When you derive a conclusion that presents you with the problem that the way you treat animals is not consistent with the way you treat infants, you introduce a new proposition: an entity is morally important if it is a member of the human species. When it's pointed out that some members of the human species, like zygotes and the brain-dead really don't seem to be that important, you might then likely patch the system again, until you eventually end up with something that more or less reflects what you already believe, with maybe a few concessions to minor behaviors that you feel comfortable changing.

First let me be very clear. I don't at all think zygotes and the brain-dead are relevant to the discussion. I have not brought them up and I'm certain that Kevin hasn't either. I don't believe that semen, eggs or the joining of the two constitute human life. Further I don't believe that the brain dead are deserving of rights and privileges enjoyed by humans. My argument was concerning babies, the retarded and Alzheimer's patients.

That being said I don't recognize any of my argument in your characterization (unless you are talking about my debate with Earthborn in R&P last year).

The problem here is that when you use more than one argument to address the same problem, you reduce the coherency of your ethical theory. Someone who needs only one proposition to come to conclusions that satisfy a few universal requirements is doing a better job than you are. If you're just going to keep introducing new propositions until you feel comfortable with the result, why not just presume that the result you want is true to begin with?

In regards to my discussion with Kevin my argument is that humans value human babies (which is different than my argument with Earthborn) because of evolution. There is utility in placing value in babies because it ensures the survival of our species. If our evolutionary instincts don't cause us to behave in an irrational way then it is a good moral standard. Valuing rats won't ensure the survival of our species.

If Korsgaard is correct, you would still have the problem that some people care about rats, they play a role in our lives, and so they would still have final value.

The extinction of a non-human species doesn't by default mean the end of humans. Valuing babies increases the likelihood that the human species will continue. Valuing rats wont.

However, I don't think she's correct. I don't think frying pans of any stripe are important because of the role they play, I think the role itself is important and frying pans have a relationship with that role.

And that is a valid position. I agree with Korsgaard. I value rats, pans and babies differently though.

Once you correct the statement and acknowledge its absoluteness, you now have the problem that you are giving the new version a privileged position without any reason for doing so. You have the same problem that other varieties of moral absolutism have.

I'll tell you what, outside of abstract-theoretical constructs I don't believe science has ever found an absolute. I don't think that they are likely to find one. This doesn't prove that absolutes don't exist but it strengthens my conviction that there are not. It has been said that absolute truth is antithetical to science. I certainly know of no absolute truths nor absolute morals. If there is no absolute truth then how would one go about proving an absolute? However, if and when you find one you let me know. Until then my position is that "t[SIZE=-1]he only absolute is that [/SIZE]there are no absolutes"[SIZE=-1]. [/SIZE]

 

[RandFan]

Mumble, after going through the thread a couple of times I think I see now your point better. Perhaps I was a authorative and combative with kevin when I lacked the right to have been. My appologies to Kevin.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

No worries.

 

[blakehaydn]

I believe that third-trimester abortions should happen for any reason the woman wants. If the woman wants to abort because...

a) It's not the right time,
b) I don't love the father,
c) I don't know who the father is,
d) It will make me fat and I don't want stretch marks

Anything, really. All of the above are legitimate reasons not to have a baby. In short, if the woman does not want a child, she should not have it. If I agree with those reasons, it is not relevant.

Here I will give a technocratic standpoint of abortion. If the parent or parents are questioning whether or not to get an abortion or plain simply want to get an aboriton... the best option is to let them do so, an opinion not movitated by their right, morality, property or anything like that. But because of science. If a parent doesn't want a child, it isn't too likely they can provide them a healthy psychological environment... which is going to possibly seriously stunt or damage the child's progress/future.

Also, if the mother of the child wants an abortion and the father doesn't. The choice must be left to the mother because she is the one that has to give the time that might not be productive for her life goals at that given moment. The same could be said if both the parents came to that decision.

This perspective is really looking out for the youth.

 

[RandFan]

Here I will give a technocratic standpoint of abortion. If the parent or parents are questioning whether or not to get an abortion or plain simply want to get an aboriton... the best option is to let them do so, an opinion not movitated by their right, morality, property or anything like that. But because of science. If a parent doesn't want a child, it isn't too likely they can provide them a healthy psychological environment... which is going to possibly seriously stunt or damage the child's progress/future.

And after the baby is born would you keep the option open?

 

[blakehaydn]

ha ha, I knew you'd respond with something along those lines. Don't you know me better than that yet?

 

[RandFan]

ha ha, I knew you'd respond with something along those lines. Don't you know me better than that yet?

Oh, I'll always take the bait.