Passenger killed by air marshall

[pgwenthold]

I wonder about John Mica's claim that "the system worked."

How can that be? There wasn't a bomb anywhere to be found. Therefore, they did not protect anyone from anything, and killed someone who was not a threat to security.

That is the system working?

No, that is a system breakdown. The system working would mean that people who are actual security risks are prevented from causing harm, and people who are not security risks are left alone. That would the system working correctly.

Now, claim that the marshalls did what they were supposed to do. That's one thing. Claim that it is unfortunate but inevitable that there will be problems like this to arise. But if this is the system working perfectly, then we have a very messed up system.

 

[Ed]

I wonder about John Mica's claim that "the system worked."

How can that be? There wasn't a bomb anywhere to be found. Therefore, they did not protect anyone from anything, and killed someone who was not a threat to security.

That is the system working?

No, that is a system breakdown. The system working would mean that people who are actual security risks are prevented from causing harm, and people who are not security risks are left alone. That would the system working correctly.

Now, claim that the marshalls did what they were supposed to do. That's one thing. Claim that it is unfortunate but inevitable that there will be problems like this to arise. But if this is the system working perfectly, then we have a very messed up system.

I disagree. A "security risk" is a bit of a movable feast. This guy was not, in retrospect but at the time he gave every appearence of being one. That said, it did work.

 

[The Central Scrutinizer]

For the skeptical, listen to the eyewitness account of a plane passenger and see if it sounds anything like the official version to you:

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10367598/

Which, of course, does not mean the official version is wrong. Perhaps this person is wrong.

 

[mumblethrax]

If you're done with your self-dialog, Skeptic, the concern here is that we have reduced alpha error beyond the optimal point at which the negative consequences from both alpha and beta errors are minimized. So far, it seems very much like air marshalls have stopped no terrorists (except, perhaps, by some deterrent effect) and killed one mentally ill man. No much of a track record, really.

I also disagree that evidence of mental illness should be completely discounted in a crisis situation. I think that's a foolish policy that jeopardizes the safety of both the officer and the suspect.

 

[chulbert]

Law enforcement officers surrounded the plane after the shooting. Inside, McAlhany said passengers were ordered to crouch under their seats. He said that when he tried to pop up for a look, a flight attendant ordered him to get back down.

How the hell do you crouch under an airline seat?

 

[Melendwyr]

I also disagree that evidence of mental illness should be completely discounted in a crisis situation.

Ah, but a companion's statements are not evidence, and should not be considered as such.

The guy who tried to blow up a plane with explosives in his shoes - he was a few marbles short of a bag, yes? But he was still trying to blow up the plane (in a profoundly irrational manner, no less).

Assuming the passenger in question did indeed say something about bombs, and then reached into a bag while disregarding an air marshall's instructions, then I don't see what other outcome was possible than his being shot.

Note to caretakers of people with conditions that might create this sort of scenario: If you absolutely must fly, then make sure the person has taken any appropriate medications, contact the airport ahead of time, and ask to be specially screened. If there's a risk of a manic attack, make that clear. I'll bet the airport employees are willing to be accomodating.

 

[mumblethrax]

Ah, but a companion's statements are not evidence, and should not be considered as such.

There are plenty of signs of mental illness that should, some of which he seemed to be exhibiting.

The guy who tried to blow up a plane with explosives in his shoes - he was a few marbles short of a bag, yes? But he was still trying to blow up the plane (in a profoundly irrational manner, no less).

No, not as far as I know. It doesn't matter; I'm not arguing mentally ill people should be allowed to place everyone else at risk.

Assuming the passenger in question did indeed say something about bombs, and then reached into a bag while disregarding an air marshall's instructions, then I don't see what other outcome was possible than his being shot.

If that's the way things happened, I'm inclined to agree.

Note to caretakers of people with conditions that might create this sort of scenario: If you absolutely must fly, then make sure the person has taken any appropriate medications, contact the airport ahead of time, and ask to be specially screened. If there's a risk of a manic attack, make that clear. I'll bet the airport employees are willing to be accomodating.

Yes, absolutely. It seems like his wife was frantically trying to contact someone before the flight, possibly about his condition. If she didn't notify the crew, she made a mistake.

 

[Mycroft]

No, that is a system breakdown. The system working would mean that people who are actual security risks are prevented from causing harm, and people who are not security risks are left alone. That would the system working correctly.

Well the difference between your expectations and reality are in play here.

The way the system should is we identify the evil-doers and dangerous nut-cases just moments after they conceive their plans to harm people and take them away for psychiatric evaluation with the general public never even knowing anything happened.

Even then, in a perfect system, there would be no evil-doers or nut-cases, so we would have no need for security.

The system worked as it was supposed to. The system is not supposed to distinguish between real terrorists who pose a real danger, nut-cases who pose a real danger, and nut-cases who are harmless. It’s not supposed to distinguish between these things because those are beyond human ability, as nobody has yet figured out a reliable way to read minds or tell the future.

 

[cbish]

How long did this incident take? How long does it take for a guy to run out of a plane waving a backpack yelling he has a bomb before he's gunned down? 10 seconds? 15? Not alot of time for a psychological evaluation.

 

[Skeptic]

If you're done with your self-dialog, Skeptic, the concern here is that we have reduced alpha error beyond the optimal point at which the negative consequences from both alpha and beta errors are minimized.

Not really, hon. The point is to second-guess whatever people who had 15 seconds to choose if they risk a plane being blown up, with the idea that, if your post-facto armchair reasoning had discovered less than optimally, then something is terribly wrong.

 

[pgwenthold]

Well the difference between your expectations and reality are in play here.

The way the system should is we identify the evil-doers and dangerous nut-cases just moments after they conceive their plans to harm people and take them away for psychiatric evaluation with the general public never even knowing anything happened.

Even then, in a perfect system, there would be no evil-doers or nut-cases, so we would have no need for security.

That's not a "perfect system." That is a "perfect world."

We have a security system in place because we don't have a perfect world. The goal of that system is to stop evil doers and leave others alone. The person killed was not an evil-doer. Hence, the system did not work as it should.

Like I said, I don't care if you claim that we have to be willing to accept problems like these if we are going to achieve our goal of security. However, don't pretend like this is not problem. Killing non-dangerous people is always a problem, and not an indication that the system is "working as it should." It could be that it is "working as it must," but this is not the same as working as it should work, or how we want it to work.

 

[Jocko]

There are plenty of signs of mental illness that should, some of which he seemed to be exhibiting.

You mean like the fidgeting and nervousness described by witnesses of Richard Reid's attempt to detonate his shoes?

No, not as far as I know. It doesn't matter; I'm not arguing mentally ill people should be allowed to place everyone else at risk.

Point is, this incident underscores that now they're mainly putting themselves at risk. Good incentive to take those meds, huh?

 

[Jocko]

How long did this incident take? How long does it take for a guy to run out of a plane waving a backpack yelling he has a bomb before he's gunned down? 10 seconds? 15? Not alot of time for a psychological evaluation.

And unless Air Marshal training includes three semesters of applied psychology, it's more than time that was lacking; so was expertise.

 

[pgwenthold]

I disagree. A "security risk" is a bit of a movable feast. This guy was not, in retrospect but at the time he gave every appearence of being one.

Whether he "gave the appearance of one" is irrelevent to the question.

It should not be the goal of our security to stop every person who "gives the appearance" of being a threat. It should be to stop the people that actually ARE threats, whether they appear to be or not. If someone appears to be a threat but it not actually a threat, it should correct that behavior in a legitimate way, but killing should be reserved only for people who ARE a threat.

Now, the challenge is to be able to tell the difference between the actual threats, and those who only look like threats. While there is certainly a correlation between the two, not all people who look like threats are threats, and not everyone who is a threat looks like one.

Given the goal of the system is get us to subdue real threats and not kill a non-threat, then it is clear that this event constitutes a failure of the system.

As I say in my other post, you could argue that failures are inevitable, and this is an unfortunate consequence. However, given that a non-dangerous passenger got killed, there is no basis to claim the system "worked."

 

[cbish]

Whether he "gave the appearance of one" is irrelevent to the question.

It should not be the goal of our security to stop every person who "gives the appearance" of being a threat. It should be to stop the people that actually ARE threats, whether they appear to be or not. If someone appears to be a threat but it not actually a threat, it should correct that behavior in a legitimate way, but killing should be reserved only for people who ARE a threat.

Now, the challenge is to be able to tell the difference between the actual threats, and those who only look like threats. While there is certainly a correlation between the two, not all people who look like threats are threats, and not everyone who is a threat looks like one.

Given the goal of the system is get us to subdue real threats and not kill a non-threat, then it is clear that this event constitutes a failure of the system.

As I say in my other post, you could argue that failures are inevitable, and this is an unfortunate consequence. However, given that a non-dangerous passenger got killed, there is no basis to claim the system "worked."

Do you understand how much time we're talking about to make these distinctions?

 

[mumblethrax]

Not really, hon. The point is to second-guess whatever people who had 15 seconds to choose if they risk a plane being blown up, with the idea that, if your post-facto armchair reasoning had discovered less than optimally, then something is terribly wrong.

This sort of non-argument makes reasonable conversation impossible. You have constructed a bullet-proof (if irrational) rejoinder that allows you to unthinkingly deflect any criticism: I just don't like Bush/air marshalls/whoever, so my criticism can be safely ignored.

The trouble is that you're wrong. My concern is that a man is dead who should not be dead. I'm not second guessing the air marshalls, and I've already agreed that if events happened as they have been reported to happen by DHS, the marshalls acted in accordance with their training.

My question, then, is whether their training is adequate, or whether they are necessary at all. We have one dead mentally ill man and zero terrorists stopped by air marshalls, which doesn't strike me as a terrifically successful security program.

Now, it can be argued that the presence of air marshalls acts as a deterrent to terrorism. There's a serious problem with this argument, in that deterrence relies heavily on rational actor theory: the hope is that terrorists won't try to smuggle on bombs if they know they're going to get caught in the act. But a rational terrorist would realize that there is no reason to announce that he has a bomb anymore, because there is nothing to be gained by it. The crew will no longer accede to the demands of terrorists, so he's better off quietly detonating his bomb.

My question, then, is whether air marshalls are doing any good at all. They killed one mentally ill man, and weren't there to stop Richard Reid, who was successful subdued by the crew and passengers. As a policy, I don't think it's working out very well.

Now, you can call me an armchair analyst, or accuse me of post-facto reasoning (I don't think this means what you think it means), but I will point out that most meaningful changes in established practices occur after that practice has been demonstrated to be flawed. The hope here is not to hang someone for their lack of foresight, but to prevent this from happening again (if that's at all possible).

 

[Freakshow]

This sort of non-argument makes reasonable conversation impossible. You have constructed a bullet-proof (if irrational) rejoinder that allows you to unthinkingly deflect any criticism: I just don't like Bush/air marshalls/whoever, so my criticism can be safely ignored.

The trouble is that you're wrong. My concern is that a man is dead who should not be dead. I'm not second guessing the air marshalls, and I've already agreed that if events happened as they have been reported to happen by DHS, the marshalls acted in accordance with their training.

My question, then, is whether their training is adequate, or whether they are necessary at all. We have one dead mentally ill man and zero terrorists stopped by air marshalls, which doesn't strike me as a terrifically successful security program.

Now, it can be argued that the presence of air marshalls acts as a deterrent to terrorism. There's a serious problem with this argument, in that deterrence relies heavily on rational actor theory: the hope is that terrorists won't try to smuggle on bombs if they know they're going to get caught in the act. But a rational terrorist would realize that there is no reason to announce that he has a bomb anymore, because there is nothing to be gained by it. The crew will no longer accede to the demands of terrorists, so he's better off quietly detonating his bomb.

My question, then, is whether air marshalls are doing any good at all. They killed one mentally ill man, and weren't there to stop Richard Reid, who was successful subdued by the crew and passengers. As a policy, I don't think it's working out very well.

Now, you can call me an armchair analyst, or accuse me of post-facto reasoning (I don't think this means what you think it means), but I will point out that most meaningful changes in established practices occur after that practice has been demonstrated to be flawed. The hope here is not to hang someone for their lack of foresight, but to prevent this from happening again (if that's at all possible).

How about uniformed, armed guards on every flight? Putting aside cost for a moment, what would you think about the effectiveness of such a solution?

 

[zenith-nadir]

Dave Adams, a spokesman for the Federal Air Marshal Service, said Alpizar had run up and down the plane's aisle yelling, "I have a bomb in my bag."

Adams said Alpizar fled the aircraft and marshals confronted him on the boarding bridge.

"They asked the gentleman, 'Drop your bag, drop your bag. Come to the ground. I'm a federal law enforcement officer. Police. Drop your bag,'" Adams told CNN.

"He failed to comply with their commands, continued approaching the air marshals claiming he had a bomb in his bag. And then they ordered him again down to the ground. He didn't."

The marshals fired two or three shots when Alpizar appeared to reach into his bag, Adams said.

link

My question, then, is whether their training is adequate, or whether they are necessary at all. We have one dead mentally ill man and zero terrorists stopped by air marshalls, which doesn't strike me as a terrifically successful security program.

Ok. Let's say you are the Air Marshal. You are on that boarding bridge and Alpizar is screaming at you "I have a bomb in my bag!". You say 'Drop your bag, drop your bag" and Alpizar ignores you and reaches into his bag.

What would you do?

 

[The Central Scrutinizer]

How the hell do you crouch under an airline seat?

That's what I was wondering.

 

[Melendwyr]

Ok. Let's say you are the Air Marshal. You are on that boarding bridge and Alpizar is screaming at you "I have a bomb in my bag!". You say 'Drop your bag, drop your bag" and Alpizar ignores you and reaches into his bag.

What would you do?

Clearly he would conduct a full psychological examination and background check in the roughly half-a-second before the passenger's hand enters the bag.