Split Thread The causes and legality of the declaration of WWII

[Michel H]

The goal isn't to bring out the best qualities in the people of ISIS. The goal is to put a stop to their naked aggression. They're welcome to be as horrible as they want, as long as they keep it to themselves, and don't bother their neighbors and our friends.

Also, why are you making the Extortionist's Argument? You're saying that the best way to stop violent people from being violent is to let them have whatever they want. That's extortion. Why are you promoting extortion? Why are you supporting ISIS's goals and methods?

I don't support ISIS's goals and methods, I view ISIS as a product of U.S. policies of expansionism, illegal invasions, bombings and censorship generally supported on this forum (unless I misunderstood). The problem though, that you don't seem to understand, is that violence often generates violence (I note that your post suggests a complete physical elimination of ISIS militants, this seems to be what the U.S. wants to do, it seems to amuse you). In my opinion, it should be possible to protect maternity wards by dealing with these people in a more humane way, and a first step could be to encourage them to have an online presence (this would probably be less expensive than a warplane). This doesn't mean approving them: you don't need to agree with someone to let him/her express himself/herself.

 

[Little 10 Toes]

so reading an article about an attack in Afghanistan by Afghan terrorists, attacking an Afghan hospital, killing/wounding Afghan babies from Afghan parents, you turn this into an anti-US topic.

 

[Michel H]

so reading an article about an attack in Afghanistan by Afghan terrorists, attacking an Afghan hospital, killing/wounding Afghan babies from Afghan parents, you turn this into an anti-US topic.

Little 10 Toes, I do not necessarily disagree with all decisions that U.S. leaders take. For example,

On Jan. 31, the Trump administration announced the United States would temporarily ban the admission of people who were in China 14 days prior to their attempted travel to the United States. The restriction took effect Feb. 2, and it exempted U.S. citizens, green card holders, and certain other people.

(Source: https://www.statesman.com/news/20200413/fact-check-was-trump-slow-to-halt-travel-from-china)
Such a travel ban was actually not recommended by the World Health Organization at the time, but I believe this was a reasonable move to try to protect U.S. citizens. I find it normal and legitimate that political leaders try to protect their citizens from various threats, preferably in a non-violent way.

However, when you rush to bombings, invasions, sanctions and censorship, in a context of overprotection for a certain country, in order to officially protect from terrorism, you can actually make matters worse rather than better. Some people who were perhaps initially only moderately angry can become very angry after taking so many bombs on their heads, and then children may pay the price. It does not seem possible to me to isolate a violent terror attack in Kabul from U.S policies in that region and in the world (there is a link).

It is clear that, in this thread, ISIS is considered (understandably) with great contempt by many posters. However, at the same time, these posters fail to explain why the "resistance movement", which initially wanted to defend Sunnis in Iraq (see figure "Why They Fight" here: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/12/why-people-join-isis/419685/) should be considered as horribly bad, while the invader itself, which originally caused all the trouble is not getting blamed at all.

The consequences of the post-9/11 wars started by the U.S. are:

- The US federal price tag for the post-9/11 wars is over $6.4 trillion dollars
- The cost of the Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Syria wars totals about $6.4 trillion. This does not include future interest costs on borrowing for the wars, which will add an estimated $8 trillion in the next 40 years.
- Over 801,000 people have died due to direct war violence, and several times as many indirectly
- Over 335,000 civilians have been killed as a result of the fighting
- 21 million — the number of war refugees and displaced persons
- Both Iraq and Afghanistan continue to rank extremely low in global studies of political freedom.
- Women in Iraq and Afghanistan are excluded from political power and experience high rates of unemployment and war widowhood.

(Sources: https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/ , https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/papers/summary)

There was, however, a simple alternative for the U.S. in 2001 (and still now):
- apologize for its previous crimes and mistakes
- order Israel to go back to its legal, internationally recognized borders, instead of supporting Israeli expansionism
- lift all sanctions, stop economic torture though "sanctions".
- greatly reduce its military spending, used to torture the world and support Israeli expansionism

I believe that, if the U.S. did these things and stopped bombing ISIS, maternity wards in Afghanistan could perhaps be much safer, though the Taliban and ISIS should themselves adopt democracy and human rights values.

 

[Jack by the hedge]

Are you serious?

In case it colours your judgement of me, I am not an American, and I have always believed the invasion of Iraq was a blunder, that it was handled badly and that the rise of ISIS into the power vacuum left by that and the shambles that the Arab Spring became in Syria was a disaster which might have been avoided, but really, are you serious?

Perhaps the US should also have apologised to Japan after Pearl Harbor, and promised to keep out of its business, hand over control of the Philippines as a goodwill gesture and not embargo its oil imports any more. What do you think?

Good grief. If large nations respond to attacks by caving in and meekly giving the attackers what they want, do you think such attacks will stop, or will they increase?

 

[SpitfireIX]

I have not seen the exact text of the March 19, 1939 law granting special powers to the French government. I tried to read it, but the wikipedia link seems to be inactive. If you have seen it (either in French or in English), I invite you to post it here (or a good summary). However, from the various descriptions of it I have seen, it is rather clear to me that this was not a text transforming France into a dictatorship led by "Führer Daladier", I think its scope was more limited.

Sorry for the delay in responding to this; I've been extremely busy. And let me add my condolences about your mother. Sorry also for the brevity and incompleteness; I'll do some more research and write more later. I was going by what was reported in the Times articles I linked. One article states that, as I mentioned, Daladier can ignore the parliament if he feels like it; there's also a quotation from him or a member of his government to the effect, IIRC, that "we won't prorogue [suspend] parliament unless we have to," and another to the effect that the people shouldn't fear giving the government dictatorial powers because Daladier and his ministers are committed democrats. I'll go back and copy the text exactly when I have time, which probably won't be for at least a few days.

There was a meeting of French parliament on September 2, 1939 in order to allocate money to the military (war declared the next day). Some members of parliament wanted to speak, but they were not allowed to, there was no debate at all (this is obviously not good in a democracy, before an important decision). This is explained in this book: https://books.google.be/books?id=fJ...dier déclaration guerre illégale 1939&f=false.

The first thing I want to know is why there was no debate; there may have been good reasons other than a fear that some member would somehow convince enough deputies to vote against the bill, or say something that would embarrass the government. Further, even granting for the sake of argument that "this is obviously not good," that still doesn't make the vote illegitimate, which appears to be the impression you are attempting to give.

Here are the parliamentary journals from 1939. I briefly looked through the ones from March 18 and September 2; I'll look at them more closely when I get a chance. It will undoubtedly take me some time, as my ability to read French is limited. I did notice that there was sustained applause from all political parties after Daladier's speech on September 2, which confirms what I've read elsewhere.

I disagree. The invaded Poland had a right to defend itself (note though that Hitler's goal was to unify his country which had been divided by the treaty of Versailles), but, if the French decide to invade and bomb Germany, they are going on offense against Germany to ridiculously try to play the "heroes".

As has been explained to you by multiple people, Hitler's goal was to conquer Poland; the Danzig issue was only a pretext, just as the issue of the Sudetenland was a pretext for war with Czechoslovakia. (Hitler was hell-bent on war in 1938, which is why he kept raising his demands. It was only the combination of Chamberlain's extreme commitment to appeasement, the resistance of the German military leadership, and Mussolini's intervention that convinced Hitler to take "yes" for an answer.) And as for playing heroes, should the French have simply waited for Hitler to attack them, when Germany was even stronger?

I think that, when you read the sentence: "After the defeat of France, those who were supporters of peace and joined the Vichy regime accused Daladier and his government of having brought France into the war illegally, without asking for the opinion of the national representation.", it must presumably be understood that "those who were supporters of peace and joined the Vichy regime" were the finest and most distinguished politicians of the time (probably many of them were law and government experts), who were unanimous in saying the war was illegal. Supporting Maréchal Pétain seemed to be a very good option at the time to bring peace to the country (and it worked: France suffered probably much less in WWII than in WWI).

First, what are the sources of those quotations? Second, your presumption is completely unfounded. Was Paul Reynaud^WP not a fine and distinguished politician? What about Georges Mandel^WP? Or Édouard Herriot^WP? Or Jules Jeanneney^WP? Also, who exactly was "unanimous in saying the war was illegal"? And more importantly, why didn't any of them speak out in September of 1939?

I'll discuss the ethical issues of the 1940 armistice and those of supporting the Vichy regime in a later post.

 

[Michel H]

Here are the parliamentary journals from 1939.

It's nice that you found this, these proceedings of the French Chamber of Deputies (lower house of parliament) provide high quality, original information.
The exact contents of the law of March 19, 1939 giving special powers to parliament are given in these proceedings. This law was very brief, it just said:

Le Gouvernement est autorisé, jusqu'au 30 novembre 1939, à prendre, par décrets délibérés en conseil des ministres, les mesures nécessaires à la défense du pays. Ces décrets seront soumis à la ratification des Chambres avant le 31 décembre 1939.

or

The Government is authorized, until November 30, 1939, to take, by decrees deliberated in the Council of Ministers, the measures necessary for the defense of the country. These decrees will be submitted to the Chambers for ratification before December 31, 1939.

I don't think this law allowed the president of France to declare war to Germany, and then to start an offensive in Germany which killed about 200 Germans (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saar_Offensive). I also think this was never the point of view of Daladier himself: Daladier argued that, by voting a large sum of money for the military on September 2, 1939, the Chamber of Deputies implicitly approved war, but I don't find this argument convincing because money for the military can also be used for purely defensive purposes (this is actually a safer, and more normal use). One of the problems, when you invade another country, is that you behave somewhat like Hitler himself. Another problem is that you generate anger, and possibly a desire for revenge. This problem is the same with ISIS: when you massively bomb and kill them without even raising a little finger to try to talk with them (U.S. style), you create anger, and you never know what will happen next.

The reason why there was no debate at all in French parliament on September 2, 1939 is explained in the book "The Phony War": https://books.google.be/books?id=fJ...dier déclaration guerre illégale 1939&f=false I have already mentioned (you may click on this link, and read various pages, though it is in French). The presidents of the various political groups wanted to emphasize unity in a time of crisis, they didn't want to create a "climate of division". This means, in my opinion, that the war was declared illegally by France, in violation of their Constitution. This was the point of view of proponents of peace, who had joined Maréchal Pétain, as explained in the book just mentioned.

You argue, in your post, that Hitler was hell-bent on war. This is the typical stereotype about Adolf Hitler, but I believe this is far from certain. Let us say that he wanted to achieve certain political goals, the primary of which was to unite all German-speaking into one large German country. During the Munich conference, he said he was not interested in taking Czechs into Germany.

 

[SpitfireIX]

I don't think this law allowed the president of France to declare war to Germany, and then to start an offensive in Germany which killed about 200 Germans

Very few people would agree with you that "defense" does not include declaring war in support of an ally who has been brutally attacked, or taking offensive measures against an aggressor. I'll have more on this when I have more time.

Until then, I renew and expand on two questions that you have failed to address. First, what sort of peace terms do you believe Germany and Japan would have accepted? And why would the Allies have believed that those countries wouldn't have attacked again in a few years? I would point out that even before Germany attacked Poland, Churchill and FDR were well aware that Germany was capable of developing nuclear weapons. And both leaders would certainly have considered the possibility that the Japanese had the potential to build an atomic bomb, especially with assistance from the Germans. (The Japanese did, in fact, attempt to do so, though with no significant help from Germany.)

Second, if the French Parliament didn't approve of Daladier's guaranteeing Poland, his giving Germany an ultimatum, or of his declaring war on Germany, then why didn't the opposition call for a vote of no confidence on any of those occasions? And why was it only after France had surrendered that some Vichy supporters started claiming that the declaration of war was illegal?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saar_Offensive[/url]). I also think this was never the point of view of Daladier himself: Daladier argued that, by voting a large sum of money for the military on September 2, 1939, the Chamber of Deputies implicitly approved war, but I don't find this argument convincing because money for the military can also be used for purely defensive purposes (this is actually a safer, and more normal use).

No. The fact that Daladier considered that the declaration of war had received parliamentary approval does not necessarily imply that he believed such approval was required. As an analogy, people generally hope that their parents approve of their choices of marriage partners, but they generally don't believe that such approval is required (at least in most Western countries, including France).

Further, the deputies voted with the full knowledge that Daladier had guaranteed Poland; only the most naive among them could have failed to understand the implications of their votes. Bear in mind that all of them had lived through World War I and its aftermath, and many had served in the military, so they would have been under no illusions about what was coming.

One of the problems, when you invade another country, is that you behave somewhat like Hitler himself. Another problem is that you generate anger, and possibly a desire for revenge. This problem is the same with ISIS: when you massively bomb and kill them without even raising a little finger to try to talk with them (U.S. style), you create anger, and you never know what will happen next.

First, are you seriously suggesting that the Western Allies' occupations of Italy, Germany, and Japan bore any resemblance to Italy's occupation of Ethiopia, Germany's occupation of Poland and Ukraine (or even of France), or Japan's occupation of the Philippines, Malaya, and other countries and colonies in Asia?

Second, are you aware of ISIS's stated goals? What possible compromise could be achieved by negotiation?

Finally, can you give us some evidence of any significant anger or desire for revenge against the Western Allies in any of those countries today, or at any time after the occupations ended?

The reason why there was no debate at all in French parliament on September 2, 1939 is explained in the book "The Phony War": https://books.google.be/books?id=fJ...dier déclaration guerre illégale 1939&f=false I have already mentioned (you may click on this link, and read various pages, though it is in French). The presidents of the various political groups wanted to emphasize unity in a time of crisis, they didn't want to create a "climate of division". This means, in my opinion, that the war was declared illegally by France, in violation of their Constitution. This was the point of view of proponents of peace, who had joined Maréchal Pétain, as explained in the book just mentioned.

Clicking the link did not provide any readable pages; possibly that's because I have an American IP address. However, I'll accept that your summary is reasonably accurate. But unless you can point to some provision of French law or the French Constitution in effect at the time that was clearly violated, the fact that no debate was allowed does not make the vote illegal. No members were prevented from voting; any who so chose could have voted against the measure, but none did. Contrast this with the vote on June 10th, 1940, to give Pétain permanent dictatorial powers, which is widely considered to have been illegal on its face, and was in any case riddled with irregularities. So for Vichy supporters to claim that the September 2nd vote was illegal is extremely hypocritical.

You argue, in your post, that Hitler was hell-bent on war. This is the typical stereotype about Adolf Hitler, but I believe this is far from certain.

The historical record indicates that it is certain. I'll have more on that later.

Let us say that he wanted to achieve certain political goals, the primary of which was to unite all German-speaking into one large German country. During the Munich conference, he said he was not interested in taking Czechs into Germany.

Whether uniting all ethnic Germans was his primary goal is debatable, though it was unquestionably high on his wish list. As has been mentioned repeatedly, and as you have ignored repeatedly, another major goal of Hitler's was gaining Lebensraum, at the expense of Eastern Europe. As for the hilited, why should anyone take any public statement by Hitler at face value?

 

[Michel H]

Perhaps the US should also have apologised to Japan after Pearl Harbor, and promised to keep out of its business, hand over control of the Philippines as a goodwill gesture and not embargo its oil imports any more. What do you think?

I believe the oil embargo (part of a larger embargo) decided by FDR in 1941 was too tough. So tough that this action should be considered as mostly equivalent to a serious act of war:

Responding to Japanese occupation of key airfields in Indochina (July 24) following an agreement between Japan and Vichy France, the U.S. froze Japanese assets on July 26, 1941, and on August 1 established an embargo on oil and gasoline exports to Japan.[12][13][14] The oil embargo was an especially strong response because oil was Japan's most crucial import, and more than 80% of Japan's oil at the time came from the United States.[15]

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Events_leading_to_the_attack_on_Pearl_Harbor#Background_to_conflict)

This time Roosevelt listened to those who, like Ickes, had long been urging him to act forcefully against all aggressors. On the night of July 26 he ordered all Japanese assets in America frozen, and Britain and the Netherlands soon followed suit. In consequence, not only did all trade with the United States cease, but the fact that America had been Japan’s major source of oil imports now left Japan in an untenable situation. To the New York Times it was “the most drastic blow short of war.” To Japan’s leaders it was much more. They had secured the bases in Indochina by negotiation with Vichy France, a country recognized if not approved by America, and international law was on their side; the freezing was the last step in the encirclement of the empire by the ABCD (American, British, Chinese, Dutch) powers, a denial to Japan of her rightful place as leader of Asia and a challenge to her very existence. The frustration, near-hysteria and anger could be expected ...

(from "The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945" by John Toland, https://books.google.be/books?id=En...left Japan in an untenable situation"&f=false)
(If this link to Google Books doesn't work for you, you can do a Google search with the search terms: "now left Japan in an untenable situation" for example)

It was perhaps a good idea at the time to act against Japanese imperialism and expansionism, but this should have been done in a more calculated and moderate way, without triggering a major war. For example, Roosevelt could have ordered that the price of oil for Japan be multiplied by two through new taxes, and that the money collected in this way be sent to resistance fighters in Northern China, until Japan stops her aggression in China (not including Manchukuo, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manchukuo, where the Japanese colonization effort might have been temporarily tolerated).

 

[theprestige]

I think actually uniting all ethnic Germans would have been counter-productive to the primary goal of lebensraum.

Having ethnic Germans across the border of his next victim, suffering abuse at the hands of their non-German overlords, was a key part of his justification for invading and annexing stuff.

I think he'd always find a way to have more ethnic Germans still waiting to be united with their Reichsbrethren.

 

[Jack by the hedge]

… It was perhaps a good idea at the time to act against Japanese imperialism and expansionism, but this should have been done in a more calculated and moderate way, without triggering a major war. For example, Roosevelt could have ordered that the price of oil for Japan be multiplied by two through new taxes, and that the money collected in this way be sent to resistance fighters in Northern China, until Japan stops her aggression in China (not including Manchukuo, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manchukuo, where the Japanese colonization effort might have been temporarily tolerated).

Or perhaps Japan could have stopped its aggression. I'm not sure why you think it was America's job to keep supplying the oil which fuelled Japan's military until Japan could seize enough territory to be independent of American supplies.

Oil was leverage America had against Japanese expansionism, short of war. But if that lever wasn't used forcefully enough to stop Japan capturing the Dutch East Indies and Malaya, that leverage would disappear.

 

[theprestige]

MICHEL: Nations should use peaceful methods to stop wars of aggression.

OTHERS: Like withdrawing material support for a war of aggression?

MICHEL: No, that is too aggressive, and justifies more aggression from the aggressor. But only if the aggressor is a xenophobic fascist regime.

 

[SpitfireIX]

I believe the oil embargo (part of a larger embargo) decided by FDR in 1941 was too tough. So tough that this action should be considered as mostly equivalent to a serious act of war:

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Events_leading_to_the_attack_on_Pearl_Harbor#Background_to_conflict)

First, two points. One, the US needed to curtail oil exports anyway, because of greatly expanding US military requirements in mid-1941, and two, within months Japan wouldn't have been able to have bought oil from the US or anyone else, due to a lack of foreign exchange caused by a large trade deficit and other economic issues.

Those aside, the oil embargo was universally popular with the America public, not only with interventionists, but also with the great majority of isolationists, who saw it as a non-violent means of curbing Japanese aggression against China.

Further, from a Gallup poll taken about a month after the embargo was announced:

Should the United States take steps now to keep Japan from becoming more powerful, even if it means risking a war with Japan?

Yes................................ 70%

No................................ 18

No opinion......................... 12​

(source)

And even as early as May, 1939:

Would you join a movement in this country to stop buying goods made in Japan?

Yes................................ 66%

No................................ 34

Do you think the United States should forbid shipment of arms or ammunition from this country to Japan?

Yes................................ 72%

No................................ 28​

(source)

(from "The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945" by John Toland, https://books.google.be/books?id=En...left Japan in an untenable situation"&f=false)
(If this link to Google Books doesn't work for you, you can do a Google search with the search terms: "now left Japan in an untenable situation" for example)

Toland was a revisionist, an FDR hater, and toward the end of his life a full-blown conspiracy theorist, although he hadn't gone completely off the deep end when the above was written. He is correct that the embargo made the situation for Japan untenable, which FDR and his advisors knew would happen¹, but Toland's insinuation that the embargo was some sort of violation of international law is specious. Vichy France agreed to allow the Japanese occupation only under military duress (from Germany in addition to Japan), which was itself a violation of international law, so the US was perfectly justified in applying economic sanctions.

It was perhaps a good idea at the time to act against Japanese imperialism and expansionism, but this should have been done in a more calculated and moderate way, without triggering a major war. For example, Roosevelt could have ordered that the price of oil for Japan be multiplied by two through new taxes, and that the money collected in this way be sent to resistance fighters in Northern China, until Japan stops her aggression in China (not including Manchukuo, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manchukuo, where the Japanese colonization effort might have been temporarily tolerated).

Granting for the sake of argument that FDR had the power to do this, the idea that it would have been any less of a provocation to Japan is frankly silly. The Japanese could not have run their economy and their war machine on only half (or even 3/4) of the oil they were using in July of 1941; they would still have been faced with the identical dilemma; either abandon the war in China, or attack the Netherlands East Indies. Except they would have been able to stockpile an additional two months' or so worth of oil before they attacked. And the US was already providing substantial military assistance to China in 1941, far more than your oil penalty would have netted, even had Japan been in a position to pay it. Plus there would undoubtedly have been a number of neutral countries that would have been happy to have helped Japan evade the penalty for a small fee.

However, I actually think that the US would have been better off not embargoing oil or strategic materials at that time (though some cuts could have been made on the aforementioned grounds of domestic requirements). The reason for this is that even a two- or three-month delay in Japan's attack would have benefited the Allies enormously; the US and Britain were both reinforcing their possessions in the Far East, and the Japanese would have had a tougher time conquering them. The Dutch were not in a position to do as much, but they did receive some modern American and British aircraft through lend-lease, which would have substantially aided in the Netherlands East Indies' defense had the Japanese attack been delayed. Also, the Allies would have had two or three months to produce more weapons and train their forces.

_______________________

¹In fact, FDR intended to make an exception to the embargo for oil, because he knew what a provocation it would be, but bureaucratic red tape and foot-dragging meant that the appropriate permits weren't issued for a month, by which time FDR judged that the damage had been done, and formalized the oil embargo. See here (paid subscription or access through a library or university required).

 

[Michel H]

Granting for the sake of argument that FDR had the power to do this, the idea that it would have been any less of a provocation to Japan is frankly silly. The Japanese could not have run their economy and their war machine on only half (or even 3/4) of the oil they were using in July of 1941; they would still have been faced with the identical dilemma; either abandon the war in China, or attack the Netherlands East Indies. Except they would have been able to stockpile an additional two months' or so worth of oil before they attacked. And the US was already providing substantial military assistance to China in 1941, far more than your oil penalty would have netted, even had Japan been in a position to pay it. Plus there would undoubtedly have been a number of neutral countries that would have been happy to have helped Japan evade the penalty for a small fee.

If Roosevelt could decree a complete oil embargo (apparently through a "freeze" on Japanese funds in the United States, from what the article "The 1941 De Facto Embargo on Oil to Japan: A Bureaucratic Reflex" that you mention explains), I don't see why he couldn't have decreed some kind of partial trade embargo, with limited penalties imposed on Japan (possibly with some help from Congress, but I am not sure this would have even been necessary). With 80% of its oil imports abruptly terminated, Japan was facing economic disaster, and in fact Roosevelt (with his administration) almost forced Japan to take the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to get the oil she needed, not only for her military, but also for her economy, and her ordinary citizens, since Japan did not want to accept to have her policies regarding China and Manchukuo dictated by the U.S.. In other words, Roosevelt almost forced Japan into war, and I think this would certainly justify an apology.

If the U.S. had clearly and pedagogically explained to Japan (after consultation with the League of Nations) that her policies in China were not acceptable, but that a policy of tolerance would be used with respect of Manchukuo, to protect Japanese settlers or workers there (about two hundred thousands), and also Japan's economic development, it seems to me the war in the Pacific could have easily been avoided. There is an obvious difference, understandable by all, between reducing oil exports by 25% (the figure you mention) and reducing them by 80%: 25% might be manageable, 80% (combined with other embargoes) was probably not, and this led to war, not unexpectedly.

Of course, the U.S. nowadays is still pursuing and continuing her trade embargo policies, which cause economic suffering for populations in Iran, Venezuela and other countries. These policies have probably been the cause of recents riots in Iran, which have killed about 1,500 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019–2020_Iranian_protests).

 

[SpitfireIX]

If Roosevelt could decree a complete oil embargo (apparently through a "freeze" on Japanese funds in the United States, from what the article "The 1941 De Facto Embargo on Oil to Japan: A Bureaucratic Reflex" that you mention explains), I don't see why he couldn't have decreed some kind of partial trade embargo, with limited penalties imposed on Japan (possibly with some help from Congress, but I am not sure this would have even been necessary).

Actually, export taxes and duties are prohibited by the US Constitution, but that's a relatively minor point. First, I said that I'd grant for the sake of argument that FDR could have done that, and, second, he could certainly have imposed an export quota without the duty (and, as I mentioned, the US was already supplying China with far more military assistance than any tax on exports to Japan could have purchased).

With 80% of its oil imports abruptly terminated, Japan was facing economic disaster . . .

No. In 1941 the Japanese estimated that the civilian economy would require 12.7 million barrels of petroleum products per year, and domestic production plus imports from Japan's possessions Manchuria and Formosa were equal to about 5.2 million barrels per year. (source) However, in 1941, Japan had petroleum stockpiles in excess of 42 million barrels (source), which would have been enough to have run the civilian economy for years.

. . . and in fact Roosevelt (with his administration) almost forced Japan to take the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) to get the oil she needed, not only for her military, but also for her economy, and her ordinary citizens, since Japan did not want to accept to have her policies regarding China and Manchukuo dictated by the U.S.

You mean they didn't want to stop their brutal war of aggression against China, which ended up killing about 10 million Chinese civilians and four million Chinese soldiers.

In other words, Roosevelt almost forced Japan into war, and I think this would certainly justify an apology.

See my previous comment.

If the U.S. had clearly and pedagogically explained to Japan (after consultation with the League of Nations) that her policies in China were not acceptable . . .

First, the US was never a member of the League, and Japan withdrew in 1933 after the other members unanimously condemned Japanese aggression in China. Fail. Second, the US did clearly explain to Japan that those policies were not acceptable, on many occasions, both before and after the embargo.

. . . but that a policy of tolerance would be used with respect of Manchukuo, to protect Japanese settlers or workers there (about two hundred thousands), and also Japan's economic development, it seems to me the war in the Pacific could have easily been avoided.

No. The militarists would never have voluntarily ended the war in China without at least a partial victory. And anyone in the Japanese government who suggested doing so was likely to have been assassinated by a junior Army officer.

There is an obvious difference, understandable by all, between reducing oil exports by 25% (the figure you mention) and reducing them by 80%: 25% might be manageable, 80% (combined with other embargoes) was probably not, and this led to war, not unexpectedly.

I think you mean "imports" here. But in any case, I may have confused you by my failure to explain how I arrived at my figures. You suggested that FDR could have doubled the price of oil sold to Japan; I took this as being equivalent to possibly cutting exports by 50%, if the Japanese continued to spend the same amount of money on oil. However, if they could somehow have come up with more money, they might have been able to have purchased a bit more, or they might have purchased a bit less, and tried to make due with other energy sources, mainly coal, for certain uses. This is ignoring the issue of that I previously mentioned of their running out of foreign exchange. Simply halving all US and Allied exports to Japan would have reduced Japanese oil consumption by 40%; their buying less oil due to your proposed penalty might have reduced that to 50%, and their paying the penalty to buy more might have increased it to 75%, but that would undoubtedly have put a severe strain on the country's already stretched foreign exchange.

The point I'm trying to make here is that 75% would have been a "best-case" scenario for Japan's oil supply in your hypothetical, with 60% more likely. And even if their supply was only cut by 25%, they could have made up the shortfall from their large reserves that I mentioned, but they would not have wanted to drain those in case they did have to fight the US, or in case of a total embargo. If you meant to imply that they could have somehow continued to run their war machine and their economy with only 75% of the oil they'd previously used, that's simply wrong. A 25% cut in oil to the economy would have caused a deep recession, and possibly a full-blown depression, and a 25% cut in oil to the Army would have seriously damaged operations in China. The Navy could possibly have survived a 25% cut, but training and operational readiness would have been severely reduced.

Of course, the U.S. nowadays is still pursuing and continuing her trade embargo policies, which cause economic suffering for populations in Iran, Venezuela and other countries. These policies have probably been the cause of recents riots in Iran, which have killed about 1,500 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019–2020_Iranian_protests).

Yes, the US clearly left the Iranian government no choice but to open fire on unarmed demonstrators.

 

[Michel H]

Second, are you aware of ISIS's stated goals? What possible compromise could be achieved by negotiation?

Perhaps the U.S. and its allies (governments of Iraq and Afghanistan) could offer to free some ISIS prisoners. As you probably know, this has been decided and done for Taliban prisoners (I suspect, though I shall not claim to be an expert, that the difference between the Taliban and the Islamic State is less big than what the U.S. is saying - but it seems, unfortunately, to be part of U.S. ideology to try to demonize some people). Another possible idea (?): the Taliban could try to bring an ISIS representative next time they meet the Americans.

 

[Little 10 Toes]

Thank you for continuing to avoid answering direct questions. The lack of a direct response speaks volumes.

 

[Michel H]

Thank you for continuing to avoid answering direct questions. The lack of a direct response speaks volumes.

Which direct question do you have in mind?

 

[SpitfireIX]

The case of Czechoslovakia is special because, in March 1939, its president Emil Hácha agreed himself to a German occupation after meeting Hitler:

After the secession of Slovakia and Ruthenia, British Ambassador to Czechoslovakia Basil Newton advised President Hácha to meet with Hitler. ... Von Ribbentrop testified at the Nuremberg trials that during this meeting Hácha had told him that "he wanted to place the fate of the Czech State in the Führer's hands."
... by four o'clock he contacted Prague, effectively "signing Czechoslovakia away" to Germany.

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emil_Hácha#Second_Czechoslovak_Republic)

I just noticed that I failed to call you on your brazen dishonesty in this post. Here is the original quotation from the Wikipedia article, with the passages you omitted hilited:

After the secession of Slovakia and Ruthenia, British Ambassador to Czechoslovakia Basil Newton advised President Hácha to meet with Hitler. When Hácha first arrived in Berlin, he first met with the German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop prior to meeting with Hitler. Von Ribbentrop testified at the Nuremberg trials that during this meeting Hácha had told him that "he wanted to place the fate of the Czech State in the Führer's hands."

In the evening of 14 March 1939, Hitler summoned President Hácha to the Reich Chancellery in Berlin. Hitler deliberately kept him waiting for hours, while Hitler watched a film. Wilhelm Keitel in his memoirs recalled that when Hácha arrived Hitler said that "he was going to let the old gentleman rest and recover for two hours" which was incomprehensible to Keitel. Finally, at 1:30 a.m., on 15 March 1939, Hitler saw the President. He told Hácha that as they were speaking, the German army was about to invade Czechoslovakia. Hitler then gave the Czech President two options: cooperate with Germany, in which case the "entry of German troops would take place in a tolerable manner" and "permit Czechoslovakia a generous life of her own, autonomy and a degree of national freedom..." or face a scenario in which "resistance would be broken by force of arms, using all means." Minutes of the conversation noted that for Hácha this was the most difficult decision of his life, but believed that in only a few years this decision would be comprehensible and in 50 years would probably be regarded as a blessing. According to Joachim Fest, Hácha suffered a heart attack induced by Göring's threat to bomb the capital and by four o'clock he contacted Prague, effectively "signing Czechoslovakia away" to Germany. [notes omitted]​

Kindly explain why you felt it necessary to edit the quotation to make it appear that Hácha's agreement was voluntary, when it was clearly under severe duress, and why you chose to omit the passages that clearly indicate that Hitler was going to invade what was left of Czechoslovakia with or without Hácha's cooperation.

 

[Michel H]

I just noticed that I failed to call you on your brazen dishonesty in this post. Here is the original quotation from the Wikipedia article, with the passages you omitted hilited:

After the secession of Slovakia and Ruthenia, British Ambassador to Czechoslovakia Basil Newton advised President Hácha to meet with Hitler. When Hácha first arrived in Berlin, he first met with the German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop prior to meeting with Hitler. Von Ribbentrop testified at the Nuremberg trials that during this meeting Hácha had told him that "he wanted to place the fate of the Czech State in the Führer's hands."

In the evening of 14 March 1939, Hitler summoned President Hácha to the Reich Chancellery in Berlin. Hitler deliberately kept him waiting for hours, while Hitler watched a film. Wilhelm Keitel in his memoirs recalled that when Hácha arrived Hitler said that "he was going to let the old gentleman rest and recover for two hours" which was incomprehensible to Keitel. Finally, at 1:30 a.m., on 15 March 1939, Hitler saw the President. He told Hácha that as they were speaking, the German army was about to invade Czechoslovakia. Hitler then gave the Czech President two options: cooperate with Germany, in which case the "entry of German troops would take place in a tolerable manner" and "permit Czechoslovakia a generous life of her own, autonomy and a degree of national freedom..." or face a scenario in which "resistance would be broken by force of arms, using all means." Minutes of the conversation noted that for Hácha this was the most difficult decision of his life, but believed that in only a few years this decision would be comprehensible and in 50 years would probably be regarded as a blessing. According to Joachim Fest, Hácha suffered a heart attack induced by Göring's threat to bomb the capital and by four o'clock he contacted Prague, effectively "signing Czechoslovakia away" to Germany. [notes omitted]​

Kindly explain why you felt it necessary to edit the quotation to make it appear that Hácha's agreement was voluntary, when it was clearly under severe duress, and why you chose to omit the passages that clearly indicate that Hitler was going to invade what was left of Czechoslovakia with or without Hácha's cooperation.

I agree (I have no reason to doubt) that there was probably intense pressure on Hácha. I put suspension points ("...") to make it clear that some sentences were omitted, and I provided a link so that interested readers could easily read the full wikipedia text. My goal was to emphasize the essential point, namely that the invasion and occupation of the remaining part of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 could be done in a mostly non-violent way, because it was accepted and agreed by its president. Wikipedia also explains:

... Hácha also signed into law legislation modeled after the Nazi Nuremberg Laws that discriminated against Czech Jews.[18]

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emil_Hácha#Protectorate_of_Bohemia_and_Moravia).
So, he actually later collaborated with the Nazis (somewhat like Pétain in France a few years later), and in the worst possible fashion, I might add, but he may have had very little choice.

 

[SpitfireIX]

I agree (I have no reason to doubt) that there was probably intense pressure on Hácha. I put suspension points ("...") to make it clear that some sentences were omitted, and I provided a link so that interested readers could easily read the full wikipedia text. My goal was to emphasize the essential point, namely that the invasion and occupation of the remaining part of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 could be done in a mostly non-violent way, because it was accepted and agreed by its president.

First, you strongly implied that Hitler's occupation of what was left of Czechoslovakia should not be taken as evidence that he wanted territory for any reason other than bringing ethnic Germans into Germany, because Hácha "agreed" to the occupation of Czechoslovakia. However, the parts of the article you omitted clearly indicate that Hitler was going to occupy the country with or without Czech cooperation, and that Hácha "agreed" only under extreme duress.

Second, after I called you on this, you pivoted back to your outrageous contention that the way to prevent wars is to refrain from resisting aggression, which is irrelevant to my point.

Wikipedia also explains:

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emil_Hácha#Protectorate_of_Bohemia_and_Moravia).
So, he actually later collaborated with the Nazis (somewhat like Pétain in France a few years later), and in the worst possible fashion, I might add, but he may have had very little choice.

This is also irrelevant.