The study of atoms in the brain doesn't explain the redness of red;Materialism = FAKE

[xjx388]

Yes, for the sake of this conversation I will grant the eyes deliver measurable quantities of physical properties . . . but from the mass, spin, charge, frequency, etc. in the cells/molecules of the brain, can we deduce (even in principle) what it is like to love a spouse or a dog?
From any recent neuroscience research I can find - the answer is no. And of recent we hear of researchers comments like Well there has to be some properties of matter we just don't know about . . . and when we discover these properties we'll understand how the brain works. Or Pansychism . . Or when the chips are down they'll take the nuclear option . . . consciousness is an illusion.

If I were to select a movie without you knowing which one, muted the volume and displayed only a single pixel on a monitor, could you tell me what the actors are saying? No. You couldn’t even deduce it in principle because you’d only be looking at a tiny tiny fraction of the whole. You wouldn’t have enough information.

So it is with consciousness. We don’t have enough information.

 

[Darat]

Can you describe what that feels like? Not in terms of the room but in terms of how you feel?

Nauseous?

 

[shuttlt]

I'd like to zoom in on this particular statement, because I've seen versions of it claimed throughout this thread, and to be honest I flat out disagree with it. I claim it is actually nothing more then chemical reactions and neurons firing in the correct sequence. But clearly you disagree, so lets go with that.

You say its missing something, even though we can currently describe red to a blind person. Please describe what is missing. If you cant, then I say you have no basis to make such a claim.

How do you know they see red and not purple or are experiencing some other thing that you don't experience? There is a subjective aspect to the experience that isn't externally knowable.

 

[Darat]

How do you know they see red and not purple or are experiencing some other thing that you don't experience? There is a subjective aspect to the experience that isn't externally knowable.

Consider this as analogy. Does your liver* in any significant way do anything different to mine? Do your eyes work differently than mine, do your nerves work differently than mine?

Since we know we can apply the same stimulus to the same part of the brain and get the same reported result from different people and we can see damage to the brain in the same place having the same effects in different people why would we think our brains work differently?

Plus we can then look at how we learn to communicate with one another as yet another level of similarity.

Now we do know that the brain is very plastic so it can adapt to lots of different environmental changes but the basic underlying mechanisms remain the same.


*Assuming we both have healthy, typical livers and organs?

 

[shuttlt]

Consider this as analogy. Does your liver* in any significant way do anything different to mine? Do your eyes work differently than mine, do your nerves work differently than mine?

Since we know we can apply the same stimulus to the same part of the brain and get the same reported result from different people and we can see damage to the brain in the same place having the same effects in different people why would we think our brains work differently?

Sure, but let's say I doubt. How would you confirm that the blind persons "red" and mine, or yours are actually the same experience? With your liver example, I suspect we could do that.

 

[MRC_Hans]

Sure, but let's say I doubt. How would you confirm that the blind persons "red" and mine, or yours are actually the same experience? With your liver example, I suspect we could do that.

I think I am getting the meaning of qualia a bit better, now:

You, I and the augmented blind person all experience red. It's essentially the same experience, because the red we observe is (presumably) the same.

From this each of us gain a memory experience, a quale, of that particular red. Those may be different, as our observation channels (eyes, added technology) are not identical, and we cannot readily compare them.

- In fact methods can be deviced that allow for some comparison of many kinds of qualia, but it may never be an exact science.

Hans

 

[David Mo]

Seems to me that most people's understanding of neuroscience is at least 10-15 years ahead of where neuroscience is actually at.

It is often an eye opener to read accounts of actual experiments to see how they differ from popular understanding of them.

Could you recommend a couple of articles on those progress?

 

[Darat]

Sure, but let's say I doubt. How would you confirm that the blind persons "red" and mine, or yours are actually the same experience? With your liver example, I suspect we could do that.

Honestly I'd say "doubt it". If the evidence and arguments don't sway you then they don't sway you but would be interested in why they don't.

 

[Darat]

I think I am getting the meaning of qualia a bit better, now:

You, I and the augmented blind person all experience red. It's essentially the same experience, because the red we observe is (presumably) the same.

From this each of us gain a memory experience, a quale, of that particular red. Those may be different, as our observation channels (eyes, added technology) are not identical, and we cannot readily compare them.

- In fact methods can be deviced that allow for some comparison of many kinds of qualia, but it may never be an exact science.

Hans

This is where folk like me come in. In a very real sense I cannot "remember" red, or a red apple or a purple balloon. I only have the "experience" of red when I am seeing something that is red, so unless I'm looking at the red apple there is no "qualia of redness" for me.

So lets say there is something in these qualia, that they exist. We'd have to ask what function do they have. And we know whatever they are and whatever they do they have nothing to do with consciousnesses, the ability to think and reason, self reflection, creativity and so on as people like me demonstrate. They seem to be rather like a vestige organ, perhaps some holdover evolutionary wise from when they did do something?

 

[shuttlt]

I think I am getting the meaning of qualia a bit better, now:

You, I and the augmented blind person all experience red. It's essentially the same experience, because the red we observe is (presumably) the same.

From this each of us gain a memory experience, a quale, of that particular red. Those may be different, as our observation channels (eyes, added technology) are not identical, and we cannot readily compare them.

- In fact methods can be deviced that allow for some comparison of many kinds of qualia, but it may never be an exact science.

Hans

How do we know that my experience of red is the same/similar to yours? The implementation in my brain is going to be slightly different. Does that difference matter? Given that the brain can construct purple when no such colour exists, clearly the brain can construct fictional colours. In fact, aren't all our experiences of colours fictions created by our brains? There is nothing red about light between 700–635 nm, our brains just map the qualia we call redness to it. How would you determine that what you experience as red, I don't experience as some completely different fictional colour, say "blarf"?

 

[shuttlt]

This is where folk like me come in. In a very real sense I cannot "remember" red, or a red apple or a purple balloon. I only have the "experience" of red when I am seeing something that is red, so unless I'm looking at the red apple there is no "qualia of redness" for me.

I suspect I'm not too far off having the same limitation Darat.

 

[MRC_Hans]

This is where folk like me come in. In a very real sense I cannot "remember" red, or a red apple or a purple balloon. I only have the "experience" of red when I am seeing something that is red, so unless I'm looking at the red apple there is no "qualia of redness" for me.

So lets say there is something in these qualia, that they exist. We'd have to ask what function do they have. And we know whatever they are and whatever they do they have nothing to do with consciousnesses, the ability to think and reason, self reflection, creativity and so on as people like me demonstrate. They seem to be rather like a vestige organ, perhaps some holdover evolutionary wise from when they did do something?

I think that is different. You cannot visualize the red object, but you do evidently remember it, since you can recognize it when you see it again.

In my opinion, 'qualia' is simply a name we can attach to some, essentiall arbitrary, part of the cognitive process. I have gotten a better understanding of that during this discussion, but I quite fail to see any evidence that it should be some uniqe entity or process.

Hans

 

[shuttlt]

Honestly I'd say "doubt it". If the evidence and arguments don't sway you then they don't sway you but would be interested in why they don't.

You are asserting that a blind person can experience redness. All I'm saying is prove it. Prove that what they are experiencing is redness, and not purpleness or "blarfness". The redness of the experience is not externally accessible. You can look at all the neurons you like down to the atom, and there is nothing there that will confirm that it is redness and not blarfness that the blind person is "seeing" and calling "redness".

 

[Darat]

I think that is different. You cannot visualize the red object, but you do evidently remember it, since you can recognize it when you see it again.

In my opinion, 'qualia' is simply a name we can attach to some, essentiall arbitrary, part of the cognitive process. I have gotten a better understanding of that during this discussion, but I quite fail to see any evidence that it should be some uniqe entity or process.

Hans

You haven't really - those that propose it mean much more than that!

 

[MRC_Hans]

You haven't really - those that propose it mean much more than that!

Then they should be able to explain that.

Hans

 

[Darat]

You are asserting that a blind person can experience redness. All I'm saying is prove it. Prove that what they are experiencing is redness, and not purpleness or "blarfness". The redness of the experience is not externally accessible. You can look at all the neurons you like down to the atom, and there is nothing there that will confirm that it is redness and not blarfness that the blind person is "seeing" and calling "redness".

That firing of neurons and all the chemicals sloshing around is your "subjective" experience. That is what "redness" is. There is no need for anything more.

 

[Darat]

Then they should be able to explain that.

Hans

You would have thought so....

 

[shuttlt]

That firing of neurons and all the chemicals sloshing around is your "subjective" experience. That is what "redness" is. There is no need for anything more.

OK, those things certainly seem to create my experience of redness. I don't dispute that they do. How would we confirm that my experience of redness is the same or different to yours? Maybe two quite different ways of producing redness actually produce the same qualia, while a similar looking way produces blarfness? How would we determine that?

 

[RedStapler]

How would we confirm that my experience of redness is the same or different to yours?

This idea may seem totally crazy and outlandish at first but how about we showed both of you something red and confirm that both of you see red

 

[Wudang]

My tl;dr version : the idea of "qualia" is an excuse to avoid learning anything about psychology & neurology. It's a postulated quantum of sensation as a sort of cargo cult aping of scientific recursive decomposition but without the rigour.