The study of atoms in the brain doesn't explain the redness of red;Materialism = FAKE

[Cheetah]

By the way I would be interested in a cite to detecting which colour a person is seeing in real time

It would be unsurprising that we could detect this in later analysis of the data but I am surprised that it can be done in real time.

Neural Networks are definitely magic, exactly like brains.

Deep image reconstruction from human brain activity

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have recently been applied successfully to brain decoding and image reconstruction from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) activity.
...
We accomplished this by training a generative adversarial network with an additional loss term that was defined in high-level feature space (feature loss) using up to 6,000 training data samples (natural images and fMRI responses). The above model was tested on independent datasets and directly reconstructed image using an fMRI pattern as the input.
Reconstructions obtained from our proposed method resembled the test stimuli (natural and artificial images) and reconstruction accuracy increased as a function of training-data size.
...
Our results show that the end-to-end model can learn a direct mapping between brain activity and perception.

Seems like the study of cells in the brain can explain the redness of red or any other perception.

Image Reconstruction From Human Brain Waves in Real-Time

 

[LarryS]

How do you think electronic devices process information?

Here's a hint: It's mathematically.

Exactly, but in this case it works because implants provide proxy qualia. Likewise I have a stereo that I bought in 1980 that can be described mathmetically, and delivers sound that can be described mathematically. But it delivers qualia.

 

[MohamedTaqi]

There is NO SUCH THING as "metaphysics'. That people might ponder these questions doesn't make them real. They also ponder warp speed, transporter beams and witches.

How do you know we don't understand matter and or consciousness fully? This is the infinity paradox in another form.

Whenever people start theorizing the metaphysical or supernatural they are just making castles in the air. These things aren't real. They might make a good movie or a book but until any of it can be demonstrated it is nothing more.

Batman, Superman, Allah, Yahweh, Thor, Sauron and so on and so on are all merely human literary creations and shouldn't be considered seiously by any individual who considers themselve a skeptic.

I am afraid my friend you do not seem to understand what "Metaphysics" is. Metaphysics is not the Metaphysical in layman terms. I will write the former in green, and the later in red.

I am personally an Atheist, I do not believe in Yahweh or Allah or any other metaphysical or supernatural entity .


- Whether the cosmos exists independent of our conscious experience (when we are not looking, i.e : materialism and dualism) , or whether it is only a construct of our conscious experience (i.e idealism). Or whether it is finite or infinite in space, Are all metaphysical questions in the branch of philosophy we call : Metaphysics.

When I ask : what are the constituents of this cup of coffee, this is physics , this is science.

When I ask questions that seem to not have an easy (or even possible) answer about the nature of things around me, this is metaphysics . A branch in philosophy.

And it has nothing to do whatsoever what lay people mean by metaphysical . The question " what is existence" is metaphysical in the philosophical sense. The question : whether magic is real? however, is not , magic is metaphysical in layman terms.

 

[bruto]

Thinking a bit more on this whole subject, it occurs to me to wonder if the initial question even makes sense. If some idea existed that actually explained the redness of red, would there be a discussion at all?

Aside from assertions that there is such a thing as redness, and that there is such a thing as qualia, and continued statements that materialism doesn't provide enough explanation, has there been what you could call an explanation of redness from any other source?

It seems as if the argument against materialism is that we haven't figured out how it would work, but that something else would if we could only figure out how it works.

 

[Darat]

Thinking a bit more on this whole subject, it occurs to me to wonder if the initial question even makes sense. If some idea existed that actually explained the redness of red, would there be a discussion at all?

Aside from assertions that there is such a thing as redness, and that there is such a thing as qualia, and continued statements that materialism doesn't provide enough explanation, has there been what you could call an explanation of redness from any other source?
It seems as if the argument against materialism is that we haven't figured out how it would work, but that something else would if we could only figure out how it works.

This has come up before and the answer is always "no".

 

[Crossbow]

Thinking a bit more on this whole subject, it occurs to me to wonder if the initial question even makes sense. If some idea existed that actually explained the redness of red, would there be a discussion at all?

Aside from assertions that there is such a thing as redness, and that there is such a thing as qualia, and continued statements that materialism doesn't provide enough explanation, has there been what you could call an explanation of redness from any other source?

It seems as if the argument against materialism is that we haven't figured out how it would work, but that something else would if we could only figure out how it works.

Seconded!

I too thought the OP made no sense because the term 'redness' is essentially an undefinable term.

And on the other hand, if the term 'redness' could be explicitly defined, then there would be no need for this discussion to begin with.

 

[Darat]

Seconded!

I too thought the OP made no sense because the term 'redness' is essentially an undefinable term.

And on the other hand, if the term 'redness' could be explicitly defined, then there would be no need for this discussion to begin with.

This is why I always say there is for me no "experience of redness" separate of me seeing something that is red*.


*With the caveat as Myriad puts it - colour isn't for humans just a matter of a certain wavelength of light, our eyes and brain can be fooled.

ETA: There is also a matter of how detailed are these "qualia" - as I asked earlier is there a separate qualia for vanilla ice cream and chocolate ice cream and for apple juice and so on and so on. Plus the question becomes how do we know what these qualia are?

But in the end there isn't any reason (any longer) to believe qualia could never mind do exist. Our increased knowledge via science has relegated it to a concept like the ether, it was considered, found not to exist and we moved on to the next question.

 

[MRC_Hans]

Exactly, but in this case it works because implants provide proxy qualia. Likewise I have a stereo that I bought in 1980 that can be described mathmetically, and delivers sound that can be described mathematically. But it delivers qualia.

It does? How do you recognize those qualia?

Hans

 

[MohamedTaqi]

That’s just an assertion, and there is no we that includes me as I do not know what their “nature” is.

By the nature of qualia, I mean what are they made of? are they material, emergent properties of the material, or something separate from the material. This is what I mean by : what is their nature.

Whether qualia exist or not, my assertion holds true :

- If qualia exist, then we do not know their nature, because we cannot give a full account of how they are produced, or whether they are material, emergent of the material or something else.

- If qualia do not exist, then again, we do not know what their nature is, because there is no nature to talk about. It's just an illusion in this case.
____

can use the same induction to claim there are no qualia as the only particular example I know of (me) doesn’t seem to have this thing (a thing that apparently can’t even be defined in a non circular way).

Yes, you can use induction if you can, but how can you get rid of this contradiction in your statement?

The definition of Qualia is the qualitative aspect of our conscious experience, how it seems, or feels...

"I don't seem to have qualia" or "I seem to not have qualia" are very contradictory statements, you can't talk about seeming if you deny qualia.

 

[Darat]

By the nature of qualia, I mean what are they made of? are they material, emergent properties of the material, or something separate from the material. This is what I mean by : what is their nature.

You need to prove something exists before we need to consider what other properties it may have.

Whether qualia exist or not, my assertion holds true :

- If qualia exist, then we do not know their nature, because we cannot give a full account of how they are produced, or whether they are material, emergent of the material or something else.

- If qualia do not exist, then again, we do not know what their nature is, because there is no nature to talk about. It's just an illusion in this case.

There is no "illusion", I see a read apple, that is the beginning and end for me there is no "seeing a red apple" and an "experience of seeing a red apple". And as has been shown there isn't a difference for other people as well.

Yes, you can use induction if you can, but how can you get rid of this contradiction in your statement?
The definition of Qualia is the qualitative aspect of our conscious experience, how it seems, or feels...

"I don't seem to have qualia" or "I seem to not have qualia" are very contradictory statements, you can't talk about seeming if you deny qualia.

Sorry but that is just silly semantics.

I don't have qualia, it is these days a silly idea. I see things and that is the beginning and end of it. Leave it in the past where it belongs with many other failed explanations.

 

[MohamedTaqi]

Nonsense.
Do transporter beams exist? No.
Do warp drives exist? No
Does Middle Earth exist? No
Does Hogwarts exist? No.
Do witches exist? No.

Existential claims must be demonstrated not merely imagined.

Cool down ! I don't believe in witches or Gods or magic.

I am just saying that when I feel redness , the color of an apple, to say that the apple exists, the quality of redness too must exist, for any knowledge to take place. This quality is what "Qualia" means.

 

[MohamedTaqi]

You need to prove something exists before we need to consider what other properties it may have.

When I am in a coma or deep sleep, compared to when I am awake.. These states feel different. The difference is what I call : the absence and presence of qualia.

And I suspect, using induction, that you feel redness too.

Moreover, the very fact that humans invented the word "existence", proves that they mean something by the word. If we were zombies (without internal conscious experience), we would not talk about "existence", because there is no way we would feel it , or observe it.

There is no "illusion", I see a read apple, that is the beginning and end for me there is no "seeing a red apple" and an "experience of seeing a red apple". And as has been shown there isn't a difference for other people as well.

Then you deny that any experience takes place .. Why do you ask me then of what exists? if you cannot experience existence?

How can you prove that you "see" anything at all, if you don't experience this seeing?

Sorry but that is just silly semantics.

I don't have qualia, it is these days a silly idea. I see things and that is the beginning and end of it.

What do you mean by " I see things "..

You mean , like a camera?

 

[shuttlt]

Thinking a bit more on this whole subject, it occurs to me to wonder if the initial question even makes sense. If some idea existed that actually explained the redness of red, would there be a discussion at all?

Aside from assertions that there is such a thing as redness, and that there is such a thing as qualia, and continued statements that materialism doesn't provide enough explanation, has there been what you could call an explanation of redness from any other source?

It seems as if the argument against materialism is that we haven't figured out how it would work, but that something else would if we could only figure out how it works.

Does one need to figure out what would work instead, or believe that such a thing is likely to be possible to think that qualia sit outside materialist explanations?

The argument I always found convincing was that emergent properties are just more complicated versions of the properties of the things they emerge from. I think that argument goes back to antiquity. Sand has a temperature, so does the sand dune. Sand moves when a force is exerted on it, so does a sand dune. It's not obvious that the subjective first person existence of qualia is like that, and if it is what aspect of a carbon atom gives rise to qualia.

 

[Wudang]

The argument I always found convincing was that emergent properties are just more complicated versions of the properties of the things they emerge from.

How about distance apart? Or the 3 body problem?

 

[Dave Rogers]

The argument I always found convincing was that emergent properties are just more complicated versions of the properties of the things they emerge from.

I'm surprised you find that a convincing argument, given that it directly contradicts the definition of the term "emergent" as I understand it; an emergent property of a system is one that is not possessed by any of the individual parts of the system, rather than a more complicated version of a specific property that is.

Dave

 

[MohamedTaqi]

The argument I always found convincing was that emergent properties are just more complicated versions of the properties of the things they emerge from. I think that argument goes back to antiquity. Sand has a temperature, so does the sand dune. Sand moves when a force is exerted on it, so does a sand dune. It's not obvious that the subjective first person existence of qualia is like that, and if it is what aspect of a carbon atom gives rise to qualia.

Yes, I can't agree more. Qualia are a process, not a thing .

But this process is not necessarily a property inherent to the parts. They are not more complicated versions, but new versions, that depends on the more basic principles.

 

[Myriad]

Exactly, but in this case it works because implants provide proxy qualia. Likewise I have a stereo that I bought in 1980 that can be described mathmetically, and delivers sound that can be described mathematically. But it delivers qualia.

If the sound from a stereo delivers qualia, then the sound itself, whether heard or unheard, either is qualia, or possesses qualia. (Otherwise it could not deliver qualia.)

If the sound is qualia, then why call it qualia rather than sound?

If the sound has qualia, what is the distinction between the sound's qualia and the sound itself?

I don't think the concept of qualia as used by those who originated the term agrees with your statement that a stereo delivers qualia. The above questions might clarify that.

 

[LarryS]

It does? How do you recognize those qualia?

Hans

I, and presumably (nearly) everyone else experiences qualitia, and while totally familiar and easy to provide examples . . . how my morning cup(s) of coffee tastes, smells and feels like to me . . . it's difficult to provide a usable definition. While it may be difficult to define qualia, that does not mean the tactic should be to claim they don't exist. I see no reason why qualia should not fall under the pervue of science. We obviously need a different approach as there has been zero progress so far - as evidenced by researhers and labs moving in directions like pansychism, 'biological materialism', 'proto-conscious matter' . . . things is getting desperate.

 

[Darat]

I, and presumably (nearly) everyone else experiences qualitia, and while totally familiar and easy to provide examples . . . how my morning cup(s) of coffee tastes, smells and feels like to me . . . it's difficult to provide a usable definition. While it may be difficult to define qualia, that does not mean the tactic should be to claim they don't exist. I see no reason why qualia should not fall under the pervue of science. We obviously need a different approach as there has been zero progress so far - as evidenced by researhers and labs moving in directions like pansychism, 'biological materialism', 'proto-conscious matter' . . . things is getting desperate.

Zero progress - apart from being able to describe sight to the blind to give them vision....

 

[MohamedTaqi]

Zero progress - apart from being able to describe sight to the blind to give them vision....

You can understand qualia if and only if you have it.

If you don't have qualia, then you cannot talk about it. You cannot deny it, because you do not know what you deny.

Because it is an intrinsically qualitative property. This is not like Gods or magic, this is a self-referential subject.