You ignore so many facts to be taken seriously.
It wasn't "The CIA", it was Alec Station which withheld information. It wasn't "The FBI" it was the FBI's bin Laden Group run out of the NYC office which was both co-opted by Alec Station and sat on its own intel. For some reason the fact that neither Alec Station nor the NYC bin Laden Group were not integrated with their respective Counter-Terrorism desks doesn't throw up any red flags for you. CIA officers often do not share intel outside of their groups. On 9-11 the CIA balked at giving White House NSC all of their information even though the attacks were in progress, and had to have their arms twisted.
We get it, you hate the CIA. Whatever, but it's just another government agency. Somehow the Clinton Administration's NSC gets a pass even though they sat on Al Qaeda for a number of years and Sandy Berger stole documents from the National Archives relating to Al Qaeda, and destroyed them. Why is it that with 9-11 Truther types the claim where there's smoke there's fire except where there is actual smoke and flames?
I don't know if I would call this a confused mess of ignorance or an ignorant mess of confusion.
As to the details of the actions at the CIA and FBI see my post #55, I even name all of the people who were involved with criminal actions that had allowed the attacks on 9/11 to take place.
You wrote:
“You ignore so many facts to be taken seriously.
It wasn't "The CIA", it was Alec Station which withheld information.”
It was not just the CIA bin Laden unit that withheld information from the FBI (criminal investigators) but the following CIA stations:
January 4-8, 2000
The information of the Kuala Lumpur al Qaeda planning meeting was withheld from FBI criminal investigators by: the Malaysian Station, the Dubai Station, the Thailand Station, the Yemen Station, the bin Laden Station, and the upper management of the CIA, including Cofer Black and George Tenet. The information on this meeting and even the full name Khalid al-Mihdhar was given to FBI Director. Louis Freeh, Dale Watson, high level manager at the FBI and in June, 2001, and acting FBI Director, Tom Pickard, none of whom gave this information to the FBI Cole bombing investigators. When FBI Agent Ali Soufan requested an official request be sent to the CIA from Freeh, for any information on any al Qaeda planning meeting in January 2000, and any information on Walid bin Attash, Freeh, claimed this information did not exist, even when he himself, had gotten much of this information from the CIA and Tenet himself, in January 2000.
March 5, 2000
The fact that Mihdhar and Hazmi had entered the US: the Malaysian Station, the Thailand Station, and the bin Laden Station.
January 4, 2001
The identification of Walid bin Attash at the Kuala Lumpur al Qaeda planning meeting, indicating that Mihdhar and Hazmi had taken part in the planning of the Cole bombing: the Pakistan Station, the Yemen Station, the bin Laden Station, the CTC managers at the CIA, and the upper management of the CIA including John Gannon and George Tenet.
June 12, 2001
The information that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was sending terrorists into the US in the summer of 2001, to link up with Mihdhar and Hazmi to carry out a huge al Qaeda terrorist attack, (based on the Bojinka plot): the Rendition Station, the CTC managers at the CIA, upper management of the CIA.
July 23, 2001
The information that Khalid al-Mihdhar would be found at the point of the next big al Qaeda terrorist attack: the bin Laden Station, the CTC managers, including Richard Blee, and Cofer Black, and upper management at the CIA.
July 13, and July 23, 2001
The information that the CIA spy inside of the FBI at the ITOS unit, Tom Wilshere, had been ordered to criminally sabotage any investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi by the FBI Cole bombing investigators; the bin Laden Station, the CTC managers at the CIA and upper management at the CIA.
August 22, 2001
The information that Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi were inside of the US in order to take part in a massive al Qaeda terrorist attack that would kill massive numbers of American: the FBI bin Laden unit at FBI HQs, and at the CIA, the bin Laden Station, the CTC managers, and the upper management at the CIA. This information went from the CIA bin Laden Station to the FBI bin Laden unit on August 21, 2001, over three weeks prior to the attacks on 9/11, and in plenty of time to have found them and stopped the attacks on 9/11.
August 23, 2001
The information that in spite of knowing a huge al Qaeda terrorist attack was about to take place inside of the US, that the criminal investigation and search warrants for a suspected Kattab/al Qaeda terrorist attempting to learn how to fly a B747 without even having a pilot’s license, were being blocked,: the RFU unit in the ITOS unit at the FBI, FBI ITOS senior management, and the very highest senior CIA management including George Tenet. Tenet and the CIA, even when they knew a huge al Qaeda terrorist attack was just about to take place inside of the US, refused to help the Minneapolis FBI get a FISA warrant for Moussaoui’s possessions. Had Tenet given the Minneapolis FBI agents just the information they had, these agents could have gotten a search warrant, found the receipt for $14000, from Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and unraveled the plan for this attack in just a few days.
August 28,29, 2001
The information that in spite of knowing a huge al Qaeda terrorist attack was just about to take place inside of the US, and that Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US in order to take part in this attack that would kill a massive number of Americans, and that the criminal investigation and criminal search warrants for Mihdhar and Hazmi were being shut down allowing this attack to take place: the senior management of the FBI ITOS unit, the bin Laden unit at the FBI, CIA the bin Laden Station, upper management of the CIA including George Tenet.
You wrote: “It wasn't "The FBI" it was the FBI's bin Laden Group run out of the NYC office which was both co-opted by Alec Station and sat on its own intel.”
Wrong again it was the RFU unit under the ITOS unit, the bin Laden unit under the ITOS unit, and senior manager in the ITOS, who were criminally sabotaging the criminal investigation of Moussaoui, and who had been ordered by the CIA to criminally sabotage the FBI Cole bombing investigating of Mihdhar and Hazmi.
You wrote: “For some reason the fact that neither Alec Station nor the NYC bin Laden Group were not integrated with their respective Counter-Terrorism desks doesn't throw up any red flags for you.
The organization where “neither Alec Station nor the NYC bin Laden Group were not integrated with their respective Counter-Terrorism desks” had nothing to do with allowing these attacks to take place.”
Wrong again.
What allowed these attacks to take place was the following:
The take over the highest management positions at the CIA by a criminal element, at the very the highest levels, who ordered that information on al Qaeda terrorists to be kept secret from the John O’Neill and his team of investigators at the New York office.
The actions of the CIA, with respect to the Joint Source, was treacherous. The agreement between the CIA and FBI when there was any debriefing of the CIA/FBI Joint Source, that both the FBI Alat and CIA Alat were to be present at the debriefing. It is now clear that when the January 4, 2001 debriefing took place, the CIA Alat gave the FBI Alat, material to photocopy, and when the FBI Alat was out of the room where the debriefing took placed, showed the Joint source the photo of Walid bin Attash at Kuala Lumpur. The fact that the Joint Source identified Walid bin Attash, in the Kuala Lumpur photo was never made known to the FBI Cole bombing investigators until after 9/11, this photo and this information was sent to FBI ITOS manager Rod Middleton on August 30, 2001. In spite of the Mifddleton knowing that Mihdhjar and Hazmi had taken part in the planning of the Cole bombing, which should have allowed Bongardt to continue his investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi, Middleton kept this information secret from the Cole bombing investigators.
When on January 4, 2001, these CIA managers, and specifically George Tenet, found out that Walid bin Attash, had been identified with these two al Qaeda terrorists at the Kuala Lumpur meeting, and knew this meant these terrorists, Mihdhar and Hazmi, had taken part in the planning of the Cole bombing, he ordered that all cables coming from the many overseas and domestic CIA stations sent to the FBI and the NSC, be scrubbed from any information on Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi, Walid bin Attash and any mention of the Kuala Lumpur meeting.
When FBI Agent Ali Soufan sent an official FBI request to George Tenet, in April 2001, asking if the CIA had any information on Walid bin Atash and any al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Tenet thought that the FBI Cole bombing investigators might have connected Walid bin Attash to this al Qaeda planning meeting and may have uncovered the information that they had been trying to keep secret, the information that Mihdhar and Hazmi had been at Kuala Lumpur with Walid bin Attash, planning the Cole bombing.
To find out what the FBI knew, Tenet moved one of his senior bin Laden Station managers, Tom Wilshere, over to the FBI ITOS unit, the unit over the Cole bombing investigators, to find out what the Cole bombing investigators knew.
Incredibly, and inexplicably, Wilshere was able to quickly enlist FBI IOS Agent Dina Corsi to set up a meeting with Soufan’s own people, Steve Bongardt and his team, and get her to present them the photos of Mihdhar and Hazmi taken at Kuala Lumpur, to find out exactly what they knew about these terrorists. On June 11, this meeting took place in the FBI field office in New York City, and Corsi presented three photos of Mihdhar taken at Kuala Lumpur to Bongardt and his team.
Then CIA officer Clarke Shannon asked; Did these FBI Cole bombing investigators recognize anyone on these photos? Bongardt said they did not know who these people were, and asked who the people in the photos were, why were the CIA surveying them and what did they have to do with the Cole bombing?
Shannon and Corsi said they could not give him any of information, due to the “wall”, a wall that was nothing but pure fiction, an illegal technique FBI HQ's used many times to keep information away from FBI field agents.
The wall was actually a procedure issued by the DOJ that forbid DOJ prosecutors from directing the activities of FBI intelligence agents. This procedure never even went out side of the DOJ and FBI. It never restricted in any way, communications between CIA officers and FBI criminal or FBI intelligence agents, or between FBI intelligence agents and FBI criminal investigators.
On July 13, and 23 Wilshere, having second thoughts about his role as a spy at the FBI, secretly requested permission from his CIA managers at the CTC, to pass the Kuala Lumpur information to the FBI [Cole bombing investigators], he was never given this permission.
On August 21, 2001, Wilshere is told by Margaret Gillespie, that an inquiry to the INS indicated that Khalid al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi were inside of the US. Wilshere requested that she, FBI IOS agent Dina Corsi, meet with him in his office the next day. At this meeting, he requested that Corsi write up an EC to start a intelligence investigation, and that Gillespie bring this information back to the CIA bin Laden unit.
On August 28, 2001, Corsi’s EC is sent to Craig Donnechie at the FBI New York office, who thinks this connects Mihdhar and Hazmi to people connected to the Cole bombing and sent this to his boss John Ligouri, who then sent this EC on to Steve Bongardt.
Bongardt called Corsi immediately and told her he needed to take part in this investigation and search for Mihdhar and Hazmi before they had time to carry out a horrific terrorist attack inside of the US. Corsi, tells Bongardt that he cannot even have her EC, that he cannot start any investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi, and he has to destroy the copy he has of her EC, because of the fact that the NSA cable in her EC needed to be approved by the NSA General Council before it could be sent to FBI criminal investigators. But Corsi, had already had been approved by the NSA General Council the day before on August 27, 2001, to give the NSA cable in her EC to “the New York criminal agents”, Steve Bongardt and his team
Bongardt tells Corsi, that he thinks she is confused, that any restriction on him having this NSA cable in her EC would only apply if the evidence in this cable came from a FISA warrant, and since the phone call described in this cable was to a phone in Yemen, between two terrorists outside of the US, this NSA cable would have had no connection to any FISA warrant. He asked her, would she ask lawyers at the NSLU for permission to see if could to start an investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi.
August 29, 2001
Corsi calls Bongardt and says that the attorney, she and Middleton, had contacted had ruled that he could have no role in any investigation for Mihdhar, and if Mihdhar was arrested and interviewed, he could not attend the interview. But according to Sabol, from the 9/11 Commission report, since the NSA cable had no connection to any FISA warrant, Sabol told Corsi, that Bongardt could take part or start any criminal investigation for Mihdhar that he wanted.
The investigation had been given to Robert Fuller on August 28, 2001, who had never done an intelligence investigation before. When he had gotten nowhere, Fuller called Corsi and asked her for permission to call Saudi Arabian Airlines, the airline Mihdhar had flown into the US on July 4, 2001, in order to get Mihdhar’s credit card number. Corsi refused to give Fuller permission saying it was just not appropriate to call the airline a get Mihdhar’s credit card number. On September 11, 2001 Fuller’s search for Mihdhar had gone nowhere.
While it is clear that the organization of the CIA and FBI did not have any significant issue in allowing the attacks on 9/11, several CIA and FBI practices and procedures did. When FBI Agent Doug Miller wanted to send the FBI a cable on Mihdhar’s passport and visa on January 5, 2000, this cable was blocked by CIA bin Landen Deputy Chief, Tom Wilshere. The FBI never should have allowed FBI CIR’s back to the FBI to have to be approved by the CIA managers before they could be sent to the FBI, just this change alone would have prevented the attacks on 9/11
The FBI agents at the bin Laden station should have watch listed themselves, all of the al Qaeda terrorist identified at the Kuala Lumpur meeting. How much effort would that have taken, not much!
Tom Wilshere was moved over to the FBI in mid-May 2001, to spy on the FBI Cole bombing investigators. Because if this, and his secret orders from his prior CIA managers, to effectively shut down any investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi, the attacks on 9/11 were allowed to take place. The FBI should never again allow CIA officers to work in critical FBI units, in positions that would supervise FBI agents and managers!
When FBI Agent Steve Bongardt wanted to get an opinion from the NSLU on whether he could take part in or start an investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi, and was told that he could not, which was a complete lie. This blocked his investigation and allowed the attacks on 9/11 to take place. All opinions from lawyers at the NSLU should be written down and given directly to the FBI criminal agents who had wanted the ruling and require an acknowledgement from the original agents that they had reviewed the written ruling. This alone would have prevented the attacks on 9/11.
If any important FBI criminal investigation, is inexplicably blocked, the FBI criminal investigators should have had a way to send a request to proceed with their investigation, directly and immediately to the office of the FBI Director, with no permission required from anyone else at the FBI, via some method of “emergency alert”. This would have let Samit get a FISA warrant for Moussaoui’s possessions, located the receipt from Ramzi bin al Shibh, and would have prevented the attacks on 9/11. Bongardt could have started an investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi. He would have had had two weeks to find them, more than enough time. Since the FBI could quickly have gotten Mihdhar’s credit card number, just a credit card search would have found him and 9 other terrorists who took part in 9/11, in just hours.
You wrote: “We get it, you hate the CIA.”
I actually do not hate the CIA, in fact, I have no feeling one way or the other, with respect to the CIA. But I think it was a real shame they deliberately allowed the al Qaeda terrorists to carry out the attacks on 9/11, murdering thousands of people including many Americans. And to date they and no one else has been able to explain why they did this. Most of these people died a horrible death, they literally burned to death in the WTC Towers, and the CIA should not have to let this happen. Maybe you think this is just OK, but the 3000 families who lost their family members on 9/11 do not think this was OK.
Your wrote: CIA officers often do not share intel outside of their groups.
But, this the testimony of Cofer Black, head of the CIA CTC, to the Joint Inquiry Committee and the 9/11 Commission stating:
“We , the CIA, are in the business of providing information to the FBI, and
not withholding it.”
Cofer disputes your statement, in testimony under oath made in a sworn statements to several US government public hearings.
