Do clever people outsmart themselves?

[David Mo]

Juvenile.

Thank you very much!

 

[abaddon]

Thank you very much!

YW. The question posed in the OP was "Do clever people outsmart themselves?"

I believe you have amply demonstrated the answer to that question.

 

[David Mo]

YW. The question posed in the OP was "Do clever people outsmart themselves?"

I believe you have amply demonstrated the answer to that question.

This comment is a commonplace. It is very worn. Look for a smarter one.

You can do it!

 

[JesseCuster]

According some of them, they could not have carried forward the scientific revolution of the 20th century.

Can you clarify the meaning of this because I'm not sure I get it.

Who are the "some of them" and what did they actually say?

They couldn't have carried forward the scientific revolution of the 20th century, unless what? I'm specifically looking for what opinions needed to have been heard and what the negative consequences of those opinions not being heard are. This response by you is very vague and doesn't actually answer the question.

For example, in order to demystify the so-called "syndonology" it is necessary to know why it is not science, even though it has been defended by scientists.

The Shroud of Turin in an obscure piece of pseudoscientific nonsense. No scientific revolution is being missed out on because people studying the shroud aren't discussing the demarcation problem in relation to studying the Shroud of Turin.

This is the best example you could come up with?

 

[David Mo]

Can you clarify the meaning of this because I'm not sure I get it.

Who are the "some of them" and what did they actually say?

They couldn't have carried forward the scientific revolution of the 20th century, unless what? I'm specifically looking for what opinions needed to have been heard and what the negative consequences of those opinions not being heard are. This response by you is very vague and doesn't actually answer the question.

The Shroud of Turin in an obscure piece of pseudoscientific nonsense. No scientific revolution is being missed out on because people studying the shroud aren't discussing the demarcation problem in relation to studying the Shroud of Turin.

This is the best example you could come up with?

Einstein and Heisenberg, for example.

They thought that philosophy helped them to change basic concepts of the paradigm of classical physics, such as absolute space or mechanical causality. Einstein said that if scientists had read Hume they would say less nonsense. Heisenberg referred to the Platonic interpretation of science as something he assumed because for him reality is essentially mathematical. He also said: "Thanks to this reading [of the Greek philosophers] I understood the fundamental concepts of atomic theory much more clearly".

I don't know what "opinions heard" you are mentioning. Perhaps you could comment the relationship between the theory of relativity and Hume. Or the Greek philosophers and the principle of indetermination. I would like to hear you, because it is an interesting subject.

I have not quoted the Turin shroud in connection with any scientific revolution. I mentioned it as a case in which it is necessary to have clear concepts of philosophy of science to discuss with some of its supporters who pretend to have made scientific studies on the cloth.

 

[Robin]

I regard all you people talking about love as nothing but brain chemistry as proof of my opening post that clever people outsmart themselves.

I take it as evidence that when people indignantly insist that the would never, ever, not in any circumstances, ever want to talk about reductionism ... are just about to start talking about reductionism.

 

[Robin]

I regard all you people talking about love as nothing but brain chemistry as proof of my opening post that clever people outsmart themselves.

There may be brain chemistry involved in feelings, but I do not believe love can be so easily dismissed.

For example, it was said by men who fought in the trenches of the first world war that they loved each other more than women. So their love was not biological, but born of comradeship..

People also love their pets, and I loved a bird. I cried when she died, and it takes a lot to drag a tear out of me.

The thing is, of course it is not just brain chemicals - put two brains side by side and they won't fall in love however many chemicals you throw their way.

There is a whole system involved here, brains, bodies, environment, billions of years of evolution, hundreds of thousands of years of culture, etc, etc.

The point is that it is almost certainly all constituted, ultimately of particles and the forces between them and there is no contradiction between that and loving your friends, families and pets.

 

[Robin]

Einstein and Heisenberg, for example.

I think you are wasting your time here. I gave evidence of two eminent scientists debating the philosophy of science in the pages of Nature, and saying how important it was for their work.

You could show the correspondence between Einstien and Schlick, but it would still do no good. They are incorrigibly convinced that no scientist has the slightest use for philosophy of science and no mere evidence will convince them otherwise.

 

[JesseCuster]

They are incorrigibly convinced that no scientist has the slightest use for philosophy of science.

It was an answer to my question, and I don't think that. I've no problem with the philosophy of science or philosophy in general, its' a subject I enjoy.

I don't have the same attitude that some of the others here do, but I do think people who are into it tend to get a bit full of themselves when discussing its importance to various subjects.

 

[JesseCuster]

I don't know what "opinions heard" you are mentioning.

I'm referring to your post in this thread where you said the following:

Philosophy of science only wants to discuss what is science. And this is a subject that seems to be interesting to many scientists. Their opinion must be heard.

[emphasis mine]

Perhaps you could comment the relationship between the theory of relativity and Hume. Or the Greek philosophers and the principle of indetermination. I would like to hear you, because it is an interesting subject.

Why would I comment on those things and what makes you think that anything I would have to say would be worth reading (it wouldn't, I know bugger all about them)? This strikes me as more than a little intellectually pretentious, name dropping subjects like "the Greek philosophers and the principle of indetermination" to make it look like you know all about it because you brought it up and your opponents know nothing because they don't have anything to say about the subject.

I mentioned it as a case in which it is necessary to have clear concepts of philosophy of science to discuss with some of its supporters who pretend to have made scientific studies on the cloth.

Discussing the philosophy of science with Shroud of Turin believers sounds about as productive as discussing philosophy of science with Young Earth Creationists. Do you really think that a discussion of what is and isn't science is going to make any difference to what is nonsense that only true believers take seriously? The people who believe that kind of guff aren't interested in the philosophy of science.

 

[Chanakya]

Do you mean that the practical scientist rejects or admits a hypothesis without knowing why? ...

Why would you think I mean that? I thought I'd made my position clear enough. Since you appear not to have grasped my point -- or perhaps the lapse was mine, in not having explained myself clearly enough -- let me try one more time:

You spoke of "rejection" and "admission" (that is, 'acceptance') of ad hoc hypotheses. Well, we're speaking of two kinds of "acceptance" here.

The actual acceptance of any hypothesis, ad hoc or otherwise, into accepted theory, would depend, always and without exception, on whether it passes muster basis all the relevant criteria that the scientific method lays out.

But the other kind of "acceptance": Which hypotheses are taken seriously, which are accepted for serious investigation? As far as this second kind of acceptance, Sure, ad hoc hypotheses are suspect, generally speaking, that is obvious: but there is no blanket rule that all ad hoc hypotheses are necessarily to be discarded, as you seem to be suggesting.

This last is a purely subjective decision, to be made basis the expertise of the scientist in the relevant field. And that is my take on this -- as a layman, let me hasten to add, and claiming no expertise other than common sense. But again, this appears more reasonable than your apparent stance of discarding all ad hoc hypotheses.



Sure, no reason why a scientist cannot philosophize, like you say, or compose music or bawdy lyrics. But what equips a person to accept or reject an ad hoc hypotheis for further investigation? Two things, clearly: First, an understanding of the scientific method; and second, technical expertise in the relevant field. And that is my take, again as a layman, on this second question.



Remember, we're discussing ad hoc hypotheses because you brought them up, as an example of how philosophy of science can be of concrete use. Well, at neither level of "acceptance", it seems to me, does a knowledge of the philosophy of science, with all its historical baggage, seem at all essential (unlike an understanding of the scientific method, or relevant technical knowledge, both of which are clearly essential).

So go ahead, now, and show us if you can, of what use a knowledge specifically of the philosophy of science might be, that the other two kinds of knowledge don't adequately cover.

 

[David Mo]

I think you are wasting your time here. I gave evidence of two eminent scientists debating the philosophy of science in the pages of Nature, and saying how important it was for their work.

You could show the correspondence between Einstien and Schlick, but it would still do no good. They are incorrigibly convinced that no scientist has the slightest use for philosophy of science and no mere evidence will convince them otherwise.

I'm not trying to convince anyone. Discussing a topic that interests you is useful to yourself. It helps to clarify ideas and review others. Sometimes you make someone think, although it is rare to recognize this in a forum. Here everyone enters beating drums and trumpets of victory even though they are losing the battle.

 

[David Mo]

Why would I comment on those things and what makes you think that anything I would have to say would be worth reading (it wouldn't, I know bugger all about them)? This strikes me as more than a little intellectually pretentious, name dropping subjects like "the Greek philosophers and the principle of indetermination" to make it look like you know all about it because you brought it up and your opponents know nothing because they don't have anything to say about the subject.

Discussing the philosophy of science with Shroud of Turin believers sounds about as productive as discussing philosophy of science with Young Earth Creationists. Do you really think that a discussion of what is and isn't science is going to make any difference to what is nonsense that only true believers take seriously? The people who believe that kind of guff aren't interested in the philosophy of science.

If we are talking about philosophy and science and you seem to disagree with what Einstein says, it is logical that I ask you for your opinion. I don't know what's pretentious about it. Another thing is for you to recognize that you know nothing about philosophy or Einstein. I have confessed my limitations regarding the theory of relativity. You seem afraid to confess yours.

The subject of the Turin shroud, like any other related to pseudosciences, is not interesting in itself. Superstition is superstition even though it is dressed as science. What is interesting is to refute some pseudo-theories that are very successful among naive people who are looking for the marvelous outside of this world. Fanatics will not be convinced. Sure. But that's not the point.

 

[David Mo]

This last is a purely subjective decision, to be made basis the expertise of the scientist in the relevant field. And that is my take on this -- as a layman, let me hasten to add, and claiming no expertise other than common sense. But again, this appears more reasonable than your apparent stance of discarding all ad hoc hypotheses.



(...) But what equips a person to accept or reject an ad hoc hypotheis for further investigation? Two things, clearly: First, an understanding of the scientific method; and second, technical expertise in the relevant field. And that is my take, again as a layman, on this second question.

(...)So go ahead, now, and show us if you can, of what use a knowledge specifically of the philosophy of science might be, that the other two kinds of knowledge don't adequately cover.

I don't quite understand what you say is subjective. I do not know if you are saying that the decision to accept or not accept an ad hoc hypothesis is subjective. That would be very interesting.

In any case, as you say, the acceptance of an ad hoc hypothesis is determined by the understanding of the scientific method. I suggest a test: go to a search engine for academic articles (Google Scholar, for example) search for "scientific method" and "ad hoc hypothesis" and find out who is dealing with the subject and in which scientific journals they publish their articles. I can tell you the results: whether they are scientists or philosophers, you will find them discussing in journals of philosophy or philosophy of science.

What is the conclusion? I suggest starting with one: there are two ways to practice science. One is normalized science, which operates within a paradigm without questioning it; another is science that breaks down the barriers of normalized paradigms. The first is rather applied science. The second is theoretical science. So that you don't imagine that I am saying strange things, I will tell you that I am only collecting the opinion of three scientists: Einstein, Kuhn and Popper.

Your attempt to reduce the philosophy of science to a mere hobby is not serious. Anyone can see that the philosophy of science refers - for better or for worse - to the professional activity of scientists while skating or watercolor painting has nothing to do with it.

 

[Robin]

It was an answer to my question, and I don't think that. I've no problem with the philosophy of science or philosophy in general, its' a subject I enjoy.

I don't have the same attitude that some of the others here do, but I do think people who are into it tend to get a bit full of themselves when discussing its importance to various subjects.

Sorry if I misrepresented your position.

 

[Chanakya]

I don't quite understand what you say is subjective. I do not know if you are saying that the decision to accept or not accept an ad hoc hypothesis is subjective. That would be very interesting.

In any case, as you say, the acceptance of an ad hoc hypothesis is determined by the understanding of the scientific method. I suggest a test: go to a search engine for academic articles (Google Scholar, for example) search for "scientific method" and "ad hoc hypothesis" and find out who is dealing with the subject and in which scientific journals they publish their articles. I can tell you the results: whether they are scientists or philosophers, you will find them discussing in journals of philosophy or philosophy of science.

What is the conclusion? I suggest starting with one: there are two ways to practice science. One is normalized science, which operates within a paradigm without questioning it; another is science that breaks down the barriers of normalized paradigms. The first is rather applied science. The second is theoretical science. So that you don't imagine that I am saying strange things, I will tell you that I am only collecting the opinion of three scientists: Einstein, Kuhn and Popper.

Your attempt to reduce the philosophy of science to a mere hobby is not serious. Anyone can see that the philosophy of science refers - for better or for worse - to the professional activity of scientists while skating or watercolor painting has nothing to do with it.

You're simply dodging the issue I'm afraid, David.

You suggested that the philosophy of science does indeed have concrete uses to real issues. So I asked you to demonstrate this with the help of some actual example. You suggested ad hoc hypotheses. Fine then, I asked you to show how exactly this example demonstrates the fact that the philosophy of science does have concrete uses. I myself suggested that acceptance or otherwise of ad hoc hypotheses has to do with knowledge of (a) the scientific method itself, and (b) technical knowledge of the relevant field. And I invited you to show how, in your view, knowledge of the philosophy of science can make some concrete contribution here, in this particular instance, over and above the contribution from these two kinds of knowledge I mentioned.

This is the third or fourth time I'm asking you. Instead of dancing around the issue, why not simply discuss how your example does make the point you claimed it makes?

I am afraid this interminable dancing-the-dance thing, that grotesque sport so popular in these forums, is something I don't have much appetite for. If after this you don't directly answer, well then, that's all good and fine, no reason for you to pursue some line of discussion that you are either not able to or don't want to: but in that case, I guess I'll just withdraw.

I'm neither professional nor fanboy, when it comes to either science or philosophy. It does appear to me, basis the arguments presented by others here, as well as my own thoughts, that philosophy of science, while no doubt we owe a great deal to it for contributions in times past, is little more than an academic exercise today. Admittedly that view is bases on only very cursory knowledge of either philosophy or even of science itself, so I realize I could be wrong. If you're able to clearly discuss how exactly knowledge of philosophy of science can contribute to accepting or rejecting ad hoc hypotheses (in ways that simply knowledge of the scientific method, as well as technical knowledge, cannot), then I'm willing to change my view. If you can't, or won't, then for now I guess I'll stick to that view, and move on.

 

[David Mo]

You're simply dodging the issue I'm afraid, David.

You suggested that the philosophy of science does indeed have concrete uses to real issues. So I asked you to demonstrate this with the help of some actual example. You suggested ad hoc hypotheses. Fine then, I asked you to show how exactly this example demonstrates the fact that the philosophy of science does have concrete uses. I myself suggested that acceptance or otherwise of ad hoc hypotheses has to do with knowledge of (a) the scientific method itself, and (b) technical knowledge of the relevant field. And I invited you to show how, in your view, knowledge of the philosophy of science can make some concrete contribution here, in this particular instance, over and above the contribution from these two kinds of knowledge I mentioned.

This is the third or fourth time I'm asking you. Instead of dancing around the issue, why not simply discuss how your example does make the point you claimed it makes?

I am afraid this interminable dancing-the-dance thing, that grotesque sport so popular in these forums, is something I don't have much appetite for. If after this you don't directly answer, well then, that's all good and fine, no reason for you to pursue some line of discussion that you are either not able to or don't want to: but in that case, I guess I'll just withdraw.

I'm neither professional nor fanboy, when it comes to either science or philosophy. It does appear to me, basis the arguments presented by others here, as well as my own thoughts, that philosophy of science, while no doubt we owe a great deal to it for contributions in times past, is little more than an academic exercise today. Admittedly that view is bases on only very cursory knowledge of either philosophy or even of science itself, so I realize I could be wrong. If you're able to clearly discuss how exactly knowledge of philosophy of science can contribute to accepting or rejecting ad hoc hypotheses (in ways that simply knowledge of the scientific method, as well as technical knowledge, cannot), then I'm willing to change my view. If you can't, or won't, then for now I guess I'll stick to that view, and move on.

You ask me to show you a "concrete" insect. I point out a fly and you tell me to show you a "concrete" insect. Then I begin to think that something is wrong with our vocabulary.

You asked me to point out some "concrete use" of philosophy. I have pointed out two: to help change scientific paradigms and to clarify the concept of ad hoc hypotheses. The latter in relation to the fraudulent use of ad hoc hypotheses in pseudosciences. You tell me that I have not shown you a "concrete use".

I am afraid I do not understand what you mean by "concrete use" or "real issue". Or you do not understand. I suspect you're thinking about using technological tools like radar, penicillin or microscope. If so, you're a little confused. Philosophy is not a technological device to manipulate things.

 

[Chanakya]

It's a simple question.

Someone who is adept in his field (of scientific research) as well as conversant with the scientific method will, basis this knowledge, be able to dismiss implausible hypotheses, including ad hoc hypothese.

What additional contribution does "philosophy of science" make towards dismissing ad hoc hypotheses? What will this scientist gain from a study of philosophy of science, in terms of how he deals with ad hoc hypotheses?

If you're aware of some compelling answer, it should be a simple matter to present it, either as it applies to ad hoc hypotheses in general, or else some specific ad hoc hypotheses that you know about.


---


Don't rush to answer me. This isn't a "debate", as far as I am concerned, with people on opposing sides trying to score points. Just think about this a minute, your hands away from the keyboard.

You believe philosophy of science helps us deal with ad hoc hypotheses, right? So explain why you believe this: what "help" does it actually proffer, that is not easily available from directly knowing the scientific method and the technical details of one's specialty?

 

[Chanakya]

Duplicate post, deleted.

 

[David Mo]

It's a simple question.

Someone who is adept in his field (of scientific research) as well as conversant with the scientific method will, basis this knowledge, be able to dismiss implausible hypotheses, including ad hoc hypothese.

You surprise me.

According to what you say the problem of ad hoc hypotheses is really a problem but "it's simple" and can be solved by anyone who is "conversant" with the scientific method. This is consistent with a previous idea of yours: that the scientist solves this problem intuitively. We would say that scientists and philosophers who fiercely argue the problem are wasting their time. It is already solved. Easily solved.

Can I know the simple way to solve it? If it's simple you'll be able to express it in a couple of lines, won't you?