Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

That's a bit unfair. There is a bit about Australian politics at the time, and Menzies, at this website:

https://www.jewishnews.net.au/menzies-an-enemy-of-tyranny-and-friend-of-freedom/29309


It's not the least bit unfair. As I wrote when you brought up Menzies and his memoir previously, and you ignored as usual:

Menzies was not PM at the time of Munich (he was attorney-general); he didn't become PM until after the death of Joseph Lyons in April 1939. That aside, Menzies' views on appeasement can hardly be considered unbiased, as he was himself an arch-appeaser who favored negotiations with Hitler even after the invasion of Poland and the declaration of war (see here).


Further, the fact that Menzies knew war was a possibility, and that Hitler would be at fault for starting it, does not mean he was the least bit anti-appeasement.
 
Military action against Germany was highly unlikely in 1934, though not impossible for the reasons outlined earlier, but strong economic sanctions were on the cards owing to Germany actions in terms of trade, debt and reparations. If the British had followed through on their threats the wheels would have come off the German economy and Hitler's regime probably wouldn't have survived.

I don't think the political and economic problems were quite as simple as that at the time. The matter is explained at this website:

http://igcsehistory.weebly.com/the-league-of-nations.html

Failure of economic sanctions

Economic sanctions were supposed to be the League’s main weapon, but members of the League did not willingly impose them because they were worried that without America, they would not work.
Economic sanctions were difficult to enforce as member countries were unwilling to stop trading with an aggressor because it would harm their own trade as much as an aggressor’s.

When they did impose them, they were easily broken.
The League therefore lacked the muscle to enforce the decisions of its assembly and council.
 
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I don't think the political and economic problems were quite as simple as that at the time. The matter is explained at this website:

http://igcsehistory.weebly.com/the-league-of-nations.html

It explains nothing, because we are not talking about the League of Nations, we are talking about the Bank of England and City of London, the people who could economically cripple Germany by denying it credit and loans. 'The matter is explained' if you read 'Wages of Destruction' but I guess since it isn't a blog or an op-ed piece that's beyond you.
 
we are talking about the Bank of England and City of London, the people who could economically cripple Germany by denying it credit and loans.

I don't think Chamberlain can be blamed for that.
You are talking as though the Bank of England and City of London were not sympathetic to the Nazis. America did not want to get involved. There is a bit about it at this website:

www.911forum.org.uk/board/viewtopic.php?p=175310

The documents reinforce the impression that Norman was an inflexible aparatchik, but also renew questions about his suspected Nazi sympathies. As outlined in Liaquat Ahmed’s Lords of Finance, Norman was close friends with Hjalmar Schacht, Hitler’s minister of economics and Reichsbank president.

In January 1939, Norman went to Berlin to attend the christening of Schacht’s grandson, named Norman in his honour. Ahmed writes that Norman admired “Schacht, and during the early years of Nazi rule, even the achievements of Hitler – he is said to have told a Morgan partner that 'Hitler and Schacht are the bulwarks of civilisation in Germany’.”

Schacht later turned against Hitler and was sent to Dachau in 1944 for suspected involvement in the attempt on the Fuhrer’s life. But he played a vital role in restoring Germany’s fortunes under the Third Reich.

Suspicions about Norman’s political leanings would be reinforced by his behaviour after the press got hold of the Czech gold scandal. By May 1939, it had become a major political issue and on May 26, the Chancellor of the time Sir John Simon, asked Norman if the Bank still had the Czech gold. Norman obfuscated.
 
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I don't think Chamberlain can be blamed for that.

Which is apropos of nothing, the point was that in 1934 the British, French and Americans were hostile to the Nazi regime partly because of the League of nations withdrawal, but mainly because of Germany actions in terms of trade and debt.

You are talking as though the Bank of England and City of London were not sympathetic to the Nazis.

Because they weren't. The only reason they backed off pressuring Germany further was the fear that they might not get back any of the money they were owed.

America did not want to get involved.

Which is utterly irrelevant as far as any military response goes in 1934. The French and the Poles were perfectly capable of dealing with a Wehrmacht that barely existed in 1934. Again military action is unlikely in 1934 but Nazi Germany had already antagonized its neighbours badly enough to provoke some loud sabre rattling from Paris and Warsaw.

There is a bit about it at this website:

www.911forum.org.uk/board/viewtopic.php?p=175310

And you've gone trawling at a 911 Truther site rather than doing real reading, still I suppose its a step up from neo-Nazi websites.
 
Chamberlain was a political genius.


Your (extremely ignorant and biased) opinion, with no real evidence provided, as usual. We're still waiting for you to explain, in detail, how Germany was going to conquer Britain prior to May 1940, had the Allies not appeased Hitler at Munich.

Come on, Henri, let's have the specifics. No vague handwaving such as "They would have used the same plan," or "I just think they would have." Give us the details, including the forces that would have been used, the strategy and tactics employed, and, most importantly, the logistics involved. Remember, "Amateurs discuss tactics; professionals discuss logistics."

And while we're at it, we're still waiting for you to provide some real evidence that Chamberlain knew that war was inevitable, and attempted to accelerate rearmament.

Here's a start for you: The scaled-down plan for Sea Lion called for one airborne and nine infantry divisions to be landed in the first wave. According to War Department Technical Manual E 30-451 Handbook on German Military Forces1 (1945):

Armored divisions [in Russia in 1941] averaged some 30 tons daily when inactive and about 700 tons a day when engaged in heavy fighting; infantry divisions required 80 tons a day when inactive and some 1,100 tons during a day of heavy fighting. When engaged in defensive, mopping-up, or minor offensive activities, the divisions required supplies in amounts somewhere between the two extremes.​

So please explain how even the first wave was going to be supplied. Note that the Luftwaffe had about 300 Ju 52s at the time of Munich, and about 400 by the next spring. That assumes that no significant losses would have been incurred conquering Czechoslovakia.
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1Thanks, Gawdzilla. We miss you. :(
 
And while we're at it, we're still waiting for you to provide some real evidence that Chamberlain knew that war was inevitable, and attempted to accelerate rearmament.

I have never made a profound study of Neville Chamberlain as Chancellor of the Exchequer. I do know there were outcries at the time when the salaries of judges were cut, and the dole cut. It's a bit like austerity now.

I remember reading a quote by Macmillan once saying that Chamberlain was the best Minister of Health we have had and a clever Chancellor of the Exchequer. There are quotes from Sir Alec Douglas-Home in the 1960s saying that Chamberlain told his colleagues to prepare for war after returning from Munich in 1938, but that was never made public. Politicians sometimes talk with forked tongues! Personally I think the strategy was for Hitler to invade Soviet Russia, which Chamberlain knew was going to happen, but which Stalin refused to believe even though he was given proper warning by the British.

There is a fair and just article about Neville Chamberlain at this website:

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-24300094

Admittedly Cruz's speech was notable more for its near record-breaking length than its historical understanding, but this derogatory reference reflects the continuing potency of a well-established conventional wisdom assiduously propagated by Chamberlain's detractors after his fall from the premiership in May 1940. As Churchill is once supposed to have quipped, "Poor Neville will come badly out of history. I know, I will write that history".
 
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I have never made a profound study of Neville Chamberlain as Chancellor of the Exchequer. I do know there were outcries at the time when the salaries of judges were cut, and the dole cut. It's a bit like austerity now.


Evasion noted.

I remember reading a quote by Macmillan once saying that Chamberlain was the best Minister of Health we have had . . .


Irrelevant.

. . . and a clever Chancellor of the Exchequer.


Clever at avoiding increasing military spending significantly even when faced with Nazi rearmament. :rolleyes:

There are quotes from Sir Alec Douglas-Home in the 1960s saying that Chamberlain told his colleagues to prepare for war after returning from Munich in 1938, but that was never made public.


30-year-old recollection, reported second-hand, which cannot be accepted without substantial corroboration, and even if true, Chamberlain's actions don't fit with it.

Politicians sometimes talk with forked tongues! Personally I think the strategy was for Hitler to invade Soviet Russia, which Chamberlain knew was going to happen, but which Stalin refused to believe even though he was given proper warning by the British.


I asked you what strategy and tactics the Nazis would have used to conquer Britain and France in 1939, after having conquered Czechoslovakia. Why don't you answer the question I asked, rather than the one you wish I'd asked?

There is a fair and just article about Neville Chamberlain at this website:

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-24300094


There are a lot of things wrong with that article, but for now I'll suffice it to say that it contradicts your claim that Chamberlain knew war was inevitable, and sold Czechoslovakia down the river in order to gain time for rearmament.
 
So Neville Chamberlin has joined Jeffrey MacDonald as people Henri McPhee will defend to the death,in spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary?
 
Henri, we're still waiting for you to explain, in detail, how Germany was going to conquer France and/or Britain in the spring or summer of 1939. Your claim that "Chamberlain was a political genius" only follows if there was a significant risk of either of these events' occurring.
 
Henri, we're still waiting for you to explain, in detail, how Germany was going to conquer France and/or Britain in the spring or summer of 1939. Your claim that "Chamberlain was a political genius" only follows if there was a significant risk of either of these events' occurring.

Chamberlain was quoted as saying it would have been far worse in 1938. I reckon Hitler would have gone through the Ardennes then. There is a sensible posting about the matter at this forum:

https://www.quora.com/What-if-Hitler-opened-the-war-as-early-as-1938

Short answer: the war would be over a year earlier. You pretty much leave it to us to sort out how he’d start the war, but let’s say he sticks to the game plan with the Molotov-Ribbontrop Treaty and invades Poland in 1938 instead. The British and French would be even less prepared for war. Hitler would overrun Denmark and Norway in 1939 and then press on for the Netherlands, Belgium and France. France would still be knocked out early and Britain truly unready for the Battle of Britain with no Spitfires to fend off German attacks. Chamberlain would probably want some sort of negotiated peace and it’s unclear how the British people would have reacted. My hunch is the reaction over the fall of Norway would have produced a similar result in forcing Chamberlain out and ushering in the more bellicose Churchill, but that’s not necessarily a given. It scarcely matters as Hitler hadn’t the stomach for a cross channel invasion and would have turned his energies to attacking Russia sooner rather than later. The rest plays out largely the same, you’d probably have the war ending in 1944 instead since you’re starting earlier.
 
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