Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[Henri McPhee]

Henri still hasn't answered if Chamberlain was receiving false data about the German Army in 1934.

I think anyone warning Chamberlain in 1934 that the German Army was some special force that they needed to worry about, was lying, or mistaken.

If Chamberlain used this as a basis for his appeasement of the Germans, then that is a mistake. If they had told Chamberlain in 1934 that Germany couldn't handle a naval blockade, then perhaps he would have taken some measures.

The Germans in 1934 were not ill-trained or ill-equipped. I believe their air force had been secretly training in Soviet Russia. I still think it would have been the utmost folly for the UK government to have had a military conflict, or naval blockade, with Germany in 1934. The British public and the House of Commons, and the rest of the world, didn't want to know about it. It would have been a wild project. There is a bit about the matter at this website:

https://spartacus-educational.com/2WWgermanA.htm

Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, the German Army was unable to grow to more than 100,000 men. One way that Adolf Hitler dealt with this issue was to allow the Sturm Abteilung (SA) to grow rapidly. By 1934 the SA had grown to a force of over 4,500,000 men.

The growth in the importance of the SA worried other leaders in the National Socialist German Workers Party. It also upset leaders of the German Army who feared that it would be taken over by the Ernst Roehm and the SA. They were won over to the Nazis when Adolf Hitler ordered the Night of the Long Knives where around 400 leaders of the SA were murdered.

Whereas the SA now lost its power, Hitler allowed the German Army to grow rapidly. In 1935 he introduced military conscription. This enabled the German Army to train 300,000 conscripts a year. By 1938 it had 36 infantry divisions of 600,000 men.

 

[Garrison]

As it happens I was just re-reading the section of ‘The Wages of Destruction' covering the situation in 1934, so you can take that as the source for the political and economic points mentioned below:

In 1934 the German army had 100,000 troops, with little in the way of artillery or machine guns and no tanks or motorized transport. The SA numbers look impressive until you realize that most of those card carrying members weren’t much use for anything more than filling up the crowd at party rallies. The hard core could be counted on for street brawling with Communists and beating up Jews, but were militarily worthless. The Luftwaffe just didn’t exist. The work in Russia was on tactics and pilot training to create a nucleus of trained personnel who could be used to create an airforce when the restrictions of Versailles were lifted. In 1934 Germany had no combat aircraft. The navy was hardly any better off, no submarines and a relative handful of largely out of date surface ships. That the army had been raised to 600,000 men by 1938 sounds impressive, except again this is still basically a force of infantry with little in the way of mechanization and still lacking in heavy weapons and munitions, the tanks in service with the Heer are largely training vehicles. It’s an utterly inadequate force to fight a war against the western powers and Hitler knew it, hence the orders to withdraw from the Rhineland in 1936 if the French intervened and the intense resistance to the idea of war with Czechoslovakia by the Wehrmacht and senior government members in 1938.

As to 1934 Germany did fear military intervention by the French and/or Poles because of the fact that Germany had withdrawn from the international disarmament talks and the League of Nations in October 1933 and then having thoroughly outraged the French they antagonized the British and Americans in December 1933 by slashing repayments on Germany’s debts. . Oh and in the summer you had the ‘Night of the Long Knives’ and the attempted Nazi coup in Austria culminating in the murder of Chancellor Dolfuss. Put it another way, far from not wanting to know about conflict with Germany the Nazi’s had enraged pretty much all their neighbours by the summer of 1934.

Of course if the British had launched the all-out trade war with Germany that seemed to be looming in 1934 after the Nazi's defaulted on Germany's debts, a trade war with the wholehearted support of one Neville Chamberlain, then the Nazi regime would have collapsed in months, deprived of the loans, credits and raw materials supplied by the City of London and the British Empire.

 

[Henri McPhee]

Of course if the British had launched the all-out trade war with Germany that seemed to be looming in 1934 after the Nazi's defaulted on Germany's debts, a trade war with the wholehearted support of one Neville Chamberlain, then the Nazi regime would have collapsed in months, deprived of the loans, credits and raw materials supplied by the City of London and the British Empire.

America has been trying a trade war with Russia and China and Iran recently. Hitler was elected. There was considerable support for him in Germany at the time.

There was a pro-Churchill TV documentary recently, made in 2013, which suggested Churchill did a good job in Lloyd George's cabinet during the 1914-18 war as a de facto Secretary of State for war making sure armaments and military equipment and aircraft were supplied to the war machine. That may be true. Churchill did make the statement then that Germany was a terrible foe.

I just feel Churchill fancied himself as a great general. I would not have liked him on my left flank in a battle situation, with his wild projects. I suppose it could be that we would have been lost without Churchill, despite his astonishing lack of vision, due to lack of leadership.

 

[Garrison]

America has been trying a trade war with Russia and China and Iran recently. Hitler was elected. There was considerable support for him in Germany at the time.

What the British threatened Germany with wasn't a trade war, it was simple economic annihilation. Germany depended on the City of London for loans and trade credit. Without those German imports would have evaporated and what could they do in return? Nothing, their export trade with the UK and the rest of the world had slumped owing to their refusal to devalue the Reichsmark. Again this is all information you could have learned if you would pick up a book instead of desperately Googling for some blog or op-ed piece that you think supports your view. Likewise if you had done any proper research you would have realised that electoral support for the Nazi's had peaked at 37.5% and had steadily declined thereafter. The Nazi regime was facing a serious crisis of support in 1934 owing to the continuing economic issues, particularly rising food prices and the decline of living standards.


And of course your hatred of Churchill is irrelevant, since as has been pointed out a hundred times he was not in power during appeasement.

 

[Henri McPhee]

Likewise if you had done any proper research you would have realised that electoral support for the Nazi's had peaked at 37.5% and had steadily declined thereafter. The Nazi regime was facing a serious crisis of support in 1934 owing to the continuing economic issues, particularly rising food prices and the decline of living standards.

From the internet:

In January 1934, the Law for the Reconstruction of the State abolished Germany’s state governments, apart from Prussia.

These changes made Germany a one-party state and destroyed democracy in the country.
When a new Reichstag election was held in December 1933, the Nazis won 92 per cent of the vote.

 

[Garrison]

From the internet:

Yes In December 1933, after they had taken power and could manipulate the vote. I mean you can't even be bothered to tell us where you got the quote from, afraid that once again whatever source you cherrypicked will contradict your claims if people get a chance to see the whole thing? Or have you turned to another neo-Nazi website?

 

[Andy_Ross]

From the internet:

How does fixing the elections so there is only your party indicate popularity?

 

[Dabop]

From the internet:

No from HERE

ETA
and here's why

Previous paragraph...

Within months of the passing of the Enabling Act, Hitler removed most sources of political opposition.

He merged the Nazi and the Nationalist Parties.
The Centre Party (Catholic Party) disbanded voluntarily in return for Hitler agreeing not to interfere in Catholic schools and youth movements.
Socialists and communists, who had not already fled, were put in prison.
In March, local parliaments were closed and then re-established with Nazi majorities.

So rather than Henri's 'see they got 92%!!!!!!' spin we get to see his cherrypicking of quotes yet again...

 

[Henri McPhee]

Again your quote relates to 1940, long after appeasement was over and yes we get that you hate Churchill and the Irish but it really has zero to do with appeasement. It's still odd that you will take the opinions of every officer of the period except the German ones who thought Germany would have been crushed if went to war in 1938, especially as their opinions seem to be backed up by the cold hard numbers of logistics and operational capabilities. why don't they count Henri?

Benny Hill had a bit to say about the Irish mentality and Catholic fundamentalists with regard to appeasement, which is on You Tube:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pLq5IINQaTk

 

[Andy_Ross]

Yes, Benny Hill is always my 'go to' for information on the history of inter-war politics and the speed of milkmen in the west.

 

[jimbob]

Yes, Benny Hill is always my 'go to' for information on the history of inter-war politics and the speed of milkmen in the west.

Though to be fair, it is an improvement on some of the other sources used in this thread

 

[Garrison]

Benny Hill had a bit to say about the Irish mentality and Catholic fundamentalists with regard to appeasement, which is on You Tube:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pLq5IINQaTk

What the hell does Benny Hill's Terry Wogan impersonation have to do with anything??? If you are incapable of responding coherently to the rebuttal of, what we will generously call your 'argument', just admit it.

 

[Henri McPhee]

Hitler had an abnormal mental kink so it was difficult to threaten him with violence in 1934 as opposed to appeasement.

 

[Garrison]

Hitler had an abnormal mental kink so it was difficult to threaten him with violence in 1934 as opposed to appeasement.

Again all you do is demonstrate your wilful refusal to actual learn anything about appeasement or the Nazi regime. In 1934 Germany had little in the way of means to fight a war and if Hitler had attempted to drag Germany into one the army and the various political/business elements who had backed him would have turned on him. The Fuhrer cult that grew up largely after 1939 and the military successes didn't exist in 1934 and Hitler's grip on power was dependent on the support of groups he hadn't yet tied to the Nazi agenda.

 

[Henri McPhee]

There are some interesting quotes about appeasement with regard to WWII in that book Afternoon Light by the former Australian Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies published in 1967. He was around at the time of appeasement:

As to the then attitude of the Labour Party, I recall that, in 1936, when we were both engaged, on opposite sides, before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, my friend and political opponent, Stafford Cripps, said to me at lunch, 'Menzies what do you think of my party's defence policy?' I was bold enough to reply: 'Well, until recently, I did not know that you had one. But I now observe that you are all for sanctions imposed by the League of Nations; that you will most fully support them; and that if this leads to hostilities you will wage war with bows and arrows.

But since no judgement on these matters can be either final or dogmatic, I will, with retrospective wisdom, assume that Baldwin followed the politically prudent but wrong course...…..

Chamberlain's 'appeasement' at Munich was an appeasement from military weakness. He believed that Britain was not capable of a major war, and, in short, that the best must be made of a bad job. I have never been able to convince myself, though I know that better men have disagreed, that if Chamberlain had thrown down the gage at Munich, we would have won the ensuing war.

The real test is-what happened to British armament between Munich and September 1939. Winston Churchill made no secret of his belief that Hitler gained more strength from that fateful year than we did; that his taking over of Czechoslovakia gave him enormous resources of a military kind. On the other hand, there can be little doubt that British equipment in fighter aircraft-the development and production of the Hurricane and the Spitfire-grew rapidly under the energetic and imaginative administration of Philip Swinton.....

 

[SpitfireIX]

There are some interesting quotes about appeasement with regard to WWII in that book Afternoon Light by the former Australian Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies published in 1967. He was around at the time of appeasement:

No. First, as I mentioned, Menzies was an arch-appeaser himself, so his opinions on the subject are likely to be heavily biased. Second, as I also discussed, there was no significant increase in the rate of fighter production after Munich. Third, Swinton was dismissed as Secretary of State for Air in May 1938, so he had nothing to do with fighter production after that time. Fail.

 

[HansMustermann]

But again, WTH had he done in 1934 that would be worth going to war over? Or do we demand just complete clairvoyance at this point?

 

[Henri McPhee]

No. First, as I mentioned, Menzies was an arch-appeaser himself, so his opinions on the subject are likely to be heavily biased.

That's a bit unfair. There is a bit about Australian politics at the time, and Menzies, at this website:

https://www.jewishnews.net.au/menzies-an-enemy-of-tyranny-and-friend-of-freedom/29309

Menzies understood the true nature of the Nazi threat, referring in his memoirs Afternoon Light, to the “sinister figure of Hitler”. When it came to attributing responsibility for the war, Menzies made clear “the guilt was that of Germany alone”.

Following a four-day visit to Germany in July 1938 (not the “several weeks” Kelly claims) Menzies, in fact, was shocked by the Nazis’ destruction of the liberal and democratic features of Germany, and by the apparent willingness of the German people to accept this. He wrote about the “somewhat queer atmosphere of Germany”, and told Dr Schacht, the president of the Reichsbank, that “the real danger of the regime was that the suppression of criticism would ultimately destroy Germany”.

Far from unrealistically believing peace could be preserved, on his return he expressed his deep concern at the parochialism of the Australian states in resisting Commonwealth plans to prepare for war. He told the Constitutional Club of Sydney in October that:

“Few people of the Commonwealth fully realised that the European crisis might involve hostilities in Australian waters – that war might be something that would come to Australia, and not merely something that was happening 12,000 miles away” (SMH, 25/10/1938).

 

[Henri McPhee]

Second, as I also discussed, there was no significant increase in the rate of fighter production after Munich.

I don't think that is strictly true:

http://spitfiresite.com/2010/04/fro...r-force-rearmament-programme-1934-1940.html/8

The supply of armaments at the outbreak of war, compared with the supply in October 1938, had improved beyond all possible dispute. Whether the improvement was sufficient to fulfil its strategic objective depends on the definition of the objective. If the sole strategic aim was to make Britain better able to withstand attack from the air then production in the year following Munich went some of the way towards achieving it.

The output of aircraft was rising. Even more importantly from the point of view of air defence, the number of modern fast fighters among the aircraft coming into production increased even more dramatically. The monthly output of Hurricanes rose from 26 in October 1938 to 44 in September 1939 and of Spitfires from 13 to 32 in the same period. The number of squadrons equipped with new aircraft had grown correspondingly.

 

[Garrison]

But again, WTH had he done in 1934 that would be worth going to war over? Or do we demand just complete clairvoyance at this point?

Military action against Germany was highly unlikely in 1934, though not impossible for the reasons outlined earlier, but strong economic sanctions were on the cards owing to Germany actions in terms of trade, debt and reparations. If the British had followed through on their threats the wheels would have come off the German economy and Hitler's regime probably wouldn't have survived.