proto-consciousness field theory

[Belz...]

Ah, that's what I was trying to establish, but Mr Morgue is too focused on providing a running meta-analysis of the discussion and steering the conversation where he and he alone believes it should go.

Not so much now but when I was young I was able to lucid dream, at will, to an extent where is was impossible to distinguish dream experience from external experience. Indeed, 'actual' experience would often be a pale imitation of dream experience. This was full-on lucid dreaming, in which I was fully conscious, fully aware I was dreaming and lying in bed, yet able to interact with the dream world as if it were external.

Imagining an apple is not the same as seeing an apple, but you can still be fooled by a dream!apple. But how does that relate to your theory?

 

[baron]

Imagining an apple is not the same as seeing an apple, but you can still be fooled by a dream!apple. But how does that relate to your theory?

It wasn't me who brought it up. I'm disputing that if you accept that the information delivery method is different (internal vs external), which it clearly is, the experience of imagination / dreaming consciousness can be identical to that of waking consciousness.

 

[Belz...]

It wasn't me who brought it up. I'm disputing that if you accept that the information delivery method is different (internal vs external), which it clearly is, the experience of imagination / dreaming consciousness can be identical to that of waking consciousness.

Ok.

I'd still want to discuss how you think we detect (experience) qualia, as a mechanism. That'd allow us to devise a hypothetical way to detect them.

That's beside the fact that qualia and experiences still seem to be the same thing.

 

[JoeMorgue]

If you're going to argue that you can see, touch, taste, feel, etc the apple but "experiencing" the apple is something different or distinct, it's not "steering the meta-conversation" to ask what the difference is.

 

[Chanakya]

That is a silly question, I can't 'visualize' I can manipulate shapes in my brain, I can remember colors, but I can't just 'visualize' red.

Hello, David. I'm sorry, I don't see why on earth you think my question was "silly"? The short answer to the question is: aphantasia. (Yes, something learnt, from Darat's reply to my question.)

If you have difficulty visualizing colors, David, then you may want to check it out.

I know you're something of a Buddhism enthusiast, or at least you used to be. If you do have a touch of aphantasia, then one very practical fallout might be this, that you wouldn't be able to fare very well with the visualization exercises within Vajrayana that are designed to establish Shamata. You'd probably do better with breath or Insight.

 

[Belz...]

Better yet, pray to Cthulhu, instead. I get better results that way.

 

[Chanakya]

Not so much now but when I was young I was able to lucid dream, at will, to an extent where is was impossible to distinguish dream experience from external experience. Indeed, 'actual' experience would often be a pale imitation of dream experience. This was full-on lucid dreaming, in which I was fully conscious, fully aware I was dreaming and lying in bed, yet able to interact with the dream world as if it were external.

That's fascinating! Kellyb's spoken of her loss-of-self experiences in this thred.

Do we really know the mechanism of how/why things like these happen? Simply sticking on a label, like 'lucid dreaming', or 'effect of epilepsy', while good to know, doesn't really explain anything IMO.

Might be off-topic to go off on a detailed discussion on this, but it would be fascinating to know the actual mechanism of how something like this might happen.

 

[ServiceSoon]

What you say is true, as far as that goes.

But surely you see that this is textbook special pleading?

Unless you can clearly provide good reasons for this exceptionalism -- that is, why the burden of proof operates one way for (a) God, but then changes direction when it comes to (b) free will and (c) consciousness -- I'm afraid that kind of reasoning would be fallacious.

I understand what special pleading is, however, I cannot see how I am doing it here. Can you please provide an example?

Only learnt about it a few years back, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-34039054. I've posted about it in the past in these types of discussions, but I never realised that I was different, I always thought folk were being poetic and using flowery language when they talked about what they could see in their mind's eye. I never realised you did in fact have a real mind's eye.

I must have aphantasia too. That was probably what contributed to my struggle with 3-D mathematics. It was impossible for me to visualize and manipulate 3-D figures in my minds eye.

I used to be able to visualize in my minds eye. When I was younger and played basketball I would close my eyes and try to imagine myself shooting the ball and it going in the hoop. After every attempt to shoot I'd re-start the experience from the beginning. Easy enough right? Sometimes the ball would hit the hoop and bounce out. Other times it would go through the hoop. No matter how hard I tried, I couldn't "visualize the win" every time.

Synesthesia is another condition what we should include in our inquiry to consciousness.

 

[Dancing David]

Better yet, pray to Cthulhu, instead. I get better results that way.

ph'nglui mglw'nafh Cthulhu R'lyeh wgah'nagl fhtagn

 

[Chanakya]

I understand what special pleading is, however, I cannot see how I am doing it here. Can you please provide an example?

Well, we were discussing whether free will and perhaps consciousness itself might be illusions. God seems intuitively self-evident to many, yet that does not put the burden of proof on to atheists.

Right after, you said that because the mind can be shown to have been tricked in some instances, doesn't mean it always is tricked.

I took that to be a response to (or at least in reference of) my post, immediately preceding. As such, what you say, while true, seemed special pleading as far as placing the burden of OBJECTIVE proof on those positing a God, while apparently holding free will and consciousness to a different standard (or so I understood your post to imply).

And nor is special pleading necessarily fallacious, provided one has valid reasons for one's exceptionalism. I was wondering if you did.

 

[Belz...]

ph'nglui mglw'nafh Cthulhu R'lyeh wgah'nagl fhtagn

Dammit, man. Post something in your own words!

 

[baron]

Ok.

I'd still want to discuss how you think we detect (experience) qualia, as a mechanism. That'd allow us to devise a hypothetical way to detect them.

As I say, I have no sensible suggestion regarding how one person might verify the qualia or experience of another. Linking their brains via some sort of neural cord, an artificual corpus callosum, might do the trick but at our current state of knowledge that's just sci-fi.

Let me ask you a question. If I'm correct, you believe that:

* An artificial, non-biological replica of a human would be conscious in the same way as a human

* Consciousness is a non-independent product of the brain (be that biological or synthetic)

This being so, what physical element do you believe is actually producing the consciousness in each case, being that neither structure (organic brain vs synthetic brain) share any physicality in common? Do you believe there are multiple ways to generate consciousness and if so, what's the common factor?

 

[baron]

That is a silly question, I can't 'visualize' I can manipulate shapes in my brain, I can remember colors, but I can't just 'visualize' red.

I can. As clearly as you can see your monitor, I can visualise red.

 

[Belz...]

As I say, I have no sensible suggestion regarding how one person might verify the qualia or experience of another.

Sorry, maybe my question wasn't clear. I was asking you how, in your view, our brain experiences these qualia. It's about you detecting your own qualia, not someone else's.

Let me ask you a question. If I'm correct, you believe that:

* An artificial, non-biological replica of a human would be conscious in the same way as a human

* Consciousness is a non-independent product of the brain (be that biological or synthetic)

Correct, though as a precision to the first point I'd say that it would have to behave precisely like a human.

This being so, what physical element do you believe is actually producing the consciousness in each case, being that neither structure (organic brain vs synthetic brain) share any physicality in common? Do you believe there are multiple ways to generate consciousness and if so, what's the common factor?

Well, since you're asking for my beliefs yes, I think you can probably produce a consciousness with non-biological means. As for something more certain, what produces our consciousness is the brain. That much is evident.

 

[baron]

Sorry, maybe my question wasn't clear. I was asking you how, in your view, our brain experiences these qualia. It's about you detecting your own qualia, not someone else's.

Then you haven't grasped my position (missus). The brain doesn't experience anything, our consciousness is the thing that experiences. Our brains process, and that's it.

Correct, though as a precision to the first point I'd say that it would have to behave precisely like a human.

Well, since you're asking for my beliefs yes, I think you can probably produce a consciousness with non-biological means. As for something more certain, what produces our consciousness is the brain. That much is evident.

Now it's my turn not to have made my question clear.

OK, here we have a brain, made of brain meat.

Here we have a synthetic brain, made of nano valves and levers and switches (not really, but just not brain meat)

Their only commonality is the behaviour they produce. Given that, why do you believe they both generate consciousness, and what physically are the things that do the generating?

 

[Belz...]

The brain doesn't experience anything, our consciousness is the thing that experiences. Our brains process, and that's it.

That sounds like a distinction without a difference again. Your brain processes what? The experience? Isn't that the same thing as experiencing?

OK, here we have a brain, made of brain meat.

Here we have a synthetic brain, made of nano valves and levers and switches (not really, but just not brain meat)

Their only commonality is the behaviour they produce. Given that, why do you believe they both generate consciousness, and what physically are the things that do the generating?

Neurons firing in one, neural chips in the other. Consciousness is what these things do as much as running is what legs do. Consciousness is not a thing but an action.

 

[baron]

That sounds like a distinction without a difference again. Your brain processes what? The experience? Isn't that the same thing as experiencing?

The brain processes data in the form of electrical and chemical impulses. It's simply a biological machine.

Neurons firing in one, neural chips in the other.

But you've just shifted the problem down a scale. I'll ask the same question. Why do you believe both biological and synthetic neurons generate consciousness, and what physically are the things that do the generating? You can't say, 'the neurons' because that's no different to saying, 'the brain'. You are alleging that there is something special to neurons, independent of their structure and composition, that create consciousness. What is this thing?

Consciousness is what these things do as much as running is what legs do. Consciousness is not a thing but an action.

I don't understand this. 'Running' is a linguistic construct, it's just a word. I could call the act of hopping on your right leg whilst flailing your left arm flallumping. Flallumping doesn't exist now any more than it did 30 seconds ago and it requires no explanation, it's simply a word I used to describe something else.

This is easily proven by imagining what would happen had humans not developed language. Would we be unable to run? No, we'd still be able to run, we just wouldn't have a word for it? So what?

 

[Belz...]

The brain processes data in the form of electrical and chemical impulses. It's simply a biological machine.

So your experiences are entirely independant of the brain?

But you've just shifted the problem down a scale.

No, I didn't. I just don't assume that the action of consciousness is special in any way.

Why do you believe both biological and synthetic neurons generate consciousness, and what physically are the things that do the generating? You can't say, 'the neurons' because that's no different to saying, 'the brain'.

It's not entirely different, no. It's still my answer.

You are alleging that there is something special to neurons, independent of their structure and composition, that create consciousness. What is this thing?

Nothing special about them at all, that's my point. They act together to do consciousness. If can figure out how, there's no reason why can't reproduce it in a machine, unless the biological components are somehow required.

I don't understand this. 'Running' is a linguistic construct, it's just a word.

1) No it's not. You can actually run by jiggling your legs around properly. But if you do it improperly, you won't be running. Running is a real thing, but it's not an object, it's an action. That's what I'm saying consciousness is.

2) Consciousness is also just a word.

This is easily proven by imagining what would happen had humans not developed language. Would we be unable to run? No, we'd still be able to run, we just wouldn't have a word for it? So what?

I think you're over-thinking my post. The word isn't important. I'm just using it to communicate a concept to you. You know, the whole point of language.

 

[baron]

So your experiences are entirely independant of the brain?

Ahhhhh.... I'll go with no since you include 'entirely'.

The brain processes information. This produces a distortion of the conscious field which in turn produces - or rather is - experience. So experience is independent in that it operates on a separate substrate, but it's not independent in the sense that it's caused by the brain in the first instance. If the brain stops processing information, or disappears, then the distortion - the experience - vanishes too.

Unless...

...no, best to leave that one alone.

No, I didn't. I just don't assume that the action of consciousness is special in any way.

It's not entirely different, no. It's still my answer.

Nothing special about them at all, that's my point. They act together to do consciousness. If can figure out how, there's no reason why can't reproduce it in a machine, unless the biological components are somehow required.

You're making an assumption there. You are assuming that the robot has been created by reproducing the functionality of humans, which mandates an understanding of how humans operate. This is logical on a practical level but it's an unwanted addition to the point I'm trying to make and it muddies the waters.

Imagine, then, that some distant alien species creates, by pure chance as far as we're concerned, a robot that behaves exactly like a human and is of the same level of intelligence. It is composed of alien metal and that sort of thing. It might have neurons, it might not, it doesn't matter.

Why do you believe this alien machine must share the attribute of consciousness with the human animal? And what common element would cause this consciousness to manifest?

1) No it's not. You can actually run by jiggling your legs around properly. But if you do it improperly, you won't be running. Running is a real thing, but it's not an object, it's an action. That's what I'm saying consciousness is.

But actions don't exist any more than flolloping does. These are just sounds and squiggles we use to clarify our communication.

Look at it this way: We could define an infinite number of movements concerned with moving our legs. We could invent a word for moving the left leg 3 inches to the right jumping 1.7 inches off the ground using our right; we could invent another word for doing the same thing but moving the left leg 3.132 inches to the right. And so on ad infinitum. We are not creating the world as we churn out this nonsense, we're just making sounds and squiggles.

2) Consciousness is also just a word.

It is, and so is tree, but the difference is that trees and consciousness are words that represent things, running and flolloping are not.

 

[Darat]

Yeah.



The problem I have with qualia is that it treats consciousness as an object rather than an action.

The old standby is show me the "run" in a person running, you obviously can't since the run is the process itself, it can't exist separate from the process because it is the process . The same with consciousness, we can't show the "conscious" in a person being conscious as it can't exist separate to the process.

Plus of course we have zero evidence for a consciousness field.