proto-consciousness field theory

[baron]

There's just too many straw men, personal insults, evasions, and disingenuous statements in that last post to even bother with. It's a shame, baron, that you don't have any interest in trying to honestly discuss your belief, especially given that you claim to have put so much time and effort into formulating it.

You've browbeaten me into submission. You can count that as a "win", if you like.

I knew with 100% certainty that as soon as I asked you to detail your views on the matter you'd come out with something like this. One hundred percent. All you're interested is bombarding me with questions in the hope of scoring a gotcha and now you've flounced because I took a stand and said you need to actually engage in the discussion and put forward a point of view.

But something tells me you'll still find time to rebut that, just not to actually enter into an actual discussion of the topic. Shame on you.

 

[baron]

What's the difference between "qualia" and "experience", then?

Qualia are part of experience, a subset. Thought is experience but does not necessarily involve qualia. Darat is protesting that qualia are a moot concept on account of how he doesn't experience them, but he is using an incorrect definition and he does experience them, just like everyone else.

 

[Belz...]

Qualia are part of experience, a subset. Thought is experience but does not necessarily involve qualia. Darat is protesting that qualia are a moot concept on account of how he doesn't experience them, but he is using an incorrect definition and he does experience them, just like everyone else.

Well, the reason why he's doing that is that the definition of qualia is very fuzzy. What's a subset of experience if not another experience?

Qualia are basically quanta of experience, but isn't that experience as well? So why not call them that? The problem is that this insistent distinction gives the impression that the reason for not calling them "experience" is to leave open a door to a sort of not-quite-so-physical aspect of consciousness. Something that'll perpetually remain beyond the purview of science.

So let's try this: how would we detect qualia? We can see the brain experiencing stuff, but how do we break it down to qualia, scientifically speaking?

 

[Squeegee Beckenheim]

I knew with 100% certainty that as soon as I asked you to detail your views on the matter you'd come out with something like this. One hundred percent.

Congratulations. Have a biscuit.

 

[baron]

Well, the reason why he's doing that is that the definition of qualia is very fuzzy. What's a subset of experience if not another experience?

Qualia are basically quanta of experience, but isn't that experience as well? So why not call them that? The problem is that this insistent distinction gives the impression that the reason for not calling them "experience" is to leave open a door to a sort of not-quite-so-physical aspect of consciousness. Something that'll perpetually remain beyond the purview of science.

If by 'physical' you mean real, that's not my position at all. It's the opposite. I believe that the conscious field is as real as gravity, as I have said before, not just a part of the universe but perhaps the most fundamental part. It's as real as you can get. I wouldn't, however, like some panpsychists and religious texts, maintain that consciousness is the only thing that is real.

So let's try this: how would we detect qualia? We can see the brain experiencing stuff, but how do we break it down to qualia, scientifically speaking?

If I could answer that I would win the Nobel Prize. That is inherent in the hard problem. There are not even any theories on how to detect qualia, let alone an experiment.

 

[Belz...]

If I could answer that I would win the Nobel Prize. That is inherent in the hard problem. There are not even any theories on how to detect qualia, let alone an experiment.

Would you consider the possibility, then, that qualia don't exist at all?

 

[baron]

Would you consider the possibility, then, that qualia don't exist at all?

No, because when I am aware of external stimulae, or imagining similar, I experience them. To deny they exist is to deny my own senses, which isn't a good starting point for any investigation or hypothesis.

 

[Belz...]

No, because when I am aware of external stimulae, or imagining similar, I experience them. To deny they exist is to deny my own senses, which isn't a good starting point for any investigation or hypothesis.

No, but I'm not asking you to deny experience, but the qualia that supposedly compose them.

What I was previously asking wasn't whether you could detect them, but how you think they could theoretically detect them. If you don't know, then how do you think we're detecting them now?

 

[baron]

No, but I'm not asking you to deny experience, but the qualia that supposedly compose them.

What I was previously asking wasn't whether you could detect them, but how you think they could theoretically detect them. If you don't know, then how do you think we're detecting them now?

You're back to subjectivity. You used the first person plural, 'we', intimating that detection would involve all of us detecting the same thing. Of course each of us experiences our own qualia all the time but I can't detect yours and you can't detect mine. If you're happy to admit that qualia exist purely on the basis of your experience then you've proved the point to yourself but nobody else. I have proved it to myself but I've nothing to offer anybody else aside from the advice they stop and think for a moment about what's really going on inside their head. I am literally unable to understand the perspective of someone who denies qualia exist, so that's another stumbling block in the communication.

 

[Belz...]

You're back to subjectivity. You used the first person plural, 'we', intimating that detection would involve all of us detecting the same thing. Of course each of us experiences our own qualia all the time but I can't detect yours and you can't detect mine.

Yeah but that doesn't change my question: how do you detect your own qualia? Once we've established that, we'd be one step closer to finding a way for me to detect your qualia.

I am literally unable to understand the perspective of someone who denies qualia exist, so that's another stumbling block in the communication.

Think of it this way: if consciousness can be an illusion, why can't qualia?

 

[baron]

Yeah but that doesn't change my question: how do you detect your own qualia? Once we've established that, we'd be one step closer to finding a way for me to detect your qualia.

How? I've no idea how. That I do is unquestionable. If I did not I wouldn't be typing this, I wouldn't have any sensory conception of the word at all, no visual 'arena', no auditory awareness, no internal body map, no awareness of smell or taste.

Think of it this way: if consciousness can be an illusion, why can't qualia?

Consciousness isn't an illusion, it's as real as gravity.

 

[Belz...]

How? I've no idea how. That I do is unquestionable. If I did not I wouldn't be typing this, I wouldn't have any sensory conception of the word at all, no visual 'arena', no auditory awareness, no internal body map, no awareness of smell or taste.

So you're saying that a p-zombie or a robot that would have the exact same behaviour as you would be impossible? Or would it be conscious as well?

Consciousness isn't an illusion, it's as real as gravity.

Ok I thought you were the one who brought this up earlier.

 

[baron]

So you're saying that a p-zombie or a robot that would have the exact same behaviour as you would be impossible? Or would it be conscious as well?

Both. A robot that behaved as I do - or more accurately, had the same potential as I do - would be as conscious as I am*. Therefore, an unconscious robot with those traits would be impossible.

* Although I don't discount the possibility that its consciousness would be different in some way, as I'm sure physical structure would have a bearing on that.

 

[Belz...]

Both. A robot that behaved as I do - or more accurately, had the same potential as I do - would be as conscious as I am*. Therefore, an unconscious robot with those traits would be impossible.

Good, so far we agree.

I'm still fuzzy on the distinction between experience and qualia. The latter still seem to be the same as the former.

 

[baron]

Good, so far we agree.

That's progress then.

I'm still fuzzy on the distinction between experience and qualia. The latter still seem to be the same as the former.

Think if it this way. You are relaxing and feel content. The feeling of contentedness is an experience but it is not classed as qualia. You are almost certainly experiencing qualia at the same time, and qualia might contribute to your feeling of contentedness, but the actual experience of contentedness is not in itself qualia.

 

[Belz...]

Think if it this way. You are relaxing and feel content. The feeling of contentedness is an experience but it is not classed as qualia. You are almost certainly experiencing qualia at the same time, and qualia might contribute to your feeling of contentedness, but the actual experience of contentedness is not in itself qualia.

That part I understand, but I still don't see the distinction. The 'qualia' that contribute to the experience ARE also an experience, are they not? If not, then what are they? Are they something distinct from you that you are experiencing? Are they the consciousness field you were talking about?

 

[JoeMorgue]

What's the difference between "qualia" and "experience", then?

A distinct without difference being used to prove the difference exists.

 

[Squeegee Beckenheim]

Okay, as I've a little more time now, and for the record, I'm going to quote myself from my first post in this thread and elaborate a little:

I don't think we yet have an adequate explanation of what consciousness is. Certainly not a universally-accepted one. It's so lacking in definition that we also can't define what it means to lose consciousness, and so there is no scientific consensus even on how anaesthetics work.

It seems to me that that's a question that needs answering before we can determine whether or not rocks are conscious.

I think that definitions of consciousness tend towards the tautological. What is consciousness? It's the state of having qualia. What are qualia? They're units of experience. What does it mean to experience something? To be conscious of it.

To quote myself again from earlier in the thread:

That's really going to come down to how we defined "consciousness". If it's just as "an emergent property of data processing", and if we define "data processing" to include, say, particles appearing and disappearing within the quantum foam, then empty space would have consciousness by definition. It'll come down to what people are trying to communicate and what utility that idea has.

I mean let's say, for example, that we determine that empty space has a minute amount of consciousness. The question then is "so what?" What useful does that tell us about space? What useful does that tell us about consciousness? How will that affect our understanding of cosmic physics? How will that affect our understanding of neurophysics? How will that affect our understanding of anaesthesiology? How will that affect our understanding of psychology?

At the moment, it seems to me that the answers are "nothing" and "not at all". Perhaps that's because I don't yet have a deep enough understanding of the subject. Perhaps that's because the field is relatively new. Or perhaps it's because it does tell us nothing useful.

If it does tell us something useful, then it'll become mainstream. If it doesn't, then it'll go the way of aether.

But the point is that it will come to be defined in science to mean whatever is the most useful way for people within relevant fields to define it. The fuzzy edges will be worked around in the same way they are with other sciences.

Where do I think consciousness comes from? I don't know, but I think it's most likely a product of the brain. Whether that's as an emergent property of the brain's particular wiring, an emergent property of a neural net, an emergent property of data processing, something that the brain is specifically wired to produce due to self-awareness being a survival trait, or something else, I don't know. I see no reason to posit the existence of any new entities to explain it, though. We know, for example, that damage to certain parts of the brain can alter consciousness in predictable and replicable ways (for example, damage to the fusiform gyrus can cause prosopagnosia), and we know that ingesting certain chemicals can alter consciousness in predictable and replicable ways, which suggests that there is an intrinsic relationship between the two.

I see no reason to suppose it's any different to a running computer programme, albeit one that is unquestionably immeasurably more sophisticated and complex than anything created by humans. But I see no reason to suppose that there's a hard line between the computer programmes running in our biological computers and the computer programmes running in our technological computers.

Are things other than humans conscious? To again repeat what I've already said in this thread, there are most likely degrees of consciousness. There are animals that certainly display outward signs of consciousness, albeit a lesser consciousness than humans. How much and how true that is will depend again on how consciousness is defined. A scale with fuzzy edges seems to me to be the most reasonable explanation.

Are inanimate objects conscious? I see no reason to suppose they are, and have heard no cogent arguments for why they should be considered so. But, as I spent the first couple of pages of this thread discussing, it will all come down to how we define consciousness and how we define consciousness will come down to what utility that definition has. I can't see any utility to defining consciousness in a way that would include inanimate objects, but I'm open to hearing a good argument for it.

 

[JoeMorgue]

Okay I'm gonna over simplify a little bit of neuro-science a little bit, but this is a fair and honest description of what I think people are usually talking about when they try to verbalize the more esoteric versions of "conscious."

//I'm going to use the over-simplified "Left Brain / Right Brain" concepts here just for simplicity sake and so this thing doesn't turn into a complete novel because one function of the brain I'm going to describe takes place in and is a major function of the left side of the brain and other functions I'm going to describe take place in and are a major function of the right side of the brain. The two hemisphere of the brain are more complex, have more usages, and so forth, then I am going to be describing here.

Also of note the nerves are swapped before they make it to the brain for our purposes. The right hemisphere of your brain takes sensory inputs and controls the left side of your body and vice-versa. I'm gonna try to make sure I am always clear between "Left/Right Brain" and "Left/Right side of the body" but I'm damn near sure to slip up and/or no clarify which I'm talking about at least once so keep this in mind.//

As most people know the two hemispheres of the brain are connected by a large bundle of specialized nerves called the Corpus Callosum which is... like a high speed data bus for the left and right hemispheres to share information.

But until a few years back severing the Corpus Callosum was a... well not common but not like super-rare method of treating very severe seizure disorders that hadn't responded to more traditional methods. Brain surgery was performed the the "link" between the left and right hemispheres was removed or severed resulting in what is known as a "Split Brain Patient."

And... it usually worked. There's still a lot of unknowns but the general idea is the seizures were being caused by information somehow getting corrupted for lack of a better term when moving between the hemispheres and when the brain tried to process it it.... well crashed and had to reboot in a sense and preventing the information from moving between the hemispheres solved the problem.

But there were often side affects. Weird side affects. Many split brain patients started to report they would essentially start disagreeing... with themselves. Their left hand would, for instance, take something out of the kitchen cabinet to eat and their right hand would put it back or even literally slap it out of their own other hand or left and right hand would simultaneously both grab they shirt 'they' wanted to wear that day.

And here's where it gets really weird. Take a split brain patient and put them in a booth so their field of vision is split down the middle, so right eye can't see what left eye sees and vice versa. Now the speech center of our brain are located in the Left Hemisphere, Right Brain can't "talk" for our purposes. So show only the right side of someone's brain a picture, ask the person what they are looking at and they won't be able to tell you, even though they know exactly what they are looking at because the part that knows what they are looking at and the part the can talk aren't talking to each other.

And it gets even weirder. Same setup, split brain patient in a booth that splits their field of vision, in front of them are several random objects. A message that says "Pick up the red toy car" is shown to Right Brain only. The person will pick up the red toy car. Ask him verbally why he is holding the red toy car and he literally won't know because it can't see the message saying "Pick up the red toy car." But, and here's where we reach the rub in my opinion, in almost all cases the person will not say "Jeez I don't know why I picked up the car that's funny why am I doing this" instead.... they'll lie.

Okay actually to be clear not lie. But they will make up a plausible, valid sounding reason. Because that's Left Brain's job. To create a complete, cognizant picture of what is happening and why the person is reacting the way they do. Because the part of our brain that creates our "picture" of the world isn't in charge of everything, as evidence here.

In the same setup and for the same reasons you can ask both halves of a split brain the same question, even a subjective opinion question, and get different answers. Your left and right brain can literally have different favorite colors and favorite songs and favorite foods which is why people with split brains so often literally and non-metaphorically disagree with themselves over things.

It's tempting to think of Left Brain as "the person" since that's the part that speaks and Right Brain as some "add on" but Left Brain doesn't (for lack of a better term) have "facial recognition software" running on it. If Left Brain is "you" then you don't know who your friends and family are.

This is why they can literally put you into an MRI machine and watch you make decisions a tiny fraction of a second before your conscious mind "decides" to make the decision. Because you don't make the decision consciously. You make them unconsciously and a split second later your brain creates a narrative for why you did and as history Process CGP Grey (who's video introduced me to this) pointed out "If you think about it closely, you know you've done this." It's also why after the split the two sides of the brain aren't completely freaking the ever loving hell out, because honestly not all that much has changed for them.

This isn't drag us down into the freewill debate or say that "you" aren't making decisions because those previous parts of you are just as much you as the other.

But I do think this "whole cognizant picture" that Left Brain creates, essentially taking all the inputs and decisions making that all the various parts of the brain perform and making the best narrative it can as to why all of it happen is, for most usages of the term "consciousness."

 

[Belz...]

Yeah split brain patients sure throw a lot of old concepts about consciousness under the bus and/or out the window (or both, as now you have two brains able to do two things!)