Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[Pacal]

Henri your latest comments deserve a very brief response.

In my opinion there may be truth in what you say in that remark, though very few people then or nowadays ever say that publicly.

Obviously you are deeply ignorant of what actual Historians say a great many do in fact say what I said and in great detail. So if publically saying something is by publishing books and articles saying it than it is said publically by many.

There is Russian historical propaganda now that the Russians were prepared to send God knows how many divisions to assist the Czechs if war was declared over the Sudetenland in 1938, but that would mean the Russians passing through Poland, which the Poles objected to, and it would not have guaranteed free and fair elections in Czechoslovakia.

Aside from the fact the Soviet Union could have flown in the help. It is still possible that the Poles would have allowed Soviet troops to cross their borders. As it is the western allies made absolutely no effort to try. As I said before Chamberlain quite deliberately froze the Soviet Union out of Munich even though the Soviets did indeed want to be involved. That of course was just stupid.

The French army which was supposed to help the Czechs was a shambles in 1938 and not much better in 1940.

Repeating arrant nonsense doesn't make it true. What your saying here is simply false. Henri once again your amazing seemingly bottomless ignorance is showing.

The fact is that Stalin thought his better option was to appease Hitler and for him to acquire the Baltic states and eastern Poland. What a twit, honestly! Even the posters on this forum can see that Hitler intended to invade Soviet Russia.

Stalin expected Hitler to be bogged down in France, which at the time was actually a reasonable assumption. So not such a twit. Further Hitler was nearly totally alone among the German military in thinking France could be defeated quickly. Stalin like much of the world was completely surprised by the speed with which Germany conquered France in May - June 1940. And surprise, surprise so were the majority of the German Generals!

Chamberlain was a wealthy manufacturer who understood British manufacturing. He was thoroughly acquainted with the whole business of the practical difficulties of shipbuilding and aircraft manufacture, and components,, and military equipment and vehicles and logistics and administrative officers and things like bombs and shells and rifles. That was unlike Churchill and Eden, and the London politicians and journalists, and university lecturers and economists who seem to be making the decisions on Brexit nowadays.

Henri forget the jabs at modern day politicians. Secondly Chamberlain's training and education were actually fairly limited. He for example greatly exaggerated the size of the German economy etc., before Munich and afterwards. He was quite unaware of the reality. Further he seriously and deliberately underestimated British resources and exaggerated British difficulties and of course he underestimated German difficulties. Further has pointed out above Chamberlain had made it quite clear that he wanted estimates of German strength that fitted his preconceived notions and dismissed or ignored data to the contrary of his preconceptions.

As for the guff about Churchill and Eden. Both of whom had longed served their countries, and in Churchill's case served as Lord High Admiral during the First World War. And in reality Churchill was actually quite knowledgeable about the state of British manufacturing and the state of the British military. He kept himself informed and so did Eden. Your statement is just ignorant.

It all reminds me so much of the Pirates of Penzance Gilbert and Sullivan opera on youtube:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rs3dPaz9nAo

Henri thank you for providing even more evidence about your sublime level of ignorance about this topic. Before you respond to my comments I suggest you read a few books. Especially Tooze. Otherwise you will continue to post drivel and nonsense.

P.S. Thanks for the link; the Major General's song fits your crap on this thread perfectly.

 

[Henri McPhee]

Stalin expected Hitler to be bogged down in France, which at the time was actually a reasonable assumption. So not such a twit. Further Hitler was nearly totally alone among the German military in thinking France could be defeated quickly. Stalin like much of the world was completely surprised by the speed with which Germany conquered France in May - June 1940. And surprise, surprise so were the majority of the German Generals!

I still think it was a monumental misjudgement by Stalin. I agree the German Ardennes offensive was a big risk by Hitler, but it had been carefully researched by the Germans in previous years. It was a failure of French Military Intelligence, and even by British Intelligence before the days of the Ultra secret information. Even Churchill said once that the German generals were better than ours. Colonel Oster of the German Military intelligence (Abwehr), if not Admiral Canaris, had provided adequate warning of the Ardennes offensive to the French and British but it was rejected and ignored as being impossible. The only good French general I have come across was General Juin.

There is a bit of waffle about Stalin's strategy before the war at this website and about the subsequent Russian rewriting of history. I agree that the Russians overwhelmed Finland in the end after serious losses:

https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-08...aved-way-world-war-ii-was-signed-75-years-ago

But the Nazi-Soviet pact didn't last. In late 1939, the Soviets also tried to invade Finland. The Finns refused to roll over. Despite being tremendously outnumbered and outgunned, they improvised a defense and made the best of the terrain and the ferocious winter weather.

One innovation of that campaign was the gasoline bomb, designed for use against the air intake ducts on Soviet tanks. Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister, had called the Russian invasion a "humanitarian" move; Soviet propaganda even claimed that bombs dropped by Soviet planes were food aid. In a sarcastic tribute, the Finns christened their homemade weapons "Molotov cocktails," joking that they should have drinks along with the Soviet-provided "meals." In the end, the Soviets suffered a brutal loss in the "Winter War" with the Finns.

The Germans were astonished at how badly the Soviets performed in the Winter War, a performance that made them believe they could turn on Stalin before finishing off the stubborn Brits in the west. In June 1941, Hitler attacked. Moorhouse and other historians say that Stalin was stunned by the invasion and refused to accept that the news was true, leading to disastrous losses by the Red Army in the early days of the war.

Once the Soviet Union recovered and defeated the Nazis, Moscow re-wrote history. The Nazi-Soviet Pact morphed from a delusion to a clever way to buy time, which allowed the Soviet Union to re-arm. Britain and America also tended to airbrush the Nazi-Soviet pact out of mainstream history, afraid that it would damage the popular narrative of the "Grand Alliance" that beat the Nazis.

And that's only the public half of the alliance: the existence of the secret protocol was officially denied by the Soviet Union until its dying days in 1989.

 

[erwinl]

I still think it was a monumental misjudgement by Stalin. I agree the German Ardennes offensive was a big risk by Hitler, but it had been carefully researched by the Germans in previous years. It was a failure of French Military Intelligence, and even by British Intelligence before the days of the Ultra secret information. Even Churchill said once that the German generals were better than ours. Colonel Oster of the German Military intelligence, if not Admiral Canaris, had provided adequate warning of the Ardennes offensive to the French and British but it was rejected and ignored as being impossible. The only good French general I have come across was General Juin.

There is a bit of waffle about Stalin's strategy before the war at this website and about the subsequent Russian rewriting of history. I agree that the Russians overwhelmed Finland in the end after serious losses:

https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-08...aved-way-world-war-ii-was-signed-75-years-ago[guote]But the Nazi-Soviet pact didn't last. In late 1939, the Soviets also tried to invade Finland. The Finns refused to roll over. Despite being tremendously outnumbered and outgunned, they improvised a defense and made the best of the terrain and the ferocious winter weather.

One innovation of that campaign was the gasoline bomb, designed for use against the air intake ducts on Soviet tanks. Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister, had called the Russian invasion a "humanitarian" move; Soviet propaganda even claimed that bombs dropped by Soviet planes were food aid. In a sarcastic tribute, the Finns christened their homemade weapons "Molotov cocktails," joking that they should have drinks along with the Soviet-provided "meals." In the end, the Soviets suffered a brutal loss in the "Winter War" with the Finns.

The Germans were astonished at how badly the Soviets performed in the Winter War, a performance that made them believe they could turn on Stalin before finishing off the stubborn Brits in the west. In June 1941, Hitler attacked. Moorhouse and other historians say that Stalin was stunned by the invasion and refused to accept that the news was true, leading to disastrous losses by the Red Army in the early days of the war.

Once the Soviet Union recovered and defeated the Nazis, Moscow re-wrote history. The Nazi-Soviet Pact morphed from a delusion to a clever way to buy time, which allowed the Soviet Union to re-arm. Britain and America also tended to airbrush the Nazi-Soviet pact out of mainstream history, afraid that it would damage the popular narrative of the "Grand Alliance" that beat the Nazis.

And that's only the public half of the alliance: the existence of the secret protocol was officially denied by the Soviet Union until its dying days in 1989.

[/QUOTE]
highlighted.

Now. If we change 'Nazi-Soviet Pact' into 'Chamberlain appeasement' and change 'Soviet Union' into 'United Kingdom', then we're all on the same page.

 

[Henri McPhee]

highlighted.

Now. If we change 'Nazi-Soviet Pact' into 'Chamberlain appeasement' and change 'Soviet Union' into 'United Kingdom', then we're all on the same page.[/QUOTE]

The Germans tried to persuade Molotov to join him in an alliance with Japan which Stalin rejected at the time. It was another Hitler con trick. Our secret service, and Chamberlain, knew for years that Hitler intended to invade Soviet Russia even if Stalin didn't.

Similarly Hitler tried to persuade the British to join him by saying the British could keep the British Empire. That was similarly rejected by Chamberlain and his Cabinet. You must remember that these politicians and civil servants say things in public which they don't mean in private. That explains all that public waffle from Chamberlain about peace in our time, and this piece of paper signed by Hitler shows the determination of our two peoples never to go to war again with each other!

 

[Andy_Ross]

Henri

The 'Ardennes Offensive' is the name generally given to the German offensive of December 1944 against the Americans.
What you are referring to is generally called the 'Battle of France'
It was not 'carefully researched in previous years'.
The 'Manstein' plan was only adopted in February 1940.
Previously to this the plan devised by Colonel-General Franz Halder was more or less a repeat of the German Schlieffen Plan of 1914 to advance through Belgium.

At least do some basic research.

 

[Dave Rogers]

At least do some basic research.

This is Henri you're talking to, remember?

Dave

 

[Border Reiver]

[The Germans tried to persuade Molotov to join him in an alliance with Japan which Stalin rejected at the time. It was another Hitler con trick. Our secret service, and Chamberlain, knew for years that Hitler intended to invade Soviet Russia even if Stalin didn't.

Stop.

You are obviously unaware that at the time that Ribbentrop and Molotov were negotiating their non-aggression pact that the Soviets and Japan were engaged in an undeclared war in the East.

Battle of Nohomon/Khalkin Gol? We may have mentioned it a few times - it was kind of a big deal.

There was no frakking way that the Soviets were going to ally with the Japanese.

 

[lobosrul5]

I still think it was a monumental misjudgement by Stalin. I agree the German Ardennes offensive was a big risk by Hitler, but it had been carefully researched by the Germans in previous years. It was a failure of French Military Intelligence, and even by British Intelligence before the days of the Ultra secret information. Even Churchill said once that the German generals were better than ours. Colonel Oster of the German Military intelligence (Abwehr), if not Admiral Canaris, had provided adequate warning of the Ardennes offensive to the French and British but it was rejected and ignored as being impossible. The only good French general I have come across was General Juin.

There is a bit of waffle about Stalin's strategy before the war at this website and about the subsequent Russian rewriting of history. I agree that the Russians overwhelmed Finland in the end after serious losses:

https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-08...aved-way-world-war-ii-was-signed-75-years-ago

The underlined: do you have any credible sources for this, whatsoever? I'm familiar with Canaris and I believe the first time he met with British agents was in 1942.

 

[Henri McPhee]

What you are referring to is generally called the 'Battle of France'
It was not 'carefully researched in previous years'.
The 'Manstein' plan was only adopted in February 1940.
Previously to this the plan devised by Colonel-General Franz Halder was more or less a repeat of the German Schlieffen Plan of 1914 to advance through Belgium.

At least do some basic research.

I agree that the textbooks say there was a change of plan for the Germans to attack through the Ardennes in 1940 but I disagree that there had never been any careful preparation, or research, by the Germans about this matter. From what I know there had been a French military exercise in previous years in the Ardennes and somehow the Germans had obtained the French reports and conclusions, and the rest of it. It's what is known technically as spying.

There is some waffle about this on another forum which makes sense to me:

https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistori...rdennes_1940_how_impenetrable_did_the_french/

The map exercises in question were conducted by General André-Gaston Prételat, the commander of Second Army between May-June 1938. As Jackson describes, Prételat's exercise estimated that it would take sixty hours for a tank-armed aggressor to cross the Ardennes. Nor was Prételat alone in his estimation of the Ardennes's suitability for tanks; a Colonel Bourguignon wrote in a study of frontier reconnaissance that the area was vulnerable to a surprise tank thrust.

The French high command was largely indifferent to these concerns. Gamelin accused Prételat of too much pessimism in his map exercise and felt that existing troop levels would be more than enough to staunch a German assault through the area. The provisions Petain staked defense on the region upon were special blocking troops of the French army and cooperation with the Belgians. Both of these would be sufficient to hold an unlikely German Ardennes offensive until the bulk of French forces could meet it and destroy the offensive in a set-piece, methodical battle. The French high command estimated that because of the roads and geography, a German attack would likely take nine days to clear the forest and two weeks to reach the Meuse. If a German attack were to materialize in this sector, then the French high command believed they would have ample time to organize an efficient counterattack. In addition to dismissing Prételat's exercise, Gamelin also restricted access to the results of the map exercise lest it create panic among the lower ranks over German capabilities.

Hindsight has rendered both Gamelin and Pétain rather foolish over this myopia over the Ardennes, and with a good deal of justification. Nonetheless, the German experience in the Ardennes does add some weight to the French military chiefs' skepticism of the Ardennes suitability for a quick thrust. Gelb created massive traffic jams in the area and the offensive did dance on the edge of disaster at a few critical points during the campaign because of road bottlenecks. French intelligence and aerial reconnaissance largely failed to pick up the build-up in the Ardennes and the French high command tended to dismiss those few reports that did indicate something was up in this sector. The French rigid system of command and control also denuded what little initiative the local blocking troops possessed to meet the upcoming onslaught.

Additionally, Franco-Belgian cooperation in the Ardennes proved anything but unified with the Belgians evacuating areas with the false expectation French troops would take their places. This was in stark contrast to German troops who had a much more flexible approach to military operations and a unified command more attuned to the realities of the situation.

Sources

Citino, Robert Michael. Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007.
Dildy, Doug, and Peter Dennis. Fall Gelb 1940 (1): Panzer Breakthrough in the West. Oxford: Osprey, 2014. 2014.
Epstein, Jonathan A. Belgium's Dilemma The Formation of the Belgian Defense Policy, 1932-1940. Leiden: Brill, 2014.
Frieser, Karl-Heinz, and John T. Greenwood. The Blitzkrieg legend: the 1940 campaign in the West. Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 2005.
Nord, Philip G. France 1940: Defending the Republic. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015.

 

[lobosrul5]

I agree that the textbooks say there was a change of plan for the Germans to attack through the Ardennes in 1940 but I disagree that there had never been any careful preparation, or research, by the Germans about this matter. From what I know there had been a French military exercise in previous years in the Ardennes and somehow the Germans had obtained the French reports and conclusions, and the rest of it. It's what is known technically as spying.

There is some waffle about this on another forum which makes sense to me:

https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistori...rdennes_1940_how_impenetrable_did_the_french/

Uhh, that reddit thread is about pre-war research by the French. Not pre-war research by the Germans. And what on earth waffle is there in a thread with two whole replies, one answering the op's question, and the only other one thanking him.

 

[Garrison]

Uhh, that reddit thread is about pre-war research by the French. Not pre-war research by the Germans. And what on earth waffle is there in a thread with two whole replies, one answering the op's question, and the only other one thanking him.

'Waffle' is like 'research' a word Henri doesn't know the meaning of.


As far as the French reaction to the idea of an attack through the Ardennes goes, well until February 1940 they were correct not to worry, the Germans had no intention of attacking there. Capturing the German battleplan in February actually worked against them. Firstly it led to them adding more troops to the Dyle Plan, weakening the reserve that would otherwise have been well placed to block an Ardennes attack. Secondly it provided the impetus for a change of plans by the Wehrmacht, adopting the high risk gamble that was 'Sickle Stroke'. In fact the sheer all or nothing gamble that Sickle Stroke entailed may have been another reason for the French dismissing it.

All of the above is of course completely academic in the context of the thread, in 1938 the Sickle Stroke plan didn't exist and if it had been proposed the means to carry it out didn't exist. Again Henri is trying to project the circumstance of 1940 onto 1938 as if nothing had change in the interim.

 

[Major Major]

As far as the French reaction to the idea of an attack through the Ardennes goes, well until February 1940 they were correct not to worry, the Germans had no intention of attacking there. Capturing the German battleplan in February actually worked against them.

Some people actually believed that the Mechelen Incident had been a deception operation to get the British and French to prepare for a rerun of the Schlieffen Plan.

 

[jimbob]

Does anyone know what the phrase "pearls before swine" means?

For some reason, reading some of the informative and interesting posts on this thread caused my imaginary cat to say that phrase. The first words he's ever uttered, too.

 

[Pacal]

More Henri nonsense.

highlighted.

Now. If we change 'Nazi-Soviet Pact' into 'Chamberlain appeasement' and change 'Soviet Union' into 'United Kingdom', then we're all on the same page.

The Germans tried to persuade Molotov to join him in an alliance with Japan which Stalin rejected at the time. It was another Hitler con trick.[/quote]

Hitler considered trying to get Stalin to sign a pact with Germany AFTER the fall of France and yes it was almost certainly a ruse. I should also point out that the Japanese felt betrayed by the Nazi-Soviet agreement which is one of the reasons they signed a non-aggression treaty with Russia in April 1941. This greatly reduced any chance of the Japanese attacking the Soviets once Hitler attacked. And by early 1941 Hitler wanted the Japanese to attack Britain and America, in order to divert their attention from Europe while he attacked the Soviets and has encouragement to the Japanese he said he would declare war on America if they attacked America. (Hitler was telling the Japanese this beginning in April 1941). Hitler was so confident of overthrowing the Soviet Union that he did not even require that the Japanese break their non-aggression treaty and attack the Soviets before declaring war!! Hitler seems to have seriously underestimated the sheer, massive power of the USA.

Our secret service, and Chamberlain, knew for years that Hitler intended to invade Soviet Russia even if Stalin didn't.

Your vast ignorance is showing. Anyone one reading Mein Kampf, or knowing it's contents would know that Hitler was planning vast Eastern conquests. The problem was most people did not take such stuff seriously at the time. And those that did, like Churchill, were ridiculed by those who did not. And Chamberlain from the historical record did not take Hitler's program has outlined in Mein Kampf seriously in the slightest. It was only in the aftermath of the fall of France that allied secret services began to take the idea of Hitler attacking the Soviet Union seriously and they got much of it wrong. First of all most Military analyses thought Hitler would present some sort of ultimatum before he attacked, most thought he had limited aims in the Soviet Union. Most did not understand that his aim was to destroy the Soviet state and commit genocide and ethnic cleansing on a truly spectacular level. And has I said Chamberlain just did not take even remotely seriously before war happened any notion that Hitler had vast continental, even global, ambitions. The record is basically unequivocal about that. Hitler had been incredibly candid about his ambitions, especially in Mein Kampf, but so many were absolutely determined not to understand. Once again showing that the best way to hide something is sometimes to put it in plain view.

As for Stalin. Well the bottom line is that Stalin was expecting by early 1941 a German attack. He was however not expecting an attack in 1941 and apparently was expecting some sort of ultimatum before hand, and like so many others was NOT expecting that Hitler's aim was in fact the destruction of the Soviet state. In other words Stalin was not expecting Hitler to be so irrational. Henri you seriously need to upgrade your knowledge of History.

Similarly Hitler tried to persuade the British to join him by saying the British could keep the British Empire. That was similarly rejected by Chamberlain and his Cabinet.

I have no idea exactly what your talking about. But if I may guess I think your referring to Hitler's peace offer after the fall of France. Henri; Churchill was in power has Prime Minister by then. And it is very clear that Hitler wasn't being serious and wanted to be able to free up resources for his attack on Russia which he began planning in early July 1940. (P.S. serious planning for the attack on the Soviet Union only began then.) Also Hitler's private conversations indicated that once finished with the Soviets he would deal with the British and would only forgo attacking them if they became basically his puppets. All of this was quite clear to the British. Further by this time consultations with the various members of the self governing parts of the British Empire had indicated that peace with the Nazis under those circumstances, (I.e., British defeat), would have very likely caused the collapse of the British empire in short order. For Example Canada would almost certainly have broken ties with Britain and established much closer relations with USA. New Zealand and Australia would have looked after their own interests. Britain would have almost certainly lost South Africa. It is not likely India would have been held for much longer either.

You must remember that these politicians and civil servants say things in public which they don't mean in private. That explains all that public waffle from Chamberlain about peace in our time, and this piece of paper signed by Hitler shows the determination of our two peoples never to go to war again with each other!

Henri you are repeating nonsense. We all know that politicians often say one thing in public and another in private. The bottom line was that after Munich Chamberlain was saying the same things in private that he was saying in public. He really thought he had made a permanent peace. In private Chamberlain kept saying over and over again that his purpose was to maintain the peace NOT to buy time to prepare for war. Chamberlain did not expect Hitler to break the Munich agreement by something like the occupation of Prague in March 1939. Even after Prague Chamberlain kept trying to avoid war and find a way of finally appeasing Hitler. Chamberlain had to be forced to speed up rearmament efforts. And has I've said before Chamberlain tried to weasel out of declaring war on Germany after the invasion of Poland and was forced to do so by his Cabinet who threatened to revolt if he did not.

Henri it is plain your knowledge of this area of history is tiny. So why don't you stop demonstrating your ignorance and wasting our time and read, at least, Tooze!

 

[SpitfireIX]

Chamberlain was a wealthy manufacturer who understood British manufacturing. He was thoroughly acquainted with the whole business of the practical difficulties of shipbuilding and aircraft manufacture, and components,, and military equipment and vehicles and logistics and administrative officers and things like bombs and shells and rifles. That was unlike Churchill and Eden . . .

Wishful thinking. As has been pointed out to you, and you've repeatedly ignored, Churchill called for large increases in military spending from the time the Nazis first came to power, but until the late 1930s those calls were mostly rejected by Chamberlain, first as Chancellor, and later as PM. Please explain how this squares with your claim that Chamberlain knew war with Germany was inevitable (hint: it doesn't).

This is simply yet another attempt by you to cast appeasement as a good idea, merely because Churchill opposed it. Fail.

 

[SpitfireIX]

Also, Henri, we're still waiting for you to explain, in detail, among other things:

• How Germany was going to conquer France, or otherwise menace Britain, in 1939, after fighting Czechoslovakia.
  
• How the Wehrmacht was going to mount a successful invasion of Britain if they had somehow conquered France in 1939.
  
• Why the Luftwaffe didn't just bomb France into submission.
  
• Why Chamberlain ceded the Treaty Ports back to Ireland in 1938, if he knew that war with Germany was inevitable.

 

[Henri McPhee]

The underlined: do you have any credible sources for this, whatsoever? I'm familiar with Canaris and I believe the first time he met with British agents was in 1942.

I have always thought that Admiral Canaris was one of ours, as they say in intelligence circles, and his assistant in the Abwehr, Colonel Oster, certainly was one of ours and he was directly involved in bomb plots to kill Hitler. There was some story full of heavy German humour about how happy Canaris and Oster were when the Nazi monster Heydrich was bumped off by Czech agents.

The Daily Telegraph reported once that Canaris met with British agents in 1941 but it could have been well before that. It was secret then and it could be that it's secret now. Canaris would have possessed high grade intelligence information. I have wondered in the past why there doesn't seem to be much publicity about Canaris, or TV documentaries. Frankly, it could possibly be something to do with avoiding embarrassment, or danger, for his descendants in Germany now.

There is a bit of background to Canaris at this website:

https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/wilhelm-canaris

Canaris appointed his friend, the anti-Nazi Hans Oster, to the number two in the Abwehr agency. From his post, Oster contacted enemies of the regime and turned them into Abwehr agents. The most important of these were Hans Von Dohnanyi, the catholic lawyer Joseph Muller and the protestant priest Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Oster created an anti-Nazi hierarchy in the Abwehr, and soon he directed all of the military plans of the resistance. He used the Abwehr to save people from the Gestapo, to cover resistance actions, to help Jews escape from Germany, and to communicate between the different circles of the resistance.

All of his actions were approved by Admiral Canaris. The commander in chief of the Abwehr supported the resistance, although he claimed that he was too old to take an active part.

Admiral Canaris, along with his second-in-command, Hans Oster, actually helped the Allies while supervising all German espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage. Canaris was revealing almost all of the important German strategy and battle plans to the Allies - from Hitler’s impending western offensive against the Low countries and France to Hitler’s plan to invade Britain. He also misled Hitler into believing that the Allies would not land at Anzio in 1943.

 

[Hans]

Frankly, it could possibly be something to do with avoiding embarrassment, or danger, for his descendants in Germany now.

There is a bit of background to Canaris at this website:

Like nobody in Germany reads wikipedia huh?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilhelm_Canaris#Downfall_and_execution

 

[Drewbot]

What would the ramifications have been, had the BEF not been able to escape from the beaches at Dunkirk?

If they had not escaped, then Chamberlain appeasement strategy would have been even more maligned.

Would the war have stretched to 10 years? Would Britain have offered terms after such a loss? An encircled British Army being forced to surrender to the Germans would have been devastating. It would have also allowed Germany to focus on Russia.

Just a small thought. How would our view of the appeasement be changed if Germans had been able to breakthrough into the Dunkirk evac zone?

 

[Drewbot]

Dunkirk may be the greatest military achievement of all time, and it came in the form of a defeat.