I can easily modify my proof be getting rid of the tape. Here it is:
1. The Universe is of infinite age.
There must be an observer or observers to verify that. But their evidence, whatever it might be, cannot be viewed in its entirety, so it cannot be accepted.
2. The universe came to be by itself, so to speak, as a result of some empirical process.
However, there was no observer to verify that, so this claim is baseless.
3. Someone created the universe.
In this case that someone is the Creator (or Creators) and the Observer at the time, so this hypothesis can be confirmed.
End of proof.
There are several theories regarding creation of the universe that do not involve God (or Gods), the theory of quantum fluctuation is one them, that contradict each other. Without the observer, how can anyone tell which one of them is correct?
1. Recall that the logical positivists regarded universally quantified empirical
propositions of the form "For all x, f(x)" as being unverifiable. But that doesn't imply that such statements, which includes all hypothesised physical laws, are meaningless under logical positivism, but rather that they are not
propositions. Physical Laws rather, are
hypotheses, where a hypothesis can be thought of as a policy adopted by scientists for generating and testing a series of related propositions whose quantifiers are finitely bounded.
So the statement "the universe is infinitely old" understood to be a hypothesis rather than a proposition, should be perfectly acceptable to the logical positivist. For it is merely a policy proposal for generating finite and verifiable propositions p(x), x=1,2,..., where p(x) is the proposition that "the universe isn't younger than x years old". The fact that the policy isn't exhaustable isn't grounds for rejecting the policy. Only falsification of one of it's generated propositions can do that.
2. Idealists and presentists, including some positivists, who reject the subject-object distinction along with metaphysical realism about physical time might say that it is
senseless to speak of the universe pre-existing observation, but this is a purely grammatical point and isn't the same thing as saying that it is empirically
baseless to speak of the universe coming to be by itself. For scientists (whether they be realists or idealists) can define equivalent verification criteria in their respective grammars for defining and testing such a hypothesis.
3. Seems to assume that it is meaningful to hypothesise a non-physical creator. Suppose one invents a creator hypothesis with enough sophistication that it is publicly verifiable (or refutable) in principle. Then what would it mean to say that this creation hypothesis was not a physical hypothesis?
Isn't the very grammatical essence of what we mean by a "physical" hypothesis that of it adhering to public verification/refutation? If so, then any scientifically admissible creator hypothesis is necessary physical.
Which then raises the question as to how one can then justify a conceptual distinction between a physical "creator-god" versus a bog-standard physical process. It isn't clear (at least to Spinozeans, pan-psychists and objective idealists) why only a certain class of physical processes should be the metaphysically privileged benefactors of psychological predicates but not others. In physical language, such metaphysical distinctions reduce to the trivialities of thermodynamic definitions of life.