Cont: The Trials of Amanda Knox and Raffaele Sollecito: Part 27

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Vixen said:
You are wrong.

From wiki:




Nota Bene In law an 'issue' has a specific legal meaning. During a trial or civil case, there will be issues.

A court can make a decision on an issue, which is not a verdict.

That decision can be appealed. The Supreme Court can determine an issue is settled, even if the final verdict is not, were it to send the case back down for further consideration on other specific issues.

If a Supreme Court decides an issue, that issue is res iudicata.

Clear now?
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Hahahaha! Nice judicious editing of the wikipedia article there!

Somehow you forgot to include the paragraphs prior to your intended "gotcha". They read as follows (my bolding for emphasis):

Res judicata includes two related concepts: claim preclusion and issue preclusion (also called collateral estoppel or issue estoppel), though sometimes res judicata is used more narrowly to mean only claim preclusion.

Claim preclusion bars a suit from being brought again on an event which was the subject of a previous legal cause of action that has already been finally decided between the parties[4] or those in privity with a party.

Issue preclusion bars the relitigation of issues of fact or law that have already been necessarily determined by a judge or jury as part of an earlier case.


And in criminal justice, res judicata almost always refers only to claim preclusion. Perhaps you will show me evidence that in Italy it refers instead to issue preclusion.


Oh, and you also forgot the text within the very passages that you quoted, of which I shall remind you again (my bolding for emphasis):

Res judicata (RJ) or res iudicata, also known as claim preclusion, is the Latin term for "a matter [already] judged", and refers to either of two concepts: in both civil law and common law legal systems, a case in which there has been a final judgment and is no longer subject to appeal;


Nota bene, indeed.................. :rolleyes:
 
LondonJohn said:
Hahahaha! Nice judicious editing of the wikipedia article there!

Somehow you forgot to include the paragraphs prior to your intended "gotcha". They read as follows (my bolding for emphasis):

Res judicata includes two related concepts: claim preclusion and issue preclusion (also called collateral estoppel or issue estoppel), though sometimes res judicata is used more narrowly to mean only claim preclusion.

Claim preclusion bars a suit from being brought again on an event which was the subject of a previous legal cause of action that has already been finally decided between the parties[4] or those in privity with a party.

Issue preclusion bars the relitigation of issues of fact or law that have already been necessarily determined by a judge or jury as part of an earlier case.


And in criminal justice, res judicata almost always refers only to claim preclusion. Perhaps you will show me evidence that in Italy it refers instead to issue preclusion.


Oh, and you also forgot the text within the very passages that you quoted, of which I shall remind you again (my bolding for emphasis):

Res judicata (RJ) or res iudicata, also known as claim preclusion, is the Latin term for "a matter [already] judged", and refers to either of two concepts: in both civil law and common law legal systems, a case in which there has been a final judgment and is no longer subject to appeal;


Nota bene, indeed.................. :rolleyes:
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Make your mind up. One minute you are moaning that all the summary of facts by Marasca-Bruno - for example, multiple attackers, staged burglary, Knox' presence, washing of blood from hands, covering up for Rudy, are 'judicial facts' which they can't do anything about.

The next minute, when it comes to ignoring Chieffi on Curatolo and reinstating Hellmann, 'res judicata' doesn't apply in Toto's case.

PIP's can only see the small picture. Then they wonder why they get called sophists.
 
LondonJohn said:
Hahahaha! Nice judicious editing of the wikipedia article there!

Somehow you forgot to include the paragraphs prior to your intended "gotcha". They read as follows (my bolding for emphasis):

Res judicata includes two related concepts: claim preclusion and issue preclusion (also called collateral estoppel or issue estoppel), though sometimes res judicata is used more narrowly to mean only claim preclusion.

Claim preclusion bars a suit from being brought again on an event which was the subject of a previous legal cause of action that has already been finally decided between the parties[4] or those in privity with a party.

Issue preclusion bars the relitigation of issues of fact or law that have already been necessarily determined by a judge or jury as part of an earlier case.


And in criminal justice, res judicata almost always refers only to claim preclusion. Perhaps you will show me evidence that in Italy it refers instead to issue preclusion.


Oh, and you also forgot the text within the very passages that you quoted, of which I shall remind you again (my bolding for emphasis):

Res judicata (RJ) or res iudicata, also known as claim preclusion, is the Latin term for "a matter [already] judged", and refers to either of two concepts: in both civil law and common law legal systems, a case in which there has been a final judgment and is no longer subject to appeal;


Nota bene, indeed.................. :rolleyes:
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The Italian Code of Criminal Procedure indeed defines res judicata in Articles 648 - 654.

Briefly, the definition is that a judgment which cannot be appealed is final.

But there are some interesting details, such as that the judgment of the criminal trial determines the judgment of the civil trial held at the same time before the same court, and no retrials of a final judgment for the same facts even if interpreted differently under law (no double jeopardy after an Italian final judgment).

The guilters are of course confusing - intentionally - the suggestions of interpretation of facts by Chieffi with decisions on interpretations of law.

Decisions by a CSC panel on interpretations of law are indeed final for a referral court. That is not true for CSC interpretation of facts.

This difference between CSC interpretation of fact and CSC interpretation of law is explained in some detail in the Marasca CSC panel MR, with citations to previous CSC decisions expanding on this matter. The guilters either haven't read those sections of Marasca, haven't understood them, or choose to ignore them, since obviously the guilters' arguments are demolished by them.
 
Vixen said:
Make your mind up. One minute you are moaning that all the summary of facts by Marasca-Bruno - for example, multiple attackers, staged burglary, Knox' presence, washing of blood from hands, covering up for Rudy, are 'judicial facts' which they can't do anything about.

The next minute, when it comes to ignoring Chieffi on Curatolo and reinstating Hellmann, 'res judicata' doesn't apply in Toto's case.

PIP's can only see the small picture. Then they wonder why they get called sophists.
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*sigh*

Firstly, the Marasca SC panel's verdicts on each of the murder-related charges for Knox and Sollecito are settled verdicts. This means that the verdicts themselves are res judicata: i.e. it can never again be put to a court that Knox or Sollecito participated in the murder, or the staged break-in, or the transportation of a knife, etc.

Secondly, you STILL seem unable to grasp that the fact-finding of the settled verdicts in the Guede and Knox-criminal-slander cases, around which the Marasca SC panel had to dance, was nothing at all to do with res judicata. Instead, it was to do with Italian law stating that there can be no conflict between any part of different SC settled judgements, otherwise there will have to be a revision to bring both to the same position. Marasca could have contradicted the fact-finding of the prior SC settled verdicts, but this then would have necessitated revisions and perhaps even revision trials. Nothing to do with res judicata.

And lastly, Marasca didn't "reinstate Hellmann". Rather, it made its own judgement. The fact that its judgement resonated strongly with Hellmann's in many respects only means that both courts reached the same conclusions based on the evidence presented in court.
 
Numbers said:
The Italian Code of Criminal Procedure indeed defines res judicata in Articles 648 - 654.

Briefly, the definition is that a judgment which cannot be appealed is final.

But there are some interesting details, such as that the judgment of the criminal trial determines the judgment of the civil trial held at the same time before the same court, and no retrials of a final judgment for the same facts even if interpreted differently under law (no double jeopardy after an Italian final judgment).

The guilters are of course confusing - intentionally - the suggestions of interpretation of facts by Chieffi with decisions on interpretations of law.

Decisions by a CSC panel on interpretations of law are indeed final for a referral court. That is not true for CSC interpretation of facts.

This difference between CSC interpretation of fact and CSC interpretation of law is explained in some detail in the Marasca CSC panel MR, with citations to previous CSC decisions expanding on this matter. The guilters either haven't read those sections of Marasca, haven't understood them, or choose to ignore them, since obviously the guilters' arguments are demolished by them.
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Here are excerpts from the Marasca CSC panel MR relating to the obligation of the referral judge to freely interpret evidence no matter what suggestions of interpretation of evidence the referring CSC panel has made - as long as the referral judge somewhat modifies the interpretation to overcome any logical error in the annulled judgement. On the other hand, the referral judge is required to follow the interpretations of law of the referring CSC panel.

"The assessment requested of this Court is – only in appearance – easy, given that the ratio decidendi [rationale for the decision] of the verdict of annulment lies in the realisation of the obvious lack of logic of the reasoning of the challenged judgment {of Nencini}; a realisation that, then, is substantiated – and specified – in the revealed violation of the principles of completeness and freedom from contradictions.

In any case, it is an indisputable application of jurisprudence that, in the presence of such grounds for annulment, pertaining to the deficiency in reasoning, the referral judge is responsible for the examination of the entire body of evidence, that he is expected to review in complete freedom to form judgments, without any type of constraints, being only required to produce motivations devoid of deficiencies of obvious lack of logic or patent contradictoriness that had caused the annulment of the first appeal verdict. In the jurisprudence of this Court of Legitimacy {the CSC}, in fact, the assertion is repeated according to: “following an annulment for deficiency of reasoning, the referral judge is not bound by founding the new verdict on the same arguments considered illogical or deficient by the Supreme Court of Cassation, but is free to arrive at, based on different arguments from those rejected in the Court of Legitimacy or rather integrating and completing those already carried out, to the same decision of the annulled pronouncement. That because it is the judge of the lower court who is expected to have the task of reconstructing the facts emerging from the results of the trial and to appreciate the significance and value of the various sources of evidence (amongst others, Section 4, n. 30422 of 21/06/2005, Poggi, Rv. 232019; Section 4, n. 48352 of 29/04/2009, Savoretti, Rv. 245775)."

Source: Marasca CSC panel MR translation, beginning 2nd paragraph of section 3, pages 23 - 24, from

http://www.amandaknoxcase.com/
 
Vixen said:
I can see that someone lacking confidence in their language skills will need to rely heavily on Merriam-Webster. They would be the type of person who would correct Shakespeare or Chaucer, as they can't find it on google.
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And I can see that someone who is incapable of admitting they are wrong about anything is extremely narcissistic.
At least I presented evidence from several dictionaries supporting my claim; you provided not a single one. NOT A SINGLE ONE. Instead you fall back on this kind of nonsense. Pitiful.

Cambridge (British) Dictionary:

mother-in-law
noun [ C ] us ​ /ˈmʌð·ər·ɪnˌlɔ/ plural mothers-in-law /ˈmʌð·ərz·ɪnˌlɔ/
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Or how about the Oxford (English)dictionary examples of the use of the plural:
And then there are these horrible power struggles that emerge between controlling mothers-in-law and the wife.’

‘But Apter believes mothers-in-law are genuinely unaware of the power they have in the daughter-in-laws' eyes.’

‘New Zealand needs to bring back mothers-in-law to help with the raising of families, Social Development Minister Steve Maharey said yesterday.’
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Nary a "mother-in-lawS" in sight. You have consistently failed to provide a single dictionary from any English speaking country (on Google or otherwise) that says "mother-in-lawS" is acceptable, but you can't even admit you're wrong about a simple mistake like this. Why is that?

 
 
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Numbers said:
Here are excerpts from the Marasca CSC panel MR relating to the obligation of the referral judge to freely interpret evidence no matter what suggestions of interpretation of evidence the referring CSC panel has made - as long as the referral judge somewhat modifies the interpretation to overcome any logical error in the annulled judgement. On the other hand, the referral judge is required to follow the interpretations of law of the referring CSC panel.

"The assessment requested of this Court is – only in appearance – easy, given that the ratio decidendi [rationale for the decision] of the verdict of annulment lies in the realisation of the obvious lack of logic of the reasoning of the challenged judgment {of Nencini}; a realisation that, then, is substantiated – and specified – in the revealed violation of the principles of completeness and freedom from contradictions.

In any case, it is an indisputable application of jurisprudence that, in the presence of such grounds for annulment, pertaining to the deficiency in reasoning, the referral judge is responsible for the examination of the entire body of evidence, that he is expected to review in complete freedom to form judgments, without any type of constraints, being only required to produce motivations devoid of deficiencies of obvious lack of logic or patent contradictoriness that had caused the annulment of the first appeal verdict. In the jurisprudence of this Court of Legitimacy {the CSC}, in fact, the assertion is repeated according to: “following an annulment for deficiency of reasoning, the referral judge is not bound by founding the new verdict on the same arguments considered illogical or deficient by the Supreme Court of Cassation, but is free to arrive at, based on different arguments from those rejected in the Court of Legitimacy or rather integrating and completing those already carried out, to the same decision of the annulled pronouncement. That because it is the judge of the lower court who is expected to have the task of reconstructing the facts emerging from the results of the trial and to appreciate the significance and value of the various sources of evidence (amongst others, Section 4, n. 30422 of 21/06/2005, Poggi, Rv. 232019; Section 4, n. 48352 of 29/04/2009, Savoretti, Rv. 245775)."

Source: Marasca CSC panel MR translation, beginning 2nd paragraph of section 3, pages 23 - 24, from

http://www.amandaknoxcase.com/
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Now, here's the next paragraph of the Marasca CSC panel MR, which examines what the referral judge should do when the referring CSC panel oversteps into looking at the merits of the case, as indeed the Chieffi CSC panel did in its MR, and did so in arbitrary and illogical manner, which thus violated the European Convention and ECHR case-law.

"A problem – outlined, with appreciable discretion, in the new reasoning in favour of Knox – is when, as in the case in question, the judge of legitimacy {CSC} made incursions into the “merit”, going beyond the institutional limits assigned to it, such as, for example, when a variety of alternative motives are proposed for the murderous act and the referral judge is expected to identify, in that predetermined numerus clausus [finite number], the most appropriate to the case in question. There is no doubt, according to this Court, that in such an unusual situation the referral judge cannot be considered in any way bound or conditioned, precisely because of the clearcut discrimen [crisis] {difference that} exists in the profession, for what has been said, between cognisance of law and cognisance of fact, the latter the exclusive prerogative of the referral judge. On this matter, moreover, this Supreme Court of Jurisprudence has already expressed itself, in stating that the referral judge cannot be conditioned in his reasoning by evaluations of fact that may have escaped {slipped out from} the judge of legitimacy, with the levels on which the respective evaluations operate being different, and with it not being the role of the Court of Cassation to superimpose its own judgment on the referral judge regarding such aspects. Moreover, where the Supreme Court focuses any attention on some particular aspects from which emerges the deficiency or the contradictoriness of the reasoning, that does not mean that the referral judge for the new verdict is limited only by the points specified, because he conserves the same powers held originally, which is as the judge of merit relative to the identification and evaluation of the court records, within the charges of the verdict affected by annulment. (Section 4 n. 30422/2005 cit.). In the same way, it was stated that […] any elements of fact or evaluation contained in the pronouncement of annulment are not binding on the referral judge, but are to be taken purely as points of reference in order to identify the defect or defects reported, and not as facts that impose upon the decision entrusted to him; in addition there is no doubt that, following a pronouncement of annulment because of lack of reasoning through the identification of specific points of deficiency or of contradictoriness, the power of the referral judge cannot be limited to the evaluation of the single points specified, as if they were isolated from the rest of the body of evidence, but is expected to consider other court records on which the decision must be based, providing the justification in the sentence. (Section 4, n. 44644 of 18/10/2011, defendant F., Rv. 251660; Section 5, n. 41085 of 03/07/2009, defendant L., Rv. 245389; Section 1, n. 1397 of 10/12/1997 dep. 1998, Pace, Rv. 209692)."
___
Thus, under Italian law - and we see the many citations listed by Marasca - there is no binding force of interpretations or evaluations of fact or merit by the referring CSC panel on the referral court. It is the only the CSC referring panel's interpretations of law that are truly binding on the referral court under Italian law.
 
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Numbers said:
Now, here's the next paragraph of the Marasca CSC panel MR, which examines what the referral judge should do when the referring CSC panel oversteps into looking at the merits of the case, as indeed the Chieffi CSC panel did in its MR, and did so in arbitrary and illogical manner, which thus violated the European Convention and ECHR case-law.

"A problem – outlined, with appreciable discretion, in the new reasoning in favour of Knox – is when, as in the case in question, the judge of legitimacy {CSC} made incursions into the “merit”, going beyond the institutional limits assigned to it, such as, for example, when a variety of alternative motives are proposed for the murderous act and the referral judge is expected to identify, in that predetermined numerus clausus [finite number], the most appropriate to the case in question. There is no doubt, according to this Court, that in such an unusual situation the referral judge cannot be considered in any way bound or conditioned, precisely because of the clearcut discrimen [crisis] {difference that} exists in the profession, for what has been said, between cognisance of law and cognisance of fact, the latter the exclusive prerogative of the referral judge. On this matter, moreover, this Supreme Court of Jurisprudence has already expressed itself, in stating that the referral judge cannot be conditioned in his reasoning by evaluations of fact that may have escaped {slipped out from} the judge of legitimacy, with the levels on which the respective evaluations operate being different, and with it not being the role of the Court of Cassation to superimpose its own judgment on the referral judge regarding such aspects. Moreover, where the Supreme Court focuses any attention on some particular aspects from which emerges the deficiency or the contradictoriness of the reasoning, that does not mean that the referral judge for the new verdict is limited only by the points specified, because he conserves the same powers held originally, which is as the judge of merit relative to the identification and evaluation of the court records, within the charges of the verdict affected by annulment. (Section 4 n. 30422/2005 cit.). In the same way, it was stated that […] any elements of fact or evaluation contained in the pronouncement of annulment are not binding on the referral judge, but are to be taken purely as points of reference in order to identify the defect or defects reported, and not as facts that impose upon the decision entrusted to him; in addition there is no doubt that, following a pronouncement of annulment because of lack of reasoning through the identification of specific points of deficiency or of contradictoriness, the power of the referral judge cannot be limited to the evaluation of the single points specified, as if they were isolated from the rest of the body of evidence, but is expected to consider other court records on which the decision must be based, providing the justification in the sentence. (Section 4, n. 44644 of 18/10/2011, defendant F., Rv. 251660; Section 5, n. 41085 of 03/07/2009, defendant L., Rv. 245389; Section 1, n. 1397 of 10/12/1997 dep. 1998, Pace, Rv. 209692)."
___
Thus, under Italian law - and we see the many citations listed by Marasca - there is no binding force of interpretations or evaluations of fact or merit by the referring CSC panel on the referral court. It is the only the CSC referring panel's interpretations of law that are truly binding on the referral court under Italian law.
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And here is the last general paragraph from this Section 3 of the Marasca CSC panel MR:

"All of this is at the basis of the recurring lesson of this Judge of Legitimacy, on the consolidated point constituting ius receptum [established law], according to which the powers of the referral judge differ depending on whether the annulment was pronounced because of violation or erroneous application of penal law, or due to a patent lack of logic in the reasoning, since in the first case the judge is bound by the principle of law expressed by the Court, subject however that the evaluation of the ascertained facts remain unaltered in the appealed sentence; in the second case they can proceed with a new assessment of the body of evidence, with the limit of not repeating the motivational faults of the sentence that has been annulled. (Inter alia Section 3 n 7882, of 10/1/2012, Montali Rv. 252333)."

In the next section, 3.1, Marasca begins the applications of the general principles to the Nencini judgment.

"As we will see, the judge a quo [of the trial from which this appeal is being heard], in further points, remains conditioned by the prospect of the factual profile unexpectedly included in the annulled sentence; such that the stringent and analytical evaluation of the Supreme Court might unavoidably become forced towards affirming the guilt of the two accused. Misguided by this basic misunderstanding, the same judge is drawn into logical inconsistencies and obvious errores in iudicando [errors in judgment] that are here reported."
____
In other words, Nencini follows the Chieffi CSC panel suggestions into an erroneous and unlawful judgment, rather than exercising an independent evaluation of the merit based on Italian procedural law.
 
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Stacyhs said:
Cute video Amanda Knox posted. I'm sure someone will find something hateful to say about it.

https://www.instagram.com/p/Bh8B57tl-w2/
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Look how happy she is! Successful relationship, successful writer (despite spending over 4 years in prison for a crime she was proven not to be involved in), attractive, intelligent, educated, and still only 30 years old!

Man, I bet she is a big target for bitter, old, unsuccessful, lonely haters. I wonder if there is an underground PR movement and hate campaign to spread lies and misinformation about Amanda Knox? Wouldn't surprise me.
 
Stacyhs said:
I think we're all really here for the same reason: it's vastly entertaining. Kimo sabe?:rolleyes:
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I can only speak for myself, but yes, I read this to observe the next clanger being dropped followed by the inevitable attempt at recovery. It is quite amusing. The whole WW2 tail gunner thing was a classic. How could anyone believe that cell masts are madly rotating?
 
Let's have some more fun looking at the criticism of the Chieffi CSC panel decision by the Marasca CSC panel relating to use of Rudy Guede's statements, noting that Chieffi was supposed to follow Italian law, including its Constitution and ECHR case-law.

Here are some excerpts from the Marasca CSC panel MR:

"4.3 The same reference weighs, therefore, on two relevant rights of law raised by the defence {of Knox and Sollecito}; one relating to the use and validity of the above-mentioned irrevocable sentence {of Guede} in the present trial; and the other to the validity of statements – in terms that were characterised by anything but consistency and constancy – of Guede within his own trial, that in some way those being considered today were involved.

4.3.1. Concerning the first question, the use of that irrevocable sentence in this trial, considered from all points of view, is irreproachable, as set out in Article 238 bis Italian Code of Criminal Procedure. According to that provision “[…] sentences defined as irrevocable can be used once the fact has been ascertained and are evaluated according to Articles 187 and 192, section 3.”

Well, the “fact” asserted in the sentence in question is, without question, the participation of Guede in the murder “along with other persons, unknown”. {A point emphasized in the Giordano CSC panel MR finalizing Guede's conviction.} The reference to procedural rules signifies that the use of such assessment is subordinate to the double condition of amenability of this fact to the “objective of the evidence”, with reference to the present trial, and the existence of other elements of proof which confirm its reliability. {The "double elements" are 1. Guede allegedly had helpers in murdering/raping Kercher, and 2. Whether or not there is evidence Knox and/or Sollecito were those helpers.}

{Omitting here all the highly dubious "facts" allegedly justifying the claim that Guede had helpers in the murder/rape of Kercher.}

4.3.2. Regarding the second question, and as regards its usability – according to the method of acquisition under Article 238 bis Italian Code of Criminal Procedure - statements made by Guede contra alios [against others] as part of its proceedings in the absence of people blamed and their lawyers. (This is by reference to Guede’s not always consistent and stable allegations, made during the preliminary investigation and reported in judgment. In these he had somehow involved Knox in the murder, but never explicitly Sollecito, while at the same time continuing to profess his own innocence, despite the presence at the scene of the murder and on the victim's body of numerous biological traces attributable to him). Here the result can only be negative. Indeed, such a mode of acquisition would result in an elusive sidestepping of the guarantees laid down by Article 526 section 1-bis Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, whose tenor is that "the guilt of the defendant cannot be established on the basis of statements by persons who by choice have always voluntarily avoided examination by the accused or his counsel". This would obviously, at the same time, be in violation of Article 111, section 4 Constitution, which gives the same conclusion to harmonise the trial system, according to Article 6[.3] letter d), of the European Commission [sic; correctly; Convention] of Human Rights (Section F. n. 35729 of 01/08/2013, Agrama, Rv 256576).
In this regard, it is useful to recall the principle of "non substitutability", taken by the United Sections of the Supreme Court from the widest category of "legality of the evidence", reflecting that, when the code establishes a prohibition or expresses non-usability, the use of other procedural instruments, typical or atypical, intended to surreptitiously circumvent such a barrier, is forbidden. (Section U, n. 36747 of 28/05/2003, Torcasio, Rv. 225467; cf, and Section U, n. 28997 of 19/04/2012, Pasqua, Rv. 252893).

And even in this trial process, Guede - called to testify as a witness as a result of the accusatory statements of Mario Alessi (a man convicted of a horrendous murder of a child) - after having denied the accusation, confirmed the contents of a letter he sent to his lawyer, and then unexpectedly turned to a news broadcast, in which he accused today's applicants, and then refused cross-examination by their lawyers. Thus after recognising the authenticity of his letter refuting Alessi’s claim that Raffaele Sollecito and Amanda Knox had nothing to do with the murder, Guede refused to be cross-examined by the defendants' lawyers, assuming that his presence in the trial was limited to the content of the statements of Alessi concerning himself. Hence, the unusability stated – in the part related to the letter that however concerned today’s appellants – cannot be used in a different procedural context, given that it was made without the prescribed guarantees.
...

{Summarizing this last part: Guede refused to be cross-examined. And by law, Guede could not be compelled to testify. Therefore, his statements are not usable against Knox and Sollecito. That is Italian law, included in its Constitution as well as the Code of Criminal Procedure. My comment: According to the Council of Europe, Italian law and Constitution were thus amended by 1999 in order to meet the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights and ECHR case-law.}"
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Since the Chieffi CSC panel, in its MR quashing the Hellmann appeal court acquittal, "ordered" or "suggested" that Guede's statements against Knox and/or Sollecito be used against them, and Nencini followed through, its clear that Marasca can contradict Chieffi, and Marasca's view in this aspect conforms to Italian law and Constitution, while Chieffi's and Nencini's do not.

Of course, contrary to the arguments of the guilters, courts in Italy are required by law to follow Italian law, the Italian Constitution, and also the European Convention and ECHR case-law.
 
On the reform of the Italian Constitution and Italian procedural law to meet the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights:

"Constitutional reform in 1999 confers constitutional rank to a number of
requirements of Article 6 of the Convention (fair trial, adversarial process, equality of arms…).

Craxi No. 2 (34896/97)
Judgment final on 11/10/2001

Final Resolution
ResDH(2005)28"

Source: Country Factsheet on Italy
PDF link at
https://www.coe.int/en/web/execution/country-factsheets

"Resolution ResDH(2005)28
concerning the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights
of 5 December 2002 (final on 5 March 2003)
in the case of Craxi No. 2 against Italy

(Adopted by the Committee of Ministers {of the CoE} on 25 April 2005 at the 922nd meeting of the Ministers' Deputies)
....
Appendix to Resolution ResDH(2005)28

Information provided by the Government of Italy
during the examination of the Craxi case

by the Committee of Ministers

As regards the individual measures, the government recalls that the applicant died in January 2000, without serving the sentence resulting from the proceedings at issue.

As regards the general measures, the government recalls that, subsequent to the violation in this case, important measures have been adopted by Italy with a view to ensuring the fairness of criminal proceedings in accordance with Article 6 of the Convention.

Constitutional reform of 1999

Article 111 of the Italian Constitution, as modified in November 1999, gave Constitutional rank to a number of requirements contained in Article 6 of the Convention and, in its new wording, it provides in particular that:

“1. Jurisdiction shall be exercised through fair proceedings, conducted in accordance with the law.

2. All proceedings shall be conducted in compliance with the principles of adversarial process and equality of arms before a neutral and impartial court. The right to be tried within a reasonable time shall be guaranteed by law.

3. In criminal proceedings, the law shall guarantee that the person accused of an offence is informed promptly and in confidence of the nature and grounds of the charge against him; that he shall have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; that he shall be given an opportunity before the court to examine or to have examined anyone giving evidence against him, to obtain the attendance and examination of any defence witnesses on the same conditions as witnesses called by the prosecution and to obtain the production of any other evidence in his favour; and that he will have the assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used at the trial.

4. The principle of adversarial process shall be observed during criminal proceedings with regard to the examination of evidence. The guilt of an accused cannot be established on the basis of statements made by a person who has freely and wilfully eluded examination by the accused or his lawyer.

5. Rules shall be made governing the circumstances in which adversarial examination of the evidence is to be dispensed with, either because the accused has consented or because there is due evidence that such examination is objectively impossible or that there has been unlawful conduct.”

Legislative reform of 2001

A law implementing the new constitutional provision was adopted by Parliament in 2001 (Law No. 63 of 1/03/2001), which amended inter alia Article 513 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, application of which was at the basis of the violation found in this case.

According to the law now in force, pre-trial statements made by a person who subsequently avails himself of his right to remain silent in the debate, may be read and used by the judge only if all the interested parties consent to it unless the judge establishes that the refusal to be cross-questioned in the proceedings is the result of bribery or threats.

This rule applies not only to statements made in the same proceedings but also to those made in other proceedings and, in this last case, the statements may not even be read without the consent of the accused person concerned.
.... "

Source: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-68986%22]}
CRAXI No. 2 AGAINST ITALIE 34896/97 Committee of Ministers 25/04/2005
___
Comments: Italy revised its Constitution and procedural law under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe based upon an ECHR judgment in the case of Craxi v. Italy, No. 2 34896/97.

While past behavior of a country is no guarantee of its future behavior, based upon Italy's past conformance to ECHR judgments and CoE Committee of Ministers supervision, and the ruling of the Italian Constitutional Court No. 113 of 2011, requiring consideration of a request for revision based on an ECHR final ruling requiring a reopening of proceedings, it is likely that the Italian judicial system would respond according to law and grant a revision trial to Amanda Knox in the event of a final judgment by the ECHR that Italy had violated Convention Article 6 by convicting her of calunnia against Diya (Patrick) Lumumba.
 
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Vixen said:
So that's how she's going to spend he rest of her life, schlepping around IP's pretending to be a victim.
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Get back to us when you find someone, anyone, with a legitimate connection to just one of these IP's(sic!) who has a complaint about Knox's inclusion.

The twisted opinion of a hater nobody is meaningless.
 
Here's today's laugher from TJMK courtesy of, um, "Krissy". This one shows a remarkable level of cluelessness, even by "Krissy" standards. RE: Ryan Ferguson:

$11m is not much compared to what he should have got if it was a genuine finding of innocence. Ferguson’s case was merely ‘vacated’. He has no certificate of innocence, and his co-defendant remains in jail.

$11m is more to do with technical issues rather than recompense for wrongful time served (surely that would be worth >$55K).

I don’t see Ferguson as a good example of a wrongful conviction.

Let's see now....11 million dollars is "not much"? On what planet? Maybe I'm being forgetful here but I don't recall too many exonerated(yes, Krissy) individuals getting more than that. Even the Central Park 5 got "only" about $7M each. And I dare say that 11 million dollars had one hell of a lot more "to do" than with mere "technical issues".
 
Vixen said:
Make your mind up. One minute you are moaning that all the summary of facts by Marasca-Bruno - for example, multiple attackers, staged burglary, Knox' presence, washing of blood from hands, covering up for Rudy, are 'judicial facts' which they can't do anything about.

The next minute, when it comes to ignoring Chieffi on Curatolo and reinstating Hellmann, 'res judicata' doesn't apply in Toto's case.

PIP's can only see the small picture. Then they wonder why they get called sophists.
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Nobody calls the PIP sophists, except for 5 PGP on locked down sites and you. So bit of a strawman argument.

PGP arguments don't even need to be debunked because they aren't compelling from the get go.
 
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AnimalFriendly said:
Here's today's laugher from TJMK courtesy of, um, "Krissy". This one shows a remarkable level of cluelessness, even by "Krissy" standards. RE: Ryan Ferguson:

$11m is not much compared to what he should have got if it was a genuine finding of innocence. Ferguson’s case was merely ‘vacated’. He has no certificate of innocence, and his co-defendant remains in jail.

$11m is more to do with technical issues rather than recompense for wrongful time served (surely that would be worth >$55K).

I don’t see Ferguson as a good example of a wrongful conviction.

Let's see now....11 million dollars is "not much"? On what planet? Maybe I'm being forgetful here but I don't recall too many exonerated(yes, Krissy) individuals getting more than that. Even the Central Park 5 got "only" about $7M each. And I dare say that 11 million dollars had one hell of a lot more "to do" than with mere "technical issues".
Click to expand...

This "Krissy" is as confirmation biased as the lone guilter-hater left here on ISF. It is the textbook definition of confirmation bias to cite an $11M award as some indication the guy had not been wrongfully convicted.
 
Vixen said:
You are incorrect. Any decision by a court can be appealed. It does not have to be a verdict. Chieffi, the Supreme Court ruled once and for all that it was to err legally for Curatolo's appearance and lifestyle to be the point of focus. Final decision. Res iudicata.

Marasca-Bruno does not outrank Chieffi. It did not have the power or jursidiction to resusitate Toto's chosen lifestyle. Yes, Toto was a wreck by 2011. That still doesn't cancel out the fact he saw Knox & Sollecito hanging around the basketball court on the eve of the murder, keeping watch over the scene below. The basketball court wall was about 60 metres from the cottage and did overlook via Pergola.

So Toto was mistaken about the destination of the partygoers. Being a Thursday night, why wouldn't people still be partying, with a long bank holiday weekend ahead on a Thursday evening. Thursday is fast becoming the new Friday for work party dos, as people want to reserve Friday evening for their families. Marasca's claim it is not credible anyone would be partying on a Thursday night is a stupid one. If you had to go to work the morning after Halloween, it makes sense to party the day after. That's what people in the City do. Every Friday we would finish at 4:00, make our way to the basement to socialise and have drinks. Then with a Bacardi Breezer in our hands, we would totter off to some incredibly loud wine bar-cum-nightclub in Moorgate or Finsbury Square. Marasca's reasoning that it must have been Wednesday when Toto witnessed the rowdy revellers is just crap. There are also hen parties and stag parties. A guy in my office loved nothing more than to dress up in costume, and we would all eagerly gather round his latest package sent via the office, to see his latest mad costume. My bank manager in Finland loves nothing more than to dress up as a Harry Potter character for his Halloween parties, which - hello???!!! - are not always exactly on 31 Oct!!!


I cannot believe the terrible reasoning of Hellmann and Marasca. They are as thick as two broad planks. Or utterly corrupt, more like.
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As per usual on this forum we see the vile hypocrisy of PGP :-

• In the post above Hellman and Chiefi are attacked for being corrupt whilst PGP have slavishly defended and supported corrupt police/prosecutors who violated the rights of Amanda and Raffaele during the interrogations by denying access to lawyers, not taping the interrogations, not explaining their rights, abused Amanda, Raffaele and Lumumba during the interrogations, lied to Amanda she had HIV, fed false information to the media, lied in court and committed perjury, suppressed and destroyed evidence as detailed in the links below. PGP don’t have a problem with corruption if it works against Amanda and Raffaele.

http://www.amandaknoxcase.com/raffaeles-kitchen-knife/
http://www.amandaknoxcase.com/contamination-labwork-coverup/
http://www.amandaknoxcase.com/meredith-kercher-perjury-corruption/
http://www.amandaknoxcase.com/evidence-destroyed/
http://www.amandaknoxcase.com/blood-evidence-downstairs-apartment/
https://knoxsollecito.wordpress.com...old-about-amanda-knox-and-raffaele-sollecito/
http://www.injusticeinperugia.org/myths.html
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=11071314#post11071314

• In the above post PGP Accuse Hellman and Chieffi of being stupid whilst displaying grotesque stupidity as detailed in the posts below.

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=11951980#post11951980

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=12184990#post12184990

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=12129207#post12129207

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=12109033#post12109033

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=12080218#post12080218

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=12013334#post12013334

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=12046056#post12046056

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=12230718#post12230718

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=12099647#post12099647

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=12092521#post12092521

• PGP argue the Chieffi court acted against Italian law whilst PGP had no problem with the police/prosecution breaking numerous Italian laws as detailed in the links below. PGP had no problem with laws being violated when it worked against Amanda and Raffaele. The chieffi report annulled the convictions of Amanda and Raffaele. For some reason PGP only have a problem with laws supposedly being broken if it works in Amanda and Raffaele’s favour.

http://www.amandaknoxcase.com/echr-case-law/

http://www.injusticeanywhereforum.com/viewtopic.php?f=20&t=3161&sid=cd2dbf4173e451d8bd24b911d59f1b67

• PGP viciously attack Amanda and Raffaele for taking drugs whilst defending and supporting a heroin addict Curalto. PGP had no issue with the testimony of a drug addict being used against Amanda and Raffaele.

• Curalto was questioned by the police just after the murder of Meredith. He said nothing about seeing Amanda and Raffaele and then changed his story months later to say he had seen them. Curalto either saw Amanda and Raffaele but decided not to say anything when first questioned or he had not seen them and lied when he later changed his story. PGP viciously attack Amanda and Raffaele for lying but had no problem with witnesses lying and the testimony of blatant liars being used against Amanda and Raffaele.

• PGP attack Amanda and Raffaele for changing stories but had no problem with witnesses such as Curalto changing stories.

• PGP attack the defence for using unreliable witness testimony such as Aviello but had no problem with prosecution using unreliable witnesses such as Curalto who gave testimony lacking in credibility full of holes and PGP go to great lengths to defend to defend these witnesses.
 
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