Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

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And yet the evidence says the opposite. Either offer evidence to support your claims or retract them, its one or the other Henri.
Posts like this are fooling no one Henri, you are not the voice of reason here, quite the opposite in fact.

The criticism of Chamberlain seems to be that he was only interested in peace, and that he was supposedly conned by Hitler at Munich in 1938, and that he should have declared war in 1938 with a Churchill 'with what' strategy, because Germany was supposedly militarily weak in 1938, and could not possibly invade or bomb Britain then. The Czechs didn't like him because they felt abandoned by supposedly preventing Soviet Russia from coming to their aid, which is debatable.

The point is Neville Chamberlain was recommended to be Prime Minister by Admiral Sir Hugh Sinclair because of his judgment, who I thing was chief of the secret service at the time. Chamberlain was no fool. Our secret service knew what was going on, and Hitler's intentions, and Chamberlain was following the military advice he had been given, which was not to declare war in 1938. Chamberlain was involved in serious rearmament, and strengthening of the air force, while talking "peace in our time" in public.

There is some waffle about Chamberlain at this website:

http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/625

The day may come when my much cursed visit to Munich will be understood. Neither we nor the French were prepared for war. I am not responsible for this lack of preparation...It would be rash to prophesy the verdict of history, but if full access is obtained to all the records it will be seen that I realized from the beginning our military weakness and did my best to postpone if I could not avert the war (p. 435).
 
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The criticism of Chamberlain seems to be that he was only interested in peace, and that he was supposedly conned by Hitler at Munich in 1938, and that he should have declared war in 1938 with a Churchill 'with what' strategy, because Germany was supposedly militarily weak in 1938, and could not possibly invade or bomb Britain then. The Czechs didn't like him because they felt abandoned by supposedly preventing Soviet Russia from coming to their aid, which is debatable.

The point is Neville Chamberlain was recommended to be Prime Minister by Admiral Sir Hugh Sinclair because of his judgment, who I thing was chief of the secret service at the time. Chamberlain was no fool. Our secret service knew what was going on, and Hitler's intentions, and Chamberlain was following the military advice he had been given, which was not to declare war in 1938. Chamberlain was involved in serious rearmament, and strengthening of the air force, while talking "peace in our time" in public.

There is some waffle about Chamberlain at this website:

http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/625

They were all wrong, they were all idiots and we all paid price for their idiocy!

And that quote is blatant self-serving lie.

ETA: You can try to excuse idiot Chamberlain all you want, he was still responsible!
 
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There is some waffle about Chamberlain at this website:

http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/625

So when asked for evidence to support your claims you repeat the same waffle as before (note waffle being used in the correct sense here) and a link to a book review with a self serving rationalization from Chamberlain?

You keep attempting to argue a point that no one here disputes, the delay bought by Munich did allow Britain to strengthen its defences. The problem Chamberlain apologists like yourself keep ignoring is that Germany benefitted far more from the delay. it allowed Germany to acquire Czech equipment that was invaluable in 1939 and contributed greatly to making the German attack on France in 1940 a success, neither the plan nor the means existed in 1938. Munich created the conditions for the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that allowed Germany to access resources from the USSR, resources it was desperately short of.

In the face of these facts all you have to offer is rambling complaints about Churchill, attacks on your fellow posters and weblinks that contain either no facts or actually contradict your claims.
 
The point is that Chamberlain's military advice accepted that the Czechs would strengthen Germany. Chamberlain was not a qualified Field Marshal, or even a strategic genius, and neither was Churchill. You should direct your criticism to Army Chief Ismay, or whatever his name was, not Chamberlain, who reported though it was secret at the time, that Chamberlain should delay a declaration of war. After Munich in 1938, the production of armaments, and Spitfires and Hurricanes went into overdrive. That's not appeasement.

I don't know much about Chamberlain as a Chancellor of the Exchequer. By todays standards he seemed to be old-fashioned and Victorian with all that talk of tariffs. It's not exactly today's Milton Friedman trickle down economics stuff, or dealing with lunatic currency arrangements, but he gets a sympathetic hearing at this website:

http://canvas.union.shef.ac.uk/wordpress/?p=563
 
They were all wrong, they were all idiots and we all paid price for their idiocy!

And that quote is blatant self-serving lie.

ETA: You can try to excuse idiot Chamberlain all you want, he was still responsible!

The BBC recently broadcast a series on how leaders medical conditions affected history, for example Kruschev thinking that Kennedy would be easily overwhelmed based on early interactions when Kennedy's Addison's disease was less well controlled than later.

Similarly, they argued (quite convincingly to my lay ears) that Chamberlain might have been more defeatist during Munich because of his (unknown?) terminal illness at the time.
 
The point is that Chamberlain's military advice accepted that the Czechs would strengthen Germany.

Again unsupported claim.


Chamberlain was not a qualified Field Marshal, or even a strategic genius, and neither was Churchill.

Your Churchill fetish is both tiresome and irrelevant.


You should direct your criticism to Army Chief Ismay, or whatever his name was, not Chamberlain, who reported though it was secret at the time, that Chamberlain should delay a declaration of war.

How odd, since from Ismay's Wiki page:

While Chamberlain was at the Munich Conference attempting to resolve the crisis, Ismay ordered the digging of trenches in London as protection against air attacks, should war occur. Ismay later said that he thought Britain should have gone to war at Munich instead of waiting, but said nothing at the time.

Now this could be a self-serving retrospective quote, but you apparently are quite happy to use those and no doubt you have a solid source for this 'secret' advice?

After Munich in 1938, the production of armaments, and Spitfires and Hurricanes went into overdrive. That's not appeasement.

Who exactly is this point aimed at Henri? As I pointed in the very post right before this one no one is arguing that Britain didn't strengthen it's air defences post Munich. You are arguing with no one on this and avoiding the real question, who gained most from Munich? Hint: it was Germany. And of course there is a second question, did Chamberlain lead this effort or did he have to be pushed into it?


I don't know much about Chamberlain as a Chancellor of the Exchequer. By todays standards he seemed to be old-fashioned and Victorian with all that talk of tariffs. It's not exactly today's Milton Friedman trickle down economics stuff, or dealing with lunatic currency arrangements, but he gets a sympathetic hearing at this website:

And more irrelevance, which you admit you have no meaningful basis to assess the merit of.

What exactly was the point of this post of your Henri? it does nothing to strengthen your claims?
 
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Has the reset button been hit again?

Sadly yes. As I have noted before he'll just refuse to understand anything or answer question and just keep repeating his failed ideas until everyone gives up .
 
Sadly yes. As I have noted before he'll just refuse to understand anything or answer question and just keep repeating his failed ideas until everyone gives up .

He's been trying the same thing on the 'Jeffery MacDonald' thread for years, hasn't worked for him yet.;)
 
Patton wouldn't have taken Berlin or Prague. He would have been knocked back across the Rhine.

Not even relevant to the thread.
 
Roosevelt supported appeasement of Stalin. He never had a bad word to say about the Soviet dictator - www.jrbooksonline.com/fdr-scandal-page/fdr.html
In 1945 Patton stated he was ready to take both Berlin and Prague but was refused permission to do so from Eisenhower acting on instructions from Roosevelt -
https://wearswar.wordpress.com/2017...denly-patton-dies-burying-the-real-holocaust/

I have seen that story before from various sources that Patton wanted to be first into the Czech and Slovakia lands and that he wanted to be first into Berlin. The background to all that is that Roosevelt was not at all well at the time.

The strategy at the end of the war was firmly in the hands of Eisenhower. General Alan Brooke used to say that Eisenhower had never commanded anything larger than a battalion before he was promoted. There seemed to be some kind of a feud between Patton and Eisenhower and Montgomery. Eisenhower made unauthorised telegrams to Stalin. I have seen reports in the past that Patton's death was controversial but I don't want to get involved in yet another conspiracy theory about it. In the end the Russians 'liberated' the Czechs and Berlin.

To his credit Churchill did say that he wanted to meet the Russians as far east as possible.
 
On the actual topic of appeasement It has to be remembered Munch was not some logical continuation of the policy, it was the result of that policy backfiring. In the simplest terms the concessions made to Germany prior to the Sudeten Crisis had not appeased them, it had simply encouraged ever more outrageous demands. Munich was a last ditch effort to buy off Hitler and stave off a war that appeasement had made more likely, not less. No one really expected the conference to produce any meaningful results, it was just a throw of the dice.

Munich itself only ‘succeeded’ because of two things. One was Chamberlain’s willingness to concede almost anything so long as it avoided war, the time bought for Britain to rearm was a side effect not the primary reason for the concessions. The other was the warnings from senior military and political leaders inside Germany that the country simply wasn’t ready for war that forced Hitler to take a step back. Had the Wehrmacht High Command been a little more sanguine, or Chamberlain a little less supine, it would have been war in 1938.

The attempts to impose some coherent plan on Chamberlain’s actions are by and large just the products of hindsight and a desire to see order in chaos. Munich wasn’t a triumph for Chamberlain, it was a final desperate attempt to rescue a failed policy and preserve his reputation, it failed miserably on both counts.
 
I have seen that story before from various sources that Patton wanted to be first into the Czech and Slovakia lands and that he wanted to be first into Berlin. The background to all that is that Roosevelt was not at all well at the time.

The strategy at the end of the war was firmly in the hands of Eisenhower. General Alan Brooke used to say that Eisenhower had never commanded anything larger than a battalion before he was promoted. There seemed to be some kind of a feud between Patton and Eisenhower and Montgomery. Eisenhower made unauthorised telegrams to Stalin. I have seen reports in the past that Patton's death was controversial but I don't want to get involved in yet another conspiracy theory about it. In the end the Russians 'liberated' the Czechs and Berlin.

To his credit Churchill did say that he wanted to meet the Russians as far east as possible.

What does any of this have to do with the topic at hand? Why are you yet again quoting a holocaust denier supportively?
 
The point is that Chamberlain's military advice accepted that the Czechs would strengthen Germany. Chamberlain was not a qualified Field Marshal, or even a strategic genius, and neither was Churchill. You should direct your criticism to Army Chief Ismay, or whatever his name was, not Chamberlain, who reported though it was secret at the time, that Chamberlain should delay a declaration of war.


Ismay reported, incorrectly, that "from a military point of view" it would be better to delay fighting Germany for six months or a year. But the decision on whether to back Czechoslovakia also had tremendous political consequences. Chamberlain should have known that appeasing Hitler would be an international political disaster, but he went ahead anyway. And that is squarely on him.

After Munich in 1938, the production of armaments, and Spitfires and Hurricanes went into overdrive. That's not appeasement.


No. British rearmament had been going on for a while, and gradually increasing over time. There was no great jump in any type of armament production after Munich, though the crisis did infuse the effort with a renewed urgency, to a certain extent. For example, here is a table showing monthly aircraft deliveries; as you can see, there is no huge jump after Munich. The great increase came during the summer of 1940, for a variety of reasons, but primarily due to the impetus of an actual shooting war with the Axis powers.

Also, your continued attempt to redefine "appeasement" in order to cast Chamberlain in a more positive light is frankly laughable, and growing rather tiresome. Chamberlain appeased Hitler by allowing him to occupy the Sudetenland; no amount of handwaving can change that fact. And neither Chamberlain's reasons for appeasement, nor his actions afterward, can change that fact, either.
 
Looking at those figure, for fighters specifically as that's where the differences were most felt, you can see a (give or take) doubling in August '38, and then again in Feb/March '39.

But then again, the figures pre-August aren't anything to write home about are they?
 
Looking at those figure, for fighters specifically as that's where the differences were most felt, you can see a (give or take) doubling in August '38, and then again in Feb/March '39.

But then again, the figures pre-August aren't anything to write home about are they?

Coincidently this rise in august '38 is when the first Spitfires started to be delivered. I suspect the earlier deliveries are from the Hawker Hurricanes and de Spitfires simply came on top of that.

That's not really ramping up production, but just taking delivery of what was ordered quite some time before that. (june '36 to be exact, when the first order for 310 Spitfires was placed).

I even suspect the lowering of aircraft numbers delivered in the second half of '39 is because this batch of 310 Spitfires were then delivered (the second batch of 200 Spitfires only been ordered by march '38).

Till deliveries of these extra aircraft (oct '39?) and the coming online of the Castle Bromwich plant in '40, I suspect there was a time when only Hurricanes were delivered (but that is just me interpretering these data, without any hard proof).

Not that Henry will understand this, but oh well.
 
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I did wonder whether it was something to do with that. Didn't have the time to dig into it.

So, with those figures. we're looking at the 600 odd Hurricanes and 300 odd Spits. All ordered back in '36 (or thereabouts).

Be interesting to see when additional orders were placed up to (say) the end of '39. I think I've seen those, but can't remember where now.
 
I did wonder whether it was something to do with that. Didn't have the time to dig into it.

So, with those figures. we're looking at the 600 odd Hurricanes and 300 odd Spits. All ordered back in '36 (or thereabouts).

Be interesting to see when additional orders were placed up to (say) the end of '39. I think I've seen those, but can't remember where now.


As far as I can see from the data in de Wiki it is as follows.

Spitfires:
first batch of 310 ordered in june '36 - deliveries starting from august '38.
Second batch of 200 ordered in march '38 - deliveries starting in oct '39?????

'38 start construction of aircraft plant Castle Bromwich. I suspect additional orderings of Spitfires (above the number of 510) were at this future plant.
First deliveries (all 10 of them) from Castle bromwich in june '40.

Could well be that there were additional orderings between these dates, but I don't think there were more deliveries. Because of the production times needed, I don't really see any space left in these periods. Not with the data we have now.

So yes. You're right.
 
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