Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[ddt]

That's what Chamberlain thought and believed in 1938, and to my mind with good reason. War could have broken out in 1938. The verdict of history is that Britain was not ready for an aggressive war by Germany in 1938. Chamberlain gave a guarantee to Poland in 1939 which meant war, however weak Germany was at the time. That's not appeasement.

That's still no answer how Britain ever was going to lose the war in a week. How would the Germans in 1938 invade Belgium, rush to the Channel coast, cross the Channel and capture London, and that all within a week time? With Britain being an island, that is the only realistic interpretation of "losing a war".

 

[ddt]

http://www.johndclare.net/EII6.htm

This one's curious from that page:

Also, Kristallnacht in November 1939 had made people realise that Hitler was evil.

Of course, that should be 1938. It looks at first like a typo, when you look at the surrounding text, were it not that it happens twice on the page in different sentences.

 

[Hubert Cumberdale]

That's what Chamberlain thought and believed in 1938, and to my mind with good reason. War could have broken out in 1938. The verdict of history is that Britain was not ready for an aggressive war by Germany in 1938. Chamberlain gave a guarantee to Poland in 1939 which meant war, however weak Germany was at the time. That's not appeasement.

There is some background to this at this website, which I admit may not be the pure unadulterated historical truth, but which does not defy logic or common sense:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/higher/history/roadwar/appease/revision/2/

No, you are the one claiming Britain would capitulate within a week.

Please stop obfuscating and explain how this would have happened.

 

[Hubert Cumberdale]

This one's curious from that page:

Of course, that should be 1938. It looks at first like a typo, when you look at the surrounding text, were it not that it happens twice on the page in different sentences.

Its amazing how Hitler literally set out his manifesto in Mein Kampf but people only realised he wasn't a very nice person after <insert Nazi atrocity here> happened....

 

[Tolls]

My reason for thinking France doing better really rests on two things. Firstly that the USSR enters the war and this prevents them concentrating their full weight in the west.

Well, that involves someone else joining in the war (eg Poland).
Otherwise what can the Soviets do apart from aircraft?

Secondly that courtesy of Czech campaign the German armoured spearhead would be far weaker and the historical version of Case Yellow would either not happen (the Ardennes stroke only got adopted in February 1940, it faced a lot of resistance) or would have a much higher chance of failure.

This, though, is the big question.
Would the narrow thrust have happened (or some other similarly ambitious strategy)? And if it did, would the tanks be up to it? Considering the armoured thrust was only stopped (essentially) by logistic issues then it would be a reasonable assumption that one conducted a year earlier and with a more threadbare force would be forced to halt sooner.

Nothing's guaranteed of course but I think the French chances would have been better in a 'Munich War' than what happened historically.

And, something that's just occurred to me, would Germany have gone for Norway in this scenario?

Indeed, could Germany go for Norway?

 

[Henri McPhee]

Britain would have ended up like Holland and Denmark and Norway and Belgium in 1938. You must be too strong to be attacked, which Chamberlain understood, but not Churchill.

 

[Klimax]

Britain would have ended up like Holland and Denmark and Norway and Belgium in 1938. You must be too strong to be attacked, which Chamberlain understood, but not Churchill.

HOW? How would German military cross that Channel? Where the hell would they even get resources?

There are so many things wrong with your statement...

 

[Border Reiver]

Britain would have ended up like Holland and Denmark and Norway and Belgium in 1938. You must be too strong to be attacked, which Chamberlain understood, but not Churchill.

Germany didn't have any way to get and sustain forces across the Channel after taking out Holland, Belgium and France in 1940, let alone in 1938.

We get it, you don't like Mr. Churchill.

 

[Henri McPhee]

Germany didn't have any way to get and sustain forces across the Channel after taking out Holland, Belgium and France in 1940, let alone in 1938.

We get it, you don't like Mr. Churchill.

To my mind a lot would have depended on the air war in 1938, and the RAF had practically no Spitfires in 1938. It must be remembered that London was heavily bombed by the Germans even in the First World War which is now largely forgotten. If the RAF had been made non operational in 1938 by the Germans a cross-channel invasion would not have been a really opposed landing. general Alan Brooke was worried about a German parachute landing in the London parks and other places in September 1940 and he was honestly expecting a German invasion at any moment then, though the British public and House of Commons were not told that information at the time:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/...s-detailed-plans-for-invasion-of-Britain.html

 

[lobosrul5]

To my mind a lot would have depended on the air war in 1938, and the RAF had practically no Spitfires in 1938. It must be remembered that London was heavily bombed by the Germans even in the First World War which is now largely forgotten. If the RAF had been made non operational in 1938 by the Germans a cross-channel invasion would not have been a really opposed landing. general Alan Brooke was worried about a German parachute landing in the London parks and other places in September 1940 and he was honestly expecting a German invasion at any moment then, though the British public and House of Commons were not told that information at the time:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/...s-detailed-plans-for-invasion-of-Britain.html

Heavily? Not really. Best source I can find is 123 tons of bombs from planes (maybe twice that from Zeppelins) over all of the UK. As compared to 30,000 tons just on London during the blitz in ww2. That doesn't include later raids and V weapons.

 

[Tolls]

To my mind a lot would have depended on the air war in 1938, and the RAF had practically no Spitfires in 1938. <snipped to below> If the RAF had been made non operational in 1938 by the Germans a cross-channel invasion would not have been a really opposed landing.

We've been over this. There was no chance, even with the RAF out of action in 1940, of the Germans getting across the Channel and getting a beachead they could actually keep supplied. There was even less chance a year earlier.

It must be remembered that London was heavily bombed by the Germans even in the First World War which is now largely forgotten.

People do know of the bombing raids in WW1. The 100th anniversary of the first on in 1915 was in the news. However, "heavily bombed" was really not the case.

general Alan Brooke was worried about a German parachute landing in the London parks and other places in September 1940 and he was honestly expecting a German invasion at any moment then, though the British public and House of Commons were not told that information at the time:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/...s-detailed-plans-for-invasion-of-Britain.html

And we've been over Brooke's parachute fears.
And in this case, since we're talking a war starting in 1938, the 1st Parachute Division was only formed in October of that year.

 

[Klimax]

To my mind a lot would have depended on the air war in 1938, and the RAF had practically no Spitfires in 1938. It must be remembered that London was heavily bombed by the Germans even in the First World War which is now largely forgotten. If the RAF had been made non operational in 1938 by the Germans a cross-channel invasion would not have been a really opposed landing. general Alan Brooke was worried about a German parachute landing in the London parks and other places in September 1940 and he was honestly expecting a German invasion at any moment then, though the British public and House of Commons were not told that information at the time:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/...s-detailed-plans-for-invasion-of-Britain.html

Market garden would like to have a word with you. Or Dieppe.

 

[Andy_Ross]

Even without an RAF in 1940 the Germans wouldn't have made a successful landing.
They were relying on strings of barges towed across at night.
Their plan relied on the RN not interfering at all and after a landing still not interfering with the barges as they were towed back across the channel to collect supplies.
There was no provision for landing armour, artillery, transport (other than motorbikes) or stores. No specialist landing craft and no naval gun support.
The plan was that once ashore they would capture a large port intact to bring in ships with artillery and armour.

In the 70s the remaining commanders from the German and British forces that would have been involved in Sealion took part in a wargame at Sandhurst.
They gamed the landings and the aftermath.
To help the Germans the RN wasn't allowed to interfere for 24 hours after the first landing on the beach and the Luftwaffe were given air superiority.

All the south coast and channel ports were blocked and immobilised within hours of the fist landing.
German troops made some progress inland from the beaches but without armour and artillery or any naval gunfire support they made little headway towards their objective ports.
RN ships arrived in among the barges and their tugs just as they were returning to their embarkation ports to collect supplies and second wave forces and they were obliterated.
After a few days of fighting the surviving Germans surrendered.

In reality the RN would have been in among the invasion barges as soon as they left port and tried to form up.
RN Destroyer sweeps regularly patrolled right up th the French coast right down the Channel and even in to some of the ports to shoot things up a bit.
Hundreds of barges assembling at sea and wallowing behind their tugs at 3 or 4 knots would have been destroyed before they even got away from the coast.

 

[jimbob]

Even without an RAF in 1940 the Germans wouldn't have made a successful landing.
They were relying on strings of barges towed across at night.
Their plan relied on the RN not interfering at all and after a landing still not interfering with the barges as they were towed back across the channel to collect supplies.
There was no provision for landing armour, artillery, transport (other than motorbikes) or stores. No specialist landing craft and no naval gun support.
The plan was that once ashore they would capture a large port intact to bring in ships with artillery and armour.

In the 70s the remaining commanders from the German and British forces that would have been involved in Sealion took part in a wargame at Sandhurst.
They gamed the landings and the aftermath.
To help the Germans the RN wasn't allowed to interfere for 24 hours after the first landing on the beach and the Luftwaffe were given air superiority.

All the south coast and channel ports were blocked and immobilised within hours of the fist landing.
German troops made some progress inland from the beaches but without armour and artillery or any naval gunfire support they made little headway towards their objective ports.
RN ships arrived in among the barges and their tugs just as they were returning to their embarkation ports to collect supplies and second wave forces and they were obliterated.
After a few days of fighting the surviving Germans surrendered.

In reality the RN would have been in among the invasion barges as soon as they left port and tried to form up.
RN Destroyer sweeps regularly patrolled right up th the French coast right down the Channel and even in to some of the ports to shoot things up a bit.
Hundreds of barges assembling at sea and wallowing behind their tugs at 3 or 4 knots would have been destroyed before they even got away from the coast.

Indeed, and given the times, the RN would have had opportunity for night attacks without any concerns of air cover. Overlord required air and naval supremacy - not just superiority. Even then the 1944 storms caused logistical difficulties for the Allies.

 

[Border Reiver]

The short answer is that militarily the Germans could not take out Britain.

Taking Britain out of the fight because it did not wish to continue the war is a different matter. I will note that in wars against major continental powers the British response to land defeats has been to withdraw to the home islands, boost the RN, crippling the seaborne trade of the continent, and then dealing with the overstretched land forces of the continental power. Seems to work.

 

[Garrison]

Henri also seems to assume that the Luftwaffe will be hammering London into rubble the day war breaks out. Given what actually happened in WWII the major air battles over the Channel and UK (assuming the Germans can repeat their gamble of 1940 with similar results for France) are going to be in summer 1939, by which time the RAF will have had the opportunity to substantially upgrade fighter command and get some version of Chain Home running.

If France doesn't fall of course the Germans face a miserable war of attrition and with no flow of materiel from the USSR and the nagging threat of the rebuilding Soviet army at their rear I don't see them holding for anything like the six years they managed historically.

And the other thing that hasn't been mentioned is the Holocaust, how many millions might be spared if the Germans don't occupy Poland, the Ukraine, and Western Europe?

 

[Craig B]

To my mind a lot would have depended on the air war in 1938, and the RAF had practically no Spitfires in 1938. It must be remembered that London was heavily bombed by the Germans even in the First World War which is now largely forgotten. If the RAF had been made non operational in 1938 by the Germans a cross-channel invasion would not have been a really opposed landing. general Alan Brooke was worried about a German parachute landing in the London parks and other places in September 1940 and he was honestly expecting a German invasion at any moment then, though the British public and House of Commons were not told that information at the time:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/...s-detailed-plans-for-invasion-of-Britain.html

In May 1941 the Germans had great difficulties in Crete and their one and only Parachute division suffered unacceptable losses in that operation, successful though it finally was. Now tell me how the Germans were to knock the UK out of the war by landing parachutists in London parks.

 

[Andy_Ross]

Look at their contribution to the Ardennes offensive.
landed in the wrong place, hid in a wood then surrendered.

 

[dudalb]

Market garden would like to have a word with you. Or Dieppe.

Germany did not have anywhere near the "Sea life" capability to pull off an invasion in 1938, and had to depend on a number of very dubious improvisions in planning Sea Lion in 1940.

 

[Hubert Cumberdale]

To my mind a lot would have depended on the air war in 1938, and the RAF had practically no Spitfires in 1938. It must be remembered that London was heavily bombed by the Germans even in the First World War which is now largely forgotten. If the RAF had been made non operational in 1938 by the Germans a cross-channel invasion would not have been a really opposed landing. general Alan Brooke was worried about a German parachute landing in the London parks and other places in September 1940 and he was honestly expecting a German invasion at any moment then, though the British public and House of Commons were not told that information at the time:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/...s-detailed-plans-for-invasion-of-Britain.html

Look up the operation radius of the Bf109 and then tell me why Spitfires would be necessary, bearing in mind they would be flying from Germany.