Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

Ah yes, forgot about the 35.
All told there were some 300 in 1938?

That outnumbers the Germans PzIII and PzIV (some 40 of the former and 80 or so of the latter). However you can't look at these in isolation.

It has to be looked at with the tactics overall, so the Luftwaffe.



This is one of the questions that comes up in briefing documents for Chamberlain in '38. Could anyone actually intervene fast enough. And the analysis that seemed to come back each time was "no".



They had hundreds of 109s in 1938. No one else had a frontline fighter that would match that.



As I say above, you can't do that in isolation.

Luftwaffe?

Good question for:
7.5 cm kanon PL vz. 37
8 cm PL kanon vz. 37
8.35 cm PL kanon vz. 22
9 cm kanon PL vz. 12/20
(PL = AA)

ETA:
However, I am not sure how well Luftwaffe would be of use against defenses. (Like Border Fortifications)

Short as in 0 km. Poland bordered Romania (the "Romanian bridgehead" through which substantial parts of the Polish army escaped in 1939) and thus CS didn't border the USSR. Poland would have been needed to grant the Red Army the right to cross its territory to get into Slovakia (or to nitpick, Carpatho-Ruthenia). Guess the chances of them doing that.

I remembered bit about no border, but failed to realize extent of changes of borders post-war when trying to refresh memory.

Aka: You are right.
 
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I remembered bit about no border, but failed to realize extent of changes of borders post-war when trying to refresh memory.

Aka: You are right.

Pre-war actually. When CS was dismembered in March 1939, the Nazis occupied the rump of the Czech part, Slovakia declared independence, Poland occupied the Teschen area (*) and Hungaria seized Carpatho-Ruthenia. After the war, the USSR seized Ruthenia and didn't give it back to CS.

(*) sorry that's the German name of the town, I forgot the Czech or Polish names. CS and Poland fought a war over the area in 1920/21 and ended up dividing the area.
 
Luftwaffe?

Good question for:
7.5 cm kanon PL vz. 37
8 cm PL kanon vz. 37
8.35 cm PL kanon vz. 22
9 cm kanon PL vz. 12/20
(PL = AA)

Not sure what you're trying to compare here.
The Czech's front line fighter was a biplane, albeit the best biplane fighter made. If the Luftwaffe gain air superiority (or as much as they did over Poland and France) then AA guns aren't going to help all that much.

ETA:
However, I am not sure how well Luftwaffe would be of use against defenses. (Like Border Fortifications)

Fortifications that were incomplete, and already outflanked.
It was no Maginot Line.
 
Not sure what you're trying to compare here.
The Czech's front line fighter was a biplane, albeit the best biplane fighter made. If the Luftwaffe gain air superiority (or as much as they did over Poland and France) then AA guns aren't going to help all that much.



Fortifications that were incomplete, and already outflanked.
It was no Maginot Line.

It's list of in-service AA guns. No idea how well they could make life hard for German planes, but Germans found them useful. And that's why I didn't list Czech planes, because development of new planes was unfinished. (It seems we would need similar amount of years as Brits for their Spitfire.) Note: About development of new planes, that is IIRC.

Note: 70% of small objects were already finished And even unfished bunker can provide more protection then being outside. We were mostly missing Heavy Objects.

Outflanked where? It was missing only on border with Hungary and Poland. (pre-war borders)
See map:
http://mapa.opevneni.cz/?n=48.931465&e=17.892468&r=1a955000010&z=7&m=t&l=cz

Note: Plan was to finish First Wave in 1941 with full line being finished in 50s.
 
The German Stuka dive bomber was very effective in the early part of the war. I'm not quite clear how the British Army, or Navy, or RAF, could have helped the Czechs. The French High Command was in a bad way. Politically, Hitler was putting pressure on Slovakia to secede. Some military experts gave the Czechs three months to survive a war, and others three weeks.

There is some interesting waffle about this matter of appeasement at this website, although it is not terribly erudite:

https://www.quora.com/What-would-ha...o-appease-Hitler-and-give-him-the-Sudetenland

This is one comment which makes sense to me:

A more firm attitude towards Hitler would perhaps have prevented WWII according to some historians.

However, it's kind of unfair to put the blame for the failing of the Munich conference on the shoulders of Chamberlain. Rather can one blame Hitler who didn't settle to the agreements of the Munich conference.....

It seems quite probable that in that case Germany would have become the major power of continental Europe, and it seems highly improbable any country would have had the intention to declare a war on Germany. Hitler had very strong cards in his hands in 1938, but he all blew it by plunging Germany and the rest of Europe in the nightmare of WWII.
 
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It's list of in-service AA guns. No idea how well they could make life hard for German planes, but Germans found them useful. And that's why I didn't list Czech planes, because development of new planes was unfinished. (It seems we would need similar amount of years as Brits for their Spitfire.) Note: About development of new planes, that is IIRC.
Which is where the German advantage lay.
But it was a temporary advantage, which is one reason for the push for war (another being the slightly insane German economy).

Note: 70% of small objects were already finished And even unfished bunker can provide more protection then being outside. We were mostly missing Heavy Objects.

True.
It's one of those "what if" things that's open to a number of interpretations.

Outflanked where? It was missing only on border with Hungary and Poland. (pre-war borders)
See map:
http://mapa.opevneni.cz/?n=48.931465&e=17.892468&r=1a955000010&z=7&m=t&l=cz

Note: Plan was to finish First Wave in 1941 with full line being finished in 50s.

Austria.
Yes it has forts, but they were nowhere near as strong as the ones on the opposite flank. The big concern post anschluss was the pincer from those two drives.

I wish I could find the quote I read from one of the Czech generals informing the French that they felt they could hold out for (I think) 6 weeks maximum, based on this change in the situation.
 
The German Stuka dive bomber was very effective in the early part of the war. I'm not quite clear how the British Army, or Navy, or RAF, could have helped the Czechs. The French High Command was in a bad way. Politically, Hitler was putting pressure on Slovakia to secede. Some military experts gave the Czechs three months to survive a war, and others three weeks.

There is some interesting waffle about this matter of appeasement at this website, although it is not terribly erudite:

https://www.quora.com/What-would-ha...o-appease-Hitler-and-give-him-the-Sudetenland

This is one comment which makes sense to me:

The first highlighted part,


The British and French could have given an ultimatum whilst mobilising and then declared war, and meant that Germany would have had to prepare for a war on two fronts, without many U-boats and under a naval blockade similar to that in WWI. As a start.

The second highlighted part - that's an unconventional use of the English language, but l can see how you might consider waffle interesting.
 
Often the question about Munich is that Chamberlain bought time for British rearmament by his appeasement at Munich. What this ignores is that contemporary evidence does not indicate in the slightest that Chamberlain appeased Hitler to buy time.

Instead it indicates that Chamberlain really thought that he, through appeasement, was making a lasting peace. Further Chamberlain continued right until the German invasion of Poland to think in terms of appeasement of some kind. In fact between the state of Hitler's invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939 and the British declaration of War, Sept 3, 1939, Chamberlain sought to find a reason not to go to war with Germany. Chamberlain's Cabinet revolted and basically forced him to declare war.

Further the British rearmament program was put in place before Chamberlain became Prime Minister and Chamberlain was forced to allow it to continue, despite his misgivings about it. Also Chamberlain was responsible for ending the Ports arrangement with the Republic of Ireland, which during the war greatly impeded the British fight against the U-Boat menace.

Also this fixation on Britain ignores that Germany was also unprepared for war. In fact Germany was so unprepared that several German generals were planning a military coup against Hitler if a war started. They actually endeavoured to contact the British government but were rebuffed.

In fact Germany was so unprepared that Hitler's generals basically forced Hitler to accept Chamberlain's mediation. The Generals felt that Germany was woefully unprepared for war and looked askew at the threadbare forces they would have to leave in the west while they dealt with Czechoslovakia.

For we now know that Hitler really wanted a war with Czechoslovakia, which was why Hitler before Munich kept upping the stakes, to basically force a war. In fact right to his dying day Hitler felt he had made a big mistake in giving in to his Generals and not having his war in 1938.

As for benefits. Yes appeasement gave Britain and France more time to rearm, (Although as stated above this was not Chamberlain's goal.), but it had huge costs which, in my opinion, outweighed the gains.

First it gave Germany more time to arm. Secondly it gave the resources of the Czechoslovakian state to Germany. This included much Military material, the significant industrial resources of said state along with a significant armaments industry. It also gave the financial and fiscal resources of said state to Germany. (This included significant resources of foreign currency, which Germany was short of, and gold reserves. In one of the last gestures of appeasement Chamberlain allowed the part of the gold reserves held in Britain by the Czechoslovakian state to be given to Germany after Hitler liquidated the Czech state in March of 1939 and turn Slovakia into a protectorate.)

Further Munich basically destroyed the western system of alliances in Eastern Europe opening up the area for German, political and economic domination.

So the bottom line is that in my opinion Hitler's Germany benefited more from Appeasement at Munich than did Britain and France.

The irony of all this is that Hitler saw his greatest diplomatic victory has a failure and mistake.
 
Often the question about Munich is that Chamberlain bought time for British rearmament by his appeasement at Munich. What this ignores is that contemporary evidence does not indicate in the slightest that Chamberlain appeased Hitler to buy time.

Instead it indicates that Chamberlain really thought that he, through appeasement, was making a lasting peace. Further Chamberlain continued right until the German invasion of Poland to think in terms of appeasement of some kind. In fact between the state of Hitler's invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939 and the British declaration of War, Sept 3, 1939, Chamberlain sought to find a reason not to go to war with Germany. Chamberlain's Cabinet revolted and basically forced him to declare war.

Further the British rearmament program was put in place before Chamberlain became Prime Minister and Chamberlain was forced to allow it to continue, despite his misgivings about it. Also Chamberlain was responsible for ending the Ports arrangement with the Republic of Ireland, which during the war greatly impeded the British fight against the U-Boat menace.

Also this fixation on Britain ignores that Germany was also unprepared for war. In fact Germany was so unprepared that several German generals were planning a military coup against Hitler if a war started. They actually endeavoured to contact the British government but were rebuffed.

In fact Germany was so unprepared that Hitler's generals basically forced Hitler to accept Chamberlain's mediation. The Generals felt that Germany was woefully unprepared for war and looked askew at the threadbare forces they would have to leave in the west while they dealt with Czechoslovakia.

For we now know that Hitler really wanted a war with Czechoslovakia, which was why Hitler before Munich kept upping the stakes, to basically force a war. In fact right to his dying day Hitler felt he had made a big mistake in giving in to his Generals and not having his war in 1938.

As for benefits. Yes appeasement gave Britain and France more time to rearm, (Although as stated above this was not Chamberlain's goal.), but it had huge costs which, in my opinion, outweighed the gains.

First it gave Germany more time to arm. Secondly it gave the resources of the Czechoslovakian state to Germany. This included much Military material, the significant industrial resources of said state along with a significant armaments industry. It also gave the financial and fiscal resources of said state to Germany. (This included significant resources of foreign currency, which Germany was short of, and gold reserves. In one of the last gestures of appeasement Chamberlain allowed the part of the gold reserves held in Britain by the Czechoslovakian state to be given to Germany after Hitler liquidated the Czech state in March of 1939 and turn Slovakia into a protectorate.)

Further Munich basically destroyed the western system of alliances in Eastern Europe opening up the area for German, political and economic domination.

So the bottom line is that in my opinion Hitler's Germany benefited more from Appeasement at Munich than did Britain and France.

The irony of all this is that Hitler saw his greatest diplomatic victory has a failure and mistake.

Well said.

About the kindest thing that can be said about Chamberlain is that he might have been already suffering from the illness that killed him and that might have affected his bargaining.
 
Which is where the German advantage lay.
But it was a temporary advantage, which is one reason for the push for war (another being the slightly insane German economy).



True.
It's one of those "what if" things that's open to a number of interpretations.



Austria.
Yes it has forts, but they were nowhere near as strong as the ones on the opposite flank. The big concern post anschluss was the pincer from those two drives.

I wish I could find the quote I read from one of the Czech generals informing the French that they felt they could hold out for (I think) 6 weeks maximum, based on this change in the situation.

I remember that Germans did number of weapon tests against forts. Don't know if they ever tested their bombs. Could have provided some answers.

As for those 6 weeks, do you remember if it included activity from western allies?
 
I remember that Germans did number of weapon tests against forts. Don't know if they ever tested their bombs. Could have provided some answers.

By and large the defences were there to channel troops. There was a limit to the fire zones, and the whole Czech plan was to withdraw from the Western part to buy time. Post-Austria, this withdrawal became faster as they feared getting a large chunk of their army trapped by a pincer.

As for those 6 weeks, do you remember if it included activity from western allies?

This was how long (and I do wish I could find the reference) they would stand without significant Western intervention. Considering what happened the following year, the French would not have been in a position to do a great deal.

Where things change is what happened next.

As Pacal suggests, how would a Germany without the 2 or 300 Czech tanks fare against the French and British. I'm not convinced they would do any worse...however, the big question is what happens in the east. And I have no idea on that one.
 
This was how long (and I do wish I could find the reference) they would stand without significant Western intervention. Considering what happened the following year, the French would not have been in a position to do a great deal.
This is another what-if, but how much would have been different in 1938 compared to 1939? The Siegfried Line was also very much a work in progress. IIRC, in September 1939, the French were held up in one sector of the front by a large minefield. Was that minefield already present at the time of Munich?

And in the rest of the front, the French encountered resistance from German troops. Those would have been absent in a 1938 scenario as Germany would need all its troops against CS.
 
I wish I could find the quote I read from one of the Czech generals informing the French that they felt they could hold out for (I think) 6 weeks maximum, based on this change in the situation.

This is a quote about this matter:

We have a variety of other contemporary opinions. The Czechoslovak Chief of the General staff, General Ludvig Krejci, thought that the participation of Poland in the attack would limit the Czech capacity to hold out to three weeks. The official military history of Czechoslovakia estimated that the Czechs could hold out for a month without the assistance........
 
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This is another what-if, but how much would have been different in 1938 compared to 1939? The Siegfried Line was also very much a work in progress. IIRC, in September 1939, the French were held up in one sector of the front by a large minefield. Was that minefield already present at the time of Munich?

Fair point.
The Saar defences were not in existence, but the line behind them was.
In essence the earlier defences were intended to forestall an attack in depth, sacrificing the ground around Aachen.

And in the rest of the front, the French encountered resistance from German troops. Those would have been absent in a 1938 scenario as Germany would need all its troops against CS.

The German plans (Green) had pretty much as many troops in the defences in the West as they had the following year, so that wouldn't make much odds.

It is possible a solid Czech defense, with a more aggressive French attack, would result in the Germans deciding to withdraw troops to the French frontier. But that involves an aggressive French command, which does not seem to have been the case.

Two things.

1. This is not a quote from a Czech general.
2. Quote from where? Putting it in Google results in no hits.

I'm also not convinced Poland would act.
After all, if they attacked Czechoslovakia then that would instantly open them up to Soviet reprisals.
 
Ah yes, forgot about the 35.
All told there were some 300 in 1938?

That outnumbers the Germans PzIII and PzIV (some 40 of the former and 80 or so of the latter). However you can't look at these in isolation. It has to be looked at with the tactics overall, so the Luftwaffe.



This is one of the questions that comes up in briefing documents for Chamberlain in '38. Could anyone actually intervene fast enough. And the analysis that seemed to come back each time was "no".



They had hundreds of 109s in 1938. No one else had a frontline fighter that would match that.



As I say above, you can't do that in isolation.

Wehrmacht tactics were substantially honed in the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Poland.
 
Wehrmacht tactics were substantially honed in the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Weren't the "flying artillery" tactics already in place?
I know other parts were changed, but I thought the core tank and air support tactics were in place by Munich?
 
Two things.

1. This is not a quote from a Czech general.
2. Quote from where? Putting it in Google results in no hits.

If you scroll down to the bottom of the page at this website there are several quotes from military experts about the matter of Czech defences including Brigadier Stronge, who seems to have been the British military attache there:

https://www.quora.com/What-would-ha...o-appease-Hitler-and-give-him-the-Sudetenland

Poland was a Czech enemy at the time and eventually did a Czech land grab after Munich.

Chamberlain was playing a diplomatic poker game. For him to go to war in 1938 would have resulted in a world war in which he would have had practically no reliable allies, and for which the British armed forces were ill-equipped and ill-trained. The verdict of history is that Hitler started the war by breaking the Munich agreement, and the German-Soviet pact. That's when conscription was introduced. There are people on the internet now who accuse Churchill of starting the war. If there had been war in 1938, which nearly happened, Chamberlain and the Czechs would have been blamed for starting it.
 
By and large the defences were there to channel troops. There was a limit to the fire zones, and the whole Czech plan was to withdraw from the Western part to buy time. Post-Austria, this withdrawal became faster as they feared getting a large chunk of their army trapped by a pincer.



This was how long (and I do wish I could find the reference) they would stand without significant Western intervention. Considering what happened the following year, the French would not have been in a position to do a great deal.

Where things change is what happened next.

As Pacal suggests, how would a Germany without the 2 or 300 Czech tanks fare against the French and British. I'm not convinced they would do any worse...however, the big question is what happens in the east. And I have no idea on that one.

Stalin is now pissed off that his ally was attacked by Germany. No Molotov-Ribentrop pact. He probably sees Germany as a more immediate threat rather than not even believing reports on the day Barbarossa started. Can't see him being OK with Germany taking Poland.
 

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