Proof of Immortality, VII

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Hey, Jabba, how do you think your opponents will score your efforts in this thread?
A brief snippet from the site:

"- I'll try to get my opponents to join in and evaluate my efforts also. Assuming that I can convince them to participate over here (they had grown tired of my stubborness over there), I'll show their evaluations of my efforts in black brackets, and a -1 from them would likewise indicate that in their judgment, the particular exchange favored them rather than me."

Sooooo.... I'm thinking of awarding Jabba so far 10-100 points. I think that quite reasonable. What do y'all think? Too many? Too few?

Also, what are the odds that I'd come up with that number?


(Hint: psychological priming)
 
Thermal,
- I doubt that I can do any better at quashing your reservations than I already have...

Jabba:

You could quash my reservations by justifying the following:

1. There is a little bit of beach sand on the floor of my living room. The odds of silica being formed on this particular planet, its journey across the cosmos and the aeons and through the tumultuous oceans, that it would just happen to attach to me...and that a me existed alongside all this to marvel at it...and that my lazy kid that was supposed to sweep it didn't, with all of the attendant variables there...it would have a vanishingly small initial likelihood that all these things would come together for that sand to exist on the floor 'now'.

2. Then I realize each and every event in the universe had a similar initial likelihood, incalculably and vanishingly small. Yet they happened, so their probability was 1 and is not particularly noteworthy.

What makes you revere #1 and dismiss #2?

eta: Nevermind. There are a lot of people ahead of me in line waiting for answers to some very good questions. When you answer them, I am sure it will all be clear.
 
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His typical answer to this is that probability imports differently to humans than to inanimate objects because humans have a soul.

Can't wait to see the robust support for both the existence of the soul and the specifics of its nature and how they affect probabilities, then. Lucky for me that so many existential musings are resolved by one poster. Well, not lucky. The probability was 1.
 
Jabba:

You could quash my reservations by justifying the following:

1. There is a little bit of beach sand on the floor of my living room. The odds of silica being formed on this particular planet, its journey across the cosmos and the aeons and through the tumultuous oceans, that it would just happen to attach to me...and that a me existed alongside all this to marvel at it...and that my lazy kid that was supposed to sweep it didn't, with all of the attendant variables there...it would have a vanishingly small initial likelihood that all these things would come together for that sand to exist on the floor 'now'.

2. Then I realize each and every event in the universe had a similar initial likelihood, incalculably and vanishingly small. Yet they happened, so their probability was 1 and is not particularly noteworthy.

What makes you revere #1 and dismiss #2?

eta: Nevermind. There are a lot of people ahead of me in line waiting for answers to some very good questions. When you answer them, I am sure it will all be clear.
Thermal,
- I think you're referring to the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy. My latest syllogism includes my best attempt at rebutting that claim. Below, I've hilited the sections that address this issue.
- I also think that Caveman agrees that the Sharpshooter fallacy doesn't apply. See below my syllogism.

- Here's the latest version of my syllogism.

THE MATH OF MORTALITY

New information may affect the probability of an existing hypothesis (H).
An old event may be new info if it hasn’t already been considered in the current probability of H.
If an event is unlikely – given a particular hypothesis (H) – but the event occurs, the occurrence will tend to have a negative effect upon the probability of H — but, it need not.
For instance, it could be that given the complementary hypothesis – the event would be even more unlikely.
Or, it could be that all possible events – given H – are equally unlikely (e.g. a fair lottery) — if so, the particular event needs to be “set apart” in a way that is relevant to the hypothesis in order to impact the hypothesis. If – given H – an event is impossible, but does occur, H must be wrong.
Otherwise, what we call Bayesian statistics is used to evaluate the effect of a new and relevant event upon the probability of H.
I claim that by using my own current existence as the new info, Bayesian Statistics, virtually proves that we humans are not mortal.

Here’s how it works.
The likelihood of drawing a particular sample from a particular population has mathematical implications re the likelihood that a particular sample was, in fact, drawn from that population… You might want to read that again…
Or, in other words, the probability of a hypothesis being true is affected by the likelihood of samples actually drawn from the involved population — given that hypothesis.
The thing is, we have the mathematical right to apply this logic to our own expected mortality (the hypothesis)…
According to the typical, non-religious model of reality, each of us is temporary and singular — at best. If we ever live, we won’t live long, and we’ll do it only once.
By “we,” I mean we “selves” or senses of self” or “specific self-awarenesses” (SSA) or even “souls” (if “soul’ isn’t defined as immortal) — in other words, what reincarnationists think keep coming back to life.
If we are only temporary, however, the probability of me ever existing is teensy-weensy, or vanishingly small. I’m damned lucky to ever be here.
And as now happens to be now, I’m even luckier than that.

But then, is my current SSA “set apart” from all the other SSAs? Here’s why I think it is. My SSA is the only thing or process that I know exists — the rest could be my imagination. If it didn’t ever exist, it would be as if nothing ever existed — and the likelihood of it ever existing is less than 1/10100. If it didn’t currently exist, it would be as if nothing currently existed, and the likelihood of it currently existing is even (much) less than the likelihood of it ever existing… That gives enormous significance to my current, personal SSA. And, the thing is, every current SSA has the same reason to believe that OOFLam is wrong — and that she or he is not mortal. “So? However unlikely, those things are, they do happen now and then.” (Or something similar.) is the usual response.
And every once in a while, someone gets a poker hand of 4 aces. You’re right, those things happen. But, in the poker case, if you have any existing suspicions about the dealer and your opponent (setting the specific event apart from the other possibilities), those suspicions will take a decided turn for the worse if your opponent turns over 4 aces at a particularly convenient time.
In other words, if you have a plausible hypothesis other than the ‘null
hypothesis’ and you get results you wouldn’t expect given that the null hypothesis were correct, you can be justifiably suspicious of your null hypothesis (in our case, the non-religious hypothesis). It’s simply, which hypothesis – over all, adding the new info – is the most probable. No problem.
It’s only when you have no other plausible hypothesis that you’re stuck with the null hypothesis.
So, the question is, do I have available another plausible hypothesis for my current existence?
I can think of at least four that seem plausible.
And further, I can lump these four together (along with all other plausible hypotheses) in the complement to the null hypothesis and say something concrete and definite about the probability of the null hypothesis – the non-religious hypothesis – being true, given my current existence.

So, given
…k = all background knowledge
…P = the probability of
…H = Only one Finite Life at most (OOFLam)
…| = given
…E = my current existence
…~H = Complement of OOFLam
The formula for this probability is
…P(H|E & k) = P(E|H)P(H|k) / (P(E|H)P(H|k) + P(E|~H)P(~H|k)).

Re P(H) and P(~H): I won’t argue the point for now, but would guess that most scientist would not be entirely sure that H is true, so I’ll estimate that P(H) should be no more than .99, and P(~H) should be no less than .01.

Re P(E|~H):
The probability (“likelihood”) of E given ~H, involves several specific hypothetical possibilities.
That only some of us have but one finite life.
That we each have numerous finite lives.
That only some of us have numerous finite lives.
That we each have an infinity of finite lives.
That only some of us have an infinity of finite lives.
That we each have an infinite life.
That only some of us have an infinite life.
That time isn’t what we think it is.
Some other explanation.

Now I must estimate (roughly) the prior probability (rounded off to three decimal places) of each more specific possibility (hypothesis), given ~H.
That only some of us have but one finite life: .000
That we each have numerous finite lives: .2.
That only some of us have numerous finite lives: .000.
That we each have an infinity of finite lives; .2
That only some of us have an infinity of finite lives: 000.
That we each have an infinite life: .2
That only some of us have an infinite life: .000
That time isn’t what we think it is: .2
Some other explanation: .2

And now, I must estimate the likelihood of my own current existence given the different specific hypotheses under ~H.
That only some of us have but one finite life: .10.
That we each have numerous finite lives: .10.
That only some of us have numerous finite lives: .25.
That we each have an infinity of finite lives; 1.00
That only some of us have an infinity of finite lives: .50.
That we each have an infinite life: 1.00.
That only some of us have an infinite life: .50
That time isn’t what we think it is (to be explained): .50
Some other explanation: .50

And now, I must multiply each of the prior probabilities of ~H above by the likelihoods of my current existence, given each specific hypothesis, and add up their products. And, the total likelihood of my current existence given ~H:
P(E|~H) = (0*.5) + (.2*.10) + (0*.25) + (.2*1.0) + (0*.5) + (1*.2) + (0*.5) + (.2*.5) + (.2*.5), or
P(E|~H) = 0 + .02 + 0 +.2 + 0 + .2+ 0 + .1 + .1, or
P(E|~H) = .62. And,
P(H|E) = 0*.99/(0*.99 + .62*.01) = (0/.0062) = 0.
P(H|E) = 0.

...
7. If P(E|I) is NOT an example of the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy,...
Of course it isn't, the TS fallacy has nothing to do with using your own existence in a conditional and there are no such things as "valid targets" or "invalid targets", just ignore all that.

The TS fallacy is the fallacy of switching the conditional.

Let A be "shot the side of the barn such that it counts as a hit"
Let B be "drew a difficult target on the side of the barn"

Then a sharpshooter can be considered as P(sharpshooter) = P(A|B), ie by the probability that you can score a hit given that a difficult target has been drawn. Someone using the TS fallacy would be arguing P(sharpshooter) = P(B|A), ie that they're a sharpshooter because they can draw a difficult target given a shot at the side of the barn that needs to count as a hit.

In your case, if you were making a TS fallacy you'd be arguing "the probability of me being immortal is P(E|I)" and you're making a lot of errors, but you're not making that particular one.

Your actual problem is this assertion: P(E|~H) > P(E|H)
 
Thermal,
- I think you're referring to the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy. My latest syllogism includes my best attempt at rebutting that claim.
Edited by Agatha: 
Edited to remove breach of rule 0
 
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Jabba, if that's your best attempt at getting around the Texas Sharpshooter issue then you might as well just give up.
 
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Thermal,
- I think you're referring to the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy. My latest syllogism includes my best attempt at rebutting that claim. Below, I've hilited the sections that address this issue.
Your latest syllogism doesn't rebut the fact that you are employing the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy in any way.

- I also think that Caveman agrees that the Sharpshooter fallacy doesn't apply. See below my syllogism.
Describe the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy in your own words and we'll see if it applies or not, regardless of where you think you've found agreement.
 
My latest syllogism includes my best attempt at rebutting that claim.

Your best attempt is your well-worn cross between solipsism and frantically begging the notion that the Texas sharpshooter fallacy shouldn't be considered a fallacy as long as you really, really want it not to be. Seriously. It's a completely subjective wad of pseudo-philosophical gobbledy-gook. It does nothing whatsoever to rebut the charge. And what's worse, this is not even a "new" argument. It's the same feeble way you've been trying to sidestep the Texas sharpshooter fallacy for months if not years. It's clear you have no answer.

You obviously don't know what the Texas sharpshooter fallacy is. You can't describe it in your own words, and you certainly don't have the faintest clue how to avoid it or to rebut the evidence that shows you're committing it. Your critics here and elsewhere have shown that you simply don't understand the disciplines that contribute to your argument. You don't know logic. You don't know math. You don't know science. You don't know religion. Again the question arises: why would you ask anyone to take you seriously following all that?

I also think that Caveman agrees that the Sharpshooter fallacy doesn't apply.

If you're going to cite him as an expert, be sure either to include or rebut where he agrees your proof fails for a number of other reasons.
 
Jabba:

You could quash my reservations by justifying the following:

1. There is a little bit of beach sand on the floor of my living room. The odds of silica being formed on this particular planet, its journey across the cosmos and the aeons and through the tumultuous oceans, that it would just happen to attach to me...and that a me existed alongside all this to marvel at it...and that my lazy kid that was supposed to sweep it didn't, with all of the attendant variables there...it would have a vanishingly small initial likelihood that all these things would come together for that sand to exist on the floor 'now'.

2. Then I realize each and every event in the universe had a similar initial likelihood, incalculably and vanishingly small. Yet they happened, so their probability was 1 and is not particularly noteworthy.

What makes you revere #1 and dismiss #2?

eta: Nevermind. There are a lot of people ahead of me in line waiting for answers to some very good questions. When you answer them, I am sure it will all be clear.
Thermal,
- I think you're referring to the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy. My latest syllogism includes my best attempt at rebutting that claim. Below, I've hilited the sections that address this issue.
- I also think that Caveman agrees that the Sharpshooter fallacy doesn't apply. See below my syllogism.

- Here's the latest version of my syllogism.

THE MATH OF MORTALITY

New information may affect the probability of an existing hypothesis (H).
An old event may be new info if it hasn’t already been considered in the current probability of H.
If an event is unlikely – given a particular hypothesis (H) – but the event occurs, the occurrence will tend to have a negative effect upon the probability of H — but, it need not.
For instance, it could be that given the complementary hypothesis – the event would be even more unlikely.
Or, it could be that all possible events – given H – are equally unlikely (e.g. a fair lottery) — if so, the particular event needs to be “set apart” in a way that is relevant to the hypothesis in order to impact the hypothesis. If – given H – an event is impossible, but does occur, H must be wrong.
Otherwise, what we call Bayesian statistics is used to evaluate the effect of a new and relevant event upon the probability of H.
I claim that by using my own current existence as the new info, Bayesian Statistics, virtually proves that we humans are not mortal.

Here’s how it works.
The likelihood of drawing a particular sample from a particular population has mathematical implications re the likelihood that a particular sample was, in fact, drawn from that population… You might want to read that again…
Or, in other words, the probability of a hypothesis being true is affected by the likelihood of samples actually drawn from the involved population — given that hypothesis.
The thing is, we have the mathematical right to apply this logic to our own expected mortality (the hypothesis)…
According to the typical, non-religious model of reality, each of us is temporary and singular — at best. If we ever live, we won’t live long, and we’ll do it only once.
By “we,” I mean we “selves” or senses of self” or “specific self-awarenesses” (SSA) or even “souls” (if “soul’ isn’t defined as immortal) — in other words, what reincarnationists think keep coming back to life.
If we are only temporary, however, the probability of me ever existing is teensy-weensy, or vanishingly small. I’m damned lucky to ever be here.
And as now happens to be now, I’m even luckier than that.

But then, is my current SSA “set apart” from all the other SSAs? Here’s why I think it is. My SSA is the only thing or process that I know exists — the rest could be my imagination. If it didn’t ever exist, it would be as if nothing ever existed — and the likelihood of it ever existing is less than 1/10100. If it didn’t currently exist, it would be as if nothing currently existed, and the likelihood of it currently existing is even (much) less than the likelihood of it ever existing… That gives enormous significance to my current, personal SSA. And, the thing is, every current SSA has the same reason to believe that OOFLam is wrong — and that she or he is not mortal. “So? However unlikely, those things are, they do happen now and then.” (Or something similar.) is the usual response.
And every once in a while, someone gets a poker hand of 4 aces. You’re right, those things happen. But, in the poker case, if you have any existing suspicions about the dealer and your opponent (setting the specific event apart from the other possibilities), those suspicions will take a decided turn for the worse if your opponent turns over 4 aces at a particularly convenient time.
In other words, if you have a plausible hypothesis other than the ‘null
hypothesis’ and you get results you wouldn’t expect given that the null hypothesis were correct, you can be justifiably suspicious of your null hypothesis (in our case, the non-religious hypothesis). It’s simply, which hypothesis – over all, adding the new info – is the most probable. No problem.
It’s only when you have no other plausible hypothesis that you’re stuck with the null hypothesis.
So, the question is, do I have available another plausible hypothesis for my current existence?
I can think of at least four that seem plausible.
And further, I can lump these four together (along with all other plausible hypotheses) in the complement to the null hypothesis and say something concrete and definite about the probability of the null hypothesis – the non-religious hypothesis – being true, given my current existence.

So, given
…k = all background knowledge
…P = the probability of
…H = Only one Finite Life at most (OOFLam)
…| = given
…E = my current existence
…~H = Complement of OOFLam
The formula for this probability is
…P(H|E & k) = P(E|H)P(H|k) / (P(E|H)P(H|k) + P(E|~H)P(~H|k)).

Re P(H) and P(~H): I won’t argue the point for now, but would guess that most scientist would not be entirely sure that H is true, so I’ll estimate that P(H) should be no more than .99, and P(~H) should be no less than .01.

Re P(E|~H):
The probability (“likelihood”) of E given ~H, involves several specific hypothetical possibilities.
That only some of us have but one finite life.
That we each have numerous finite lives.
That only some of us have numerous finite lives.
That we each have an infinity of finite lives.
That only some of us have an infinity of finite lives.
That we each have an infinite life.
That only some of us have an infinite life.
That time isn’t what we think it is.
Some other explanation.

Now I must estimate (roughly) the prior probability (rounded off to three decimal places) of each more specific possibility (hypothesis), given ~H.
That only some of us have but one finite life: .000
That we each have numerous finite lives: .2.
That only some of us have numerous finite lives: .000.
That we each have an infinity of finite lives; .2
That only some of us have an infinity of finite lives: 000.
That we each have an infinite life: .2
That only some of us have an infinite life: .000
That time isn’t what we think it is: .2
Some other explanation: .2

And now, I must estimate the likelihood of my own current existence given the different specific hypotheses under ~H.
That only some of us have but one finite life: .10.
That we each have numerous finite lives: .10.
That only some of us have numerous finite lives: .25.
That we each have an infinity of finite lives; 1.00
That only some of us have an infinity of finite lives: .50.
That we each have an infinite life: 1.00.
That only some of us have an infinite life: .50
That time isn’t what we think it is (to be explained): .50
Some other explanation: .50

And now, I must multiply each of the prior probabilities of ~H above by the likelihoods of my current existence, given each specific hypothesis, and add up their products. And, the total likelihood of my current existence given ~H:
P(E|~H) = (0*.5) + (.2*.10) + (0*.25) + (.2*1.0) + (0*.5) + (1*.2) + (0*.5) + (.2*.5) + (.2*.5), or
P(E|~H) = 0 + .02 + 0 +.2 + 0 + .2+ 0 + .1 + .1, or
P(E|~H) = .62. And,
P(H|E) = 0*.99/(0*.99 + .62*.01) = (0/.0062) = 0.
P(H|E) = 0.

...
7. If P(E|I) is NOT an example of the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy,...
Of course it isn't, the TS fallacy has nothing to do with using your own existence in a conditional and there are no such things as "valid targets" or "invalid targets", just ignore all that.

The TS fallacy is the fallacy of switching the conditional.

Let A be "shot the side of the barn such that it counts as a hit"
Let B be "drew a difficult target on the side of the barn"

Then a sharpshooter can be considered as P(sharpshooter) = P(A|B), ie by the probability that you can score a hit given that a difficult target has been drawn. Someone using the TS fallacy would be arguing P(sharpshooter) = P(B|A), ie that they're a sharpshooter because they can draw a difficult target given a shot at the side of the barn that needs to count as a hit.

In your case, if you were making a TS fallacy you'd be arguing "the probability of me being immortal is P(E|I)" and you're making a lot of errors, but you're not making that particular one.

Your actual problem is this assertion: P(E|~H) > P(E|H)
[/QUOTE]See, jabba, we already know that all of that is a wall of lies and dishonesty. You could obviate that simply by being honest.

In fairness, you actually tried that in some version of this thread and it did not work out well for you. It will not get better this time around. You lied then and nothing has changed.

Perhaps you think that something is different now. OK present something new. That would be a first. In five years you have failed to do so. Oh, now it is six years. Or is it seven. Doesn't matter, it is a fail trail. The years matter not a whit.
 
Jabba:

Yes, I caught that 'if my SSA didn't exist, then it would be as nothing ever existed' argument. That would assume that you don't accept reality existing outside your senses. I, on the other hand, do. We could call that a Presumption Of One Perception (POOP). The world exists regardless of your POOP.

I also caught your poker hand analogy. I would not be suspicious of the deal because I do not think the universe is pulling a fast one on me. We could call that rationale the Cards' Arrangement Conspiratorially Assigned (CACA). This POOP and CACA really don't answer my questions.

Seriously, please answer the questions of others who have been patiently waiting for responses before returning to me.
 
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Your critics here and elsewhere have shown that you simply don't understand the disciplines that contribute to your argument. You don't know logic. You don't know math. You don't know science. You don't know religion.

He does know Truly Effective Debatetm, however1.






1 : Also known as the method that breaks down a conversation fractally into so many sub-issues as to bog down everything until nothing can be discussed at all, leading to a victory by sheer momentum.
 
That would assume that you don't accept reality existing outside your senses.

Which makes the question of immortality moot.

Seriously, please answer the questions of others who have been patiently waiting for responses before returning to me.

Gracious as this request is, it won't be heeded. You're fresh meat. The rest of us have been slogging it out with Jabba for years, and he's invented all sorts of excuses why he doesn't need to respond to those persistent questions. Jabba evidently doesn't want to debate; he wants to preach and be praised for the cleverness of his preaching. And he's using your recent arrival as his latest excuse just to start his spiel over again, which is really all you'll ever get out of him. He'll fawn over you for a while and probably do some low-level gaslighting. His homegrown methodology for "Effective Debate" lets him choose only one opponent at a time, which for obvious reasons is typically either the one who offers him the least resistance or someone new about whom he can say, ""For so-and-so's benefit let me repeat my entire argument."
 
Jabba, if that's your best attempt at getting around the Texas Sharpshooter issue then you might as well just give up.
Dave,
- I think that I will give up here as soon as I've listed all your objections to your satisfaction. After that, I'll take my argument elsewhere (again).
 
I think that I will give up here as soon as I've listed all your objections to your satisfaction.

We did that seven months ago. You showed no interest in rebutting them, except insofar as you could parlay them to enable your standard shell game. If you have no intention of actually talking to your critics, then why should they -- or you -- care that you've "listed" all their objections? It's just a slap in their faces.

Your proof is objectively wrong. You've been told exactly in what ways it's wrong, by three independent groups of people. What makes you think you're going to get a different answer that's informed and honest?
 
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